ALLAHABAD BANK vs. AVTAR BHUSHAN BHARTIYA

Case Type: Special Leave To Petition Civil

Date of Judgment: 22-04-2022

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NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 32554 OF 2018 ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS.       …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS AVTAR BHUSHAN BHARTIYA              ...RESPONDENT(S) WITH SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 9096 OF 2019 O R D E R 1. Aggrieved by an order of reinstatement with 50% back­wages, but all other consequential benefits in full, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, the Management of the Allahabad Bank has   come   up   with   one   Special   Leave   Petition   and   the   delinquent Officer has come up with the other Special Leave Petition. Signature Not Verified 2. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. Digitally signed by GULSHAN KUMAR ARORA Date: 2022.04.22 16:29:42 IST Reason: 1 3. Since one of these Special Leave Petitions is by the Management of the Bank and other SLP is by the delinquent Officer, we shall refer to the parties as “the Bank” and “the Officer­employee”. 4. The Officer­employee was first appointed as a Clerk way back in the year 1974. He was promoted to the post of Junior Manager Grade­ II in 1982 and to the post of Manager in 1987. In July, 1988 he was issued   with   a   charge   memorandum,   comprising   of   3   articles   of charges. A departmental enquiry followed and the Enquiry Officer held the charges proved. After finding that the Report of the Enquiry Officer was not very happily drafted, the disciplinary authority analysed the evidence on record independently and passed an order of penalty of dismissal from service on 31.03.1989. 5. The   Officer­employee   filed   a   departmental   appeal   under Regulation 17 of the Allahabad Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, contending among others, that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were not even enclosed to the final order of penalty. 6. The appellate authority, by an order dated 28.02.1990 dismissed the appeal, despite recording a finding that the copy of the enquiry 2 report was not enclosed to the final order of penalty. However, the Appellate Authority attempted to overcome this defect by holding that after the Officer­employee filed the statutory appeal, a copy of the enquiry report was sent to his address on 02.06.1989 and that the same returned undelivered. 7. After filing a petition for Review and getting it dismissed, the Officer­employee   moved   the   High   Court   with   a   writ   petition   in W.P.No.29426 of 1990. After referring to Regulation 9 of the Allahabad Bank   Officer   Employees   (Discipline   and   Appeal)   Regulations,   1976 which provides for a supply of the copy of the enquiry report, the High Court   allowed   the   writ   petition   by   an   order   dated   27.04.2011, directing   the   Management   to   supply   a   copy   of   the   enquiry   report within one month and giving liberty to the Officer­employee to file a fresh Appeal with a further  direction to the  appellate authority to decide the appeal expeditiously. 8. The Bank filed a Special Leave Petition (C) CC No. 13418 of 2011 and   the   same   was   dismissed   by   this   Court   by   an   Order   dated 26.08.2011. The Bank then sought a review before the High Court but the same also got rejected. 3 9. In an interesting twist, the Bank sent a letter dated 8.05.2012 to the Officer­employee, claiming that the copy of the enquiry report was not traceable and that he will be free to submit a statutory appeal, raising   all   issues.   Aggrieved   by   the   stand   so   taken,   the   Officer­ employee filed a fresh Writ Petition in W.P No.1403 of 2013. The said Writ   Petition   was   allowed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at Allahabad,   setting   aside   the   order   of   penalty   and   directing reinstatement with 50% of the back wages, but with all consequential benefits including post retirement benefits to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed from service. This was for the reason  that  the  employee   attained   superannuation  on   28.02.2013. The operative portion of the Order dated 01.10.2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is reproduced as follows: “... Resultantly, the writ petition is allowed. The   order   dated   31.03.1989   whereby   the punishment   of   dismissal   has   been   imposed   upon   the petitioner   is  hereby   quashed.   We  also  quash  the   order dated 15.09.2016 rejecting the statutory appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order of dismissal. The petitioner will thus be entitled to be given all consequential   benefits,   including   the   post   retirement benefit to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed from service of the bank, for the reason that he has since attained the age of superannuation. We, however, direct that so far as the back wages, including the wages to be determined by giving notional promotions to the petitioner, if any, are concerned, he shall be entitled only   to   50%   of   total   back   wages.   