PUSHPENDRA KUMAR SINHA vs. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 24-08-2022

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Full Judgment Text

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1333  OF 2022 [ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO.3440 OF 2021] PUSHPENDRA KUMAR SINHA     …..APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF JHARKHAND      ..…RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T J.K. Maheshwari, J. Leave granted.  2. The   Appellant   has   assailed   the   final   judgment   dated 06.01.2020 passed by High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Criminal Revision No. 1057 of 2018, by which the order dated Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Anita Malhotra Date: 2022.08.24 17:16:40 IST Reason: 04.07.2018   passed   by   learned   Special   Judge,   Anti­Corruption 1 Bureau   dismissing   the   application   for   discharge   filed   by   the Appellant under Section 239 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “ ”) in connection with Special Case No. 02 of Cr.P.C. 2011 has been affirmed. The criminal case was registered against the   Appellant   and   others   for   commission   of   offences   under Sections   109,  409,  420,   467,  471,  477A  and   120B  of   Indian Penal Code (for short “ IPC ”) and Section 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “ PC Act ”). 3. The facts briefly put are that the Appellant was working as an Executive Engineer (Electrical) (“ EE ”) in the Accelerated Power Development   Reforms   Program   (“ APDRP ”)   Wing   of   Jharkhand State Electricity Board (in short “ JSEB ”) from 07.12.2004. During his   tenure   as   EE,   one   Ramjee   Power   Construction   Limited (hereinafter “ ”)   was   awarded   a   contract   of   work   under   RPCL APDRP vide work order dated 27.01.2005. On account of delay in execution of the work and to resolve the said issue, the then Chairman   JSEB,   Mr.   Shivendu,   convened   a   meeting   on 21.12.2006, wherein he orally instructed Mr. R.P. Agarwal, the then Chief Engineer (“ CE ”), to place the agenda for next board 2 meeting for termination of the contract of M/s RPCL. Prior to convening   of   the   next   Board   meeting,   Mr.   V.N.   Pandey   was appointed as the new Chairman, JSEB on 04.01.2007. The new Chairman called for a meeting on 06.02.2007/07.02.2007 for the agenda   to   review   the   progress   of   RPCL’s   work.   In   the   said meeting, other officers of JSEB including Mr. R.P. Agarwal, CE, had participated. In the meeting, it was mutually agreed by JSEB and   RPCL   that   full   effort   to   complete   the   work   within   the extended   time,   i.e.   July,   2007   shall   be   made   by   RPCL.   In furtherance of the decision taken in the aforesaid meeting, Mr. R.P.   Agarwal,   CE,   made   various   correspondences   reminding RPCL to complete the pending work. On retirement of Mr. R.P. Agarwal,   Mr.   S.C.   Shrivastava   Superintending   Engineer (Electrical) was made in charge in place of Mr. R.P. Agarwal. Meanwhile, RPCL sent letters dated 16.05.2007, 18.05.2007 and 08.06.2007 requesting him for further extension of time. In the said correspondences, it was said that RPCL had already invoked the arbitration clause on 22.12.2006, in terms of the contract and requested JSEB for appointment of an arbitrator. The said letters were handed over to the Appellant, on which under the instructions,   the   Appellant   prepared   a  note   dated   08.06.2007 3 and   placed   it   before   the   Chairman   on   the   issue   relating   to appointment of an arbitrator and waiver of penalty, as advised by learned   Advocate   General   (“ ”)   of   State   of   Jharkhand   in AG similarly placed transmission lines projects.  4. Thereafter,   vide   JSEB   resolution   dated   28.06.2007,   a committee   consisting   of   one   Mr.   GNS   Munda   (Member, Technical), Mr. A. Banerjee (Finance) and Mr. A.K. Mishra (Law Officer) was constituted, which on 09.08.2007 suggested three names for appointment of an Arbitrator. Out of the three names as   suggested,   Mr.   Ramayan   Pandey   was   appointed   as   the arbitrator by consent. Arbitration proceedings commenced and an   interim   award   dated   25.11.2007   was   passed   in   favour   of RPCL.   