Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
WORKMEN OF BALMER LAWRIE AND CO.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
BALMER LAWRIE AND CO.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
07/11/1963
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
WANCHOO, K.N.
GUPTA, K.C. DAS
CITATION:
1964 AIR 728 1964 SCR (5) 344
CITATOR INFO :
R 1967 SC1286 (8)
RF 1969 SC 513 (15,22,23)
RF 1970 SC 512 (10)
RF 1972 SC1210 (15)
R 1972 SC2332 (74,118)
RF 1973 SC2758 (16)
R 1978 SC1113 (14)
R 1987 SC1415 (12)
ACT:
Industrial Dispute-Clerical and subordinate staff-Age of
retirement-Reduction of grades-Wage structure-Conditions for
re-examination-Revision of wage scales-Principles--Res
judicata-Applicability-Comparable character of industrial
undertakings
HEADNOTE:
Industrial disputes arose between the respondent and its
employees the appellants. The appellants demanded the
reduction of the existing five grades into two grades,
increase in the scales of pay, privilege and medical leave
and increase of the existing age of retirement which was 55.
The Tribunal rejected all the demands of the appellants, but
allowed an increase of Rs. 10 in the initial salary of all
grades. In appeal by special leave:
Held:The age of retirement in case of the respondent’s
workmen should be increased to 58. Time has now come for
increasing the age of retirement in the case of clerical
staff and subordinate staff generally from 55 to 58.
Guest, Keen Williams Private Ltd. v. P.J. Sterling, (1960.)
1 S.C.R. 348 and Workmen of M/s. Jessop & Co. Ltd. v. M/s
Jessop & Co., [1964] I.L.L.J. 451 1961, followed.
(ii)In the present case having regard to the genesis and the
manner in which these grades have functioned since 1949, it
is not necessary to make any adjustments in the grades by
reducing their number.
(iii)The question as to the revision of wage scales
must be examined on the merits in each individual case.
Technical considerations of res judicata should not be
allowed to hamper the discretion of industrial adjudication.
The principle of gradual advance towards the living wage
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which industrial adjudication can never ignore, itself
constitutes such a special feature of industrial
adjudication that it renders the application of the
technical rule of res judicata singularly in appropriate.
If the paying capacity of the employer increases or the cost
of living index shows an upward trend, or there are other
anomalies, mistakes, or errors in the award fixing wage
structure, or there has been a rise in the wage structure in
comparable industries in the region, industrial employees
would be justified in making a claim for the re-examination
of the wage structure and if such a claim is referred for
industrial adjudication, the Adjudicator would not normally
be justified in rejecting it solely on the ground that
enough time has not passed after the making of the award, or
that material change in
345
relevant circumstances had not been proved. It is, of
course not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule in
the matter. The question must be examined on the merits in
each case.
Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1959) 1 L.L.J. 450 and
James Finley & Co. Ltd. Employees Union, Calcutta v. M/s.
James Finley & Co. Ltd. Calcutta, 1957 L.A.C. 154, referred
to.
In dealing with industrial matters, industrial adjudication
should not normally encourage technical pleas and having
regard to the fact that cases are conducted before the
Tribunal many times by laymen, the significance or the
importance of the argument that a particular question is not
put to a particular witness should never be exaggerated.
(iv)In dealing with the comparable character of industrial
undertaking, industrial adjudication does not normally rely
on oral evidence alone. This question is considered in the
light of material facts and circumstances which are
generally proved by documentary evidence. The total capital
invested by the concern, the profits made by the concern the
dividends paid, the number of employees, the standing of the
concern in the industry, these and other matters have to be
examined in determining whether one concern is comparable
with another in the matter of fixing wage, and these
questions cannot be decided merely on the interested
testimony of either the workmen or the employer and his wit-
nesses.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 820 of 1962.
Appeal by special leave from the award dated June 29, 1961,
of the First Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No.
VIII-608 of 1960.
P.K. Sanyal and P.K. Mukherjee, for the appellants.