The   consequential 4 benefits arising out of this judgment and order shall be made available to the petitioner within a period of two months   from   the   date   a   certified   copy   of   this   order   is furnished to the competent authority. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances of the case and also considering that the petitioner has been litigating since the year 1990, we also direct cost to be paid by the respondent­bank to the petitioner which we quantify to be Rs.50,000/­.” 10. It is against the aforesaid order that the Bank has come up with Special Leave Petition (C) No.32554 of 2018. On 03.01.2019, this Court directed the issue of notice in the said Special Leave Petition limited to the quantum of back wages. The order dated 03.01.2019 passed by this Court reads as follows:­ “Heard. We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court insofar as the petitioner­Bank has been   directed   to   pay   all   the   retiral   dues   to   the   first respondent.   Issue notice limited to the quantum of back­wages. In   the   meanwhile,   there   shall   be   stay   of   the impugned order so far as the back­wages are concerned.” 11. Thereafter the Officer­employee came up with Special Leave Petition   (C)   No.9096   of   2019,   challenging   that   portion   of   the impugned order whereby he was deprived of 50% of the back wages. Therefore, on 5.04.2019, this Court ordered the issue of notice in 5 the said Special Leave Petition also and directed the matter to be tagged along with the Special Leave Petition of the Bank. 12. In view of the order passed by this Court on 3.01.2019, the only question that we are called upon to decide is, whether the Officer­employee is not entitled to back wages at all or whether he is entitled only to 50% of the back wages as held by the High Court or whether he is entitled to full back wages. 13. For finding an answer to the above question, we have to see primarily, as to who was at fault. 14. Admittedly,   the   Bank   initiated   disciplinary   proceedings   in terms of Allahabad Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations 1976, for a major misconduct. The three articles of charges framed against the Officer­employee were as follows:­ “ARTICLE OF CHARGE I While   posted   and   functioning   as   Manager,   Nighasan Branch   during   the   year   1986­87   Shri   Avtar   Bhushan Bhartiya failed to maintain integrity and devotion to duty and did not act with diligence in as much as he allowed advances   to   several   borrowers   in   an   indiscriminate manner without observing the norms of the Bank and the spirit of the scheme under which such advances were allowed   at   a   grave   risk   and   has   thereby   violated regulation   3(1)   of   Allahabad   Bank   Officer   Employees' (Conduct) Regulations amounting to a misconduct under regulation 24 of the aforesaid regulations. 6 ARTICLE OF CHARGE II While   posted   and   functioning   as   Manager,   Nighasan Branch   during   the   year   1986­87   Shri   Avtar   Bhushan Bhartiya has failed to maintain integrity and devotion to duty in as much as he allowed indiscriminate advances for   patthar   udhyog   in   village   Jhandi   &   Khairani   in complicity   with   one   Shri   Raj   Kumar   with   intent   to misutilise the subsidy availed on such advances by not observing the norms of the Bank and the rules of the scheme   under   which   advances   were   allowed.   Shri Bhartiya has thereby violated regulation 3(1) of Allahabad Bank   Officer   Employees'   violated   Regulation,   1976 amounting to a misconduct under regulation 24 of the aforesaid regulations. ARTICLE OF CHARGE III While   posted   and   functioning   as   Manager,   Tikonia Branch in Distt. Lakhimpur during the year 1985, Shri Bhartiya has failed to act with diligence and devotion to duty in as much as he failed to conduct appraisal and verification of the identity of Shri Tarsem and has thereby violated   regulation   3(1)   of   Allahabad   Bank   Officer Employees'   (Conduct)   Regulations   amounting   to   a misconduct   under   regulation   24   of   the   aforesaid regulations.” 15. The   departmental   enquiry   commenced   on   21.11.1988   and concluded on 09.01.1989. The enquiry report dated 09.03.1989 was forwarded to the disciplinary authority  vide  letter dated 13.03.1989. The   disciplinary   authority   passed   an   order   of   penalty   on 31.03.1989.   