Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5483 of 2007
PETITIONER:
Yadvendra Arya & Anr
RESPONDENT:
Mukesh Kumar Gupta
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/11/2007
BENCH:
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5483 OF 2007
(Arising out of SLP (C)No. 19545 of 2006)
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a
learned Single Judge of the Uttranchal High Court allowing
the writ petition filed by the respondent. Said respondent
undisputedly is the landlord of the premises which were let
out to the present appellants.
3. An application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. (Urban
Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972,
(Act No.13 of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the ’Act’) was
filed by the respondent against the appellants praying for the
release of the Shop situated at Mohalla Bazar Ganj (Park
Road), Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar, which was
under tenancy on the ground that the respondent has passed
High School Certificate Examination and is unemployed and
he has no independent business to earn his livelihood and,
therefore, he wants to do the business of Electrical Goods,
T.V., V.C.R., Music System, Cooking Range etc. in the said
Shop.
4. It was, further, stated by the landlord in his release
application that his father Sri Mithilesh Kumar Gupta is doing
the independent business in the name of Mithilesh Kumar
and Brothers of which his father is the sole owner and there is
no possibility of employing any other person, as the shop in
possession of his father is not so elaborate ’so as to
accommodate the respondent also. It was also stated that he
also does not want to join the business along with his father,
as he wants to do the independent business. It has further
been stated in the release application that he has already
been married in 1994 and is separate from his father and as
such, the shop in dispute is required for his own use and
occupation for settling himself in the independent business.
5. A written statement was filed by the present appellants
in which it was stated that the landlord can be accommodated
in the business of the father.
6. An affidavit was filed by the respondent who has
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deposed that he wants to run the independent business and
he cannot settle himself along with his father. So far as the
availability of the other shops are concerned, it was
specifically stated that all other shops are rented
accommodation and the tenants are occupying the same.
7. The prescribed authority, Kashipur District Udham Singh
Nagar allowed the application of the respondent directing the
appellants to vacate the shop within a period of 30 days.
8. Being aggrieved the appellants preferred an appeal which
was allowed by the appellate authority. The respondent filed
Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
1950 (in short the ’Constitution’). The High Court as noted
above allowed the writ petition of the respondent and directed
the appellants to vacate the premises.
9. In support of the appeal, it was contented by learned
counsel for the appellants that the parameters relating to
bonafide needs and comparative hardship have not been
considered in the proper perspective.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand
supported the judgment of the High Court stating that the
High Court has kept in view the factual scenario and applied
the appropriate and applicable principles and, therefore, no
interference is called for.
11. So far as the basic need concept is concerned in
Akhileshwar Kumar and Others v. Mustaqim and Others [AIR
2003 SC 532] it was inter alia held as follows:
"In our opinion, the approach adopted by the
High Court cannot be countenanced and has
occasioned a failure of justice. Overwhelming
evidence is available to show that the plaintiff
No. 1 is sitting idle, without any adequate
commercial activity available to him so as to
gainfully employ him. The plaintiff No. 1 and
his father both have deposed to this fact.
Simply because the plaintiff No. 1 is
provisionally assisting his father in their family
business, it does not mean that he should
never start his own independent business.
What the High Court has overlooked is the
evidence to the effect, relied on by the trial
Court too, that the husband of plaintiff No. 4,
i.e. son-in-law of Ram Chandra Sao, was
assisting the latter in his business and there
was little left to be done by the three sons.
4. So is the case with the availability of
alternative accommodation, as opined by the
High Court. There is a shop in respect of which
a suit for eviction was filed to satisfy the need
of plaintiff No. 2. The suit was compromised
and the shop was got vacated. The shop is
meant for the business of plaintiff No. 2. There
is yet another shop constructed by the father
of the plaintiffs which is situated over a septic
tank but the same is almost inaccessible
inasmuch as there is a deep ditch in front of
the shop and that is why it is lying vacant and
unutilized. Once it has been proved by a
landlord that the suit accommodation is
required bona fide by him for his own purpose
and such satisfaction withstands the test of
objective assessment by the Court of facts then
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choosing of the accommodation which would
be reasonable to satisfy such requirement has
to be left to the subjective choice of the needy.
The Court cannot thrust upon its own choice
on the needy. Of course, the choice has to be
exercised reasonably and not whimsically. The
alternative accommodation which have
prevailed with the High Court are either not
available to the plaintiff No. 1 or not suitable
in all respects as the suit accommodation is.
