Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 12
PETITIONER:
IN RE: P.C. SEN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
08/11/1968
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
BENCH:
SHAH, J.C.
RAMASWAMI, V.
GROVER, A.N.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 1821 1969 SCR (2) 649
ACT:
Contempt of Court---Chief Minister broadcasting speech
justifying Order of which validity was challenged in
proceedings pending before Court--if contempt--Whether
intention to commit contempt relevant-If different
considerations apply when trial not by jury.
HEADNOTE:
The West Bengal Government issued an Order under Rule 125 of
the Defence of India Rules, placing certain restrictions
upon the right of persons carrying on business in milk
products. The validity of this Order was challenged by a
writ petition. After Rule had been issued on the petition
and served on the State Government, the State Chief Minister
broadcast a speech sreking to justify the propriety of the
Order. The High Court issued a Rule requiring the Chief
Minister to show cause why he should not be committed for
contempt of Court.
It was contended on behalf of the Chief Minister that he
had come to learn of certain persons propagating the view
that the Order would not only have the effect of reducing
the supply of milk, but also of displacing numerous persons
from work and causing unemployment; that attempts were made
to commence a political agitation against the Order;
and that with a view to agitation it was considered that the
Chief Minister was under a duty to explain to the people
the policy underlying, and the reasons for promulgating the
Order.
The High Court held that the speech amounted to
contempt of Court; that it was contumacious in that it was
likely to have a baneful effect upon the petitioners who
had challenged the validity of the Order, and their cause
and upon other persons having a similar cause; and that it
was likely to interfere with the administration of justice.
The High Court therefore expressed disapproval of the Chief
Minister’s conduct.
In appeal to this Court it was contended, inter alia,
on behalf of the Chief Minister that the High Court erred
in holding that the Chic/ Minister committed contempt of
court because there was no finding that the contempt was
intentionally committed; no real prejudice was caused either
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 12
in the mind of the Judge or to the cause of the petitioners;
that the speech contained no direct reference to any pending
proceedings and that the Chief Miraster was under a duty to
make the speech to instruct the public about the true state
of affairs.
HELD :The speech was ex facie calculated to interfere
with the administration of justice. The High Court’s orders
observing that the Chief Minister had acted improperly and
expressing disapproval of his action was correct and did not
call for any interference, by this Court.
R.v. Gray, [1900] 2 Q.B.D. 36 at p. 40 and Legal
Remembrancer .v. Matilal Ghose and Others, I.L.R. 41 Cal
173; referred to.
The, question in all cases of comment on pending
proceedings is not whether’ the publication does interfere,
but whether it tends to interfere, with the due course of
justice. The question is not so much of the in tention. of
the contemner as whether it is calculated to interfere with
the
650
administration of justice. If, therefore, the speech
broadcast by the Chief Minister was calculated to interfere
with the course of justice, it was liable to be declared
a contempt of the Court even assuming that he had not
intended thereby to interfere with the due course of
justice. [654 B]
Debi Prasad Sharma and Ors. v. The King-Emperor, L.R. 70
I.A. 216 at p. 224; Saibal Kumar Gupta and Ors. v.B.K. Sen
and Anr., [1961] 3 S.C.R. 460; and Arthur Reginald Perera v.
The King, [1951] A.C. 482; referred to.
The Chief Minister in his speech characterised the
preparation of food with milk in West Bengal as tantamount
to a crime. He also announced his version about the
validity of the order, the reasons why it was promulgated,
and asserted that it was an order made bona fide and in the
interest of the public so that those who resisted it were
acting contrary to the public interest. These were the very
questions that had to be determined by the Court. The
statements in the Chief Minister’s broadcast were therefore
prims facie calculated to obstruct the administration of
justice, since they were likely to create an atmosphere of
prejudice against the petitioners and also to deter other
persons having similar claims from approaching the Court.
