Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MANAGEMENT OF ADVANCE INSURANCE CO. LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SHRI GURUDASMAL & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
04/03/1970
BENCH:
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)
BENCH:
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)
SHELAT, J.M.
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
GROVER, A.N.
RAY, A.N.
CITATION:
1970 AIR 1126 1970 SCR (3) 881
1969 SCC (1) 633
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1976 SC1856 (7)
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950, 7th Sch. List 1 Entry 80-Word
’State’ in Entry-Whether includes ’Union Territories’ after
passing of Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act,
1956--Adaptation of Laws (No. 1) Order 1956 enlarging
definition of ’State’ in s. 3(58) of General Clauses Act,
1897 to include Union Territories-Effect of Order-Power of
President to pass Order after expiry of period specified in
Art. 372(2) of Constitution-Power is sustained under new
Art. 372-A.
Special Police Establishment Act 25 of 1946 as amended in
1952--Purporting to create Special Police Force "in Delhi’-
Such force whether "belonging to" a ’State’ within meaning
of Entry 80-Consent of State Government to extension of
powers of Special Police Establishment--Proof-Consent
already given in respect of certain offences subsists after
new offences added by fresh notification.
HEADNOTE:
Entry 80 in List 1 of the 7th Sch. to the Constitution of
India 1950 corresponding to entry 39 in the Federal List of
the Government of India Act, 1935, empowered the Central
Legislature inter alia to extend the powers and jurisdiction
of members of the police force ’belonging to’ any State to
any area outside that. State with the consent of ’the State
in which such area was situate. Under the Constitution as
originally adopted the States in the Indian Union were
specified as Part A, B & C States and certain territories as
part D territories. By the Constitution (Seventh Amendment
Act), 1956 the distinction between Part A & B States was
abolished and Part C States and Part D territories came to
be described as Union Territories. The Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act 25 of 1946 was passed under entry 39 of
the Federal List of the Government of India Act, 1935. As
adapted in 1950, the long title of the Act referred to
Special Police Force ’for the State of Delhi’. After the
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Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Act 26 of
1952 the long title referred to a Special Police Force ’in
Delhi’. The Adaptation of Laws (No. 3) Order 1956
substituted the words ’Union Territories’ in place of Part
’C’ States in the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act.
On November 6, 1956 Notification No. 7/5/55-AVD was issued
by the Central Government under s. 3 of the Act enabling the
Special Police Establishment to investigate inter alia
offences under ss. 409 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code.
By memorandum No. DPE/1260/6554-V, dated July 2, 1960, the
Government of Maharashtra purported to express its consent
to the extension to the State of Maharashtra of the powers
of Delhi Police Establishment to investigate into the
offences mentioned in the Central Government Notification
aforesaid dated November 6, 1956 and subsequent
notifications dated February 12, 1957, June 21, 1957 and
August 27, 1957. The appellant company was charged in a
complaint filed by Income-tax Officer (Section X Central),
Bombay with offences under ss. 409, 477A and 120B read with
s. 409 of the Indian Panel Code. ’Me case was registered by
the Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment,
Delhi and investigation thereof was ordered to be conducted
in the State of Maharashtra by an Inspector under the
Establishment. The appellant filed a writ
882
petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the
power of the Special Police Establishment to investigate the
case in the State of Maharashtra. The petition being
dismissed, an appeal with certificate was filed in this
Court. The contentions raised on behalf of the appellant
which fell for consideration were : (i) that Act 25 of 1946
when it was made applicable to Union Territories as a result
of Adaptation Order No. 3 of 1956 was thereby cut adrift
from entry 80 which referred only to ’States’ (ii) that the
enlargement of the definition of ’State’ in s. 3(58) of the
General Clauses Act to include Union Territories as respects
the period after the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution
was not effectively made by Adaptation Order (No. 1) 1956
because the power of the President under Art. 372(2) expired
in 1953; (iii) that Act 25 of 1947 as amended in 1952
purposed to create a special police force in Delhi, and the
Act was not thus not in accord with entry 80 in which the
phrase used was ’belonging to any State,"; (iv) that the
consent of the Maharashtra Government to the Central
Government Notification dated November 6, 1956 extending to
the State of Maharashtra, the power of the State Police
Establishment to investigate cases under s. 409 and s. 477A
of the Indian Penal Code was not proved to have been
obtained; (v) that in, any case no fresh consent ,for the
investigation of these offences was obtained when by
Notification dated February 18, 1963 the Delhi Special
Police establishment was empowered to investigate in
Maharashtra certain other offences in addition to those
mentioned in the earlier notifications.