The approach of the High Court that an
accommodation got vacated to satisfy the need
of plaintiff No. 2, who too is an educated
unemployed should be diverted or can be
considered as relevant alternative
accommodation to satisfy the requirement of
plaintiff No. 1, another educated unemployed
brother, cannot be countenanced. So also
considering a shop situated over a septic tank
and inaccessible on account of a ditch in front
of the shop and hence lying vacant cannot be
considered a suitable alternative to the suit
shop which is situated in a marketing
complex, is easily accessible and has been
purchased by the plaintiffs to satisfy the felt
need of one of them."
12. In Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co.
[2000(1) SCC 679] it was held as follows :
"It is settled position of law that the landlord is
best judge of his requirement for residential or
business purpose and he has got complete
freedom in the matter. (See: Prativa Devi (Smt.)
v. T.V. Krishnan, [(1996)5 SCC 353]. In the
case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted
eviction of the tenant from the suit premises
for starting his business as it was suitable and
it cannot be faulted."
13. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal [(2002(5) SCC
397) it was held as follows:
"In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors.
v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1998) 2 SCC
1) this Court emphasized the need of social
legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a
balance between rival interests so as to be just
to law. "The law ought not to be unjust to one
and give a disproportionate benefit or
protection to another section of the society".
While the shortage of accommodation makes it
necessary to protect the tenants to save them
from exploitation but at the same time the
need to protect tenant is coupled with an
obligation to ensure that the tenants are not
conferred with a benefit disproportionately
larger than the one needed. Socially
progressive legislation must have a holistic
perception and not a shortsighted parochial
approach. Power to legislate socially
progressive legislation is coupled with a
responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and
unreasonability. A legislation impregnated with
tendency to give undue preference to one
section, at the cost of constraints by placing
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shackles on the other section, not only entails
miscarriage of justice but may also in
constitutional invalidity.
xxx xxx xxx
The need for reasonable interpretation of
rent control legislations was emphasized by
this Court in Bega. Begum v. Abdul Ahad
Khan (1979 AIR SC 273). Speaking in the
context of reasonable requirement of landlord
as a ground for eviction, the Court guarded
against any artificial extension entailing
stretching or straining of language so as to
make it impossible or extremely difficult for the
landlord to get a decree for eviction. The Court
warned that such a course would defeat the
very purpose of the Act which affords the
facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord
on certain specified grounds. In Kewal Singh v.
Lajwanti (1980) 1 SCC 290) this Court has
observed, while the rent control legislation has
given a number of facilities to the tenants, it
should not be construed so as to destroy the
limited relief which it seeks to give to the
landlord also. For instance, one of the grounds
for eviction which is contained in almost all
the Rent Control Acts in the country is the
question of landlord’s bona fide personal
necessity. The concept of bona fide necessity
should be meaningfully construed so as to
make the relief granted to the landlord real
and practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v.
Dr Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222)
the Court has held that the concept of bona
fide need or genuine requirement needs a
practical approach instructed by the realities
of life. An approach either too liberal or too
conservative or pedantic must be guarded
against.
9. The rent control legislations are heavily
loaded in favour of the tenants treating them
as weaker sections of the society requiring
legislative protection against exploitation and
unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords.
The legislative intent has to be respected by
the courts while interpreting the laws. But it
is being uncharitable to legislatures if they
are attributed with an intention that they
lean only in favour of the tenants and while
being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of
being unfair to the landlords. The legislature
is fair to the tenants and to the landlords -
both. The courts have to adopt a reasonable
and balanced approach while interpreting
rent control legislations starting with an
assumption that an equal treatment has been
meted out to both the sections of the society.
In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour
of the tenants, while interpreting such of the
provisions as take care of the interest of the
landlord the court should not hesitate in
leaning in favour of the landlords. Such
provisions are engrafted in rent control
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legislations to take care of those situations
where the landlords too are weak and feeble
and feel humble.
xxx xxx xxx
In providing key to the meaning of any
word or expression the context in which it is
set has significance. Color and content
emanating from context may permit sense
being preferred to mere meaning depending
on what is sought to be achieved and what is
sought to be prevented by the legislative
scheme surrounding the expression.