It   is   obvious   from   the   order   of   penalty   dated 31.03.1989 that the copy of the enquiry report was neither sent beforehand nor even enclosed to the order of penalty. Interestingly, the disciplinary authority agreed with the conclusions reached by 7 the   enquiry   officer   but   felt   that   the   reasoning   was   deficient. Therefore, the disciplinary authority chose to analyse the evidence on record independently. The relevant portion of the order of the disciplinary authority reads as follows:­ “From the enquiry officer's report I find that while holding the charges leveled against Shri Bhartiya in the aforesaid charge sheet dated 26.7.88 as proved against him he has not analysed the facts brought on the records of the enquiry proceedings and has also not highlighted the   merits/demerits   of   the   evidences   brought   on   the records of enquiry proceedings. Accordingly evidences on records of the proceedings would first be discussed and analysed by me chargewise separately each here under as the same exercise has become necessary for the reasons mentioned above.” 16. In the statutory appeal filed by the Officer­employee, he raised a specific contention that the enquiry report was not furnished. Despite recording a finding that the copy of the enquiry report was not   even   enclosed   to   the   final   order   of   penalty,   the   Appellate Authority attempted to overcome the same on the ground that after the appeal was filed, the copy of enquiry report was sent by post and that the same returned undelivered. The relevant portion of the order of the Appellate Authority reads as follows:­ Also,   a   copy   of   the   Enquiry   Officer's   report/findings, although not enclosed with the Disciplinary Authority's Order, has been subsequently provided to the appellant. However,   the   same,   which   was   sent   at   the   recorded address of the appellant on 2.6.1989, has been returned 8 undelivered by the Post Office with the remark : "Pane wale bar bar jane par nahi milte, intezar ke bad wapas."  17. At the time when the final order of penalty dated 31.03.1989 was passed and at the time when the appeal was dismissed by the order dated 28.02.1990, the law in this regard was actually in a state of flux. After the decision of the Constitution Bench of this 1 Court in  Union of India and Another  vs.  Tulsiram Patel ,  a two member Bench doubted its authenticity or applicability to cases where a copy of the enquiry report was not supplied. Therefore, in 2 Union of India And Others     vs.   E.   Bashyan ,   a   reference was made, which led to the decision in    vs. Union of India and Others 3 Mohd. Ramzan Khan .   The position became very clear after the decision   in       vs.     . Managing   Director,   ECIL   ,   Hyderabad B 4 Karunakar   . 18. Therefore, by the time the writ petition challenging the final order of penalty was decided on 27.04.2011, the law in this regard was no longer  res integra . 1 (1985) 3 SCC 398 2 AIR 1988 SC 1000 3  (1991) 1 SCC 588 4 1994 SCC Supp.(2) 391 9 19. Dehors   the   development   of   law   as   aforesaid,   the   Officer­ employee   had   an   advantage   in  the   form   of   Regulation  9   of  the Allahabad   Bank   Officer   Employees   (Discipline   and   Appeal) Regulations 1976. This Regulation 9 reads as follows:­ “9. COMMUNICATION OF ORDERS: Orders   made   by   the   Disciplinary   Authority   under Regulation 7 or Regulation 8 shall be communicated to the   officer   employee   concerned,   who   shall   also   be supplied with a copy of the report of enquiry, if any.” 20. Therefore,   by   the   order   dated   27.04.2011,   the   High   Court allowed the writ petition of the Officer­employee, on the basis of the above Regulation. The operative portion of the order of the High Court dated 27.04.2011 reads as follows:­ “In view of above, the writ petition is allowed. A writ in   the   nature   of   certiorari   is   issued   quashing   the impugned appellate order dated 28.2.1990 and the order dated   3.7.1990   (Annexure­8)   passed   on   the   review petition.   A   cost   of   Rs.50,000/­   is   imposed   upon   the respondents which shall be deposited in this Court within a period of two months. The respondents shall supply a copy of the enquiry report within one month from today. Thereafter, the petitioner may prefer an appeal setting up grounds and pointing procedural illegality including the plea raised before this Court within the next one month. The   appellate   authority   shall   decide   the   appeal, expeditiously say within a period of two months from the date   of   filing   of   fresh   appeal.   In   case   the   cost   is   not deposited, the same shall be realised through the District Magistrate as arrears of land revenue. It shall be open for the petitioner to withdraw an amount of Rs.25,000/­ and the rest shall be remitted to the Mediation Centre of this Court at Lucknow. Registry to take follow­up action.” 10 21. The aforesaid order of the High Court has attained finality with the dismissal of the SLP on 26.08.2011. The order of dismissal of the SLP reads as follows:­ “Delay condoned. Having considered the pleadings in the case, the materials placed on record and the submissions of the learned counsel, we do not find any merit in the Special Leave   Petition   and   hence   the   special   leave   petition   is dismissed.” 