[657 F; 658]
It could not be held that when the trial of a case is
held by a Judge without the aid of a jury, no contempt by
interfering with the administration of justice may be
committed. The foundation of the jurisdiction lies not
merely in the effect which comments on a pending proceeding
may have upon the mind of the jury, but the consequences
which result from the conduct of the contemner, who by
vilification or abuse of a party seeks to hold him up to
public ridicule, obloquy, censure or contempt or by comment
on his case seeks to prejudice the issue pending before the
Court. [658 H; 659 A, B]
The William Thomas Shipping Co., In re. H.W. Dhillan &
Sons Ltd. v. The Company, In re, Sir Robert Thomas and
Others, [1930] 2 Ch. 368 and Regina v. Duffey and others
Ex Parte Nash, [1960] 2 Q.B.D. 188; referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 119 of
1966.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 12
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated’ March 15, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court in Matter
No. 375 of 1965.
B. Sen, P.K. Chatterjee and P.K. Chakravarti, for the
appellant.
S. V. Gupte and G.S. Chatterjee, for the Calcutta
High Court.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Shah, J. This appeal is filed with special leave against
the order of the High Court of Calcutta declaring that a
speech broadcast on the night of November 25, 1965, on the
Calcutta Station of the All India Radio by Mr. P.C. Sen,
then Chief Minister of West Bengal, was calculated to
obstruct the course of justice and
651
on that account amounted to contempt of court and the
conduct of Mr. Sen merited disapproval.
On August 23, 1965, the State of West Bengal issued, in
exercise of power under sub-rr. (2) and (3) of r. 125 of
the: Defence of india Rules, the West Bengal Channa Sweets
Control Order, 1965, placing restrictions upon the right of
persons carrying on business in milk products and especially
dealers in sweetmeat made out of Channa. In a petition
moved by Nani Gopal Paul the High Court of Calcutta declared
by order dated Novera bet 16, 1965, that the West Bengal
Channa Sweets Control Order, 1965, is an "unreasonable
piece of delegated legislation made in arbitrary exercise of
power under r. 125 without any justification in law and
regardless of the purpose for which such order may be made",
and issued an injunction against the State of West Bengal
from enforcing that order.
The State of West Bengal thereafter issued another order
with immediate effect on November 18, 1965, called the "West
Bengal’ Milk Product Control Order, 1965". On November 22,
1965, Messrs Ramlal Ghosh and Grandsons challenged by
Petition No. 369 of 1965 the validity of the Order issued on
November 18, 1965, and prayed for a writ declaring the Order
"null and void" and for an injunction restraining the State
of West Bengal and the Secretary, Department of Animal
Husbandry and Veterinary Services from giving effect to the
said Order. Rule was issued on the Petition by Banerjee,
J., and was duly served on the State of West Bengal, on
November 23, 1965. On the night of November 25, 1965, the
Chief Minister of West Bengal broadcast a speech on the
All India Radio, Calcutta Station, seeking to justify the
propriety of the Control Order. In the course of that
broadcast speech the Chief Minister made several comments on
controversial matters which were pending for adjudication
before the court
At the hearing of the rule on November 29, 1965, counsel
1or. Ramlal Ghosh and Grandsons brought to the notice of the
Court a newspaper report of the speech broadcast by the
Chief Minister Rule was issued by Banerjee, J., requiring
the Chief Minister to show cause why he should not be
committed for contempt of court on the grounds--( 1 ) that
the speech was likely to prejudice the Court and the public
against the cause of the petitioners, and’ may compel or
induce them to discontinue the action, (2) that it was
likely to have "the pernicious con,sequence" of prejudicing
the minds of the public against the petitioners, (3) and
that it was likely to have the effect of misrepresenting a
piece of illegal legislation before the Court had an
opportunity to decide the matter, and was on that account
calculated to deter other persons havingsimilar causes from
approaching the Court for relief.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 12
652
Instead of making a frank statement before the Court,
the Chief Minister was apparently advised to adopt grossly
technical pleas Counsel informed the Court that the Chief
Minister did "not like to use any affidavit showing cause".
