Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2788 OF 2005
NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION (MN)LTD. … APPELLANT
VERSUS
M/S DURGA TRADING CO. AND ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.
This appeal has been preferred by the appellant against
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judgment dated 6 February, 2003 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.1552 of 2000. By the
impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed
the writ petition filed by respondent no.1 and held as follows:
“ In the facts and circumstances of the present
11.
case, the petitioner having acted on the agreement
of sale and having paid the entire consideration
was clearly not an unauthorized occupant within the
meaning of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act.
That being so, there is no justification for
applying the summary procedure under the Public
Premises Act, nor has the Estate Officer any
authority or jurisdiction to evict the petitioner
under Section 5(2) of the Public Premises Act.
There seems to be serious dispute about the title
which dispute cannot be resolved under Public
Premises Act. In our opinion, the invocation of the
provisions of the Public Premises Act in the
present case was wholly improper. The Estate
Officer without any application of mind issued
directions for putting locks and seals on the
premises. In our opinion, due process of law in a
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Rajni Mukhi
Date: 2015.02.19
17:16:37 IST
Reason:
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case like the present necessarily implies the
filing of suit by the respondents for the
enforcement of their alleged rights in respect of
the subject premises.”
2. While holding so the Division Bench of the High Court also set
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aside the order dated 23 June, 2000 and notices dated 17
November, 2000 issued under Sections 4 and 7 of the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1971
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘1971 Act’) by Estate Officer,
National Textile Corporation(MN) Ltd.
The factual matrix of the case is as follows:-
3.
3.1 The respondent no.1 filed a petition being Writ Petition
No.1552 of 2000 before the Bombay High Court challenging the
proceedings initiated by the appellant against it (respondent no.
1) u/s 5A (for removal of movable structures/fixtures) and u/s
4(2) (b) read with Section 7(1) and (3) (for damages and eviction)
of the 1971 Act, in respect of subject premises i.e. land
admeasuring 2921 sq. yards with structures thereon bearing Nos.96
and 97 situated at the premises of Shri Sitaram Mills Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as ‘SSML’ for short) at N.M. Joshi Marg,
Mumbai.
3.2 In the said writ petition, respondent no. 1 submitted that the
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subject premises belonged to the erstwhile owner, SSML. On 25
March, 1975 an agreement to sell the subject premises was entered
into between respondent no.1 and SSML and the full consideration
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of RS.25 Lakhs was paid by respondent no.1 to SSML. On 1 April,
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1975 possession of the subject property was handed over to
respondent no.1 and has since then remained with respondent no.1.
3.3 The management of the textile undertaking of SSML was taken
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over by the Central Government w.e.f. 18 October, 1983 under the
Textile Undertakings (Taking over of Management) Act, 1983
(hereinafter referred to as the, ‘1983 Act’) and the appellant
corporation was appointed as its Custodian. Later, the right,
title and interest in relation to the textile undertakings got
transferred and vested in Central Government under the Textile
Undertakings (Nationalization) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to
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as the, ‘1995 Act’) w.e.f. 1 April, 1995.
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On 23 June, 2000, the Estate Officer of the appellant
3.4
Corporation passed an order under Sub Section (3) of Section 5A of
the 1971 Act treating the subject premises as ‘public premises’
and directed respondent no.1 to remove the movable structures and
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fixtures from the said premises. Thereafter, on 17 November, 2000
the said authority issued two show cause notices to respondent
no.1 u/s 4(1) and 7(3) of the 1971 Act calling upon respondent
no.1 to show cause why it should not be evicted from the subject
premises and why it should not be made liable to pay damages. The
appellant Corporation initiated the aforesaid action against
respondent no.1 on the ground that the premises were required for
bona fide use. Moreover, the appellant Corporation urged before
the High Court that since conveyance deed was not executed between
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the erstwhile owner SSML and respondent no. 1, it was merely an
agreement to sell and hence, the subject premises got vested in
the Central Government under the 1995 Act.
