GELUS RAM SAHU vs. DR. SURENDRA KUMAR SINGH

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1667 OF 2020 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C)No. 32417 OF 2016]

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.1668 OF 2020 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C)No. 10647 OF 2017] JUDGMENT Leave Granted. 2. The appellants are aggrieved by the order dated 28.09.2016 of Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by CHARANJEET KAUR Date: 2020.02.18 18:26:55 IST Reason: the High Court of Chhattisgarh through which the writ petition filed by Surendra Kumar Singh (Respondent No. 1) seeking declaration of Page  | 1 Ph.D. being an essential qualification for the post of Principal at the Polytechnic colleges was allowed and consequently appointment of the appellants were quashed for want of the said qualification.  ACTS F 3. Respondent No. 1  started teaching  as a  lecturer  of  electrical engineering at the Govt Polytechnic College, Ambikapur on 10.11.1993 and was promoted as the Head of Department (hereinafter, “HOD”) of electrical engineering at the Govt Polytechnic, Durg from 03.03.2009. He   is   presently   working   at   Govt.   Polytechnic,   Kabirdham   with additional   responsibility   of   Principal­in­charge.   Having   completed three   years   of   service   as   HOD   on   01.01.2012,   Respondent   No.   1 applied   for   the   post   of   Principal   in   response   to   the   process   of promotion initiated by the State of Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 2) in 2014. Along with Respondent No. 1, numerous other serving HODs (including the seven appellants herein) too participated in the selection process. Whereas Appellants No. 1   to 7 were declared successful st through   notification   dated   25.06.2014,   the   1   respondent   did   not figure in the selection list.  4. Respondent No. 1 being aggrieved approached the High Court, complaining   that   his   fundamental   rights   stood   violated   as   the promotion process was in contravention of the ‘Pay Scales, Service Page  | 2 conditions and Qualifications for the Teachers and other Academic Staff   in   Technical   Institutions   (Diploma)   Regulations,   2010’ (hereinafter,   “2010   AICTE   Regulations”).   These   regulations   were framed by All India Council for Technical Education (Respondent No. 3, hereinafter “AICTE”) in exercise of its powers conferred under the AICTE   Act,   1987   which   has   been   enacted   by   Parliament   with reference to Entry 66 of the Union List contained in Schedule VII of the Constitution; and is thus binding on the State of Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 2). The ‘Chhattisgarh Technical Education (Teaching cadre­Polytechnic)   (Gazetted)   Service   Recruitment   Rules,   2014’ (hereinafter,   “2014   Chhattisgarh   Rules”),   in   so   far   as   they   allow candidates   without   Ph.D   to   be   appointed   as   Principals,   were contended to be illegal for being in contravention of the 2010 AICTE Regulations whereunder, according to respondent No. 1, Ph.D degree was a mandatory qualification for the post of Principal.  5. Respondent No. 1 butressed his superior claim highlighting that he had the requisite three­year HOD experience and there was no complaint or disciplinary enquiry pending against him. On the other hand, he urged that the appellants had been promoted though none of them was having Ph.D qualification. He further alleged several other irregularities   in   the   selection   process,   including   the   below­ specification   ACR   gradings   possessed   by   certain   candidates. Page  | 3 Accordingly,   Respondent   No.   1   sought   quashing   of   the   2014 Chhattisgarh Rules and the promotion order dated 25.06.2014; review of   the   proceedings   conducted   by   the   Departmental   Promotion Committee and the grading awarded to him in his Annual Confidential Reports   of   2012   and   2013,   and   further   sought   resultant reconsideration of his case for promotion from HOD to Principal. 6. The High Court viewed that the 2010 AICTE Regulations were binding, and relying upon a decision of the High Court of Kerala in  B 1 Ajith Kumar v. State of Kerala , it held that the State Government could not lower the qualification threshold .   Further, the High Court interpreted the AICTE criteria to imply that Ph.D was mandatory for appointment/promotion as ‘Principal’ and any ambiguity which could plausibly   have   existed   in   the   initial   formulation   of   2010   AICTE Regulations,   had   been   clarified   through   the   ‘All   India   Council   for Technical   Education   (clarifications   on   certain   issues/anomalies pertaining to Qualifications, Pay Scales, Service Conditions, Career Advancement Schemes (CAS) etc. for Teachers and other Academic Staff   of   Technical   Institutions   Degree/Diploma),   2016’   (hereinafter, “2016 AICTE Notification”) which although published on 04.01.2016 would   operate   retrospectively   being   clarificatory   in   nature. 