Evidence was then led before the Court to prove that the
offending speech was in fact broadcast by the Chief Minister
on the All India Radio, Calcutta Station. After evidence
was recorded in the Court about the speech broadcast by
the Chief Minister he somewhat belatedly filed an affidavit
on March 4, 1966, admitting that he had delivered the speech
on the All India Radio on the night of November 25, 1965,
the contents of which were proved by the evidence of the
Programme Director. It was also admitted that the Chief
Minister had knowledge of the filing of the petition when
he broadcast the speech and of the rule served upon the
State Government. By the affidavit it was attempted to
justify the speech, on the plea that the Chief Minister came
to learn that certain persons had started publicly
propagating the view that far from achieving the objects,
the Order will not only reduce the supply of fluid milk in
the area, but also displace numerous persons from their
normal avocation resulting in unemployment for many that the
object of the propaganda was to criticise and ridicule the
policy of the State Government in promulgating the Order,
that the propaganda had misled certain sections of the
people about the object, purpose and nature of the Order and
the consequences thereof, particularly with regard to the
position of supply of milk and the question of continued
employment of the persons working in the sweetmeat shops in
the area, that taking advantage of the situation, attempts
were made to commence a political agitation against the
State Government for having promulgated the Order, and in
the circumstances and particularly with a view to
preventing widespread agitation in connection with the
Order, it was thought that it was the duty of the Chief
Minister of the State to explain to the people the policy
underlying and the reasons for promulgating the Order, that
in making the speech his sole and only intention and
purpose was to "remove the confusion and allay the fears, if
any, from the minds of the people with regard to the purpose
nature, object and effect of the promulgation of the
Order", that he had no intention, whatsoever of either
showing any disrespect to the Court or interfering in any
manner with the due course of the administration of justice,
nor did he anticipate that his speech could have any such
effect, and that by broadcasting his speech he had committed
no contempt of Court nor had he any intention of doing so.
Banerjee, J., after a detailed examination of the
relevant law and the speech broadcast, held that the
speech broadcast amounted to contempt of Court "in the sense
that it was likely to have
653
several baneful effects upon the petitioners" in Petition
No. 369 of 1965, "upon their cause and upon others having a
cause similar to that of the petitioners". The learned
Judge accordingly recorded that "the Chief Minister cannot
wholly escape the charge of having committed contempt of
Court", since "the speech was contumacious in the sense that
it was likely to have baneful effects upon the petitioners"
in Petition No. 369 of 1965 "their cause, and upon persons
having a similar cause and as such was likely to interfere
with the administration of justice by the Court." The
learned Judge, however, observed that "the condemner Mr. Sen
should be let off with an expression of disapproval of his
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 12
conduct and in the hope that the sort of indiscretion will
not be repeated".
In This appeal counsel for the appellant has raised
four contentions in support of his argument that the High
Court erred in holding that the Chief Minister by
broadcasting the speech did commit contempt of Court:
(1) that there is no finding by the High
Court that the contempt was intentionally
committed by the Chief Minister;
(2) that by broadcasting the speech no
real prejudice was caused either in the mind
of the Judge or to the cause of the
petitioners in Petition No. 369 of 1965;
(3) that the speech contained no direct
reference to any pending proceeding; and
(4) that the Chief Minister was under a
duty to make the Speech to instruct the public
about the true state of affairs and to remove
the misgivings arising in the public mind from
agitation carried on by political parties.
The law relating to contempt of Court is well settled.
Any act done or writing published which is calculated to
bring a Court or a Judge into contempt, or to lower his
authority, or to interfere with the due course of justice or
the lawful process of the Court, is a contempt of Court:
R.v. Gray(1). Contempt by speech or writing may be by
scandalising the Court itself, or by abusing parties to
actions, or by prejudicing mankind in favour of or against
a party before the cause is heard. It is incumbent upon
Courts of justice to preserve their proceedings from being
misrepresented, for prejudicing the minds of the public
against persons concerned as parties in causes before the
cause is finally heard has pernicious consequences.
Speeches or writings misrepresenting the proceedings of the
Court or prejudicing the public for or against a party or
involving reflections on parties to a pro-
(1)[1900] 2 Q.B.D. 36 at p.40.
Sup CI/69--9
654
ceeding amount to contempt. To make a speech tending to
influence the result of a pending trial, whether civil or
criminal is a grave contempt. Comments on pending
proceedings, if emanating from the parties or their
lawyers, are generally a more serious contempt than those
coming from independent sources. The question in all cases
of comment on pending proceedings is not whether the
publication does interfere, but whether it tends to
interfere, with the due course of justice. The question is
not so much of the intention of the contemner as whether it
is calculated to interfere with the administration of
justice. As observed by the Judicial Committee in Debi
Prasad Sharma and Ors. v. The King-Emperor (1):
" .... the test applied by the ....