Thereafter,   an   agenda   accompanied   with   the   aforesaid award was put before Chairman, Mr. B.M. Verma prior to asking for   an   opinion   from   the   AG,   State   of   Jharkhand,   regarding enforceability of the award. Later, as per the opinion of the AG, JSEB vide Board Resolution dated 05.04.2008 and 07.04.2008, decided to implement the interim award. It is worthwhile to state that,   Mr.   GNS   Munda   (Member,   Technical)   as   well   as   Smt. 4 Rajbala Verma (then Finance Secretary, State of Jharkhand) were part of this Board meeting.  5. It is pertinent to mention that, while giving effect to the award,   JSEB   was   facing   shortage   of   funds.   However,   JSEB decided to make internal enquiry into handling the work contract given to RPCL. On the basis of the said enquiry, allegations of malpractice and financial irregularity were levelled against the Appellant and some others. The Secretary, JSEB vide letter dated 30.07.2010, made a request to the Director General of Vigilance Bureau (“ ”) to lodge an FIR against the Appellant and others DGP for offences punishable under Sections 109, 409, 420, 467, 471, 477A and 120B of IPC and Section 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of PC Act. Additionally, another letter dated 03.09.2010, was issued by Smt. Rajbala Verma (then Vigilance Commissioner) to   the   DGP,   recommending   the   same   action   against   the Appellant. As already noted above, Smt. Rajbala Verma was also a part of the Board meeting (being the then Finance Secretary, State of Jharkhand) that had approved the implementation of the arbitral   award.   In   the   said   facts,   FIR   dated   20.01.2011   was lodged   against   the   Appellant   and   other   officers   of   the   JSEB. 5 Investigation was carried out, chargesheet dated 08.01.2016 was filed   and   cognizance   was   taken   by   the   Court   dealing   with vigilance   cases   vide   order   dated   11.01.2016.   Thereafter,   the Appellant moved a discharge petition under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C.,   which   came   to   be   dismissed   by   the   learned   Special Judge   vide   order   dated   04.07.2018.   The   Court   observed   that sufficient material exists to make out a  prima­facie  case against the Appellant for framing of charges.  6. Aggrieved by the same, the Appellant preferred a criminal revision   assailing   the   aforesaid   order.   The   High   Court   vide impugned order dismissed the revision and affirmed the order passed   by   the   learned   Special   Judge.   The   High   Court   was prima­facie   influenced by the fact that the previous chairman, JSEB, Mr. Shivendu had orally instructed to put up the agenda for termination of the contract of RPCL. On demitting the office by   the   said   Chairman,   the   Appellant   had   put   the   file   noting before   the   subsequent   Chairman   Mr.   V.N.   Pandey,   regarding referral of the matter for arbitration without mentioning about the instructions given by the previous Chairman, JSEB. The High Court   found   fault   in   the   action   of   the   Appellant   of   having 6 proposed an agenda regarding wrongful implementation of the award  which   was   challenged   belatedly.   Thus,   having   found  a prima­facie  case against the Appellant, the High Court dismissed the revision petition. 7. Learned counsel for the Appellant, Mr. Prashant Bhushan strenuously urged as under:  (i) the   Appellant   was   not   having   decision­making   power   or financial authority to carry out the contract and the award passed. The nature of duty assigned to the Appellant was confined to follow instructions of his superiors and by no stretch of imagination he can be said to have the power to refer the matter for arbitration in a case where the dispute is arising out of a work contract between JSEB and RPCL;  (ii) there is no concealment of the instruction of the previous Chairman   pertaining   to   termination   of   the   contract   as substantiated by noting dated 08.06.2007 on page no. 48 of the APDRP file which was the next page of noting of the CE on page no. 47, under instructions from the Chairman;  (iii) the prosecution has concealed that the verbal instruction for termination of contract given by the previous Chairman 7 in   the   meeting   dated   21.12.2006,   had   been   overturned within two months by the new Chairman, Mr. V.N. Pandey in   the   JSEB   tripartite   meeting   held   on   06.02.2007   and 07.02.2007, in which the Appellant was not a member; (iv) the questionable noting dated 08.06.2007 of the Appellant was   based   on   facts   and   documents   forming   part   of   the APDRP file endorsed to him by his controlling officer;  (v) the Appellant is being prosecuted on a wrong premise from the stage of granting time to complete the work, reference made to arbitration and till further directions for making the payment   for   the   interim   award   passed   against   JSEB,   in favour   of   the   RPCL.   