1   (2009) 3 KLJ 563. Page  | 4 Consequently, the High Court quashed the incongruous parts of 2014 Chhattisgarh Rules.  7. The   High   Court     further   observed   how   Appellant   No.   1   was Chairman of the very Committee which drafted the 2014 Chhattisgarh Rules,   making   him   an   interested   party.   Noting   yet   other   infirmity regarding the date of publication of 2014 Chhattisgarh Rules in the official gazette, the High Court quashed the order promoting Appellant Nos. 1 to 7 to the posts of Principal of the Polytechnic Colleges.  ONTENTIONS C 8. The distressed appellants contend before us that there existed no ambiguity in the 2010 AICTE Regulations. These regulations clearly mention “or” between two sets of qualifications, one in which Ph.D was specified and the other without such prescription. It is submitted that the  High  Court could  hence  not   have  read  it  in  a   manner  which converted “or” into “and”. It was further submitted that even if any ambiguity existed, it was not open for the AICTE to retrospectively introduce an eligibility condition in a manner which would expropriate the appellants of their vested rights.  9. Highlighting   how   seven   out   of   nine   positions   would   remain vacant   in   case   a   Ph.D   degree   was   mandated   as   an   essential qualification   for   the   posts   of   Principal   in   polytechnic   colleges   in Page  | 5 Chhattisgarh, the appellants vociferously sought intervention of this Court. They further urged that having participated in the process of promotion, Respondent No. 1 had acquiesced to the interpretation and understanding of the Rules made by Respondent No. 2, and the former was   now   estopped   from   challenging   the   validity   of   the   selection­ process or of the 2014 Chhattisgarh Rules.  10. Respondent No. 1, on the other hand, reiterated that the AICTE is a statutory body established by the Parliament through the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987, and thus enjoys complete supremacy and superintendence over determination of standards for technical education. All technical institutions across the country are obliged to adhere to the minimum standards laid down by AICTE. Supporting the High Court’s interpretation, he maintains that since the 2010 AICTE Regulations mandated ‘Ph.D in Engineering’ as one of the   essential   qualification   for   the   post   of   Principal,   the   2014 Chhattisgarh Rules were ultra vires for having impermissibly relaxed st mandatory qualifications. The 1  Respondent adverts to certain other procedural   irregularities   in   framing   and   publication   of   the   2014 Chhattisgarh Rules, and additionally alleges that Respondent No. 2 not only violated the Chhattisgarh Public Service Promotion Rules, 2003 but also arbitrarily altered the minimum grading requirement to favour certain candidates. Page  | 6 11. Respondent No. 3 (AICTE) has submitted that it was not their case that candidates who had already been promoted to the posts of Principal despite not possessing Ph.D, should be removed. Drawing attention to various relevant provisions of the 2010 AICTE Regulations read with  the 2016 AICTE Notification, learned counsel for AICTE urged that any interpretation by this Court holding Ph.D mandatory ought only be prospective in application, and not retrospective. A NALYSIS 12. The AICTE Act, 1987 has been enacted, as explained briefly in para 4 of this order with an explicit power to  set up an Expert Body to regulate   the   standards   and   norms   in   technical   education   and   for establishment of institutions imparting such education. It is not a matter of dispute that AICTE is a creation of the said statute and the Regulations framed by it in exercise of the powers under the AICTE Act, 1987 carry the force of law. Indeed, it has been accepted by learned counsel for the parties that the 2010 AICTE Regulations would be the governing law, holding the field, and would bind all parties, including the State of Chhattisgarh. The foremost question which thus arises for our consideration is whether the 2010 AICTE Regulations, in fact, make it mandatory for candidates vying for the post of Principal to possess a Ph.D degree? Page  | 7 (i) Is   Ph.D   mandatory   for   appointment   to   the   post   of ‘Principal’ under the 2010 AICTE Regulations? 13. The cause of the present controversy is not difficult to fathom. Prerequisite   criteria   for   appointment   to   the   post   of   Principal   in   a Polytechnic   College   has   been   provided   under   the   2010   AICTE Regulations in a tabulated form, relevant parts of which are extracted below: 