Board which heard the reference was whether
the words complained of were in the
circumstances calculated to obstruct or
interfere with the course of justice and the
due administration of the law."
If, therefore, the speech which was broadcast by the Chief
Minister was calculated to interfere with the course of
justice, it was liable to be declared a contempt of the
Court even asuming that he had not intended thereby to
interfere with the due course of justice. There is nothing
in Saibal Kumar Gupta and Ors. v. B.K. Sen and Ant. (2), on
which counsel for the appellant relied, which supports his
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 12
contention that intention of the contemner is the decisive
test. The observations of Imam, J., speaking for the
majority of the Court that the appellants should be
acquitted, because they "had at no time intended to
interfere with the course of justice and their conduct did
not tend to interfere with the course of justice", does
not imply that conduct which tends to or is calculated to
interfere with the administration of justice is not liable
to be punished as contempt because the contemner had no
intention to interfere with the course of justice. Nor does
the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Arthur Reginald
Perera v. The King(a) support the contention that in
determining whether conduct which is otherwise calculated to
interfere with the due administration of justice will not be
contempt of Court because on the part of the contemner there
was no intention to interfere with the administration of
justice. In that case, a member of the House of
Representatives in Ceylon, on receiving a complaint from
some of the prisoners about the practice of producing
followed by the Jail Authorities in the Court when an appeal
filed by the prisoners was being heard, made an entry in the
prison visitors’ book that "The present practice of appeals
of remand prisoners being heard in their absence is not
healthy. When
(1) L.R. 70I. A. 216atp. 224.
(2) [1961] 3S.C.R. 460. (3) [1951] A.C. 482.
655
represented by counsel or otherwise the prisoner should be
present at proceedings". Information conveyed to Perera was
inaccurate It was held by the Judicial Committee that Perera
acted in good faith and in discharge of what be believed to
be his public duty as a member of the legislature, and that
he had not committed any contempt of Court because the words
made no direct reference to the Court or to any of its
Judges, or to the course of justice or to the process of the
Courts. His criticism was honest criticism on a matter of
public importance and there was nothing in his conduct which
came within the definition of contempt of Court.
The Chief Minister in the speech broadcast ’by him in
the first instance announced what in his view is the legal
effect of the Order promulgated, and then proceeded to state
the reasons which persuaded the Government of West Bengal to
issue the Order banning the preparation of sweetmeats with
milk products Channa and Khir and expressed the hope that
the residents of Calcutta will be in a position to secure
larger quantities of milk. He stated that if producers of
Milk cooperate with the Government, not only will they be
benefited, but they will do real good to a large number of
people of the State. He estimated the number of
establishments which were in his view likely to be affected,
and stated that many of the employees in their
establishments who it was expected were likely to be thrown
out of employment, may be employed in depots for collection
of milk. He wound up by stating "This new Order will (not)
only be beneficial to the buyers and sellers of milk
alone it will (also) be of help in solving the milk problem
in the whole of West Bengal in the near future". In the
course of his speech he stated after referring to the
difficulties encountered in procuring milk and the acute
scarcity of milk prevailing in West Bengal:
"According to the science relating to
nutrition a person requires at least 8 Ounces
of milk per day Hence to prepare any food
with Milk in our West Bengal is, indeed,
tantamount almost to a crime."