HELD : (i) After the amendment of s. 3(58) of ’,he General
Clauses Act by the Adaptation Order (No. 1) of 1956 the word
’State’ in entry 80 of List I must be read as respects any
period after the commencement of the Seventh Amendment of
the Constitution so as to include ’Union Territories’.
Therefore, members of a police ’force belonging to the Union
Territory of Delhi could have their power and jurisdiction
extended to another State with the consent of the Government
of that State. Adaptation Order No. 3 of 1956 did not have
the effect of taking Act 25 of 1946 outside the ambit of,
entry 80. [890 C]
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(ii) The power of the President under Art. 372(2) to adapt
and modify laws no doubt expired in 1953. But a fresh power
equal and analogous to that under Art. 372(2) was conferred
on President by Art. 372A which was introduced by the
Constitution Seventh Amendment Act, 1956. Therefore, the
amendment of the definition of ’State’ in s. 3(58) of the
General Clauses Act by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 1) Order,
was valid and had the effect of including Union Territories
in entry 80 of the Union List [890 H; 891 F-G; 892 D-E]
Ramkishore Sen & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1966] 1
S.C.R. 430 at 438 and T. M. Kanniyan V. Income-tax Officer,
Pondicherry & Anr. [1968] 2 S.C.R. 103 at 108, referred to.
Ram Kishore Sen’s case to Art. 372 held per incuriam.
(iii) Provisions of law must be read as far as possible with
a view to their validity and not to render them invalid.
The expression ’belonging to’ in entry 80 only conveys the
meaning that it is a police force constituted and
functioning in one area, which may be authorised to function
in another area. The change ’from "for" to "in" made in the
long title of Act 25 of 1946 by the amendment of 1952 makes
no difference because both expressions fit with the meaning
of the phrase ’belonging to’ in the entry. In this way the
Delhi Special Police Establishment means a police force
constituted and functioning in the Union Territories in
Delhi and it could not be said that Act 25 of 1946 as
amended in 1952 was not in second with entry 80. [893 E-F]
883
(iV)There is a presumption of regularity of official acts
but even apart ’from it the memorandum of the Government of
Maharashtra dated July 2, 1960 and the affidavit filed by
the Under Secretary to the Government clearly established
that the consent of the Government of Maharashtra to the
notifications of he Central Government mentioned therein was
duly given. [888 F]
(v)If by the notification dated February 18, 1963 ss. 409
and 477A Indian Penal Code had been newly added, consent of
the Government of Maharashtra would have been necessary: But
that Government had on more than one occasion consented to
the investigation in that State of those offences, and no
fresh consent in respect of them was therefore necessary.
[889 A-B]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2258 of
1968.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 18, 1968 of
the Delhi High Court,-Himachal Bench at Simla in Civil Writ
No. 365 of 1968.-
A. K. Sen and B. Datta, for the appellant.
Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor-General, R. L. Mehta and R. N.
Sachthey, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Hidayatullah, C.J. On a complaint, January 30. 1968 by the
Income Tax Officer (Section X Central) Bombay, of the
Commission of Offences under ss. 409, 477A and 120B read
with s. 409 of the Indian-Penal Code a case was registered
by the Superintendent of Police, Special Police
Establishment, New Delhi. Investigation was entrusted to an
Inspector under the Establishment. It -was to be made in
Maharashtra State. The appellant, which is a limited
company, called the Management of Advance Insurance Company
Limited, thereupon filed a petition under Art. 226 of the
Constitution in the High Court at Delhi challenging the
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right of the Special Police Establishment to investigate the
case. This petition was disposed of on October 18, 1968 by
the High Court ordering its dismissal. The present appeal
is by certificate granted by the High Court.