B. Sen, S. Ghosh and B.N. Ghosh, for the respondent No. 1.
November 7, 1963. The Judgment of the Court was delivered
by
GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-An industrial dispute between the
respondent, M/s Balmer Lawrie & Co., and its employees, the
appellants, has given rise to the present appeal by special
leave. The dispute related to four demands made by the
appellants and it was referred for adjudication by the
Government of West Bengal to the Industrial Tribunal
constituted under section 7A of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947. These demands were: grades
346
and scales of pay, privilege leave, medical leave and
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retiring age. In regard to the claim of the appellants for
reducing the existing five grades into two grades organised
on a rational and scientific basis, the Tribunal held that,
on the whole, . the grades seemed to function
satisfactorily, and so, no case had been made out for their
amalgamation. The demand for increase in the scales of pay
was substantially rejected by the Tribunal, but it held that
the appellants should be given some relief by increasing the
initial salary of all the grades by Rs. 10. The claims for
privilege leave and medical leave were rejected by the
Tribunal; it held that the mere fact that two concerns in
the neighbourhood had agreed to give more than 21 days’
privilege leave, was no justification for changing the
present rule as to privilege leave which governed the
appellants, and as to medical leave, the Tribunal held that
the construction which the respondent was placing on the
relevant rule contained in Exbt. F was inadmissible, and
so, there was no necessity for introducing any rule that the
production of a medical certificate from any medical
practitioner should suffice. The Tribunal then examined the
appellants’ claim as to the retirement age and it held that
the existing age of retirement which was at 55 needed no
change. An award was accordingly passed in the light of the
findings recorded by the Tribunal on the four demands made
by the appellants. It is this award which is challenged by
the appellants before us.
In respect of the age of retirement, the approach adopted by
the Tribunal appears to be unsatisfactory. This question
has been considered by this Court on several occasions. In
Guest, Keen, Williams Private Ltd. v. P.J. Sterling.&
Ors.(1) this Court has discussed in a general way the
considerations which are relevant and material in
determining a proper age for superannuation in industrial
employments. As has been observed by this Court recently in
the case of Workmen of M/s Jessop & Co. Ltd. v. M/s Jessop &
Co. & Ors. (2)
(1) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 348.
(2) [1964] 1 L.L.J. 451.
347
we feel that the time has now come for increasing the age of
retirement in the case of clerical staff and the subordinate
staff generally from 55 to 58. It appears that the
attention of the Tribunal was not drawn to the relevant
decisions of this Court; otherwise, the Tribunal would not
have rejected the appellants’ claim. In fact, in the
present appeal, Mr. Sen for the respondent has agreed that
the, age of retirement should be increased from 55 to 58.
We accordingly reverse the order passed by the Tribunal in
that behalf and direct that the age of retirement in the
case of the respondent’s workmen should be 58 and not 55 as
from the date of this judgment.
That takes us to the question about the reduction of the
grades from 5 to 2. Mr. Sanyal for the appellants contends
that generally two ’grades are adopted by industrial
concerns and he urges that the presence of five grades is
both unscientific and inexpedient. It may be conceded that
two or three grades are generally adopted by industrial
concerns’ but in the present case, it is necessary to bear
in mind the previous history of the creation of these grades
and to take into account the fact that these five grades
have, on the whole, satisfactorily functioned in the concern
of the respondent. In the award pronounced between the
parties, in 1949, these five grades were evolved. Floormen
who are mentioned in the award correspond to Grade I which
is described as the Sub-grade in the respondent’s concern.
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Then we have the remaining four grades described as Junior
Grade, Senior Grade, Section Head Grade and Supervisor
Grade. These correspond to the four grades Nos. 11, 111, IV
& V in the respondent’s concern. Since 1949, these grades
have been maintained by the respondent. That is the genesis
of the 5 grades.
It cannot be seriously disputed that the employees working
in the Sub-grade which is Grade I are entrusted with a
distinctly inferior type of work and they cannot be
integrated with Grades II or III. Then as to Grades 11 and
111, it is significant that there is automatic promotion
from one to the other
348
(Annexure D). This automatic promotion is, of course,
subject to the condition that the Clerks concerned have
satisfactory service records and it is granted on the clear
understanding that they would continue to undertake Grade 11
duties. It also appears that a Clerk who joined the company
in Grade 1 and was placed in Grade 11 prior to the abolition
of Grade 1, or on the date when this Grade was abolished,
would be automatically promoted and fitted in the next
higher Grade, subject to the conditions mentioned in the
rule. Thus, it is clear that between Grades 11 and III
which might have been amalgamated into one Grade, there is
automatic promotion. This method has the advantage of
enabling the employer to recognise outstanding merit in a
Clerk working in the lower grade by promoting him straight-
away to the higher grade. The appellants have not suggested
that such promotions in recognition of outstanding service
and efficiency have never been given, nor have they alleged
that they have been given for improper reasons. As to
Grades IV and V, they are in the nature of selection grades
and the work entrusted to the employees in the two grades is
of such a distinctive character that it would be
unreasonable to think of amalgamating them into one grade.