Requirement of landlord for his own use, is
an expression capable for attributing an
intention to the legislature that what was
intended to be fulfilled is such requirement
as would persuade the landlord to have the
premises vacated by the tenant, to forego the
rental income, and to put the premises to
such use as the landlord would deem to be
his own use and in the given facts and
circumstances of a case the Court too would
hold it to be so in contradistinction with a
mere ruse to evict the tenant. The legislature
intending to protect the tenant also intends
to lift the protection when it is the
requirement of landlord to put the
accommodation to such use as he intends,
away from leasing it out.
xx xxx xxx
32. If we do not meaningly construe the
concept of requirement the provision may
suffer from the risk of being branded as
unreasonable, arbitrary or as placing
uncalled for and unreasonable restrictions on
the right of the owner to hold and use his
property. We cannot place a construction on
the expression ‘for his own use’ in such a
way as to deny the landlord a right to evict
his tenant when he needs the accommodation
for his own son to settle himself well in his
life. We have to give colour and content to the
expression and provide the skin of a living
thought to the skeleton of the words, which
the Legislature has not itself chosen to
define. The Indian society, its customs and
requirements and the context where the
provision is set in the legislation are the
guides leading to acceptance of the meaning
which we have chosen to assign to the words
‘for his own use’ in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the
Act.
33(1)In the present case, the requirement
of landlord of the suit premises for user as
office of his chartered accountant son is the
requirement of landlord ’for his own use’
within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii)."
14. Again in G.C. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin (AIR 2002
SC 200) it was noted as follows:
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"It is settled position of law that bonafide
requirement means that requirement must be
honest and not tainted with any oblique motive
and is not a mere desire or wish. In Dattatraya
Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali
Kotkunde and Anr. (1999 (4)SCC1) this Court
while considering the bonafide need of the
landlord was of the view that when a landlord
says that he needs the building for his own
occupation, he has to prove it but there is no
warrant for ’presuming that his need is not
bonafide’. It was also held that while deciding
this question. Court would look into the broad
aspects and if the Courts feels any doubt
about bonafide requirement, it is for the
landlord to clear such doubt.
10. In Raghunath G. Panhale G. Panhale (D) By
Lrs. v. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co.
(1999(8)SCC1)his Court inter alia held that it
was not necessary for landlord to prove that he
had money to invest in the new business
contemplated nor that he had experience of it.
It was a case for eviction on the ground of
bona fide requirement of the landlord for non-
residential purpose, as he wanted to start a
grocery business in the suit premises to
improve his livelihood."
15. In Mst. Begam Begum & Ors. V. Abdul Ahad Khan (d) by
Lrs & Ors. (1979(1) SCC 273) this court had occasion to deal
in detail with the comparative hardship’s aspect as follows:
"Moreover Section 11(h) of the Act uses the
words ’reasonable requirement’ which
undoubtedly postulate that there must be an
element of need as opposed to a mere desire or
wish. The distinction between desire and need
should doubtless be kept in mind but not so
as to make even the genuine need as nothing
but a desire as the High Court has done in this
case. It seems to us that the connotation of the
term ’need’ or ’requirement’ should not be
artificially extended nor its language so unduly
stretched or strained as to make it impossible
or extremely difficult for one landlord to get a
decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat
the very purpose of the Act which affords the
facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord
on certain specified grounds. This appears to
us to be the general scheme of all the Rent
Control Acts, prevalent in other State in the
country. This Court has considered the import
of the word requirement and pointed out that
it merely connotes that there should be an
element of need.
In this connection our attention was
drawn to the evidence led by the defendants
that the main source of their income is the
hotel business carried on by them in the
premises and if they are thrown out they are
likely to get any alternative accommodation.
The High Court has accepted the case of the
defendants on this point, but does not appear
to have considered the natural consequences,
which flow from a comparative assessment of
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the advantages and disadvantages of the
landlord and the tenant if a decree for eviction
follows. It is no doubt true that the tenant will
have to be ousted from the house if a decree
for eviction is passed, but such an event would
happen whenever a decree for eviction is
passed and was fully in contemplation of the
legislature when Section 11(1)(h) of the Act
was introduced in the Act. This by itself would
not be valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs
for eviction.
Thus, on careful comparison and assessment
of the relative advantage and disadvantages of
the landlord and the tenant it seems to us that
the scale is titled in favour of the plaintiff. The
inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from
denial of a decree for eviction in favour of the
plaintiffs far outweight the eviction from that
point of view."
16. It is to be noted that learned counsel for the appellants
submitted that the matter should have been remanded to the
authorities for further consideration. Such a practice has
been deprecated by this court in a large number of cases. [See:
R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami
and V.P. Temple and Anr. (2003 (8) SCC 752)].
17. Considering the factual background in the light of the
principles as stated above, the inevitable conclusion is that
this appeal is without merit. Considering the fact that the
appellants are carrying on the business in the premises, time
is granted to them to vacate the premises in question by the
end of June, 2008 subject to filing the usual undertaking with
the prescribed authority within a period of four weeks from
today.
18. Appeal is dismissed but without any order as to costs.