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 12
He also stated:
"The quantity of the milk collected
under the Greater Calcutta Milk Supply Scheme
has increased to 65 thousand Litres from 23
thousand Litres per day on the average. A
large number of people were getting supply of
milk according to their requirements from the
local Milkman (Goalas). The quantity of milk
collected from different sources in Calcutta
increased to 2 lakhs and 61 thousand Litres
from 2 lakhs and 12 thousand Litres. This
volume of milk supply (however) consti-
656
tutes 41% of the total demand. This supply
could have been augmented much more if powder
milk could be obtained in sufficient quantity
from foreign countries. But in view of
foreign exchange difficulties, the Government
of India curtailed the import of powder milk
and as a result thereof great inconvenience
was felt. In the Greater Calcutta areas, the
total demand of Milk at present is at least
6 lakhs and 30 thousand Litres" and that "The
Government have considered the question of few
employees of sweetmeat establishments
being thrown out of employment as a result of
promulgation of this new Order. There are
about seven thousand sweetmeat shops in the
City of Calcutta and the number of persons
employed in them is nearly 3,500. The number
of sweetmeat shops in other towns is about
1,000 and the number of persons employed in
them is approximately 4,000. Hence the total
number of employees in all these sweetmeat
establishments comes to about 39,000. We
should bear in mind that almost all these
sweetmeat shops prepare salted (nonta)
variety
of edibles, such as, nimki, singara,
radhaballavi, luchi dalpuri, Kachuri,
jhuribhaja, alurdom, curry, dal etc. Besides,
curd is also sold by those shops which also
sell kinds of sweets that do not at all
require Channa or Khir (for their
preparation)," that "Those workers who had
until recently been bringing milk and Channa
to Calcutta will be able to supply from now on
milk to the Milk Collection Centres of the
Government", and that "The quantity of milk
collected by the Government is indeed daily
on the increase. And yesterday nearly 92
thousand 800 (sic) litres of milk were
collected. New Milk Depots will have to be
opened soon in Calcutta and outside. 25
depots will shortly be opened in Calcutta and
its neighbouring areas. If the quantity of
milk collected increases according to
expectations, at least 1,000 additional depots
will have to be opened in different places.
If in spite of an increase in the demand for
other sweets a number of workers become
unemployed, the Government is prepared to
employ them in those depots. This new Order
will only be beneficial to the buyers and
sellers of milk alone. it will (also) be of
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 12
help in solving the milk problem of the whole
of West Bengal in the near future".
In their Petition No. 369 of 1965 M/s. Ramlal Ghosh and
Grandsons had pleaded that the State of West Bengal and
the Secretary, Department of Animal -Husbandry and
Veterinary
657
Services had acted mala fide and "in complete and utter
disregard of the judgment and order of the High Court of
Calcutta and without reading or considering the same had
vindictively published" the impugned order "in anger and hot
haste being recklessly careless as to the consequences
thereof and without giving their mind to the comprehension
and their wills to the discharge their duty towards the
public"--(Para 18). They also had averted that they and
other traders who carried on business only in milk products
like Channa, Kheer including Khoa Kheer were facing complete
ruin by reason of the total prohibition of their trade,
commerce and intercourse (Para 19); that the impugned Order
had not only prohibited the trade, commerce and intercourse
of the petitioners but also its movement, and by the
impugned Order the petitioners were not only prohibited from
manufacturing but were also ordered not to supply or to
trains’ port the same and to deliver the same to various
customers within and outside Calcutta (Para 20); that "there
was not nor there was any material before the Governor of
West Bengal to form the alleged opinion and/or that the
purported opinion was not reasonably formed" (Para 24); and
that according to newspaper reports there were about 8,000
shops in Calcutta and 4,000 more in the neighbouring areas
and those employed about 50,000 men and presuming that each
employee maintained a family of 4, at least 200,000 people
would be affected by the impugned Order (Para. 32).
In his speech the Chief Minister characterised the
preparation of any food with milk in West Bengal as
tantamount to a crime. He also announced his version
about the validity of the Order, the reasons why it was
promulgated, and asserted that it was an order made bona
fide and in the interests of the public, and that those- who
resisted it were acting contrary to the public interest.
But these questions had to be determined by the Court.
Banerjee, 1, in the judgment under appeal was of the view
that the speech was likely to influence public opinion
against the petitioners since the Chief Minister occupies
a highly responsible position of power and authority under
the Constitution, and being a person most likely to know the
needs of the State there would be many who may believe in
factual statements made by him. The learned Judge observed
that he was not prejudiced by the speech against the
petitioners before him, since he was only "concerned with
the constitutional and legal validity of the Control Order,
and incidentally only with its socio-economic
justification", but it could’ not be said that the speech
did not or could not or was not likely to prejudice the
public against the cause of the petitioners. He also
observed that for the Chief Minister to have made a public
appeal in support of the Order, with the knowledge of the
issue of
658
the Rule Nisi calling upon the State Government and the
Secretary, Department of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary
Services to show cause why the Control Order should not be
declared void was "improper and ill-timed" and also
"contumacious", for the Chief Minister had published in
advance the defence to be taken against the Rule.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 12
The criticism made by the learned Judge is not
unwarranted. The statements in a broadcast speech by an
important dignitary of the State that persons who prepare
sweets out of milk in the course of their business are on
the version set up by him criminals, and the suggestion that
the Order was issued in the interests of the public, whereas
it was the contention of the petitioners that it was done
"recklessly, arbitrarily and vindictively and without caring
for the consequences, and without considering their duty to
the public", are prima facie calculated to obstruct the
administration of justice, since they are likely to create
an atmosphere of prejudice against the petitioners and also
to deter other persons having similar claims from
approaching the Court.