He   was   not   a   part   of   the   decision­ making process or of taking further steps to implement the said   award.   Thus,   culpability   as   alleged   against   the Appellant, on the pretext of not putting up the agenda for cancellation of the contract amounts to abuse of the power and  prima­facie,  no case to prosecute him is made out; (vi) there is no allegation of illegal gratification, undue benefit or disproportionate   assets   qua   the   Appellant   in   the   FIR   or charge­sheet which is also backed by the income tax records of the Appellant;  8 (vii) prosecution has failed to establish any nexus between the Appellant and RPCL to whom the benefit is alleged to have been made;  (viii) while   granting   bail   to   the   Appellant   on   merits,   it   was categorically observed by the High Court that the Appellant had   put   up   the   matter   before   higher   authorities   for instructions   before   proceeding   further   and   did   not   act unilaterally; (ix) except for the Director of Finance, none of the decision­ making authorities namely, members of Central Purchase Committee and the Board of JSEB have been made accused in this case;               8. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent­State has argued in support of the concurrent findings of both the Courts and contended that the entire factual gamut of the instant appeal stems   around   the   pleadings   of   defence   including   reliance   on documents which cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage. It is further urged that at the stage of framing of charge, the scope of interference is limited, and the Court is not required to see as to whether there are sufficient grounds for conviction. The 9 Court has to only see the material collected during investigation and on consideration of the same, a  prima facie  case is made out or not.  9. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record, which reveals that after the board meeting dated 21.12.2006, the then Chairman Mr. Shivendu had orally instructed the then CE, Mr. R.P. Agarwal to place the agenda for termination of the contract of RPCL. As per the said instructions, the agenda was proposed and placed on 27.12.2006 by Mr. R.P. Agarwal. On the said proposed agenda, Member Technical put up a note on 19.01.2007, recording  “please discuss” . Thereafter, the meeting of the JSEB was held on 06.02.2007 and 07.02.2007, which was presided over by the new Chairman Mr. V.N. Pandey and Mr. R.P. Agarwal, CE, was a member of the said meeting. Either at the stage of the proposed agenda or in the meeting of the JESB held on 06.02.2007 and 07.02.2007, the Appellant had not participated in the decision­making process. The minutes of the aforesaid meeting is relevant and reproduced as under:  “MINUTES OF THE MEETING HELD ON 06.02.2007 & 07.02.2007 AT JSEB HQR. The following officer, consultant & contractors were present in the meeting:­ 10 1.  Shri V.N. Pandey Chairman 2. Shri R.P. Agarwal Chief Engineer (APDRP) 3.  Shri P. Ranjan                               General Manager­cum­               Chief Engineer/Jamshedpur     4. Shri Niranjan Rai        Director (Finance) 5. Shri Madhup Kumar       Director (RE/Plan) 6. Shri P. Raghu       RITES Ltd. 7. Shri Y.P. Singh           do 8. Shri A.K. Singh RPCL 9. Shri T.K. Bhattacharya    do The issue of M/s RPCL was discussed in length. Work of Jamshedpur town under APDRP has been awarded to M/s RPCL vide W.O. Nos. 28 & 29 dated 27.01.2005. The progress was reviewed   and   found   that   progress   is   very­very   slow.   After discussion, JSEB & M/s RPCL mutually agreed on the following points:­ 1. M/s RPCL will submit photo copy of all orders placed by them for   procurement   of   materials   for   the   APDRP   work   of Jamshedpur to Chief Engineer/APDRP & m/s RITES Ltd., the consultant. 2. JSEB will help Ms RPCL for procurement of materials. 3. JSEB will be make payment immediately (probably within a week) after submission of bills by M/s RPCL. 4. Approval of additional B.O.Q. and items shall be given by JSEB immediately. 5. M/s RPCL will submit fresh inspection call of materials to Electrical   Superintending   Engineer­cum­CEO/General Manager­cum­Chief   Engineer,   Jamshedpur   for   getting inspecting officer deputed. 