Full Judgment Text
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
| APPEAL | No.135 |
|---|---|
| Leave P | etition (C |
| VERSUS<br>WITH<br>L APPEAL No.1362 | |
| l Leave P<br>L APPEAL | etition (Cr<br>No.1361 |
| l Leave P<br>L APPEAL | etition (Cr<br>No.1360 |
| l Leave Petition (Cr |
JUDGMENT
J U D G M E N T
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
1. Leave granted.
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2 . The appellant, at the relevant point of time, was a
member of the Indian Administrative Service and serving on
deputation as the Administrator-cum-Managing Director of the
| Coope | rative F |
|---|
aforesaid Federation is a society registered under the Bihar
Cooperative Societies Act, 1935. On the basis of the various
complaints made against the appellant, FIR Nos. 837/2002
dated 16.12.2002, 859/2002 and 860/2002 both dated
24.12.2002, 19/2003 dated 07.01.2003 and 41/2003 dated
18.01.2003 under Sections 409/420/467/468/ 471/34/120-B of
the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter for short ‘IPC’) were
registered at Police Station Gardani Bagh (Shastri Nagar),
Patna. On completion of investigation in all the cases,
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chargesheets were submitted before the competent court on
the basis of which the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna
took cognizance of the offences alleged against the appellant.
Aggrieved, the appellant filed revision applications before the
learned Sessions Judge, Patna challenging the orders passed
by the learned Trial Court, primarily, on the ground that the
said orders were without jurisdiction and incompetent in law
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inasmuch as sanction for prosecution of the appellant under
Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter for
short ‘the Code’) was not obtained or granted prior to the
| izance. T | he revis |
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the appellant were dismissed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.2, Patna by orders of
different dates. The said orders of the learned Additional
Sessions Judge were challenged before the High Court of
Patna in Crl. Misc. No. 3187/2011, 3190/2011, 3191/2011 and
3192/2011. The High Court by the common impugned order
dated 27.11.2012 negatived the challenge made by the
appellant leading to the present appeals. There is yet
another proceeding instituted by the appellant before the
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High Court i.e. Crl. Misc. No. 41263/2010 in respect of P.S.
Case No. 859/2002 which has been dismissed by the High
Court by its order dated 18.07.2012 on the ground that the
order taking cognizance by the learned Trial Court had not
been specifically challenged before it and it is only the order
of the learned Sessions Judge that has been assailed by the
appellant. The aforesaid order dated 18.7.2012 of the High
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Court has also been challenged by the appellant in the
present group of appeals.
| Abhinav | Mukerji, |
|---|
State.
4. As the arguments advanced on behalf of the rival parties
are a reiteration of the arguments advanced before the High
Court the detailed and specific contentions need not be taken
note of and it will suffice to say that while the appellant
contends that grant of sanction under Section 197 of the Code
is a sine qua non for his prosecution for the offences alleged,
according to the State of Bihar the appellant is not a public
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servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the IPC and in any
case none of the offences alleged can be attributed to acts
that arise out of or have any proximity with the discharge of
official duties by the appellant so as to require sanction for his
prosecution.
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5. Section 197(1) of the Code will be required to be noticed
at this stage and is therefore extracted below.
| trate or<br>his offi | a pub<br>ce save |
|---|
(a) in case of a person who is employed or,
as the case may be, was at the time of
commission of the alleged offence employed,
in connection with the affairs of the Union, of
the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed
or, as the case may be, was at the time of
commission of the alleged offence employed,
in connection with the affairs of a State, of
the State Government :
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Provided that where the alleged offence was
committed by a person referred to in clause (b)
during the period while a Proclamation issued
under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution
was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if
for the expression “State Government” occurring
therein, the expression “Central Government:
were substituted].
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6. A reading of the provisions of Section 197(1) of the Code
reveals that there are three mandatory requirements under
Section 197(1) of the Code, namely,
| used is a | public s |
|---|
post by or with the sanction either of the Central or
the State Government, as the case may be
(c) the act(s) giving rise to the alleged offence had
been committed by the public servant in the actual
or purported discharge of his official duties.