Before the High Court many questions were mooted. Shortly
stated the argument is that the Delhi Special Police
Establishment is not constitutional and that it has no
jurisdiction to investigate the cases in other States. This
argument has many facets which will presently appear.
Before. we consider them it is necessary to say something
about the original constitution of this Special Police
Establishment.
We are concerned today with the Delhi Special Police Esta-
blishment Act of 1946 (XXV of 1946). This Act succeeded two
884
Ordinances which had been earlier passed by the Governor
General and it had been amended from time to time by way of
adaptation and modification. It was passed" when the
Government of India Act 1935 was in force. Entry No. 3 of
the Provincial Legislative List in the 7th Schedule to the
Government of India Act, 1935 read "police including railway
and village police". Entry 39 of the Federal Legislative
List was as follows
"39. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction
of members of a police force, belonging to any
part of British India to any area in another
Governor’s Province or Chief Commissioner’s
Province, but not so as to enable the police
of one part to exercise powers and
jurisdiction elsewhere without the consent of
the Government of the Province or the Chief
Commissioner as the case may be; extension of
the powers and jurisdiction of members of a
police force belonging to any unit to railway
areas outside that unit."
It was substituted by the India (Provisional
Constitution) Order 1947, as follows :
"39. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction
of members of a police force belonging to any
province to any area in another province, but
not so as to enable the police of one province
exercise powers and jurisdiction in another
province without the consent of the Government
of that Province; extension of powers and
jurisdiction of members of a police force
belonging to any unit to railway areas outside
that unit.
In this entry "province" includes a Chief
Commissioner’s province."
The explanation which was included in this last entry was to
obviate the implication of the definition of a Province in
s. 46(3) of the Act which read :
"In this Act the expression "Province" means
unless the context otherwise requires, a
Governor’s Province, and "Provincial" shall be
construed accordingly."
The implication of the explanation was to apply entry 39 to
the Chief Commissioner’s Province in addition to Governor’s
Province. In this way the jurisdiction exercisable under
entry 39 was made co-extensive again with what was formerly
British India, which, by s. 311 (1) of the Act, meant both
kinds of provinces. The prior history of the Act may be
shortly noted. It ’has little bearing upon the questions in
Hand.
8 8 5
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On July 12, 1943 the Governor General enacted an ordinance
(XXII of 1943) in exercise of his powers conferred by S. 72
of the Government of India Act which was continued in the
Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. An
emergency had been declared owing to World War II and the
powers were exercisable by the Governor General. The ordi-
nance was called the Special Police Establishment (War
Department) Ordinance, 1943. It extended to the whole of
British India and came into force at once. By s. 2(4) the
Special Police Establishment (War Department) was
constituted to exercise throughout British India the power
and jurisdiction exercisable in a province by the members of
the police force of that province possessing all their
powers, duties, privileges and liabilities. Under s. 4 the
superintendence of the Special Police Establishment (War
Department) was vested in the Central Government. It was,
however, provided by s. 3 as follows :
"Offences to be investigated by Special Police
Establishment :-
The Central Government may by general or
special order specify the offences or classes
of offences committed in connection with
Departments of the Central Government which
are to be investigated by the Special Police
Establishment (War Department), or may direct
any particular offence committed in connection
with a Department of the -Central Government."
This ordinance ’would have lapsed on September 30, 1946.
