Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, PATNA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
USHA MARTIN INDUSTRIES
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/08/1997
BENCH:
SUHAS C. SEN, B. N. KIRPAL, K. T. THOMAS
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
WITH
[Civil Appeal Nos. 2080-2081 of 1996, 10440-10441 of 1995)
J U D G M E N T
THOMAS, J.
The common question involved in all these appeals is
whether the benefit of excise duty exemption (granted by the
Central Government as per certain notifications) can be
claimed in respect of commodities made out of raw materials
on which no excise duty was payable. The relevant
notifications exempted such commodities from excise duty
under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (for short "the
Act’), if they were produced from materials on which the
appropriate amount of duty of excise has already been paid.
As the Central Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal
(for short the Tribunal) by different ordered upheld such
claims made by certain manufacturers the Revenue has filed
these appeals through the collectors of Central Excise
concerned.
Avoiding proliferation with facts in Civil Appeal
No.2319 of 1989 filed by Collector of excise, Patna against
the respondent M/s Usha Martin Industries Ltd.
Respondent in that case manufacturers wire-rods(which
fall under Tariff Item 26AA(1a) of the central Excise
Tariff). For manufacturing such wire-rods the raw materials
used were steel products including billets. Such steel
products were procured from stockyards of manufacturers like
TISCO etc. The Superintendent of Central Excise concerned,
while making assessment of the duty payable by the
respondent, demanded that excise duty should have been paid
on ire rods since the billets used for its manufacture were
totally exempted from duty. The Assistant Collector of
central Excise upheld the aforesaid stand of the
Superintendent and assessed excise duty on 1721.36 Mt. tones
of such wire-rods. However, the said order was reversed by
the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) on the premise
that the input goods cleared on nil payment of excise duty
should be treated as goods cleared after payment of
appropriate amount of duty. Revenue did not agree with that
premise and hence they approached the Tribunal in second
appeal and the Tribunal passed the impugned order confirming
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the view of the Collector of Appeals.
In the remaining appeals also the same position has
been adopted by different benches of the Tribunal, though
the notifications under which exemption was claimed were
different, nevertheless closely similar. If the
interpretation placed by the Tribunal on the expression in
the notification i.e." on which appropriate amount of duty
has been paid" is sustainable the result would be that all
the impugned orders would deserve to be upheld.
The notification on which both sides placed reliance in
the case against M/s Usha Martin Industries Ltd. was dated
30.11.63, but that was amended from time to time. As the
assessment order related to a period in 1982 we would
reproduce the notification as it stood buy the last
amendment thereto dated 7.4.1981.
"Exemption in goods falling under
item 26AA (1a) made from duty paid
material:
In exercise of the powers
conferred by sub-rule (1) of Rule 8
of the Central excise rules, 1944
and in supersession of the
Notification of the Government of
India in the M.F. (D.R.) No.
131/62-CE., dated 13.6.1962, the
Central Government hereby exempts
Iron or Steel products falling
under sub-item (1a) of Item No.26AA
made from any of the following
materials or a combination there of
namely:-
(i) fresh unused re-rollable scrap
on which the appropriate amount of
duty of excise has already been
paid.
(ii) semi-finished steel including
blooms, billets. slabs, sheet bars
tin bars and hoe bars, on which the
appropriate amount of duty of
excise has already been paid.
(iii) old and used re-rollable
scrap.
(iv) other iron or steel products
falling under sub-item (1a) of item
No. 26AA of the said first schedule
on which the appropriate duty of
excise has already been paid from
payment of the whole of the duty of
excise leviable on such products."
( underlines supplied)
There is no doubt that as per the above notification if
any amount of duty has been paid on the raw material, the
output product would escape from excise duty. The doubt
arose was regarding the expression in the notification i.e."
on which the appropriate amount of duty of excise has
already been paid" as to whether it is capable of two
interpretations, one as claimed by the assessee and the
other as putforth by the revenue".
Much reliance was placed by the Revenue on the judgment
of this Court in Ahura Chemical products Pvt Ltd. vs. Union
of India (1981 ELT 613). The Tribunal found that the said
decision was not relevant for the reason that the question
before the Supreme Court was whether the goods were
purchased from open market or from the manufacturer. A two
judge Bench of this Court has considered the exemption
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clause in a similar notification involved in that case as
per which certain "preparations intended for use in
industrial process" were exempted from duty " if in respect
of surface active agents used in the manufacture of such
preparations the appropriate amount of the duty of excise or
the additional duty has already been paid or where such
surface active agents are purchased from the open market on
or after 20th day of January, 1968." if the surface active
agents were purchased from open market it was immaterial in
that case whether the input commodity was exempted from duty
or not. The assessee’s stand in that case was that the raw
material was purchased from open market. The said stand of
the assessee was upheld and hence there was no need for this
Court in that case to embark on the first limb of the
exemption Clause. So the observations relating to that limb
are only obiter.