There is in the speech no direct reference to the
proceedings pending before the Court, but it is now common
ground that the Chief Minister was aware of the filing of
the petition and the issue of the rule which was served upon
the Government. Whether he was aware of all the details of
the allegations made in the petition is not relevant. If he
knew that a petition was filed and the rule was served upon
the Government of which he was the Chief Minister, before
making any statement on a matter which was controversial it
was his duty to acquaint himself with the allegations made
and also to ascertain what the points in dispute were before
going to on to a public broadcasting system to announce the
case of the Government. Whatever may be the motive of the
Chief Minister and whatever he may have thought as a Chief
Minister to be necessary in order to acquaint the public, a
speech which presented the case of the Government to the
public, before it was tried by the Court, and suggested that
those who prepare sweetmeats out of milk were criminals and
were acting in a manner contrary to the interest of the
general public, was calculated to interefere with the due
administration of justice.
Council for the Chief Minister contended, relying upon
certain judgments of the Courts in the United Kingdom that
in cases where the trial of a case is held without the aid
of a jury, comments on matters in dispute in a pending
proceeding or criticism of the parties thereto, will not
amount to interference with the administration of justice.
Courts seek to punish acts or conduct calculated to
interfere with the administration of justice; and we are
unable to hold that when the trial of a case is held by a
Judge
659
without the aid of a jury no contempt by interfering with
the administration of justice may be committed. The
foundation of the jurisdiction lies not merely in the effect
which comments on a pending proceeding may have upon the
minds of the jury, but the pernicious consequences which
result from the conduct of the contemner, who by
vilification, or abuse of a party seeks to hold up a party
to public ridicule, obloquy, censure or contempt or by
comment on his case seeks to prejudge the issue pending. We
are unable to agree that where a trial of a case is held in
the Court of First Instance, without a jury, or before a
Court of Appeal persons so inclined are free to make
comments on pending proceedings or to abuse parties thereto
without any protection from the Court. It is difficult to
accept the contention that comments which are likely to
interfere with the due administration of justice by holding
up a party to a proceeding to ridicule or to create an
atmosphere against him in the public mind against his
cause when the trial is held without the aid of a jury
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 12
do not amount to contempt. If a party to the proceeding is
likely to be deterred from prosecuting ,his proceeding or
people who have similar cause are likely to be dissuaded
from initiating proceedings, contempt of court would be
committed. It matters little whether the trial is with the
aid of the jury or without the aid of jury.
In The William Thomas Shipping Co., In re. H.W. Dhillon
& Sons Ltd. v. The Company, In re. Sir Robert Thomas and
others(1) it was observed that the publication of injurious
misrepresentations concerning parties to proceedings in
relation to those proceedings may amount to contempt of
Court, because it may cause those parties to discontinue or
to compromise, and because it may deter persons with goods
causes of action from coming to the Court, and was thus
likely to affect the course of Justice. But Maugham, J.
