M/S Shah Enterprises Through Padmaben Mansukhbhai Modi vs. Vaijayantiben Ranjitsingh Sawant

2024 INSC 182 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2159 of 2016] M/S SHAH ENTERPRISES THR. PADMABEN MANSUKHBHAI MODI ...APPELLANT (S) VERSUS VAIJAYANTIBEN RANJITSINGH SAWANT & ORS. ...RESPONDENT (S) J U D G M E N T B.R. GAVAI, J. 1. Leave granted. th 2. The present appeal arises out of the order dated 9 December 2015 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Misc. Civil Application (For Contempt) No. 3364 of 2015, thereby dismissing the said Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Narendra Prasad Date: 2024.03.06 17:01:25 IST Reason: Contempt Petition filed by the present appellant. 1 FACTS 3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as under: 3.1 In the years 1953-54, the land bearing Survey Nos. 505, 506, and 507 was given on lease to one Bapusaheb Bajirao Sawant by one Nawab Mir Fakruddin Hussein Khan Vigore and three others (“the Original Owners”) for 99 years. 3.2 In the year 1956, the said lease deed was cancelled by the Original Owners by way of a notice. 3.3 In the year 1969, the land in question was bought by 67 persons. However, the sale deed was originally executed in the name of four persons. The land in question was subsequently divided into 67 divisions. 3.4 In the year 1972, after the death of Bapusaheb Bajirao Sawant, his legal heirs including one Ranjitsingh Bapusaheb Sawant filed Special Civil Suit bearing Nos. 23, 24, and 25 of 1972 in the Court of the Civil Judge (S.D.), Surat, claiming possession over the land in question based on the lease deed. 2 3.5 In the said suits, a compromise agreement was entered into between the heirs of Bapusaheb Bajirao Sawant and the Original Owners of the subject property, whereby it was agreed that the lease issued in the year 1953 had been cancelled in the year 1956 and after the cancellation of the lease deed, the legal heirs had no right, title, and interest in the subject property based on heirship. The said compromise agreement was recorded as consent decree by the learned Civil Judge (S.D.) Surat, vide order th dated 18 September 1972. 3.6 In the year 1986, the appellant herein bought land admeasuring 20 acres out of the land bearing Survey No. 506 vide a registered sale deed. 3.7 In the year 2008, Ranjitsingh Bapusaheb Sawant expired. 3.8 In the year 2014, i.e., after the death of Ranjitsingh Bapusaheb Sawant, who was the legal heir of Bapusaheb Bajirao Sawant, his legal heirs filed Regular Civil Suit No. 645 of 2014 in the Court of learned Principal Civil Judge, Surat against 264 defendants, including the appellant herein, for declaration and permanent injunction. 3 3.9 In the year 2015, the appellant sent legal notices to all the respondents herein and brought to their attention the consent decree passed in the year 1972 and, therefore, requested them to withdraw the suit filed before the Principal Civil Judge, Surat. 3.10 Since the respondents did not withdraw the suit, the appellant filed a Contempt Petition being Misc. Civil Application (For Contempt) No. 3364 of 2015 before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. The said petition came to be dismissed vide the impugned judgment. 3.11 Hence the present appeal. nd 4. This Court vide order dated 22 February 2016 had issued notice. We have heard Shri Amar Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Nachiket Anil Dave, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. SUBMISSIONS 5. Shri Amar Dave, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the finding of the High Court that mere filing of a suit cannot be construed to be within the scope of Contempt jurisdiction is erroneous and contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the 4 case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper 1 Construction and another . It is submitted that, in the present case, a lis between the parties had culminated into a compromise agreement leading to passing of a consent decree in a judicial proceeding. It is, therefore, submitted that filing of the suit contrary to the consent decree, which has received the imprimatur of the Court, would amount to contempt of the Court. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the filing of the suit was nothing else but a brazen act to undermine the judicial process by filing multiple proceedings and that too after a period of four decades. 6. Per contra, Shri Nachiket Anil Dave, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellant herein was not a party th to the consent decree in question dated 18 September 1972. It is, therefore, submitted that the appellant cannot be permitted to allege contempt of the consent decree to which it was not a party. 