Full Judgment Text
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CS(COMM) 75/2021
R X INFOTECH PRIVATE LIMITED ..... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Sumit Nagpal, Ms. Dolly
Luthra and Ms. Aastha Sood, Advs.
versus
JALPA RAJESH KUMAR JAIN ..... Defendant
Through: Ms. Kangan Roda and Mr.
Sharad Besoya, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
% 29.08.2023
I.A. 4953/2023 (Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC)
1. This is an application, by the defendant, under Order VII Rule
11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for rejection of the
plaint on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.
2. Though a finding of want of territorial jurisdiction would
ordinarily carry one to Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC rather than
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, Ms. Kangan Roda has drawn my
attention to a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Radico
1
Khaitan Ltd. v. Nakshatra Distilleries & Breweries Ltd which
upholds the decision of a learned Single Judge to reject a plaint under
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC on the ground of want of territorial
jurisdiction.
1
(2017) 241 DLT 48
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM
Signing Date:01.09.2023
09:53:44
CS(COMM) 75/2021 Page 1 of 8
3. Without, therefore, entering into the distinction between Order
VII Rule 10 of the CPC and Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, I have
proceeded to hear learned Counsel on the core issue as to whether this
Court can be said to be lacking in territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate
the plaint. Ms. Roda initially drew my attention to para 46 of the
plaint, which deals with the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
plaint which reads thus:
“46. That this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction under Section 134
of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 as the Plaintiff, has been voluntarily
carrying on its activities in the jurisdiction of Delhi through its
head office and registered office at 601, 6th Floor Bhandari House,
91, Nehru Place New Delhi 110019, India.”
4. Ms. Roda submits that invocation of the territorial jurisdiction
of this Court has, therefore, been predicated in the plaint solely on
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Section 134 of the Trades Mark Act, 1999. She submits that, seen
solely in the light of Section 134, this plaint would not be amenable to
the jurisdiction of this Court, as the case would fall within the third
category of cases envisaged in para 14 of the judgment of the Division
Bench of this Court in Ultra Home Construction Pvt Ltd v.
3
Purushottam Kumar Chaubey . In the said paragraph, this Court had
| 2 134. Suit for infringement, etc. to be instituted before District Court. – | ||
|---|---|---|
| (1) No suit – | ||
| (a) for the infringement of a registered trade mark; or | ||
| (b) relating to any right in a registered trade mark; or | ||
| (c) for passing off arising out of the use by the defendant of any trade mark which | ||
| is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trade mark, whether registered or | ||
| unregistered, | ||
| shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit. | ||
| (2) For the purpose of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1), a “District Court having | ||
| jurisdiction” shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of | ||
| 1908) or any other law for the time being in force, include a District Court within the local limits of | ||
| whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceeding, the person | ||
| instituting the suit or proceeding, or, where there are more than one such persons any of them, | ||
| actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. | ||
| Explanation. – For the purposes of sub-section (2), “person” includes the registered proprietor and | ||
| the registered user. |
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM
Signing Date:01.09.2023
09:53:44
CS(COMM) 75/2021 Page 2 of 8
expressed the opinion, apropos Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act
that, if the plaintiff has a principal office at one place and subordinate
or branch office at another place and the cause of action arises where
the subordinate office is located, the plaintiff would be deemed to be
carrying on business where the subordinate office is located and
would necessarily have to institute the suit before the Court having
jurisdiction over the subordinate office, and not before the Court
having jurisdiction over the principal office, which would be coram
non judice . The said passage reads thus:
“14. It is evident from the above observations that the
interpretation given to the expression “carries on business” in the
context of a defendant under section 20 of the Code has also been
employed in the context of a plaintiff under the said sections
134(2) and 62(2). Thus, in addition to the places where suits could
be filed under section 20 of the Code, the plaintiff can also institute
a suit under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Copyright Act,
