Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3
PETITIONER:
MADAN LAL ARORA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
EXCISE & TAXATION OFFICER, AMRITSAR
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
07/04/1961
BENCH:
SARKAR, A.K.
BENCH:
SARKAR, A.K.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
WANCHOO, K.N.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
CITATION:
1961 AIR 1565 1962 SCR (1) 823
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1962 SC1621 (12,52,90,125)
D 1967 SC1408 (9)
RF 1975 SC1208 (28)
R 1977 SC 540 (13)
ACT:
Sales Tax--Return furnished--Assessee called upon to produce
evidence in support of teturn--Period of limitation for such
demand from when to run--Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948,
(Punj. 46 of 1948), s. II, r. 20.
HEADNOTE:
Under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, a dealer had
to furnish his return every quarter according to the Rules
and was also required to furnish evidence in support of the
return if called for, and if he failed to do so the
assessing authority could proceed to make an assessment to
the best of his judgment, but this power could he exercised
"within three years after the expiry of the period".
Held, that three years within which the authority could
proceed to make the best judgment assessment had to be com-
puted from the end of such quarter in respect of which
return had been filed.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 120 of 1959.
Writ Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for
enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Bhagirath Das and, B. P.
Maheshwari, for the petitioner.
N. S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
1961. April 7. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
824
SARKAR, J.-The petitioner is a dealer registered under the
Punjab General Sales Tax Act. He filed returns of his sale
turnovers for the four quarters of the financial year
ending on March 31, 1955, and likewise, for the four
quarters of the financial year ending on March 31, 1956. In
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3
respect of each year the Sales Tax Assessing Officer served
three successive notices on him on March 7, 1958, April 4,
1958, and August 18, 1959, requiring him to attend with the
documents and other evidence in support of his returns. In
the last of the notices mentioned above it was stated that
on failure to produce the documents and other evidence
mentioned, the case would be decided "on best judgment
assessment basis". The petitioner did not comply with any
of the notices, but after the receipt of the last notice he
presented this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
challenging the right of the authorities to make a best
judgment assessment.
The question raised by the petitioner turns on s. 11 of the
Punjab General Sales Tax Act, relevant provisions of which
are set out below.
S. 11. (1) If the Assessing Authority is
satisfied without requiring the presence of
registered dealer or the production by him of
any evidence that the returns furnished in
respect of any period are correct and
complete, he shall assess the amount of tax
due from the dealer on the basis of such
returns.
(2)If the Assessing Authority is not satisfied
without requiring the presence of a registered
dealer who furnished the returns or production
of evidence that the returns furnished in
respect of any period are correct and
complete, he shall serve on such dealer a
notice in the prescribed manner requiring him,
on a date and at a place specified therein,
either to attend in person or to produce or to
cause to be produced any evidence on which
such dealer may rely in support of such
returns.
............................................
...........................................
(4) If a registered dealer, having furnished
returns in respect of a period, fails to
comply with the terms of a notice issued under
sub-section (2), the
825
Assessing Authority shall within three years
after the expiry of such period, proceed to
assess to the best of his judgment the amount
of the tax due
from the dealer.
The contention of the petitioner is that at the date of the
notice last mentioned the Sales Tax authorities had no right
to proceed to make any beat judgment assessment as the three
years within which only such assessment could be made had
expired before then. It seems to us that the contention of
the petitioner is well founded. The learned counsel for the
respondent, the assessing authority, also frankly conceded
that he ’found it difficult to contend to the contrary.
Sub-section (4) of s. 11 deals with the case of a dealer who
has furnished returns in respect of a period and has
thereafter been asked to produce evidence to support the
returns but has failed to do so. The subsection provides
that in such a case the assessing authority may proceed to
make an assessment which to the best of his. judgment should
be made irrespective of the returns. The reason for this
provision is that the correctness of the returns having been
doubted by the assessing authority, the dealer has not
availed himself of the opportunity afforded to him to remove
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3
these doubts. The sub-section however provides that the
power can be exercised within the three years mentioned in
it. Quite plainly, the power cannot be exercised after
these three years have gone by.
The question is, how to compute the three years? The sub-
section ’says "within three years after the expiry of such
period". So the three years have to be counted from the
expiry of the period mentioned. What then is that period?
The words are "such period". The period referred therefore
is the period mentioned earlier. in the sub-section, and
that is the period in respect of which returns had been
furnished by the dealer. This is also made clear by sub-s.
(1) of s. 11. That deals with a case where the returns are
accepted. Both sub-ss. (1) and (4) deal with returns for
the same period. Now s. 10(3) provides that
104
826
every registered dealer shall furnish such returns by such
dates and to such authority as may be prescribed"
"Prescribed" means prescribed by rules framed under the Act.
Under r. 20 of these rules, a registered dealer like the
petitioner, had to furnish returns quarrerly. The rules
define "return period" as "the period for which returns are
prescribed to be furnished by a dealer". It would therefore
appear that when sub-sec. (4) of s. 11 talks of "returns in
respect of a period", that refers in the case of the
petitioner to the quarters in respect of which he submitted
the returns. We when come to this that the three years
within which the authority could proceed to make the best
judgment assessment had to be counted from the end of each
quarter in respect of which returns had been filed.
Now the last of the quarters in respect of which the
petitioner filed his returns ended on March 31, 1956. So
the assessing authority could not proceed to make a best
judgment assessment in respect of this quarter after March
31, 1959. In the case of the earlier quarters, of course,
the three years had expired even prior to this date. It is
not in dispute that the assessing officer had not proceeded
to make any assessment on the petitioner at the date of any
of the notices. In the present case therefore the notices
given on August 18, 1959, that best judgment assessments
would be made in respect of the quarters constituting the
financial years 1955 and 1956, the last of which expired on
March 31, 1956, were futile. No such assessments could be
made in respect of any of these quarters after March 31,
1959.
The petition must, therefore, be allowed. A writ will issue
restraining the respondent from making any best judgment
assessment on the petitioner for sales tax for any quarter
of the financial years 1955 and 1956. The petitioner will
get the costs of this petition.
Petition allowed.
827