6. M/s RPCL will contract Chief Engineer (APDRP) if here is any delay in issuing Road permits by Chief Engineer (S&P). 7. M/s RPCL agreed that they will apply their full efforts to complete   the   project   so   that   it   may   be   completed   within extended completion period i.e. July’ 07 instead of going for Arbitration/Court of Law. 8. JSEB will review the matter of L.D. clause after completion of the project work. Sd/­ 11 (R.P. Agrawal) Chief Engineer (APDRP) Memo No.  ­­­­­        Dated­­­­­­­­ Copy forwarded to all concerned officers/M/s RITES Ltd./ M/s  RPCL for information and necessary action. Fax – 2543986” 10. The   perusal   of   the   aforesaid   minutes   and   the   proposed agenda   dated   27.12.2006   prepared   by   Mr.   R.P.   Agarwal,   CE, reveals that the oral recommendation of the then Chairman, Mr. Shivendu, was drawn in the proposed agenda but it was not acted upon as per the noting dated 19.01.2007 made by the Member Technical who made an endorsement   “Please discuss” . Thereafter, what was the agenda that was put forth in the next JSEB   meeting,   is   not   on   record.   The   minutes   of   the   Board meeting   reflect   that   Mr.   R.P.   Agarwal   who   had   prepared   the agenda dated 27.12.2006, was a part of the said meeting. The decisions were taken in the said meeting with the mutual consent of the parties. The  Appellant was  not a  part  of the  decision­ making process. In the said meeting as per clause (7), it was decided  that   “M/s RPCL agreed that they will apply their full efforts to complete the project so that it may be completed within extended   completion  period, i.e.,  July’  07,  instead   of  going  for 12 Arbitration/Court of Law.”   Correspondences further reflect that prior to demitting the office, Mr. R.P. Agarwal, CE, wrote three letters, of which two were dated 05.04.2007 and one was dated 25.04.2007, requesting RPCL for implementation of the contract as per the decision of JSEB. The said correspondence also does not   show   any   involvement   of   the   Appellant.   As   alleged,   the agenda dated 08.06.2007 was prepared by the Appellant, wherein the following instructions were required to be obtained: “…….Hence instruction may be obtained on: (i) Appointment of an arbitrator in light of the advice of the AG Jharkhand. (ii) Waiver   of   penalty   in   light   of   the   advice   of   the   AG, Jharkhand, and (iii) Putting the agenda for further time extension incorporating the condition of approval of revised BQO which could not be given till date.” 11. On perusal of the JSEB Board meeting dated 06.02.2007 and 07.02.2007, it is clear that extension was granted up to July 2007 instead of going in for arbitration or approaching the Court of Law. The JSEB and its members were not inclined to cancel the   contract   and   the   decision   was   taken   by   mutual   consent. Therefore, the instructions sought by the Appellant as per the agenda dated 08.06.2007, were either based on the advice of the learned   AG   of   Jharkhand   or   in   furtherance   of   the   previous 13 decision of the Board. Later, it was directed that JSEB, Member Technical may constitute a committee consisting of officers from ‘Technical’, ‘Finance’ and ‘Law’ to suggest the names to appoint an   Arbitrator,   after   approval   of   the   Chairman.   The   Member Technical proceeded in the matter of appointment of Arbitrator and three names were proposed on 09.08.2007, out of which, Mr. Ramayan   Pandey,   Ex­Law   Secretary,   State   of   Jharkhand   was appointed   as   an   arbitrator.   The   Arbitrator   passed   an   interim award on 25.11.2007, in favour of RPCL.  12. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, it is apparent that at the time of taking a decision by the JSEB on 06.02.2007 and 07.02.2007, the Appellant was neither involved nor was part in the proposal or the decision­making process. He had prepared the   proposed   agenda   for   instructions   on   08.06.2007,   in furtherance of clause (7) of the aforesaid Board meeting, and based on the advice of the learned AG, State of Jharkhand in the matter of appointment of an Arbitrator and waiver of penalty, as suggested. Even after the proposed agenda for termination of the contract dated 27.12.2006, prepared by the then CE Mr. R.P. Agarwal, it was not acted upon because Member Technical on 14 19.01.2007, had put up a note  “Please