Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
ALL DELHI CYCLE RICKSHAW OPERATORS UNION ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ORS. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT06/01/1987
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 648 1987 SCR (1) 905
1987 SCC (1) 371 JT 1987 (1) 66
1987 SCALE (1)1
ACT:
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, section
481(1)(L)(5), scope of--Power to make bye law regulating the
keeping or plying for hire a cycle rickshaw in Delhi--Wheth-
er, the Bye-law 3(1) of the Cycle Rickshaw Bye-laws, 1960
restricting the number of licence to only one and the grant
only to the owner of a cycle rickshaw either to keep or to
ply for hire, is within the scope of the power conferred on
the authority-Whether the said bye-law is opposed to Article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
HEADNOTE:
Section 481(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act,
1957 empowers the Corporation to make additional bye-laws to
the existing ones. Under the power so conferred the Corpora-
tion introduced Byelaw No.3(i) in the Cycle -Rickshaw Bye-
laws, 1960, under which only an owner of the cycle rickshaw
can obtain a licence to keep a cycle rickshaw or to ply for
hire and only one such licence would be issued to a person.
By necessary implication it excludes persons who own a
number of cycle rickshaws from applying for licences and
prohibits the hiring out of the cycle rickshaw by the owner
in favour of a rickshaw puller against payment of considera-
tion.
The Writ Petitioners are owners of cycle rickshaws. Some
of them own two or more cycle rickshaws which are hired out
by them to rickshaw pullen under a contract under which the
rickshaw pullen have to pay some amount to the owners of the
cycle rickshaws at the end of the day out of their earnings
during the day. Being aggrieved by the introduction of Bye-
law No.3(i), they have moved the Supreme Court under Article
32 of the Constitution that the said Bye-law is opposed to
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and also outside the
scope of section 481 (1)L(5) of the Delhi Municipal Corpora-
tion Act, 1957.
Dismissing the petitions, the Court,
906
HELD: 1.1 On a consideration of the language of clause
(5) in section 481(1) L of the Delhi Municipal Corporation
Act, 1957, it is clear that Bye-law 3(1) falls within the
scope of the power conferred on the Corporation to frame
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bye-laws for the issue of licences in respect of cycle-
rickshaws which are kept or used for plying in the Delhi
Municipal Corporation area. While framing bye-laws under the
above statutory provision it is permissible for the Corpora-
tion to restrict the issue of licences only to the owners of
the rickshaws who themselves act as rickshaw pullers. This
is apparently done to prevent exploitation of the rickshaw
pullen by the owners of the cycle rickshaws. A licensing
authority may impose any condition while issuing a licence
which is in the interest of the general public unless it is
either expressly or by necessary implication prohibited from
imposing such a condition by the law which confers the power
of licensing. The restriction imposed by the Corporation in
the present case is in the interest of the general public.
[910C-E]
1.2 The Bye-law No.3(1) cannot therefore be said to be
either outside the scope of section 481 of the Corporation
Act or opposed to the provisions of the Constitution. [911D]
Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union (Regd) Ch. Town Hall, Amrit-
sar & Ors. etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR366
and Nanhu & Ors. etc. v. Delhi Administration & Ors., [1981]
1 SCR 373, referred to.
Man Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1985] 4 SCC
146, followed.
(The Court approved the two schemes of financial assist-
ance, put forward, at its instance, by the Bank of Baroda
and the State Bank of India and the willingness of the
Credit Guarantee Corporation of India (Small LOans) to
guarantee the repayment of the loans advanced to the rick-
shaw pullers and directed, accordingly, the several branches
of the Punjab National Bank, the Bank of Baroda and the
State Bank of India operating in Delhi to give financial
assistance to rickshaw pullers who wish to oWn cycle rick-
shaws and ply them under licences issued by the Corporation
subject to their producing the necessary eligibility certif-
icate issued by the Corporation and satisfying the other
terms of the Schemes, namely (i) the scheme for financial to
cycle rickshaw pullers; and (ii) self employment programme
for urban poor (SEPUP). The court also directed the Delhi
Administration to comply with the directions issued in Nanhu
JUDGMENT:
907
&
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 13688 of 1983 etc.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
T.U. Mehta and S.M. Ashri for the Petitioners.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, G.L. Sanghi, V.C. Mahajan, R.B. Datar,
Miss Bina Tamta, S.K. Mehta, M.K. Dua, Aman Vachhar, H.S.
Parihar, Vipin Chandra, G.D. Gupta, M.L. Kaicker and V.B.
Saharya for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATARAMIAH, J: In these petitions the petitioners
have questioned the validity of bye-law No. 3(1) of the
Cycle-Rickshaw Bye-Laws, 1960 framed under section 481 of
the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter
referred as ’the Act’). Bye-law No. 3(1) reads as follows:
"3(1). No person shall keep or ply for the hire a cycle
rickshaw in Delhi unless he himself is the owner thereof and
holds a licence granted in that behalf by the Commissioner
on payment of the fee that may, from time to time, be fixed
under sub-section (2) of section 430.