22. The   Bank   thereafter   took   a   chance   by   filing   a   petition   for review before the High Court, but the same also got dismissed on 29.02.2012. Thereafter, the Bank took a very strange position by holding out that the copy of the enquiry report was not traceable. The   communication   dated   08.05.2012   sent   by   the   Bank   to   the Officer­employee in this regard reads as follows:­ “In reference to the captioned matter we have to advise that the copy of the finding of Enquiry Officer is not traceable and this fact has been brought to the notice of Hon'ble High Court in the writ petition, and also to you vide letter No.ZOLK/INSPECTION/693 dated 08.09.2011. You are requested to submit your statutory appeal and the same will be considered and you will be provided all reasonable   opportunity   to   put   forth   your   case   even personal hearing, if required, will also be afforded to you, but since the copy of finding of Enquiry Officer is not traceable we are unable to provide the same. Kindly bear with us and submit your appeal which will be considered by the Bank on the basis of records available.” 11 23. In view of the aforesaid turn of events, the Officer­employee moved a contempt petition before the High Court. Finding that the Management of the Bank cannot be penalized for not being able to trace the copy of the enquiry report, the High Court closed the contempt petition with liberty to the employee to re­agitate the issue on the basis of the subsequent cause of action. The relevant portion of the order dated 21.05.2013 passed by the High Court in the contempt petition filed by the employee reads as follows:­ “…Since by the letter dated 8.5.2012, the respondents had communicated that inquiry report is not available in absence of inquiry report, cause of action arose contrary to   finding   recorded   by   the   judgment   and   order   dated 27.4.2011.  It is open for the petitioner to approach this Court   again  to  ventilate   his   grievance   on  the   basis   of subsequent cause of action…” 24. Therefore, the Officer­employee was driven to the necessity of filing a fresh writ petition in W.P.No.1403(S/B) of 2013. During the pendency of the said writ petition, an order was passed by the High Court   on   03.08.2016   holding   that   the   stand   of   the   Bank   was unacceptable and that in any case an appeal may be preferred and the same may be decided by the Appellate Authority. Accordingly, an appeal was preferred. The Appellate Authority considered the appeal once again but obviously without the copy of the enquiry 12 report   and   rejected   the   appeal.   This   fact   is   borne   out   by   the impugned   order   itself,   the   relevant   portion   of   which   reads   as follows:­ “…During pendency of this writ petition, an order was   passed   by   the   Court   in   these   proceedings   on 03.08.2016 wherein it has been observed that the stand of   the   respondent­Bank   that   enquiry   report   was   not available, cannot be accepted in view of the finding of this Court   recorded   earlier   i.e.   the   finding   recorded   in   the judgment and order dated 27.04.2011.   It was further observed that the obligation cast upon the respondent­ Bank has not been carried out on the lame excuse.  The Court   further   observed   that   the   Bank   may,   however, decide the appeal preferred by the petitioner taking into consideration the direction issued earlier, vide judgment and order dated 27.04.2011…” 25. In the light of the aforesaid facts, no great deal of research was necessary on the part of the High Court to arrive at the conclusion that the Management of the Bank was clearly at fault. Therefore, the High Court allowed the writ petition. The operative portion of the impugned order is already extracted earlier. 26. It is not as though the High Court proceeded solely on the basis of the failure of the Management to supply the copy of the enquiry report. The High Court found that the charges related to a Government   sponsored   Scheme   and   that   the   beneficiaries   were identified and were short­listed by a Government agency, namely 13 the District Rural Development Agency. The High Court also found that no bad motive was either attributed to the employee nor proved in the departmental proceedings. 27. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the High Court could have granted all the reliefs in full, including full back­wages. But considering the fact that from the date of his dismissal namely, 31.03.1989, upto the date of his superannuation on 28.02.2013, a period of nearly 24 years had passed, the High Court thought it fit to limit the back­wages to 50%. In such circumstances, we do not think that the Management can make out any grievance, especially  after having violated Regulation 9;   after their failure to point (i) (ii) out to the High Court in the first round of litigation that the copy of the enquiry report was not available; and  (iii)  after their inability to comply with the order of the High Court passed in the first round of litigation, which was also confirmed by this Court. 