discuss” . Later, the Board took a decision on 06.02.2007 and 07.02.2007. Thus, it is clear that the question of termination of contract in the opinion of the Board was dropped and the recourse to complete the work within the   extended   time   was   agreed   in   place   of   going   in   for arbitration/Court of Law. The same has also been observed by the High Court in its order dated 02.05.2016, while granting bail to the Appellant on merit. In the said facts, merely preparing a subsequent agenda dated 08.06.2007, seeking instructions for appointment   of   an   Arbitrator   would   not   bring   the   Appellant within the purview of culpability for commission of the alleged offences. This Court has reason to believe that the decisions, if any, taken by  the   JSEB  and   other   higher   officials  were   after perusal of the complete noting in the file. After implementation of the   said   decision,   arbitral   proceedings   were   commenced   and award   dated   25.11.2007   was   passed.   Thereafter,   the   agenda regarding implementation of the award was put up before the Chairman, Mr. B.M. Verma who vide noting dated 27.01.2008, made   a   request   to   the   AG   to   give   legal   opinion   about   the maintainability and enforceability issues relating to the interim award. The learned AG responded by letter dated 31.01.2008, 15 opining  that  the  award  did  not suffer  from  any  illegality  and should   be   implemented.   Accordingly,   the   Board   of   JSEB approved   the   interim   arbitral   award   vide   resolution   dated 05.04.2008 and 07.04.2008. In the said meeting, Smt. Rajbala Verma (then Finance Secretary to the State of Jharkhand) also participated and duly approved the resolution. 13. The   perusal   of   material   indicates   that   because   it   was difficult for the JSEB to implement the award due to financial difficulty,   a   roving   and   fishing   enquiry   was   conducted,   in consequence   of   which,   Secretary,   JSEB   vide   letter   dated 30.07.2010   and   Smt.   Rajbala   Verma   (then   Vigilance Commissioner) vide letter dated 03.09.2010, requested the DGP, Vigilance Bureau to register an FIR against the Appellant. We fail to understand as to why the same person, who had approved the implementation of award as a member of the Board, had later as Vigilance Commissioner, recommended initiation of prosecution against the Appellant, who had merely prepared the agenda for appointment of an arbitrator and had nothing to do with the approval of the award and payment of money. In view of the aforesaid, if at all any culpability had to be assigned, it should 16 have been assigned after examining the role of senior authorities who were involved in the decision­making process. Astonishingly, most   of   the   senior   officials,   who   approved   various   decisions regarding   extension   of   time,   appointment   of   arbitrator   and implementation of arbitration award and consequent payment to RPCL have not been arrayed as accused. In our considered view, prima­facie   there   is   nothing   which   affixes   culpability   or constitutes commission of offence including   on the part mens­rea of the Appellant. It seems that an attempt has been made to implicate the Appellant for the decisions in which  prima­facie,  he did not  have  any   role  to  play,   nor  do  his  acts   establish  any culpability regarding the alleged offences. 14. If at all there were issues with respect to the maintainability of the award due to the provisions of the contract, particularly as per the contended negative covenant, the same should have been highlighted by the learned AG, especially when his opinion was expressly sought. We find it difficult to accept that the opinion of the learned AG was prejudiced merely because he was not made aware of the negative covenant pertaining to price variation by an engineer of the JSEB who has limited exposure in the domain of 17 law. We have no hesitation in stating that AG being the highest law officer of a State, is competent to advise the State on legal matters after due diligence, taking into consideration all relevant factors and material. Therefore, the Appellant cannot be said to influence or impact the opinion of the learned AG which had resulted in approval of JSEB to implement the award. Hence, in our considered view, it cannot be inferred that the Appellant led the AG and the JSEB to implement the award with fraudulent or dishonest intention to cause loss to JSEB and benefit to RPCL.  15. On a perusal of the FIR, we find that it is alleged against Umesh   Kumar,   Financial   Controller   –   III   and   the   present Appellant,   CE   (APDRP),   that   they   made   payment   of Rs.4,89,24,788/­ against the gross value of Rs. 7,89,84,826/­, as per   the   arbitral   award   without   approval   of   the   competent authority. Mr. Umesh Kumar had filed quashment petition being ‘Cr.   