observed:
"There is an atmosphere in which a common law
judge approaches the question of contempt
somewhat different from that in which a judge
who sits in this (Chancery) Division has to
approach it. The common law judge is mainly
thinking of the effect of the alleged contempt
on the mind of the jury and also, I think, he
has to consider the effect or the possible
effect of the alleged contempt in preventing
witnesses from coming forward to give
evidence. In these days, at any rate, a Judge
who sits in this Division is not in least
likely to be prejudiced by statements
published in the press as to the result of
cases which are coming before him. He has to
determine the case on the
(1) [1930] 2 Ch. 368
660
evidence, of course, and with regard to the
principles of law as he understands
them; and the view of a newspaper, however
intelligible conducted it may be, cannot
possibly affect his mind. Accordingly, a
Judge in the Chancery Division starts on
the footing that only in the rarest
possible case is it likely that the
publication by a newspaper of such a statement
as I have here to consider will affect the
course of justice in the sense of
influencing, altering or modifying the
judgment or judgments which the Court will
ultimately have to deliver;"
But our Courts, are Courts, which administer both law and
equity. Assuming that a Judge holding a trial is not likely
to, be influenced by comments in newspapers or by other
media mass communication may be ruled out--though it would
difficult to be dogmatic on that matter also--the Court is
entitled’ and is indeed bound to consider, especially in our
country where personal conduct is largely influenced by
opinion of the members of the caste, community, occupation
or profession to which he belongs, whether comments holding
up a party to public ridicule, or which prejudices society
against him may not dissuade him from prosecuting his
proceeding or compel him to compromise it on terms
unfavorable to himself. That is a real danger which must be
guarded against: the Court is not in initiating proceedings
for contempt for abusing a party to a litigation merely
concerned with the impression on the Judge’s mind even on
the minds of witnesses for a litigant, it is also concerned
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 12
with the probable effect on the conduct of the litigant and
persons having similar claims.
In Regina v. Duffey and others Ex Parte Nash(1) the
Court of Appeal in England had to consider the question
whether comments made upon a person after his conviction and
before appeal was heard may be regarded as contempt of
Court. Lord Parker, C.J., observed:
"Even if a Judge who ’eventually sat on
the appeal had seen the article in question
and had remembered its contents, it is
inconceivable that he would be influenced
consciously or unconsciously by it. A
Judge is in a very different position to a
juryman. Though in no sense superhuman, he
has by his training no difficulty in putting
out of his mind matters which are not
evidence in the case. This, indeed, happens
daily to Judges on Assize. This is all the
more so in the case of a member of the
Court of Criminal
(1) [1960] 2 Q.B.D. 188.
662
Appeal, who, in regard to an appeal against
conviction is dealing almost entirely with
points of law,. and who, in the case of an
appeal against sentence is considering whether
or not the sentence is correct in principle."
This may be true when a Court of Appeal determines questions
of law only or the appeal is confined to questions of
sentence, but where a proceeding which is tried on evidence
in the Court’ of First Instance, or in the Court of Appeal
on questions of fact as well as of law, it would be an over-
statement to assert that a Judge may not be influenced even
"unconsciously" by what he has read in newspapers.
No distinction is, in our judgment, warranted that
comment on a pending case or abuse of a party may amount to
contempt when the case is triable with the aid of a jury,
and not when it is triable by a Judge or Judges.
Ordinarily a Court will not initiate proceedings for
commitment for contempt where there is a mere technical
contempt. In Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghose and
Others(1) it was observed by Jenkins, C.J., that
proceedings for contempt shotfid be initiated with utmost
reserve and no court in the due discharge of its duty can
afford to disregard them. It was also observed that
jurisdiction to punish for contempt was arbitrary, unlimited
and uncontrolled and should be exercised with the greatest
caution: that this power merits this description will be
realised when it is understood that there is no limit to the
imprisonment that may be inflicted or the fine that may be
imposed save the Court’s unfettered discretion, and that the
subject is protected by no right of general appeal. We may
at once observe that since the enactment of the Contempt of
Courts Act 12 of 1926 and Act 32 of 1952 the power of the
Court in imposing punishment for contempt of court is not
an uncontrolled or unlimited power. That, however does not
justify the court in commencing proceedings without due
caution and reserve. But Banerjee, 1., who must be
conversant with local conditions was of the view that action
of the Chief Minister was likely to interfere with the
course of justice for it was likely to have "baneful
effects" upon the petitioners their cause and upon persons
having a similar cause, and sitting in appeal we do not
think that we can hold that he took an erroneous view of his
power or of the tendency of the speech, which he has
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 12
characterised as having "baneful effects". Banerjee, J, has
ultimately treated the contempt as technical for he has not
imposed any substantive sentence, not even a warning. He
has merely expressed his displeasure. The speech was ex
facie calculated
(1) I.L.R. 41 Cal. 173.
662
to interfere with the administration of justice. In the
circumstances the order of Banerjee, J., observing that the
Chief Minister had acted improperly and expressing
disapproval of the action does not call for any
interference by this Court.
The appeal is dismissed.
R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed
663