Before that on September 25, 1946 another ordinance of the
same name (No. XXII of 1946) was promulgated. This cons-
tituted a special police force for the Chief Commissioner’s
province of Delhi for investigation of certain offences
committed in connection with matters concerning departments
of the Central Government. The scheme of this ordinance was
slightly different. Under s. 2 Special Police Establishment
was constituted for the Chief Commissioner’s Province of
Delhi for the investigation in that province of offences
notified in s. 3. This was notwithstanding the provisions of
the Police Act of 1861. The Police Establishment had
throughout the Chief Commissionees Province of Delhi in
relation to those ’Offences the powers, duties, privileges
and liabilities of the regular police officers subject,
however, to any orders which the Central Government might
make in this behalf. Section 3 of the new ordinance was
almost the same as s. 3 of the previous ordinance. The only
changes were that the offences had to be notified and the
-power to refer any particular case was not reveated. In
the ordinance s. 5 provided that the consent of the
Government of the Governors pro-
886
vince or of the Chief Commissioner should be, obtained to
the extension before the powers would be exercised.
Ordinance No. XXII of 1946 was repealed by the Delhi Police
Establishment Act 1946 (XXV of 1946) which re-enacted the
provisions of the Ordinance. This Act was adapted and
amended on more than one occasion. First came the
Adaptation of Laws Order 1950, enacted under clause 2 of
Art. 372 of the Constitution on January 26, 1950. It made
two changes. The first was throughout the Act for the words
"Chief Commissioner’s Province of Delhi" the words "State of
Delhi" were substituted and for the word "Provinces" the
words "Part A and C States" were substituted. This was
merely to give effect to the establishment of "States" in
place of provinces under the scheme of our Constitution.
Next came the changes introduced by Part B States (Laws)
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Act, 1951 (Act III of 1951). , They were indicated in the
schedule to that Act. Those changes removed the words ’in
the States’ in the long title and the preamble. The purpose
of this was to remove reference to the States in the phrases
"for the extension to other areas in the States". The more
significant changes came in 1952 by the Delhi Special Police
Establishment (Amendment) Act 1952 (XXVI of 1952). In the
long title (after the "Adaptation of Laws Orders 1950) the
words were
"An Act to make provision for the constitution
of a special police force for the State of
Delhi for the investigation of certain
offences committed in connection with matters
concerning Departments of the Central
Government etc."
After the amendment the words read
"An Act to make provision for the constitution
of a special police force in Delhi for the
investigation of certain offences in Part C
States."
Similar changes were also made in the preamble and in S. 3
the reference to Departments of Government was also deleted.
The change from ’for the State of Delhi to ’in Delhi’ was
the subject of comment in the High Court. To that we’ shall
refer later.
In 1956 the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, -1956 was
enacted. Previously the Constitution specified the States
as parts A,B and C, States and some territories were
specified in Part D in the First Schedule. By the amendment
the distinction between Parts A and B was abolished. All
States (previously Part A and B States) were shown in the
First Schedule under the
887
heading ’The States’ and Part C States and Part D
territories were all described as Union Territories.
Thereupon an Adaptation of Laws Order, 1956 was passed and
in the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946 all
references to ’Part C States’ were ’replaced by the
expression ’union territory’. Another significant change
made by the Amending Act was to remove from s. 2 the words
’for the State of Delhi’, and all references to offences by
the words ’committed in connection with matters concerning
Departments of the Central Government’ were deleted. The
resulting position in 1956 may thus be stated by quoting the
pertinent sections
"Section 2(1) Notwithstanding anything in the
Police Act, 1861, the Central Government may
constitute a special police force to be called
the Delhi Special Police Establishment... for
the investigation of offences notified under
section 3.
(2) Subject to any orders which the Central
Gov-
ernment may make in this behalf, members of
the said
police establishment shall have throughout
in relation
to the investigation of such offences and
arrest of persons concerned in such offences,
all the powers, duties, privileges and
liabilities which police officers have in
connection with the investigation of offences
committed therein.
(3) Any member of the said police
establishment of or above the rank of Sub-
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Inspector may, subject to any orders which the
Central Government may make in this behalf,
exercise in any of the powers of the officer
in charge of a police station in the area in
which he is for the time being and when so
exercising such powers shall, subject to any
such orders as aforesaid, be deemed to be an
officer in charge of a police station
discharging the functions of such an officer
within the limits of his station."