14. Since   the   above   reproduced   clause   enables   a   ‘Head   of Department’   to   occupy   the   next   higher   post   of   Principal   `with’   or `without’ Ph.D qualification, it is necessary to find out the eligibility conditions   laid   down   for   appointment   of   different   Heads   of Department.   The   relevant   extracts   of   HOD   criteria   are   thus illustratively reproduced hereunder:  Page  | 8

15. A perusal of the qualification table makes it obvious that there can   be  multiple   HODs   for   different   departments   (like   Engineering, Architecture, Hotel Management, Pharmacy etc). In order to be HOD of any such Department, a prospective candidate needs to have both Master’s   and   Bachelor’s   degrees   in   the   relevant   field.   Whereas candidates with a Ph.D must have had 5 years of experience in the allied field, others without it must have worked for 10 years. Phrased differently, Ph.D is not mandatory for HOD, and instead results in a 5­ Page  | 9 year relaxation in requisite work experience. In other words, Ph.D has been treated equivalent to 5 years teaching experience. 16. The interpretation as propounded by Respondent No. 1 would necessarily mean that there is no power with a State Government to make Ph.D optional, and that the higher of the two alternate criteria specified under the 2010 AICTE Regulations would be binding on all. We find such a plea is problematic on two counts.   Firstly,   it implies that Ph.D, specifically in ‘Engineering’ only, would be compulsory for all   principals.   This   creates   an   inconsistency   as   such   a   restriction would be in conflict with the nature of ‘experience’ specified by the AICTE,   like   recognition   of   Experience   Certificate   granted   by   the Council for Architecture, which undoubtedly shows that there can be candidates   other   than   from   the   field   of   ‘Engineering’   eligible   for appointment   as   Principal.   Secondly,   such   a   contention   would   be iniquitous   in   so   far   as   it   disenfranchises   HODs   from   multiple recognised departments from applying to the posts of Principal, and arbitrarily restricts the zone of consideration to Engineering HODs only.   Such   seems   to   be   neither   the   intent   of   the   2010   AICTE Regulations nor is it supported by any cogent reasoning. 17. We are also not inclined to read down the rules to omit the ‘in Engineering’ part and only selectively insist upon a ‘Ph.D’, for in the present   facts   it   would   amount   to   crossing   the   fine   line   between Page  | 10 interpretation and legislation.  Hence, the only permissible way to read the AICTE criteria would be to lay emphasis on the phrase “or” and hence interpret ‘Ph.D in Engineering’ as being optional and it being discretionary   upon   the   adopting   institution/State   Government   to specify either of the two criteria.  18. This does not mean that we have not given due weightage to Ph.D   degree   while   interpreting   the   2010   AICTE   Regulations.   A candidate with Ph.D degree can become HOD with merely 5 years of work experience, whereas candidates without Ph.D need to work for 10 years. Although, requirement of experience for becoming Principal is 10 years uniformly, it comes with a stipulation that 3 years must have   been   spent   as   HOD   or   in   an   equivalent   position.   Thus,   a candidate without Ph.D would compulsorily need 10 years’ experience for HOD and would need to work further 3 years in that capacity, i.e. for minimum of 13 years’ experience to become Principal. Those with a Ph.D on the other hand, can apply for principal­ship within 10 years, as they would have become eligible for HOD with 5 years experience, and could have completed the further 3 years term as HOD in the interregnum.   Hence,   hypothetically,   there   is   a   5­year   eligibility relaxation granted under AICTE Regulations to those with a Ph.D.  19. The afore­stated advantage is only further exacerbated under the 2014 Chhattisgarh Rules, where those without a Ph.D need 15 years’ Page  | 11 experience   and   those   with   such   higher   degree,   can   be   appointed within 10 years. This can be well demonstrated from the following extracts of 2014 Chhattisgarh Rules:­