1957, as the case may be, by taking advantage of the provisions of
section 134(2) or section 62(2), respectively. Both the latter
provisions are in pari materia . Under these provisions four
situations can be contemplated in the context of the plaintiff being
a corporation (which includes a company). First of all, is the case
where the plaintiff has a sole office. In such a case, even if the
cause of action has arisen at a different place, the plaintiff can
institute a suit at the place of the sole office. Next is the case where
the plaintiff has a principal office at one place and a subordinate or
branch office at another place and the cause of action has arisen at
the place of the principal office. In such a case, the plaintiff may
sue at the place of the principal office but cannot sue at the place of
the subordinate office. The third case is where the plaintiff has a
principal office at one place and the cause of action has arisen at
the place where its subordinate office is located. In this
eventuality, the plaintiff would be deemed to carry on business at
the place of his subordinate office and not at the place of the
principal office. Thus, the plaintiff could sue at the place of the
subordinate office and cannot sue (under the scheme of the
provisions of section 134(2) and 62(2)) at the place of the
principal office. The fourth case is where the cause of action
neither arises at the place of the principal office nor at the place of
the subordinate office but at some other place. In this case, the
plaintiff would be deemed to carry on business at the place of its
principal office and not at the place of the subordinate office. And,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM
Signing Date:01.09.2023
09:53:44
CS(COMM) 75/2021 Page 3 of 8
consequently, it could institute a suit at the place of its principal
office but not at the place of its subordinate office.”
(Emphasis supplied)
5. If one were to examine the issue of jurisdiction in the present
case solely with reference to Section 134, then, perhaps, the
submission of Ms. Roda, might pass muster. However, Ultra Home
3
Construction itself referred, with emphasis, to Indian Performing
4 5
Rights Society Ltd v. Sanjay Dalia , which held that Section 20 of
the CPC would continue to apply despite Section 134 of the Trade
Marks Act and that, therefore, a plaintiff xcould sue the defendant
before any Court which would have jurisdiction either under Section
20 of the CPC or Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. Section 20 of
the CPC permits the institution of the plaint before any Court within
whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the cause of action has
arisen.
6. Ms. Roda has sought to point out that there is no reference, in
the plaint, to Section 20 of the CPC. As she somewhat quaintly
expressed it, if one were to attempt a “Ctrl F” search of the plaint,
with “Section 20” as the search term, it would yield no result.
| 5 20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises. – Subject to the | |
|---|---|
| limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction – | |
| (a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the | |
| commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally | |
| works for gain; or | |
| (b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement | |
| of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, | |
| provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not | |
| reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; | |
| or | |
| (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. | |
| Explanation. – A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or, in | |
| irfeiesdpect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place. |
CS(COMM) 75/2021 Page 4 of 8
7. The issue of whether a particular provision has been invoked in
a plaint, cannot, however, be admeasured in such a fashion, despite all
the benefits that technology now provides us. One is required to read
the plaint wholly and in a meaningful fashion. The cause of action, it
is well settled, is a compendious term for the bundle of facts which
constitute the basis for institution of the suit and which the plaintiff
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has to prove in order to entitle itself to an order or a decree . If,
therefore, any part of the facts pleaded in the plaint discloses a cause
of action having arisen in Delhi; then, despite there being no specific
reference to Section 20 in the plaint, the suit would, nonetheless, be
maintainable before this Court.
7
8. Various decisions of Division Benches of this Court have held
that, where the defendant is carrying on its infringing activities across,
inter alia , a website which is interactive, then, every Court which has
jurisdiction over a place where the website can be interactively
accessed would be competent to adjudicate on an infringement suit.
The prevailing reason for so holding, as per the said decisions, is that,
by making its infringing products available, or carrying out its
infringing activity on a virtual platform of website, the infringer
defendant has purposefully availed the jurisdiction of every Court
where the website can be accessed.