Mr. M. Gaurishankar Murthy, learned counsel for the
Revenue placed reliance on the following observations of
this Court in Andhra Re-Rolling Works, Hyderabad vs. Union
of India & Others [1986 Supple. SCC 263]:
" It is only if the appropriate
amount of duty had already been
paid on the article which formed
the raw material for manufacture of
the product covered by item 26AA,
that the manufacturer will be
entitled to a proportionate
remission of the duty on the latter
product. Inasmuch as the untested
rails were exempt from duty and
hence no amount whatever had been
paid by way of duty on the said
article from out of which M.S
Rounds were manufactured, it is
obvious that the benefit of the
notification cannot be claimed by
the appellant."
The said observations were made by this court while
interpreting a notification issued by the Central Government
exempting iron and steel products under tariff Item 26AA
"if made from another article falling under the said item
and having already paid the appropriate amount of duty from
so much of the duty of excise as is equivalent to the duty
payable on the said article." (emphasis supplied)
Even a glance through the said notification would show
that the exemption envisaged therein was not total but only
partial. What it clearly meant was deduction on duty from
the amount of duty already paid and, therefore, that
notification is different in content as well as intent and
the ratio therein cannot be taken as sufficient to fit in
with the notification involved in the present appeals.
Learned counsel on both sides referred to the meaning
of the words "paid" and ’already paid’ etc. in the
notification under consideration and they cited some
decisions as to how those words were interpreted in other
judgments. We must bear in mind that the meaning of a
particular English would used in a particular collocation of
words need not be the exact meaning when used in other
permutations. Lord Green has observed in Bidie vs. General
Accident, Fire and Life Assurance corporation Ltd. [1948 (2)
all. E.R. 995]
"Few words in the English language
have a natural or ordinary meaning
in the sense that they must be so
read that their meaning is entirely
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independent of their context. The
method of construing statutes that
i prefer is not to take particular
words and attribute to them a sort
of prima facie meaning which you
may have to displace or modify. it
is to read the statute as a whole
and ask one-elf the question in
this state, in this context,
relating to this subject-matter,
what is the true meaning of that
word."
In Bourne vs. Norwich Crematorium Ltd. [1967 (2) AER
576] Stamp J. has reminded that "English words derive colour
from those which surround them and sentences are not mere
collections of words to be taken out of the sentence,
defined separately by reference of the dictionary or decided
cases."
If we take the words "already paid" in the notification
delinked from other words employed therein, they would,
perhaps, land support to the contention of the Revenue as
the said combination relates to an antecedent act of
payment. But the word "already" is not the decisive term in
the context because ‘he preceding word "appropriate", cannot
be sidelined to piffle. The word "appropriate" is defined in
Websters’s New Dictionary and Thesaurus (Concise Edition)
as " applicable, apposite, appurtenant, apropos, apt.." In
the World book Dictionary it is defined as ’ right for the
occasion, suitable , proper, fitting...."
What is the idea behind granting exemption to the
commodities indicated in the notification? One reason is
that Central Government wanted to save certain raw materials
and the end products made with them from double duty.
Another idea, as could be discerned from it, is that the
reason which prompted the Central Government to absolve one
commodity from duty must as well be applicable to the other
commodity which is made out of the former. Therefore, we are
not disposed to afford a narrow interpretation to the
expression (i.e. on which the appropriate amount of duty of
excise has already been paid) as excluding all cases where
nil duty was paid for the input materials.
Sri V. Sridharan, learned counsel for the respondent
invited out attention to another notification issued by the
central Government (No. 178/83 CE dated 1.7.83) by which the
Government exempted" textured yarn" from excise duty subject
to the condition that the appropriate duty of excise has
already been paid in respect of the filament yarn used in
the manufacture of such textured yarn. The said exemption
was further circumscribed through a proviso added to the
main exemption clause which reads thus:
"Provided that nothing contained in
this notification shall apply to
the said textured yarn if such
textured yarn has been manufactured
out of
(i) the said filament yarn other
than textured, in respect of which
the exemptions from the whole of
the duty of excise under the said
Central Excises and Salt Act or
from the whole of the additional
duty under the said Central Excises
and Salt Act or from the whole of
the additional duty under the
Customs Tariff Act, as the case may
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be, has been availed of ..."
On the strength of the above proviso learned counsel
advanced an argument that absence of such a proviso in the
notification (with which we are concerned in these appeals)
would clinch the issue. Mr. M. Gaurishankar Murthy, learned
counsel for the Revenue, on the other hand, pointed out that
the notification involved in the appeal was issued in 1963
and submitted that it was when the manufacturers claimed
exemption even in respect of goods whose raw materials were
totally exempted from duty that the Central Government found
it necessary to make appropriate clarification in the later
notification. Hence he contended that no leverage can be
given to the respondent on the Strength of the proviso
employed in the 1983 notification.