3.5 The High Court allowed the said writ petition by the impugned
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judgment and order dated 6 February, 2003.
4. The issue involved in the present appeal is:-
“Whether in the facts and circumstances, the proceedings
initiated by the appellant before the Estate Officer against
respondent no.1 under the 1971 Act should continue or the
appellant should be relegated to prefer a suit before the civil
court as held by the High Court?”
Learned Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of the
5.
appellant made the following submissions:
5.1 The claim of respondent no.1 is based on unregistered
agreement to sell which never fructified into a registered sale
deed. Moreover, respondent no. 1 is neither the owner of the land
nor can it claim authorized occupancy pursuant to unregistered
agreement.
5.2 The land in question got vested with the State and it is
deemed to have been transferred in favour of the appellant in view
of provisions of 1983 Act and 1995 Act. In view of such vesting,
respondent no.1 cannot claim to be an authorized occupant within
the meaning of Section 2(g) of 1971 Act.
6. Per contra, according to the learned senior counsel appearing
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on behalf of the respondent:-
The subject premises did not form part of the textile
6.1
undertaking of SSML on the appointed day under the 1983 Act i.e.
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on 18 October, 1983 and for that reason the management of the
subject premises never got vested in the Central Government under
the 1983 Act and for the same reason the right, title and interest
over the subject premises never got vested in the Central
Government and the appellant under the 1995 Act. Thus both the
Acts have no applicability to the subject premises.
It was further submitted that there are two independent
preconditions for vesting under 1995 Act.
(i) what is acquired is the right, title and interest of the
owner specified in column 3 of the first schedule and
(ii) such right title and interest must relate to the textile
undertaking specified in column 2 of the first schedule.
6.2. Apart from the factual issue with respect to the second
requirement, the first requirement involves a mixed question of
fact and law. This is because whether or not a particular owner
had “right, title and interest” on the appointed day involves a
factual enquiry apart from vesting by operation of law. The
expression “the right, title and interest of the owner” is a
compenditious expression covering 3 distinct aspects. Since this
is an expropriatory legislation it ought to read strictly and all
three elements must subsist together before any vesting takes
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place. In this case, the appellant has no right, title and
interest.
6.3. In any event, more than 12 years after respondent no.1 was put
in possession and enjoyed the property fully, openly, continuously
and in a manner hostile to SSML (and its successor in interest),
respondent no.1 obtained rights in law and any residuary/vestige
of a title that remained in SSML was rendered ineffective or
unenforceable in law.
6.4. The overwhelming material available on the record suggests the
following:
(i)
Respondent no.1 and SSML had entered into an agreement to
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sell dated 25 March, 1975
(ii)
Respondent no.1 was put in possession of the subject
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premises on 1 April, 1975 pursuant to the agreement to
sell.
(iii) Respondent no.1 had paid the full consideration of
Rs.25 lakhs to SSML (Rs.21,85,000/-,
Rs.1,15,000/-,Rs.20,000/- and Rs.1,80,000/-).
(iv) The sale took place pursuant to a Special Resolution
passed at the Extra Ordinary General Meeting of the
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Company held on 2 March, 1975.
(v) The sale of subject premises was reflected in the
Balance Sheet and in Schedule of Fixed Assets of SSML
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for the year ended 31 March, 1975.
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(vi)
SSML accepted tenancy under respondent no.1 over an
area of 5802 sq. ft. of the subject premises and was
paying rent to respondent no.1
(vii) SSML paid capital gains tax on the sale of the subject
property which is clear from the letter dated
28.01.1980 written by SSML to the Commissioner of
Income Tax.
(viii) Various Government authorities have since recognized
that it is the respondent no.1 to whom the said
premises belongs. This is clear, inter alia, from the
following
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(a)Order dated 23 March, 1977 passed by the Competent
Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act granting
permission to SSML to transfer the subject premises to
respondent no.1 by way of sale.