9. In the present case, there is a specific assertion, in para 36 of
6
Refer Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh, (1977) 1 SCC 791, State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties,
(1985) 3 SCC 217 , ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 , Bloom Dekor Ltd v. Subhash
Himatlal Desai, (1994) 6 SCC 322 , A.V.M. Sales Corporation v. Anuradha Chemicals (P) Ltd, (2012) 2
SCC 315
7
Refer Absogain Retail Solutions v. Puma Se, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2827 , Tata Sons Pvt Ltd
v. Hakunamatata Tata Founders, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2968 , Advertising Standards
Council of India v. Reckitt Benckiser India Pvt Ltd,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM
Signing Date:01.09.2023
09:53:44
CS(COMM) 75/2021 Page 5 of 8
the plaint, which reads thus:
“36. That Furthermore any subsequent third-party user of the mark
deceptively similar to the registered trademark of the Plaintiff that
is LAPCARE for identical/similar activities, goods and services as
that of Plaintiff, would either be considered to be the Plaintiff's
themselves or someone who has been authorised by the Plaintiff to
use the
mark. Such unauthorized activities and
services under Plaintiff's trademark LAPCARE and constitute
infringement of Plaintiff’s rights. Details of the products sold by
the Defendant as displayed on their website are being filed with
this suit. ”
10. While adjudicating on an application under Order VII Rule 11 –
or Order VII Rule 10 – of the CPC, it is settled that one is to restrict
oneself to the plaint along with the documents filed with the plaint. If
a document is in excess of the assertions in the plaint, then, perhaps,
the document could be ignored. However, the plaint in the present
case specifically refers to sale, by the defendant of infringing products
on its website. The pages of the website have been placed on record.
The pages of the website of the defendant clearly indicate the products
of the defendant. The last page of the website contains the following
recital:
“ BUY LAPTOP ACCESSORIES ONLINE
Lappie Care is the best laptop accessories shop to buy laptop
accessories online. We offer free shipping, 7-day money back
guarantee and maximum 6-months warranty. The support we
provide is 24 x 7 which has benefited lot of customers. You can
buy Laptop Keyboard, Laptop Battery, Laptop Adapter . Buy
high quality laptop accessories from lappiecare. We are in the
business since 2005.”
11. It is not Ms. Roda’s case – as it, quite obviously, cannot be –
that the facility of purchasing laptops or accessories from the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM
Signing Date:01.09.2023
09:53:44
CS(COMM) 75/2021 Page 6 of 8
defendant’s website online was not available at Delhi. Ms. Roda
submits that, by a glance at the aforesaid website, it is not apparent
that the products can be purchased at Delhi. The submission flies in
the face of common sense and simple principles governing the
internet. There is nothing on the website to indicate that an online
transaction cannot be carried out within Delhi. It is legitimately
presumable that it is possible to purchase laptops from the defendant’s
website even within the jurisdiction of this Court. The afore-noted
webpage, which empowers purchase of laptop accessories from the
defendant’s website online, read with the concluding assertion in para
36 of the plaint, reproduced supra, clearly indicates that at least a part
of the cause of action, within the meaning of Section 20 of the CPC,
can be said to have arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court.
12. Inasmuch as Section 20 of the CPC and Section 134 of the
Trade Marks Act both provide fora within which the suit could be
instituted and the present suit would lie within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Court, tested on the touchstone of Section 20 of the
CPC, I am unable to agree with the submissions of Ms. Roda that the
plaint is liable to be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 or for that
matter, even returned for presentation before any other forum under
Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC. On the basis of the averments
contained in the plaint seen in the light of the documents filed
therewith, a prima facie case of rightful invocation of the jurisdiction
of this Court, in the present case, by the plaintiff is made out.
13. Accordingly, this application, being devoid of merit, is
dismissed.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM
Signing Date:01.09.2023
09:53:44
CS(COMM) 75/2021 Page 7 of 8
CS(COMM) 75/2021
14. List before the learned Joint Registrar (Judicial) for completion
of the pleadings, admission and denial of documents and marking of
exhibits on 3 October 2023, whereafter the matter would be placed
before the Court for case management hearing and further
proceedings.
C.HARI SHANKAR, J
AUGUST 29, 2023
rb
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARIOM
Signing Date:01.09.2023
09:53:44
CS(COMM) 75/2021 Page 8 of 8