28. Therefore,   the   Special   Leave   Petition   filed   by   the   Bank deserves to be dismissed. 14 29. Having dealt with the SLP filed by the Management, let us now come to the SLP filed by the Officer­employee with regard to the grant of back wages only to the extent of 50%. 30. The   learned   counsel   for   the   Officer­employee   places   heavy reliance   upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Deepali   Gundu Surwase   vs.   Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. ED.) 5 . , in support of his contention that the grant of full back & Ors wages is a normal rule in cases of wrongful termination of service. But the ratio laid down in the said decision cannot be pressed into service by the Officer­employee in this case. This is for the reason that the Officer­employee in this case was originally appointed as a Clerk way back in the year 1974. He was promoted to the post of Junior   Management   Grade­II   in   the   year   1982   and   as   Branch Manager in the year 1987. This is why he was governed by the Allahabad   Bank   Officer   Employees   (Discipline   and   Appeal) Regulations, 1976. Courts should always keep in mind the different yardsticks   to   be   applied   in   the   cases   of   workman   category employees   and   managerial   category   employees.   In   appropriate 5 (2013) 10 SCC 324 15 cases, the distinction between labour law and service law may also have to be kept in mind. Many times, Courts wrongly apply, in matters   arising   under   service   law,   the   principles   laid   down   in matters arising under labour laws.   31. As a matter of fact, the propositions elucidated in   Deepali Gundu Surwase  (supra),  read as follows:­ “38. The propositions which can be culled out from the aforementioned judgments are: 38.1  In   cases   of   wrongful   termination   of   service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. 38.2  The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding   the   issue   of   back   wages,   the   adjudicating authority or the Court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of   misconduct,   if   any,   found   proved   against   the employee/workman,   the   financial   condition   of   the employer and similar other factors. 38.3 Ordinarily,   an   employee   or   workman   whose services are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is required to either plead or at least make a   statement   before   the   adjudicating   authority   or   the Court  of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed   or   was   employed   on   lesser   wages.   If   the employer wants to avoid payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogent evidence to prove   that   the   employee/workman   was   gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies on the person   who   makes   a   positive   averments   about   its 16 existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than   to   prove   a   negative   fact.   Therefore,   once   the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same or substantially similar emoluments. 38.4 The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal   exercises   power   under Section   11­A of   the Industrial   Disputes   Act,   1947   and   finds   that   even though the enquiry held against the employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural justice and / or certified   standing   orders,   if   any,   but   holds   that   the punishment   was   disproportionate   to   the   misconduct found   proved,   then   it   will   have   the   discretion   not   to award   full   back   wages.   However,   if   the   Labour Court/Industrial   Tribunal   finds   that   the   employee   or workman is not at all guilty of any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false charge, then there will be ample justification for award of full back wages. 38.5 The   cases   in   which   the   competent   Court   or Tribunal   finds   that   the   employer   has   acted   in   gross violation   of   the   statutory   provisions   and/or   the principles of natural justice or is guilty of victimizing the employee   or   workman,   then   the   concerned   Court   or Tribunal will be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the superior Courts should not   exercise   power   under Article   226 or   136   of   the Constitution and interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, etc., merely because there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the employee/workman   to   get   full   back   wages   or   the employer’s obligation to pay the same. The Courts must always be kept in view that in the cases of wrongful / illegal   termination   of   service,   the   wrongdoer   is   the employer and sufferer is the employee/workman and there is no justification to give premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the form of full back wages. 