M.P.   No.   2136/2015’   before   the   High   Court   wherein   the Court   on   the   allegation   of   payment   without   approval   of   the competent   authority   (as   alleged   against   Appellant   also)   has observed as under: “1. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the records, I do find that nothing is there against the 18 petitioner   with   respect   to   appointment   of   M/s   RPCL   nor anything   is   there   in   the   matter   of   appointment   of   an Arbitrator. Only when award was given by the Arbitrator, the petitioner did make payment of the amount which had been awarded not from the working fund but from the loan fund. This   has   been   taken   by   the   Vigilance   to   be   illegal   as according to it the payment should not have been made from the existing loan amount, as the loan had never been taken for the purpose of making payment of the amount awarded by   the   Arbitrator.   This   accusation   cannot   be   the   subject matter of the prosecution in absence of anything being placed that there was restriction on the part of the authority of the Board to make payment of the amount covered under the award passed against the Board from the loan account. It is opinion   of   the   Vigilance   not   based   on   any   circular   or guideline  that the payment should have  been made after having a fresh loan from the Power Finance Corporation. It be stated that the petitioner is to act according to his own wisdom and not as per the wishes of others and if nothing is there showing any culpability in the matter of payment of the amount, the petitioner cannot be said to have committed any wrong. 2. Coming   further,   it   be   stated   that   the   petitioner   passed release   order   with   respect   to   payment   of   a   sum   of   Rs. 4,89,24,788/­ but that release order was passed without having any approval of the Chairman though such post facto approval according to the petitioner has been granted by the Chairman   not   on   the   file   but   on   separate   sheet   which according to the Vigilance is bad but even if this irregularity is there in the matter of payment of the said amount, his culpability can only be found when something is more there showing his connivance or conspiracy with the  contractor though the Vigilance has tried to establish that the file moved so fast but that never indicates about the culpability of the petitioner, as there may be conspiracy of other officials with the contractor on account of which the file moved so fast. Furthermore, it has never been the case of the vigilance that the aforesaid payments were made without the materials being supplied or short supplied. 19 3. Further, it be stated that the ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are that there should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be   proved   either   by   direct   evidence   or   by   circumstantial evidence or by both and it is a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence   have   to   be   considered   to   decide   about   the complicity of the accused. Even, if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy. Inferences   from   such   proved   circumstances   regarding   the guilt   may   be   drawn   only   when   such   circumstances   are incapable   of   any   other   reasonable   explanation.   In   other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been   established   on   mere   suspicion   and   surmises   or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence. This proposition of law has been laid down by the Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in   a   case   of   Central   Bureau   of Investigation,   Hyderabad   Vs.   K.  Narayana   Rao   {(2012)   9 SCC 512}. Here in the instant case, nothing appears to be there for showing connivance or conspiracy except aforesaid two facts which have been dealt with hereinabove regarding payment of the amount to the contractor.” 