"Section 3. The Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette. specify
the offences or class of offences which are to
be investigated by the Delhi Special Police
Establishment.’,
"Section 5(1) The Central Government may by
order extended to any area (including Railway
areas) the powers and jurisdiction of members
of the Delhi Special Police Establishment for
the investigation of any offences or classes
of offences specified in a notification under
section 3."
888
"Section 16. Nothing contained in section 5
shall be deemed to enable any member of the
Delhi Special Police Establishment to exercise
powers and jurisdiction in any area in (a
State not being a Union territory or railway
area) without the consent of the Government of
that State."
The remaining sections need not be quoted here as they
follow the scheme of the earlier ordinances and confer
powers, jurisdiction etc. equal to those of the regular
police. Those provisions are not in dispute.
After the passing of the 1946 Act a number of notifications
succeeded -which notified the offences which the Special
Police Establishment could investigate. On November 6, 1956
(Notn. No. 7/5/55-AVD) was issued under s. 3 of the Act of
1946. It enabled the Special Police Establishment to
investigate inter alia offences under sections 409 and 477-A
of the Indian Penal Code. A memorandum (No. DPE/1260/6554-
V) dated July 2, 1960 shows that the Government of
Maharashtra consented to the Delhi Special Police
Establishment exercising powers and jurisdiction in the
State of Maharashtra in respect of offences mentioned in
notifications of the Government of India dated November 6,
1956, February 12, 1957, June 21, 1957 and August 27, 1957.
The first notification has been referred to already. The
remaining three notifications were not brought to our
notice.
A doubt raised in the High Court and before us that the
Government of Maharashtra had not considered the matter or
that the consent was not properly given, is sufficiently
answered by the affidavit of the Under Secretary to the
Government of Maharashtra dated July 18, 1968 in which it is
clearly stated that the Chief Minister had considered the
matter and given his consent and that under the Rules of
Business he was quite competent to do so. No argument has
been advanced before us which entitles the appellant to go
behind the memorandum and the affidavit. There is a
presumption of regularity of official acts and even apart
from it, the memorandum and the Affidavit clearly establish
that the consent was given.
It is. however, urged that the Government of India on
February 18, 1963 issued another notification (No 25/12/62-
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AVD-II) which superseded the earlier notification No.
25/7/60AVD dated January 21, 1961. From this it is argued
that the earlier notification to which consent was given by
the Maharashtra’ Government bad all been revoked and fresh
consent was therefore, necessary and has not been proved.
In our judgment this is an argument of no avail. It is true
that if sections 409 and
8 8 9
477-A I.P.C. were newly added, consent of the Government of
Maharashtra would have been necessary. But the Maharashtra
Government had on more than one occasion consented to the
investigation in the State of Maharashtra of these offences.
The notifications mentioned those offences afresh with some
other offences. In so far as the newly added offences are
concerned, the argument would have some validity but not in
respect of offences already assented to. We find no force
in the argument since we consider the new notification as
merely restating the old notification after including some
other offences in the new notification.
This brings us to the two main arguments. The first is that
after the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act which
removed. the description ’Part C States’ from the
Constitution and introduced the expression ’Union
Territories’ the present entry 80 of the Union List
(corresponding to entry 39 of the Federal Legislative List
of the Government of India Act of 1935) cannot be read as
enabling the power to be exercised in respect of a police
force belonging to the Union Territories such as Delhi.
Entry No. 80 may be read here :
"80. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction
of members of a police force belonging to any
State to any area outside that State, but not
so as to enable the police of one State to
exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area
outside that State without the consent of the
Government of the State in which such area is
situated; extension of the powers and
jurisdiction of members of a police force
belonging to any State to railway areas
outside that State."
This entry speaks of a ’police force belonging to any State’
and not of a police force belonging to the Union Territory.
Ther adaptation of the Delhi Special Police Establishment
Act by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 3) Order, 1956 by
substituting ’Union territories’ in place of ’Part C
States’, it is said, cut the Act adrift from the entry under
which the power could alone be exercised. This power is
limited in extent, it is argued, and cannot be used except
as specifically conferred and it applies to a police force
belonging to a State and not Union territory. In reply the
provisions of the General Clauses Act, as adapted by
Adaptation Order (No. 1) were brought to our notice.
Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act was adapted to read
"State"--
(a) as respects any period before the commence
ment of the Constitution(Seventh Amendment)
SupCI(NP)/70-12
8 90
Act, 1956, shall mean a Part A State, a Part B
State or a Part C State; and
(b) as respects any period after such
commencement. shall mean a State specified in
the First Schedule to the Constitution- and
shall include a Union territory".
Previously the definition read
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"State" shall mean a Part A State., a Part B
State or a Part C State".
This definition furnishes a complete answer to the
difficulty which is raised since Entry 80 must be read so as
to include Union territory. Therefore members of a police
force belonging to the Union territory can have their powers
and jurisdiction extended to another State provided the
Government of that State consents. The Bombay State has
consented as shown, above.
Faced with this complete answer the appellants raised argu-
ment that the powers of adaptation of the President in
relation to the General Clauses Act came to an end in 1953
and the adaptation of the General Clauses Act is ineffective
to give the new meaning of the word ’State’ in Entry 80.
This argument needs some consideration.
Article 367 which followed Art. 366 in which the terms of
the Constitution were expressly defined applied in addition
the provisions of the General Clauses Act for the
interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion
of India. The Article, however, said that the General
Clauses Act might be adapted and modified under Art. 372.
Under that article continuance of the laws in force in the
territory of India immediately before the commencement of
the Constitution was laid down by cl. (1). Clause (2) then
empowered the President to bring the provisions of any such
law into accord with the provisions of the Constitution by
making such adaptations and modifications of such laws
whether by way of repeal or amendment as were required and
by providing in that order the date from which the law
subject to the....... adaptation or modification was to have
effect. The clause further provided that any such
adaptation or modification shall not be questioned in any
court of law. If this power had no time limit the
adaptation of the General Clauses Act in 1956 would be
covered by Art. 372(2) but the learned counsel for the
appellants pointed out that there was a time limit of 2
years (later extended to 3 years) in clause (3) of the
article and that time limit expired in 1953. They contend
that the definition prior to the amendment would only apply.
891
This argument overlooks the provision of a fresh power of
adaptation confered on the President of India by Art. 372-A
which was introduced by the Constitution (Seventh
Amendment). Act 1956. that article reads :
"372A. Power of the President to adapt laws.
(1) For the purposes of bringing the
provisions of any law in force in India or in
any part thereof, immediately before the
commencement of the Constitution (Seventh
Amendment) Act, 1956, into accord with the
provisions of this Constitution as amended by
that Act, the President may by order made
before the 1st day of November, 1957, make
such adaptations and modifications of the law,
whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may
be necessary or expedient, and provide that
the law shall, as from such date as may be
specified in the order, have effect subject to
the adaptations and modifications so made. and
any such adaptation or modification shall not
be questioned in any court of law.,
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall be deemed to
prevent a competent legislature or other
competent authority from repealing or amending
any law adapted or modified by the President
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under the said clause."
This conferred a power on the President of India to adapt
any law in force in India by making such adaptations and
modifications, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may
be necessary and provide that the law so adapted or modified
shall have effect subject to the adaptations or
modifications so made and the adaptations and modification
shall not be questioned. This was a fresh power equal and
analogous to Art. 372(2). Therefore, when the President
adapted. the General Clauses Act by giving a new definition
of ’State’ the new definition appropriate to the purpose
applied to the interpretation of the Constitution. The word
’State’ in entry 80 of Union List, therefore, applied to
Union Territories also.
Reference is made to Ramkishore Sen & others v. Union of
India and others(1) where the reference was to Art. 372.
This was per incuriam as the proper reference ought to have-
been to Art. 372A. It is also argued that the definition
cannot be read at all the places where the word ’State’
occurs in the Constitution. A number of such articles were
brought to our notice. one such
(11) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 430 at 438,
89 2
being Art. 246(2). It is contended that in that clause at
least the definition cannot be read as including Union
Territories and, therefore, the General Clauses Act, as
amended, cannot be read in Entry 80 either. The argument is
correct that the definition cannot always be read. - But the
answer.is plain. The definitions apply unless there is
anything repugnant in the subject or context. After the
Seventh Amendment India is a Union of States (Art. 1) and
the territories thereof are specified in the First Schedule.