Page  | 12

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

Page  | 13

20. Additionally, construction of 2010 AICTE Regulations this way, avoids conflict with the 2014 Chhattisgarh Rules, as extracted above. Even otherwise, given a choice between two interpretations, one which restricts the pool of applicants for public employment and another which enfranchises many, it would befit the spirit of Article 16 that the expansive interpretation is adopted. Such a recourse  would both provide   opportunities   to   a   wider   meritorious   class,   will   increase competition and concomitantly ensure meritorious selections. (ii) Does the 2016 AICTE Notification retrospectively ‘clarify’ eligibility conditions for appointment as ‘Principal’? 21. The   next   question   which   logically   arises   is   whether   the notification   issued   by   the   AICTE   in   2016   changes   the   eligibility conditions   which   are   explicit   in   the   2010   AICTE   Regulations,   as discussed above. Page  | 14 22. The 2016 AICTE Notification has made a significant impact upon the High Court’s determination of the present dispute. The High Court has held that the said Notification, clearly specified through Issue No. 64 that Ph.D was compulsory for all Principals. As the notification was `clarificatory’,   it   was   held   applicable   retrospectively   which   would remove any ambiguity created by the 2010 AICTE Regulations and consequently   the   appellants   were   ineligible   to   hold   the   posts   of ‘Principal’. The relied­upon Issue No. 64 reads as under:

23. The appellants as well as the AICTE have drawn our attention to Issue No. 48 in the same table of 2016 AICTE Notification which, they contend, depicts a contrary picture. The relevant part of the 2016 Notification which has not been noticed by the High Court reads as under:

