Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
U.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SUBHASH CHANDRA SHARMA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/03/2000
BENCH:
S.S.Ahmad, D.P.Wadha
JUDGMENT:
S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J. Leave granted. Respondent No.
1, [hereinafter referred to as ‘Respondent’], who was a
driver in the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation
(appellant), was charge-sheeted on 16.8.1989 for
disciplinary proceedings. Three charges were indicated in
the charge-sheet. The first charge related to his habitual
absence from duty for the period June, 1988 to May, 1989,
regarding which he also did not submit the mileage form.
The second charge was that on 19th May, 1989, when he
reached Badaun at about 9 P.M. with Bus No. 8680, he
informed the Conductor, Dinesh Kumar, that the bus had
developed some defects and, therefore, he parked the bus in
Badaun workshop. Dinesh Kumar, Conductor, went to sleep in
another bus, but when he woke up in the morning he found
that the Bus was taken by Respondent to Bareilly, regarding
which an information was also given by Dinesh Kumar to the
Station Incharge, Badaun. The Bus was also seen coming back
from Bareilly. It was noticed that in order to cover up his
act of taking the Bus to Bareilly, the Respondent got a
remark entered in his duty form by Rampal, Vulcanizer of
Badaun Depot, about the defect in the Bus. The third and
last charge against the Respondent was that on 24th May,
1980 at about 8.30 PM, he, along with Shiv Kumar Sharma,
Conductor, went to Ramesh Chandra, Assistant Cashier, in the
cash room in a drunken state. He demanded money from Ramesh
Chandra and when the latter refused, the Respondent abused
and threatened to assault him, which was treated as an act
of misconduct. The charges were enquired into by Shri S.C.
Jain, a retired District Judge, who was appointed as the
Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer submitted the Report
on 21st September, 1990, in which he found that the charge
about habitual absence was not proved against the
Respondent. The other charge relating to taking the Bus to
Bareilly was also not established, but it was established
that he had taken out the Bus unauthorisedly from Badaun
workshop to some place without taking the Conductor in the
Bus. The third charge of misconduct was found fully
established. Thereafter, a show cause notice was issued to
the Respondent on 12th August, 1991, and by order dated 31st
August, 1991, he was removed from service. On an industrial
dispute being raised by Respondent, a reference was made on
31st March, 1993 to the Labour Court for adjudication. The
Labour Court, by its award dated 6th December, 1996, came to
the conclusion that though the departmental enquiry did not
suffer from any infirmity, the punishment of ‘removal’ was
excessive. It consequently set aside the order of removal
and substituted the punishment of removal by the punishment
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of stoppage of one wage increment and payment of 50% of the
back-wages. The award was challenged by the appellant
before the High Court in a writ petition which was dismissed
summarily on 27th April, 1998. Learned counsel appearing
for the appellant has contended that once it was found by
the Labour Court that the departmental enquiry conducted
against the Respondent was proper and it did not suffer from
any infirmity, it was not open to it to interfere with the
quantum of punishment. It is contended that the High Court
should have, on that ground, set aside the award and
maintained the order of removal passed against the
Respondent. Whether it is open to Industrial Tribunal or
Labour Court or the High Court to interfere with the quantum
of punishment is, no longer, res integra, as the question
has been answered by this Court several times in its various
decisions. In Union of India & Anr. vs. B.C. Chaturvedi
[1995] 6 SCC 750, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court has held
that Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
confers power on Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court to apply
its mind on the question of proportion of punishment or
penalty. It was held that this power is also available to
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, though it
was qualified with a limitation that while seized with this
question as a writ court, interference is permissible only
when the punishment/penalty is shockingly disproportionate.
Again, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Colour-Chem Ltd.
vs. A.L. Alaspurkar & Ors. [1998] 3 SCC 192, relying upon
an earlier decision in Hind Construction & Engineering Co.
Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1965 SC 917 = [1965] 2 SCR 85 = [1965]
1 LLJ 462, laid down as under : "Consequently it must be
held that when looking to the nature of charge of even major
misconduct which is found proved if the punishment of
dismissal or discharge as imposed is found to be grossly
disproportionate in the light of the nature of the
misconduct or the past record of the employee concerned
involved in the misconduct or is such which no reasonable
employer would ever impose in like circumstances, inflicting
of such punishment itself could be treated as legal
victimisation." Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act
provides as under:- "11A. Powers of Labour Court, Tribunals
and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of
discharge or dismissal of workmen -- Where an industrial
dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman
has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the
adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal as the case may be, is satisfied that the
order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may,
by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal
and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and
conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other
relief to the workman including the award of any lesser
punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the
circumstances of the case may require: Provided that in any
proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on
the material on record and shall not take any fresh evidence
in relation to the matter." This Section, as interpreted by
this Court, no doubt, vests the Labour Court with discretion
to substitute the order of discharge or dismissal of a
workman into an order of reinstatement of the workman on
such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit or give
such other relief to the workman including the award of any
lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the
circumstances of the case may require. In the present case,
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the following industrial dispute was referred to the Labour
Court for adjudication: "Whether the termination of the
service of their workman Sh. Subhash Chandra Sharma S/o
Shri Nathimal, driver by the employer by order dt.
31.08.1991 is proper and legal? If not, what is the relief
(with details) to which the workman is entitled to?" The
Labour Court, while upholding the third charge against the
respondent nevertheless interfered with the order of the
appellant removing the respondent from the service. The
charge against the respondent was that he, in drunken state,
along with a conductor went to the Assistant Cashier in the
cash room of the appellant and demanded money from the
Assistant Cashier. When the Assistant Cashier refused, the
respondent abused him and threatened to assault him. It was
certainly a serious charge of misconduct against the
respondent. In such circumstances, the Labour Court was not
justified in interfering with the order of removal of
respondent from the service when the charge against him
stood proved. Rather we find that the discretion exercised
by the Labour Court in the circumstances of the present case
was capricious and arbitrary and certainly not justified.
It could not be said that the punishment awarded to the
respondent was in any way "shockingly disproportionate" to
the nature of the charge found proved against him. In our
opinion, the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution and did not correct
the erroneous order of the Labour Court which, if allowed to
stand, would certainly result in miscarriage of justice.
We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned
judgment of the High Court and the award dated December 6,
1996 of the Labour Court. There shall, however, be no order
as to costs.