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(b) the agreements dated 5 May, 1976 and 1
September, 1976 whereby respondent no.1 had let out a
portion of the property on the first and second floor
to the Collector of Customs through President of
India. Even after the 1983 Act and the 1995 Act, the
President of India through the Collector of Customs
continued the agreements with respondent no.1. At no
stage did the Collector of Customs approached the
Central Government or appellant;
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(c) BMC made separate property tax assessment in the
name of respondent no.1
(d) the property tax assessed and paid by respondent
no.1 to the Bombay Municipal Corporation
(e) BMC granted separate water connection in the name
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of respondent no.1 vide its letter dated 20 July,
1981.
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(f) NOC dated 5 February, 1982 issued u/s 230A(1) by
the Income Tax Authorities in respect of the sale of
the subject premises.
(g) The order of the Recovery Officer, Provident Fund
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and Labour Dues dated 5 February, 1983 inter alia
stating that the attachment on Plot No.9 (part) was
raised and vacated as the building on Plot No.9 (part)
was agreed to be sold by SSML to respondent no.1
(h) Though the 1983 Act had come into force, the
Customs Department in 1993 surrendered 12571 sq.ft out
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of 15805 sq.ft. in its possession on the 1 floor of
the subject premises to respondent no.1.
(i) Though the 1995 Act had come into force, the
Customs Department surrendered the remaining 3234
sq.ft in its possession on the first floor and the
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entire 8667 sq.ft in its possession on the 2 floor to
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respondent no.1 on 26 February, 1997.
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(j) Letter dated 23 February, 1985 from Valuation
Officer, Income Tax Department to respondent no.1
regarding assessment of rent of the premises of
respondent no.1 occupied by the Customs admeasuring
8667 sq.ft and 15305 sq.ft.
(k) Various letters from Building Department, New
Customs House, Bombay to respondent no.1 regarding
reassessment of rent of premises occupied by Customs
Department.
The Correspondence between the parties also shows that the
6.5.
subject premises were never considered as a part of the textile
undertaking after the same was sold to respondent no.1 in the year
1975.
6.6. It was submitted that the subject premises herein were not
part of the assets or rights or leaseholds or powers or
authorities or privileges or property of the textile company
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(SSML) immediately before 1 April, 1994. Since the subject
premises and all rights in respect of these premises stood
excluded from the textile undertaking of SSML in 1975, SSML had no
“ownership, possession, power or control” in relation to the said
premises and hence the subject premises stand excluded from the
first part of Section 4(1) of 1995 Act.
6.7. It was further submitted that there is a serious dispute
about title that cannot be resolved under the 1971 Act. The
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appellant cannot be permitted to take a unilateral decision in its
own favour that the property belongs to it, and on the basis of
such decision take recourse to the summary remedy. Due process of
law in a case like the present necessarily implies the filing of a
suit by the appellant for enforcement of their alleged rights in
respect of the subject premises.
Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no. 1, also relied
6.8.
upon decisions of this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna
Rao and Anr. (1982) 2 SCC 134 wherein the Court held that having
regard to the bona fide title dispute, the respondents cannot be
evicted summarily; and State of U.P. v. Zia Khan, (1998) 8 SCC 483
wherein this Court held that the question of title cannot be
decided under U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1972 and the decision on the subject had to be
made by either revenue court or civil court.
7. Before adverting to the rival submissions made by the learned
counsels for the parties, it would be necessary to make a brief
reference to the provisions of the 1983 Act and the 1995 Act.
Section 2(d) of the 1983 Act defines “textile undertaking” as
follows:
“(2)(d) “textile undertaking” or “the textile
undertaking” means an undertaking specified in the
second column of the first Schedule;”
Section 3(1) of the 1995 Act provides that on the appointed
date, the right, title and interest of the owner in relation to
every textile undertaking shall stand transferred to and shall
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vest absolutely in the Central Government. Sub-section (2) thereof
provides that every textile undertaking which stands vested in the
Central Government by virtue of sub-section (1) shall immediately
after it has so vested, stand transferred to and vested in the
National Textile Corporation.