Therefore, we are satisfied that having regard to the
genesis of the five grades which prevailed in the
respondent’s concern and the manner in which these grades
have functioned since 1949, it is not necessary to make any
adjustments in the grades by reducing their number.
Accordingly, we think the Tribunal was right in refusing to
accept the demand of the appellants to reduce the grades
from five to two.
The next question to consider is one in regard to the
increase ’in the scales of pay. The Tribunal has rejected
this claim on the ground that no material change had been
proved in the relevant circumstances since the scales were
previously fixed. It appears that when the grades were
first determined by an award in 1949, they operated for
three years; then a revision
349
was made in 1952 and another revision was effected in 1955.
By these revisions, modification has been made in the
maximum salary payable to the employees in the different
grades, but the minimum remained unchanged. That is why the
Tribunal has made an ad hoc addition of Rs. 10 to the
minimum salary in the respective grades. The Tribunal
thought that this modification would meet the ends of
justice. The other reason given by the Tribunal for
rejecting the claim is that the plea of the high increase in
the cost of living on which the appellants relied was not
valid, because dearness allowance was paid to the appellants
under the Bengal Chambers of Commerce Formula and that, the
’tribunal thought, answered the appellants’ contention about
the rise in the cost of living. The appellants also relied
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on an agreement between the parties and urged that by virtue
of the said agreement, they were entitled to claim a
revision of the wage scale, because four comparable concerns
in the region had in the meanwhile revised their wage
scales. The Tribunal was not impressed by this plea either.
It is these findings recorded by the Tribunal that need to
be examined in the present appeal.
Taking the first argument that there has been no change in
the circumstances, the Tribunal has relied upon two
decisions in support of the view that unless a material
change in circumstances is proved, there can be no change in
the wage structure. In Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen &
Ors.(1), this Court has observed that in the absence of
anything to show that between 1950 and 1955 when the present
industrial dispute was referred for adjudication, circum-
stances had so altered to make the existing scales of pay
and grades unreasonable or inadequate to meet the conditions
prevailing at the time the industrial dispute had been
referred to the Tribunal, it must be held that any revision
of the existing wage-scales or grades was unjustified.
Similarly, in James Finlay & Co. Ltd. Employees’ Union,
Calcutta v. M/s. James
(1) [1959] 1 L.L.J. 450.
350
Finlay & Co. Ltd., Calcutta(1), the Labour Appellate
Tribunal observed that though the principles of res judicata
bad no application to adjudication on industrial disputes,
on principle, a previous award should not be changed, except
on justifiable grounds. The Appellate Tribunal then
proceeded to observe that some of the grounds on which the
award can be changed are: change of circumstances, principle
of gradual advance to the living wage; anomaly, mistake or
error in the last award involving hardship to either party
or both.
While dealing with the question about the revision of wage
scales, it is necessary to remember that the technical
considerations of res judicata should not be allowed to
hamper the discretion of industrial adjudication. It is
undoubtedly true that wage scales are devised and wage
structures constructed as matters of long-term policy, and
so, industrial adjudication would naturally be reluctant to
interfere with the wage structures without justification or
in a lighthearted manner. When a wage structure is framed,
all relevant factors are taken into account and normally it
should remain in operation for a fairly long period; but it
would be unreasonable to introduce considerations of res
judicata as such, because for various reasons which
constitute the special characteristics of industrial
adjudication the said technical considerations would be
inadmissible. As the Labour Appellate Tribunal itself has
observed, the principle of gradual advance towards the
living wage which industrial adjudication can never ignore,
itself constitutes such a special feature of industrial
adjudication that it renders the application of the
technical rule of res judicata singularly inappropriate. If
the paying capacity of the employer increases or the cost of
living shows an upward trend, or there are other anomalies,
mistakes or errors in the award fixing wage structure, or
there has been a rise in the wage structure in comparable
industries in the region, industrial employees would be
justified in making a claim for the re-exami-
(1) [1957] L.A.C. 154.
351
nation of the wage structure and if such a claim is referred
for industrial adjudication, the Adjudicator would not
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normally be justified in rejecting it solely on the ground
that enough time has not passed after the making of the
award, or that material change in relevant circumstances bad
not been proved. It is, of course, not possible to lay down
any hard and fast rule in the matter. The question as to
revision must be examined on the merits in each individual
case that is brought before an adjudicator for his
adjudication.