7. Shri Nachiket Anil Dave submitted that various disputed questions of fact and law are pending adjudication in the civil 1 (1995) 3 SCC 507=1995 INSC 105 5 suit i.e. RCS No. 645 of 2014. He submitted that filing the contempt petition was nothing else but an attempt to preempt RCS No. 645 of 2014. It is further submitted that the civil suit filed is for asserting the rights of the plaintiffs/respondents over the ancestral agricultural land admeasuring about 2082 acres in relation to Survey Nos. 505, 506 and 507, whereas the claim of the appellant herein is only restricted to its purchase of 20 acres in Survey No. 506. It is submitted that there are 264 defendants in RCS No. 645 of 2014 filed by the respondents herein and the Contempt Petition in question was filed only by one of them i.e., the present appellant. 8. Shri Nachiket Anil Dave further submitted that the appellant had also filed an application under Section 11 read with Order XIV Rule 2 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) for framing preliminary issues of limitation and res judicata in the subject suit. It is submitted that the learned trial judge vide Order Below nd Exh. 337 dated 22 December 2017 had allowed the said application and preliminary issues had been framed. 6 9. It is further submitted that an application had also been filed under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC for dismissal of the subject suit. However, the learned trial judge vide order dated st 31 December 2018 had rejected the said application. It is, therefore, submitted that the said order has not been challenged and the same has attained finality. CONSIDERATION 10. The High Court while rejecting the petition of the present appellant vide the impugned order has observed that though there cannot be a dispute with the proposition that even consent terms incorporated in the Court’s order when breached would give rise to allegations of contempt, in the present case, by mere filing of a civil suit asserting certain legal rights over the lands in question, it cannot be stated that the plaintiffs have breached the consent terms. The High Court held that the act of the respondents in filing the said civil suit may be one of annoyance or nuisance to the contempt petitioner (appellant herein), however, mere filing of the suit would not amount to contempt. 7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14 22. Similarly, the observations made by this Court in paragraphs 54 to 57, which read as under, have to be construed in the background of the aforesaid factual scenario. “ 54. The filing of the Suit No. 770 of 1993 is nothing but a wilful action on the part of the contemners to undermine the dignity of this Court and the majesty of law. The conduct of the contemners tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect or even disregard. It equally tends to interfere with or prejudice the litigants during the litigation. Abuse of the process of court calculated to hamper the due course of judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice is a contempt of court. In Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries [AIR 1962 SC 1089 : 1962 Supp (3) SCR 127] at page 315, this Court observed: (SCC para 7) “While we are conscious that every abuse of the process of the court may not necessarily amount to contempt of court, abuse of the process of the court calculated to hamper the due course of a judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice, we must say, is a contempt of court. It may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the court may be suitably dealt with as between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 16 or in some other manner. But, on 15 the other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and effects the interest of the public in the administration of justice.” 55. Again as stated by Sir John Donaldson in Attorney General v. Newspaper Publishing plc [(1987) 3 All ER 276] , C.J. Miller Contempt of Court, 1989, Clarendon Press, Oxford: “An action for contempt of court arose— ‘where the conduct complained of is specifically intended to impede or prejudice the administration of justice. Such an intent cannot be expressly avowed or admitted, but can be inferred from all the circumstances including the foreseeability of the consequences of the conduct’.” 56. At this stage, it is worthwhile for us to quote Lord Hardwicke, L.C. in St. James's Evening Post [(1742) 2 Atk 469, 471 : 26 ER 683] : “There cannot be anything of greater consequence, than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters.” 16

17 25. We find that, by no stretch of imagination, it could be said that the filing of the suit for asserting the rights of the plaintiffs/respondents could be said to be amounting to contempt of the Court. 26. In that view of the matter, we find that no interference is warranted in the impugned order. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 27. Needless to state that the observations made hereinabove are only restricted to the maintainability of the contempt proceedings. They shall have no bearing on the proceedings of the suit which will be decided on its own merits. 28. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. …….........................J. [B.R. GAVAI] …….........................J. [RAJESH BINDAL] …….........................J. [SANDEEP MEHTA] NEW DELHI; MARCH 06, 2024 18