Provided that no person will be granted more than one such
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licence.
No person shall drive a cycle rickshaw for hire unless he
holds a driving licence granted in that behalf by the Com-
missioner on payment of the fee that may, from time to time
be fixed under sub-section (2) of section 430."
The petitioners are owners of cycle rickshaws. Some of
them own two or more cycle rickshaws which are hired out by
them to rickshaw pullers under a contract under which the
rickshaw pullers have to pay some amount to the owners of
the cycle rickshaws at the end of the day out of their
earnings during the day. In order to eliminate the exploita-
tion of rickshaw pullers by the owners of the cycle rick-
shaws the Delhi Municipal Corporation amended the Cycle-
Rickshaw Bye-laws, 1960 by introducing bye-law No.3. Under
that bye-law only the owner of the cycle rickshaw can obtain
a licence to keep a cycle rickshaw or to ply
908
for hire and only one such licence would be issued to a
person. By necessary implication it excludes persons who own
a number of cycle rickshaws from applying for licences and
prohibits the hiring out of the cycle rickshaw by the owner
in favour of a rickshaw puller against payment of considera-
tion. The contention of the petitioners is mainly dependent
upon section 48 1(I)L(5) of the Act which reads thus:
"481(1). Subject to the provisions of this Act the Corpora-
tion may, in addition to any bye-laws which it is empowered
to make by any other provision of this Act, make bye-laws to
provide for all or any of the following matters. namely:-
......................................................
L. Bye-laws relating to miscellaneous matters--
.......................................................
(5). the rendering necessary of licences--
(a) for the proprietors or drivers of hackney-
carriages; cycle rickshaws, thelas and rehires kept or
plying for hire or used for hawking articles;
..................................................."
It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the above
provision in the Act does not permit the Corporation to make
a bye-law which prohibits the issue of licences to the
owners of cycle-rickshaws who are not themselves rickshaw-
pullers. It is also urged that the bye-law is violative of
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The respondentCorpora-
tion contends that the impugned bye-law No. 3 is within the
scope of the authority conferred on it by the Act to make
the bye-law in question and that it is not opposed to Arti-
cle 19(1)(g).
The constitutional validity of a similar provision in the
Punjab Cycle-Rickshaws (Regulation of Licence) Act, 1976
(Punjab Act 41 of 1975) came up for consideration before
this Court in Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union (Regd) Ch, Town
Hail, Amritsar & Ors., etc. v. State of Punjab & Others,
[1981] 1 SCR 366. In the course of its judgment the Court
approved a scheme flamed for providing financial assistance
to the richshaw-pullers for acquiring cycle rickshaws. The
909
provision of the Act which was impugned in that petition
was, however, left untouched. On the same date this Court
pronounced another judgment in Nanhu & Ors., etc. v. Delhi
Administration & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR 373 in which the very
same bye-law with which we are concerned in these cases came
up for consideration. That case was disposed of by this
Court by a short order which reads thus:
"We have disposed of today applications from cycle rickshaw
pliers of Amritsar Municipality where a scheme has been
worked out to help them become owners of cycle rickshaws. A
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similar scheme, says the Solicitor-General appearing for the
Delhi Administration, will be extended to the Delhi territo-
ry. We, therefore, annex a copy of the judgment in Writ
Petitions Nos. 839 of 1979 and 563 of 1979--Azad Rickshaw
Pullers Union, Amritsar and others v. State of Punjab &
Others and Nanak Chand and Others v. State of Punjab and
Others, respectively to this judgment.
There is another problem which arises in these two cases and
that is that the Delhi Administration has put a ceiling on
the total number of cycle rickshaws permissible to be plied
within its territory perhaps--we do not know for
certain--this number may not accommodate all the applicants
for cycle rickshaws plying licencees. We are told that apart
from the applicants in this Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution, there are numerous petitioners who have ap-
proached the High Court of Delhi under Article 226 of the
Constitution and yet others who have filed suits in civil
courts for the same relief. All that we can do is to accept
the suggestion made by the learned Solicitor-General that
the Delhi Administration will effectively publicize and
notify applications for licencees for plying of cycle rick-
shaws and all those who apply will be considered on their
merits including length of service as cycle rickshaw pliers.
The criteria that the Delhi Administration will adopt must
be reasonable and relevant; otherwise it will be open to the
aggrieved parties to challenge the selection. Likewise we do
not want to fetter the rights of parties aggrieved if the
ceiling upon the total number of rickshaws permissible
within the Delhi territory is arbitrary.
On the basis of reasOnable criteria the Delhi Administra-
910
tion will direct the concerned Municipal authorities to
grant licences for plying rickshaws and if the applicants so
chosen are not owners themselves all the facilities we have
indicated in the Amritsar order will be extended to such
cycle rickshaw pliers fixing reasonable time limits. With
these directions we dispose of the applications. Until fresh
licences are issued by the Delhi Administration and the
Municipal authorities the present petitioners will be al-
lowed to ply their cycle rickshaws."