Having bestowed our consideration on the rival
contentions we are persuaded to accept the argument of the
learned counsel for respondent for the main reason that the
Central Government could have inserted the same proviso in
the notification now under consideration, by way of
modification or amendment if the Government wanted that
meaning to be adopted to it. We find considerable force in
the contention that absence of any such proviso in the
notification(under our consideration) is consistent with the
construction sought to be placed on it by the respondents.
How the Revenue has understood the notification or made
others to understand this position can be seen from the
instructions or circulars issued by the Central Board of
Excise and Customs (for short "the Board") from time to
time. One such circular is dated 15.5.1995 no. 125/36/95-CX.
The material portion thereof are extracted below:
"There are a number of
notifications which exempt
specified goods provided such goods
have been made from other goods on
which the appropriate duty of
excise has already been paid board
has issued instructions from time
to time that in such cases, even if
the issued instructions from time
to time that in such cases, even if
the inputs are exempted from excise
duty, the exemption on the finished
goods cannot be denied on that
ground. Still, cases have been
brought to notice where exemption
is being denied on the ground that
the inputs did not bear any excise
duty..... It was clarified by the
Board that in the case of S.O. dyes
made from exempted dyes, the
exemption cannot be denied on the
ground that the inputs were
exempted from the whole of the duty
of excise. This logic would apply
to other similar cases also where
exemption has been given on the
consideration that the finished
products have been made from inputs
on which appropriate duty of excise
has already been paid."
Learned counsel for the appellant adopted a contention
that the circulars issued by the Board cannot take the place
of judicial interpretation of statutory notifications as
those circulars could at best be reflective of that line of
thinking or the part of the department for a time. He
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pressed into service that judicial interpretation of a
statutory provisions or notifications thereunder should not
be influenced by what the department thought it at a
particular time.
No doubt the court has to interpret statutory
provisions and notifications thereunder as they are with
emphasis to the intention of the legislature. But when the
Board made all others to understand a notification in a
particular manner and when the latter have acted
accordingly, is it open to the Revenue to turn against such
persons on a premise contrary to such instructions?
Section 37-B of the Act enjoins on the Board a duty to
issue such instructions and directions to the excise
officers as the Board considers necessary or expedient for
the purpose of uniformity in the classification of excisable
goods or with respect to levy of duty excised on such
goods." It is true that Section 37b was inserted in the Act
only in December, 1985 but that fact cannot whittle down the
binding effect of the circulars or instructions issued by
the Board earlier. Such instructions were not issued earlier
for fancy or as rituals. Even the pre-amendment circulars
were issued for the same purpose of achieving uniformity in
imposing excise duty on excisable goods. So the circular,
whether issued before December 1985 or thereafter should
have the same binding effect on the Department.
Through a catena of decisions this Court has pronounced
that Revenue cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary to
the instructions issued by the Board. It is a different
matter that an assessee can contest the validity or legality
of a departmental instruction. But that right cannot be
conceded to the department, more so when others have acted
according to such instructions, [vide Collector of Central
Excise. Bombay vs. Collector of Central Excise [1996(88) ELT
638], Ranadey Micronutrients vs. collector of Central Excise
[1996(87) ELT 19] , Poulose and Mathen vs. collector of
central Excise [1997(90) ELT 264, British Machinery Supplies
Co. vs. Union of India[1996(86) ELT 449]. Of course the
appellate authority is also not bound by the interpretation
given by the Board but the assessing officer cannot take a
view contrary to the Board’s interpretation.
We may observe particularly that a special aspect
highlighted by the Bench in Poulose and Mathen vs. Collector
of Central Excise [1997(90) ELT 264] is apposite for
fastening the revenue with binding force as regards the
instructions issued, while constructing a notification which
was not free from doubt, Learned judges in that decision
have observed thus:
"One aspect deserves to be
noticed in this context. The
earlier tariff advice no. 83/81 on
the basis of which trade notice No.
222/81 was issued by the Collector
of Central Excise and Customs is
binding on the department. It
should be given effect to . There
is no material on record to show
that this has been rescinded or
departed from, and even so, to what
extent. Even assuming that the
later tariff advice No.6/85 has
taken a different view about which
there is no positive material the
facts point out that the concerned
department itself was having
considerable doubts about the
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matter. The position was not free
from doubt. It was far from clear.
In such a case, where two opinions
are possible, the assessee should
be given the benefit of doubt and
that opinion which is in its favour
should be given effect to. In the
light of the above, it is
unnecessary to adjudicate the other
points involved in the appeal on
the merits."
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, looking from different angles we are inclined to
take the view that benefit of exemption from duty can
legitimately be claimed by the respondents in respect of
those goods referred to in the notifications under
consideration the raw materials of which were not exigible
to any excise duty at all. In the result, we dismiss all
these appeals.