Then as to the rise in the cost of living, the Tribunal has
no doubt observed that having regard to the fact that
dearness allowance is paid to the appellants’ under the
Bengal Chambers of Commerce formula, the appellants’ plea
was not valid; but it does not appear that the Tribunal has
considered the question as to whether the said formula
affords complete neutralisation to the employees against the
rise in the cost of living. We propose to express no
opinion on this point, but we are concerned to point out
that unless the Tribunal had examined the matter carefully
and bad come to the definite conclusion that the formula in
question gave nearly complete neutralisation against the
rise in the cost of living, it would be unreasonable to hold
that because the Chamber formula is adopted by the
respondent for payment of dearness allowance to its
employees, the complaint of the appellants that there has
been a rise in the cost of living and so, their wage struc-
tures should be revised, has no substance. This is a matter
which has to be carefully examined before any conclusion is
reached in a satisfactory way.
That leaves another Point to be considered and it has
reference to the agreement between the parties on which the
appellants relied. In 1955, when by agreement the wage
scales were revised, the parties agreed that the pay scales
then introduced would remain unchallenged "unless amended by
any Mercantile Omnibus Tribunal or any legislation
prescribing higher rates of pay, or in the event of any
substantial enhancement of scales of pay being effected
generally
352
in other Mercantile Firms of Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd.’s
standing,. or in the event of any extraneous circumstances
arising resulting in a general demand for further
enhancement of the scales of pay." The appellants contended
that wage scales had been recently revised by the Imperial
Tobacco Co. Ltd., Shaw Wallace Co., Voltas Co. and Tata Iron
& Steel Co., and in support of this plea, they examined four
witnesses who proved the revised scales of wages. The
argument was that these concerns are comparable concerns and
since there has been a revision of wage scales in these
concerns, the appellants were entitled to claim a revision
of their wage scales in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. After the appellants led their evidence in proof
of the fact that the four concerns had revised their pay
scales, the respondent examined some witnesses on its
behalf. Amongst these witnesses was Kamal Prasad Sircar.
In his evidence he mentioned the names of six firms which,
according to him, were comparable with the firm of the
respondent. Amongst these firms, he did not include any of
the four firms referred to by the appellants. The Tribunal
took the view that since Sircar was not cross-examined on
the question as to whether any of the said four firms are
comparable to the respondent’s concern, the plea of the
appellants that the said firms are comparable must be
rejected. In our opinion, the reason given by the Tribunal
in rejecting the appellants’ claim is wholly unsatisfactory
and the approach adopted by it in dealing with this matter
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inappropriate. In dealing with industrial matters,
industrial adjudication should not normally encourage
technical pleas and having regard to the fact that the cases
are conducted before the Tribunal many times by laymen, the
significance or the importance of the argument that a
particular question is not put to a particular witness
should never be exaggerated. Besides, the Tribunal has
overlooked the fact that though evidence was led by the
appellants in respect of the four concerns obviously on the
ground that they were comparable concerns, Sircar did not
positively take the oath that they were not comparable
concerns, and so, it would
353
not be reasonable to make a finding against the appellants
on the ground that Sircar was not asked any question about
it.
Besides, it is necessary to emphasise that in dealing with
the comparable character of industrial undertakings,
industrial adjudication does not usually rely on oral
evidence alone. This question is considered in the light of
material facts and circumstances which are generally proved
by documentary evidence. What is the total capital invested
by the concern, what is the extent of its business, what is
the order of the profits made by the concern, what are the
dividends paid, how many employees are employed by the
concern, what is its standing in the industry to which it
belongs, these and other matters have to be examined by
industrial adjudication in determining the question as to
whether one concern is comparable with another in the matter
of fixing wages. Now, it is obvious that these questions
cannot be decided merely on the interested testimony either
of the workmen, or of the employer and his witnesses.
Unfortunately, the Tribunal has lost sight of this important
feature. Therefore, we are satisfied that the Tribunal was
in error in refusing to consider the merits of the
appellants’ claim in regard to the modification and increase
in the wage scales.
In regard to the appellants’ grievance in respect of
privilege leave and medical leave, we see no substance.
The result is, the award rejecting the appellants’ claim for
modification and revision of the wage scales is set aside
and the matter is sent back to the Tribunal for disposal of
this issue in accordance with law. Parties would be at
liberty to lead additional evidence in support of their
respective cases. The order made by the’ Tribunal giving ad
hoc increase of Rs. 10 in the initial salaries fixed for
different grades is confirmed. The other directions given
by the award in respect of the other claims made by the
appellants are also confirmed. Having regard to the fact
that
1 SCI/64-23
354
the appellants have succeeded in respect of the retirement
age and that an order of remand has been passed by us in
their favour for a reconsideration of their claim as to
revision of the wage scales, we direct that the respondent
should pay the appellants their costs in this Court.
Award partly set aside and case remanded.