7. Insofar as the first requirement is concerned, the position
of officers belonging to the Indian Administrative Service
serving on deputation in a cooperative society was decided in
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S.S. Dhanoa vs. MCD . Dealing with clause 12 of Section 21
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of the IPC, this Court had held that the word ‘corporation’
appearing in clause 12(b) of Section 21 IPC meant
corporations established by a statute and would have no
application to a cooperative society. In the present case, the
materials on record, i.e., the incorporation of the Bihar State
Housing Cooperative Federation under the provisions of the
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(1981) 3 SCC 431
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Bihar Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 would seem to indicate
that the said cooperative federation is a cooperative society.
The above, however, is a prima facie view on the materials
| at this s | tage. I |
|---|
behalf of the appellant that at the relevant point of time the
federation was under supersession and it was being
exclusively controlled by the State. The above contention i.e.
the extent of State control over the management of the
Federation will be required to be established by means of
relevant evidence before the legal effect thereof on the status
of the appellant as a public servant can be decided. Possibly
it is on account of the said fact that the High Court in the
impugned order had granted the liberty to the appellant to
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raise all other points as and when they arise and had also
required the Trial Court to decide all such issues, including the
requirement of sanction, in the light of such subsequent facts
that may come on record.
8. Insofar as the second requirement for the applicability of
Section 197(1) of the Code is concerned, namely, whether the
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post held by the appellant at the relevant time was one from
which he could not be removed except by or with the sanction
of the State Government, no evidence, whatsoever, has been
| tion. Th | e corre |
|---|
regard to the applicability of the second requirement under
Section 197(1) can, therefore, be answered only at a
subsequent stage i.e. after evidence on the issue, if any, is
forthcoming.
9. The above discussion will now require the Court to
consider the question as to whether the acts giving rise to the
alleged offences had been committed by the accused in the
actual or purported discharge of his official duties. In a series
of pronouncements commencing with Satwant Singh vs.
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2 3
State of Punjab ; Harihar Prasad vs. State of Bihar and
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Prakash Singh Badal & Anr. vs. State of Punjab & Ors.
it has been consistently held that it can be no part of the duty
of a public servant or acting in the discharge of his official
duties to commit any of the offences covered by Section 406,
2
AIR 1960 SC 266
3
(1972) 3 SCC 89
4
(2007) 1 SCC 1
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409, 420 etc. and the official status of the public servant can,
at best, only provide an opportunity for commission of the
offences. Therefore, no sanction for prosecution of the public
| nces wo | uld be r |
|---|
197 of the Code. Notwithstanding the above, the High Court
had granted liberty to the appellant to raise the issue of
sanction, if so required, depending on the evidence that may
come on record in the course of the trial. Despite the view
taken by this Court in the series of pronouncements referred
to above, the opportunity that has been provided by the High
Court to the benefit of the appellant need not be foreclosed
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by us inasmuch as in Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari , P.K.
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Pradhan vs. State of Sikkim and Prakash Singh Badal
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(supra) this Court had consistently held that the question of
sanction under Section 197 of the Code can be raised at any
time after cognizance had been taken and may have to be
determined at different stages of the proceeding/trial. The
observations of this Court in this regard may be usefully
extracted below.
5
AIR 1956 SC 44
6
(2001) 6 SCC 704
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Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari (para 21)
| ubseque<br>inquiry | ntly com<br>or even |
|---|
P.K. Pradhan vs. State of Sikkim (para 15)
“ It is well settled that question of sanction under
Section 197 of the Code can be raised any time
after the cognizance; may be immediately after
cognizance or framing of charge or even at the
time of conclusion of trial and after conviction as
well. But there may be certain cases where it may
not be possible to decide the question effectively
without giving opportunity to the defence to
establish that what he did was in discharge of
official duty. In order to come to the conclusion
whether claim of the accused, that the act that he
did was in course of the performance of his duty
was reasonable one and neither pretended nor
fanciful, can be examined during the course of
trial by giving opportunity to the defence to
establish it. In such an eventuality, the question of
sanction should be left open to be decided in the
main judgment which may be delivered upon
conclusion of the trial .”
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Prakash Singh Badal & Anr. vs. State of Punjab & Ors.
[Para 27]
| elating t<br>97 of the | o the n<br>Code i |
|---|
10. In view of the discussions we will have no occasion to
cause any interference with the orders passed by the High
Court in the proceedings instituted before it by the appellant
which have been impugned in the appeals under
consideration. Consequently, we dismiss all the appeals and
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maintain the orders passed by the High Court in all the cases
before it.
……..……………........………………………J.
[SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]
……..……………........………………………J.
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[RANJAN GOGOI]
NEW DELHI,
JULY 7, 2014.
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