16. The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings against Umesh Kumar with the above said observations. Assailing the same, Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4062 of 2017, was filed by the State of Jharkhand, which was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 05.02.2020, after condoning the delay. As 20 per the FIR allegations, it is alleged that Umesh Kumar and the present Appellant had made the payment of Rs.4,89,24,788/­ against the gross value of Rs.7,89,84,826/­ without approval of the competent authority. In this regard, the allegation against the Appellant is that he suggested that part payment of the arbitral award   may   be   made   to   RPCL   from   the   working   fund,   on refundable basis since there was no fund available in the Power Finance   Corporation   Account.   It   is   not   the   case   of   the prosecution that the Appellant had made payment to the agency. However, it can be inferred that the Appellant has suggested the possible mode of payment in furtherance of the Board’s office order no.   243   dated  16.03.2006,  after  passing  of   the   arbitral award which was required to be paid alongwith interest, but to satisfy the award by noting, the said suggestion was made. In our view, this itself is not sufficient to implicate the Appellant. In addition   thereto,   it   is   most   pertinent   that   even   on   such   a suggestion, the payments were not made from the working fund, rather, part payment of the award was made from the loan taken from   Power   Finance   Corporation   on   the   recommendation   of Umesh Kumar, against whom criminal proceedings have been 21 quashed as indicated hereinabove and the said order has not been interfered with by this Court.  17. It   is   also   worthwhile   to   mention   that   during   the investigation,   no   incriminating   material   or   money   was   seized from the house of the Appellant. Further, it is not a case where allegations of illegal gratification or disproportionate assets have been successfully found by prosecution against the Appellant. On the contrary, when the Income Tax Department had assessed the block   income   tax   return   for   seven   years,   the   Department recorded   a   refund   Rs.8843   to   the   Appellant   after   detailed scrutiny of the records.  18. It is a well settled law that at the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing of charge the Court must apply it’s judicial   mind   on   the   material   placed   on   record   and   must  be satisfied   that   the   commission   of   offence   by   the   accused   was possible. Indeed, the Court has limited scope of enquiry and has to see whether any  prima­facie  case against the accused is made out or not. At the same time, the Court is also not expected to mirror   the   prosecution   story,   but   to   consider   the   broad 22 probabilities   of   the   case,   weight   of   prima­facie   evidence, documents produced and any basic infirmities etc. In this regard the judgment of   Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4”   can be profitably referred for ready reference. Having due regard to the documents placed before us and in the light of the submissions and discussion made above, we are of the   considered   view   that   sufficient   grounds   casting   a   grave suspicion on the Appellant, do not exist. It is observed that the ingredients of alleged offences cannot be  prima­facie  established against   the   Appellant   as   neither   had   he   been   entrusted   with funds of JSEB nor he had fraudulently or dishonestly deceived senior officials of the JSEB to cause any benefit to RPCL or any wrongful loss to JSEB and no evidence of illegal gratification or disproportionate assets has been found against the Appellant.   19. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court erred in refusing to exercise the revisional powers vested in it under Sections 397 and 401 of the Cr.P.C.   and   dismissing   the   criminal   revision   preferred   by   the Appellant.   In   the   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   as discussed, the inescapable conclusion that can be drawn in this 23 case that ingredients of the alleged offences are not   prima­facie made out against the Appellant. Therefore, we deem it fit to allow the   instant   appeal   and   set­aside   the   impugned   order. Consequently,   the   Appellant   is   discharged   in   the   criminal proceedings arising out of Special Case No.02 of 2011. ……………………..CJI. [N.V. Ramana] ………………………..J. [J.K. Maheshwari] ………………………..J. [Hima Kohli] New Delhi; August 24, 2022 24