38.6 In a number of cases, the superior Courts have interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory 17 authority on the premise  that  finalization of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay  in   the   disposal   of   cases.  For   this   the   litigants cannot   be   blamed   or   penalised.   It   would   amount   to grave   injustice   to   an   employee   or   workman   if   he   is denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of time between the termination of his service and finality given to the order of reinstatement. The Courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position vis­à­vis the employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain for   prolonging   the   agony   of   the   sufferer,   i.e.,   the employee or workman, who can ill afford the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount  of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt   the   course   suggested   in Hindustan   Tin   Works Private Limited v. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited  (1979) 2 SCC 80 . 38.7 The observation made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P. Agrawal  (2007) 2 SCC 433   that on reinstatement the   employee/workman   cannot   claim   continuity   of service   as   of   right   is   contrary   to   the   ratio   of   the judgments   of   three   Judge   Benches   referred   to hereinabove and cannot be treated as good law. This part of the judgment is also against the very concept of reinstatement of an employee/workman.” 32. Even if we apply the propositions enunciated by this Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase  (supra), the Officer­employee may not be entitled to full back wages. This is for the reason that there is nothing on record to show whether he was gainfully employed after his dismissal from service. A careful look at the pleadings in the writ petition W.P. No.1403 of 2013 would show that he has not 18 pleaded about his non­employment. Though in paragraphs 36 to 38 of his writ petition, the employee has pleaded about the sudden set back to his health in the year 2011 and the financial hardships he was facing, there was no assertion about his non­employment.  The employee   had   his   pleadings   amended   after   the   dismissal   of   his appeal   during   the   pendency   of   the   writ   petition.   Even   in   the amended pleadings, there was no averment relating to his non­ employment.   Therefore,   even   if   we   apply   the   ratio   in   Deepali (supra), the employee may not satisfy the third Gundu Surwase   proposition found in para 38.3 thereof. 33. The   reliance   placed   upon   the   decision   in   Pawan   Kumar vs. Agarwala     General Manager­II  and  Appointing  Authority, 6 State Bank of India and Others   may not also be of help to the employee. It is a case where this Court applied the propositions laid down in   (supra).  This Court found that Deepali Gundu Surwase   there   was   nothing   to   show   that   the   employee   was   gainfully employed after the date of dismissal.  It is needless to point out that in   the   first   instance,   there   is   an   obligation   on   the   part   of   the 6 (2015) 15 SCC 184 19 employee to plead that he is not gainfully employed. It is only then that   the   burden   would   shift   upon   the   employer   to   make   an assertion and establish the same. 34. The   decision   in   Fisheries   Department,   State   of   Uttar 7 Pradesh  vs.  Charan Singh   arose out of an award of the Industrial Tribunal under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, the same has no relevance to the case on hand. 35. In   vs. Jayantibhai   Raojibhai   Patel     Municipal   Council, 8 Narkhed and Others , this Court referred to the principles laid 9 down in   and to the Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd.  vs.  Employees propositions culled out in the   Deepali Gundu Surwase   (supra). Though this Court held that the denial of back wages in entirety was   not   justified,   this   Court   awarded   only   a   lump­sum compensation in that case. 36. Therefore,   even   applying   the   ratio   laid   down   in   various decisions,   we   do  not  think   that   the   employee   could   be   granted anything more than what the High Court has awarded. 7 (2015) 8 SCC 150 8 (2019) 17 SCC 184 9 (1979) 2 SCC 80 20 37. As we have pointed out at the beginning, the total period of service rendered by the Officer­employee before his dismissal from service, was about 15 years, from 1974 to 1989 and he attained the age of superannuation in February, 2013, meaning thereby that he was out of employment for 24 years.  The High Court has taken this factor into consideration for limiting the back wages only to 50% and we find that the High Court has actually struck a balance. We do not wish to upset this balance. Therefore, the Special Leave Petition of the Officer­employee is also liable to be dismissed. 38. Accordingly, both the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed, no costs. ………………………………….J. (Indira Banerjee) ………………………………….J. (V. Ramasubramanian) New Delhi April  22, 2022 21