It is clear from the above order that this Court did not
say anything about the constitutional validity of bye-law
No. 3. We, however, find on a consideration of the language
of clause (5) in section 481(1)L of the Act that the bye-law
falls within the scope of the power conferred on the Corpo-
ration to frame bye-laws for the issue of licences in re-
spect of cycle-rickshaws which are kept or used for plying
in the Delhi Municipal Corporation area. While framing bye-
laws under the above statutory provision it is permissible
for the Corporation to restrict the issue of licences only
to the owners of the rickshaws who themselves act as rick-
shaw pullers. This is apparently done to prevent exploita-
tion of the rickshaw pullers by the owners of the cycle
rickshaws. A licensing authority may impose any condition
while issuing a licence which is in the interest of the
general public unless it is either expressly or by necessary
implication prohibited from imposing such a condition by the
law which confers the power of licensing. The restriction
imposed by the Corporation in the present case is according
to us in the interest of the general public. In Man Singh
and Others v. State of Punjab and Others, [1985] 4 SCC 146
the petitioners contended that the provision in the Punjab
Cycle Rickshaw (Regulation of Licence) Act, 1976 was viola-
tive of Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution as also
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This Court negativ-
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ing the said contention observed thus:
"In the instant case, section 3 of the Punjab Act has the
effect of making it possible for the rickshaw puller to ply
the rickshaw as owner of the vehicle and thereby to be the
full owner of the income earned by him. No longer will he be
obliged to part with an appreciable portion of that income
in favour of another who owns the vehicle. The Punjab Act is
beneficial legislation bringing directly home to the rick-
shaw puller the entire fruit of his dally toil. The enact-
ment is intended as a social welfare measure against the
exploitation of the poor and unemployed by rapacious
911
cycle rickshaw owners who by reason of their superior finan-
cial resources fatten their wealth from the sweated toil of
rickshaw pullers. Even if we look at the impugned legisla-
tion from the point of view of its impact on the fundamental
right of rickshaw owners who give them on hire to rickshaw
pullers for plying, it is plain that the legislation consti-
tutes a reasonable restriction on the right of such rickshaw
owners to carry on the business of hiring out cycle rick-
shaws inasmuch as the exercise of the right is excluded by
legislation designed for the economic and social welfare of
rickshaw pullers, who constitute a significant sector of the
people, a sector so pressed by poverty and straightened by
the economic misery of their situation that the guarantee of
their full day’s wages to them seems amply justified."
We do not, therefore, find any ground to set aside the
bye-law in question either on the ground that it is outside
the scope of section 48 1 of the Act or on the ground that
it is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution. The
above contentions, therefore, fail.
During the pendency of these proceedings the Court
issued notices to the Punjab National Bank, the Bank of
Baroda and the State Bank of India and also the Credit
Guarantee Corporation of India (Small Loans) to ascertain
whether the banks are willing to extend financial assistance
to the rickshaw pullers to acquire the ownership of cycle
rickshaws and to ply them within the Corporation area and
also to ascertain whether the Credit Guarantee Corporation
of India Small (Loans) would guarantee the loans advanced to
the rickshaw pullers. The learned counsel for these banks
and the Credit Guarantee Corporation of India (Small Loans)
have submitted that the banks are willing to advance upto
Rs.2,000 by way of loan at reasonable rate of interest to
the rickshaw pullers on the security of the cycle rickshaws
owned by them in order to assist the rickshaw pullers to
acquire the cycle rickshaws. The banks have put forward
before the Court two schemes: (1) the scheme for finance to
cycle rickshaw pullers, and (2) Self-employment programme
for urban poor (SEPUP) under which it is possible for them
to give financial assistance to the rickshaw pullers. The
Credit Guarantee Corporation of India (Small Loans) is
agreeable to guarantee the repayment of loans advanced to
the rickshaw pullers. The Corporation authorities are agree-
able to issue necessary eligibility certificates to the
rickshaw pullers to obtain the loan.
912
In view of the above submissions, we direct the several
branches of the Punjab National Bank, the Bank of Baroda and
the State Bank of India operating in Delhi to give financial
assistance to rickshaw pullers who wish to own cycle rick-
shaws and ply them under licences issued by the Corporation
subject to their producing the necessary eligibility certif-
icate issued by the Corporation and satisfying the other
terms of the Schemes referred to above. We also direct the
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Delhi Administration to comply with the directions issued by
this Court in Nanhu & Others (supra).
In the course of the argument the learned counsel for
the petitioners incidentally made a complaint about the
seizure of cycle rickshaws by the Corporation officers
without issuing an acknowledgment to the owners whenever
they found that the cycle rickshaws were being used on the
roads contrary to the rules. The learned counsel for the
Corporation stated that whenever the cycle rickshaws are
seized written acknowledgments will be issued to the owner
if he is found near the cycle rickshaw at the time of its
seizure. We record the above statement made on behalf of the
Corporation.
These petitions are accordingly disposed of. No costs.
S.R. Petitions
disposed of.
913