Page  | 15 24. After going through the contents of the 2016 AICTE Notification in its entirety, we are of the opinion that the conclusion drawn by the High Court is erroneous for a variety of reasons. At the very outset, no attempt appears to have been made to determine the nature of the 2016 AICTE Notification, as to whether it supplements an obvious omission in the 2010 AICTE Regulations and most importantly its effect on those who have meanwhile acquired vested rights.  25. ‘Clarificatory’ legislations are an exception to the general rule of presuming prospective application of laws, unless given retrospective effect either expressly or by necessary implication.   In order to attract this exception, mere mention in the title or in any provision that the legislation   is   ‘clarificatory’   would   not   suffice.   Instead,   it   must substantively be proved that the law was in fact ‘clarificatory’, as noted 2 by this Court in  Virtual Soft Systems v. CIT : “50. It may be noted that the amendment made to Section 271 by   the   Finance   Act,   2002   only   stated   that   the   amended provision would come into force with effect from 1­4­2003. The statute nowhere stated that the said amendment was either clarificatory or declaratory. On the contrary, the statute stated that the said amendment would come into effect on 1­4­2003 and therefore, would apply only to future periods and not to any period prior to 1­4­2003 or to any assessment year prior to Assessment   Year   2004­2005.   It   is   the   well­settled   legal position   that   an   amendment   can   be   considered   to   be declaratory and  clarificatory only if the  statute itself expressly   and   unequivocally   states   that   it   is   a 2 (2007) 9 SCC 665. Page  | 16 declaratory   and   clarificatory   provision.   If   there   is   no such   clear   statement   in   the   statute   itself,   the amendment   will   not   be   considered   to   be   merely declaratory or clarificatory. 51. Even if the statute does contain a statement to the effect that the amendment is declaratory or clarificatory, that is not the end of the matter. The Court will not regard itself as being bound   by   the   said   statement   made   in   the   statute   but   will proceed  to  analyse  the   nature  of   the  amendment  and   then conclude whether it is in reality a clarificatory or declaratory provision or whether it is an amendment which is intended to change the law and which applies to future periods.” (emphasis supplied) 26. The   present   case   is   one   where   except   for   the   title,   nothing contained   therein   indicates   that   the   2016   AICTE   Notification   was clarificatory in nature. The said Notification is framed in a question­ answer style and merely restates what has already been made explicit in the 2010 AICTE Regulations. There seems to be no intent to alter the position of law but instead only to simplify what the AICTE had resolved through its original regulation. The 2016 AICTE Notification is a response to the doubts put forth to AICTE by the public. This is evident from the stand put forth by AICTE before us in its reply as well as during the course of hearing, namely, that there is no retrospective alteration in the qualification prescribed for the post of Principal. 27. Even if the 2016 AICTE Notification was clarificatory, it must be demonstrated   that   there   was   an   ambiguity   in   the   criteria   for Page  | 17 appointment to the posts of Principal, which needed to be remedied. Clarificatory notifications are distinct from amendatory notifications, and the former ought not to be a surreptitious tool of achieving the ends   of   the   latter.   If   there   exists   no   ambiguity,   there   arises   no question of making use of a clarificatory notification. Hence, in the absence of any omission in the 2010 AICTE Regulations, the 2016 AICTE Notification despite being generally clarificatory must be held to have reiterated the existing position of law . 28. As discussed earlier, there were no two interpretations possible, and hence Issue Nos. 48 and 64 of 2016 AICTE Notification have, in no   uncertain   terms,   reprised   the   substance   of   2010   AICTE Regulations. (iii) Whether   retrospective   changes   in   qualificatory requirements can affect the existing appointments? 29. Having   held   that   the   2016   AICTE   Notification   is   only complementary to what the AICTE had laid down in 2010, we may hasten to add that even in a situation where eligibility conditions are clarified from an anterior date, it may not be prudent to affect the appointments   which   had   been   made   on   the   basis   of   a   possible understanding of the eligibility conditions. Page  | 18 30. This Court in a range of decisions including  TR Kapur v. State 3 4 and  of Haryana , K Ravindranath Pai v. State of Karnataka   K 5 Narayanan v. State of Karnataka ,   has   opined that vested rights cannot be impaired by enacting law with retrospective effect and that such   statutory   rules   ought   not   to   result   in   any   discrimination   or violation of constitutional rights.    31. The law on vested rights in service matters has exhaustively 6 been elaborated in   Railway Board v. Rangadhamiah,   wherein it has been stated: “20. It can, therefore, be said that a rule which operates in futuro so as to govern future rights of those already in service cannot   be   assailed   on   the   ground   of   retroactivity   as   being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, but a rule which seeks to reverse from an anterior date a benefit which has been granted or availed of, e.g., promotion or pay scale, can be assailed as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution to the extent it operates retrospectively. xxx 24. In many of these decisions the expressions “vested rights” or “accrued rights” have been used while striking down the impugned   provisions   which   had   been   given   retrospective operation  so  as  to  have  an adverse  effect  in the  matter of promotion,   seniority,   substantive   appointment,   etc.,   of   the employees. The said expressions have been used in the context of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought to be altered with effect from an anterior date and thereby taking 3  1986 Supp SCC 584. 4    1995 Supp (2) SCC 246. 5  1994 Supp (1) SCC 44. 6  (1997) 6 SCC 623 Page  | 19 away the benefits available under the rule in force at that time. It has been held that such an amendment having retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a benefit already available to the employee under the existing rule is arbitrary, discriminatory   and   violative   of   the   rights   guaranteed   under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. ...” 32. The aforestated principle would apply with equal force on the outcome of judicial review also and any new meaning given to a set of Rules/Regulations by the court of law would not ordinarily unsettle the settled appointments or conferment of other service benefits.  We are,   nevertheless,   fully   conscious   of   the   legal   position   that appointment   of   a   candidate   who   has   erroneously   secured   public employment without fulfillment of minimum qualifications can always be annulled upon   discovery   of   mistake.   An   appointment   which   is     erroneous   or   illegal   from   the   very   inception   does   not   clothe     the appointee with any indefeasible right and such appointment is always subject to correctional decisions. 33. There is no quarrel that the appellants herein do not possess Ph.D. However, they satisfied the requirement of having fifteen years’ experience (of which at least three years was as HOD) under the 2014 Chhattisgarh   Rules  and  were  found  suitable  for  promotion  by  the Departmental   Promotion   Committee   on   the   basis   of   various   other material.   They   have   also   been   found   in   possession   of   one   of   the eligibility criteria prescribed under the 2010 AICTE Regulations. We Page  | 20 are, thus, of the considered opinion that the appellants’ appointments ought to remain undisturbed in any eventuality. 34. This takes us to the last objection  taken by the High Court regarding ‘conflict of interest’.   It is not in dispute that the State Government   had   inducted   Appellant   No.   1   in   a   Committee   which submitted the draft service rules.   It is, however, difficult to accept (nor   has   it   been   alleged)   that   the   said   appellant   held   a   position through   which   he   could   influence   the   rule­making   authority   to exercise its powers under Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution as per his wishes.  He was holding too small a position that no inference of his dominance in the decision making process can be drawn. ONCLUSION C 35. In the light of the above discussion, the appeals are allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 challenging the promotion of appellants is dismissed but without any order as to costs. ………………………….CJI (S.A. BOBDE)    ……..……………………..J. (B.R. GAVAI) Page  | 21 …………………………… J. (SURYA KANT) NEW DELHI DATED : 18.02.2020 Page  | 22