Then there are Union Territories which are mentioned
separately. There is thus a distinction between ’States’
and ’Union territories’ which cannot be lost sight of. When
the I definition cannot be made applicable owing to the
context or the subject, the word ’State’ refers to States in
the First Schedule only. Such an occasion arose in T. M.
Kanniyan v. Income-Tax Officer Pondicherry and Anr.(1‘) and
Bachawat J. explained Art. 246 by holding that the
definition of ’State’ in two parts in the adapted section
3(58) of the General Clauses Act was repugnant to the
subject and context of Art. 246. There is nothing in the
subject or context of Entry 80 of the Union List which can
be said to exclude the application of the definition in s.
3(58). Indeed the Part C States were expressly mentioned in
Entry No. 39 of the Federal List of the Government of India
Act, 1935 (after its amendment in 1947) and thus before the
Seventh Amendment the definition of State (subject to the
subject or context) included Part C States. Therefore, the
definition of ’State’ in s. 3(58) in the General Clauses Act
after the adaptation in 1956 applies and includes Union
Territories in Entry 80 of the Union List.
The last argument is that the Entry 80 of the Union List
speaks of a police force ’belonging to any State’ and this
phrase was also used in the Government of India Act, 1935 to
Entry 39 of the Federal Legislative List both before and
after its amendment in 1947. It is argued that in Ordinance
XXII of 1946 the phrase was ’for the Chief Commissioner’s
Province of Delhi’ and it was repeated in Act XXV of 1946
till the phrase was changed to ’for Part C States’. Thus
the word ’for’ took the place of the words ’belonging to’ in
the Entry. Then came the change to the present phrase ’a
special police force in Delhi.’
It is pointed out that the Special Police Establishment does
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not belong to the Union territory of Delhi, since the
superintendence of it vests in the Central Government. It
is said that the force of the words ’belonging to’ is not
the same as that of the word ’in’. Therefore it is claimed
that the Act is not in accord with the Entry.
(1) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 103 at 108.
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Various meanings of the expression ’belonging to’ are
suggested in the arguments before us. On behalf of the
appellants it is said that it meant ’employed by’ and not
merely ’located in’. In this sense, it is argued, the
Special Police Establishment did not belong to any State or
Union territory. On the other side it is argued that the
words ’belonging to’ convey no more than a territorial
nexus. The police force belong& to a part of India and it
does not have to belong to a Provincial Government or a
State Government or Government of a Union territory. The
extension of the powers, jurisdiction etc. of such a force
is also in another part of India, placing again an emphasis
on the territory. This shows that the police force of one
area operates in another area.
Now the scheme of the Constitution is that the Union
territories are centrally administered and if the words
’belonging to’ mean belonging to a part of India, the
expression is equal to a police force constituted to
function in an area. In this way the Delhi Police
Establishment means a police force constituted and
functioning in the Union territory of Delhi. Previously the
same force functioned in the Chief Commissioner’s Province
of Delhi, then in Part C State of Delhi and now it functions
in the Union territory of Delhi.
It is no doubt true that the words are susceptible of the
other meaning also but so long as the words are-capable of
bearing the meaning we have given it is not necessary to
discover another meaning under which the whole scheme would
become void. Provisions of law must be read as far as is
possible with a view to their validity and not to render
them invalid. In our judgment the expression ’belonging to’
only conveys the meaning that it is a police force
constituted and functioning in one area which may be
authorised to function in another area. The change from
’for’ to ’in’ makes no difference because both expressions
fit in with the meaning of the phrase ’belonging to’ in the
Entry. We see no force in this argument also.
The result is that the appeal is devoid of force-. It fails
and will be dismissed. There will be no order about costs.
G.C. Appeal
dismissed,
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