Section 3 of the 1995 Act reads:
“3(1) On the appointed day, the right, title and
interest of the owner in relation to every textile
undertakings shall stand transferred to, and shall
vest absolutely in, the Central Government.
(2) Every textile undertaking which stands vested in
the Central Government by virtue of sub-section
(1) shall, immediately after it has so vested,
stand transferred to, and vested in, the
National Textile Corporation.”
The key expression in sub-section (3) for the purposes of
this case is:
“the right, title and interest of the owner in
relation to every textile undertaking”
The real issue in the present case is whether the subject
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premises can be said to be an asset of the SSML vested with the
State.
In
9. National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Sitaram Mills Ltd. &
Ors. 1986 (Supp.) SCC 117, this Court noticed the stand taken by
parties with regard to property in question. The said case
related to the very same mill SSML. The Division Bench of the High
Court of Bombay on a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India filed by SSML while upholding the
constitutional validity of Section 3(1) of the Textile
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Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983 held that the
surplus land appurtenant to the mill was not an ‘asset in relation
to the textile undertaking’ within the meaning of sub-section (2)
of Section 3 of the Act and directed the Central Government to
restore the possession of the said land to the Company. Being
aggrieved by the said decision the appellant corporation
approached this Court. In the said case this Court held:
“ 40……. The legislature in enacting the law for the
taking over of the management of the textile
undertakings therefore clearly had the intention of
taking over the surplus lands of the Company. In our
opinion, the High Court ought to have interpreted
sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act in the context
of sub-section (1) thereof and the other provisions of
the Act in consonance with the intention of the
legislature. It was the intention of the legislature to
take over all the assets belonging to the Company held
in relation to the textile undertaking. The note
attached to the report of the Task Force includes the
total lands belonging to the petitioners’ Company for
the purpose of determining the value of the assets of
the Company and does not exclude the Real Estate
Division. Even for determining the total compensation
to be paid on nationalisation, the Task Force takes
into account the total surplus lands of the Company and
does not exclude any land belonging to the so-called
Real Estate Division. The viability study of the IDBI
also heavily relied on the surplus lands held by the
petitioners’ Company.
41. In the premises, the High Court has manifestly
erred in holding that the said Real Estate Division was
separate and distinct from the textile undertaking.
Surplus lands of the textile mills taken over under
sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act are but a vital
physical resource capable of generating and sustaining
economic growth of the textile mills. There can be no
doubt that the legislative intent and object of the
impugned Act was to secure the socialisation of such
surplus lands with a view to sustain the sick textile
undertakings so that they could be properly utilised by
the Government for social good i.e. in resuscitating
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the dying textile undertakings. Hence, a paradoxical
situation should have been avoided by adding a narrow
and pedantic construction of a provision like
sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act which provides
for the consequences that ensue upon the taking over in
public interest of the management of a textile
undertaking under sub-section (1) thereof as a step
towards nationalisation of such undertakings, which was
clearly against the national interest. In dealing with
similar legislation, this Court has always adopted a
broad and liberal approach…….”
10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.1
placed reliance on the aforesaid decision in to
Sitaram Mills Ltd.
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suggest that the execution of the agreement dated 25 March, 1975
was not disputed in the said case.
11. While giving the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the
High Court also proceeded on such presumption that the property in
question has been sold by the Textile Undertaking and observed as
follows:
“ ……….It would not be out of place to mention that in
9…
an appeal arising out of the judgment of the Division
Bench of this Court in respect of this very Mill, the
Supreme Court has recorded in its judgment that the
property in question has been sold by the textile
undertaking prior to the commencement of the 1983 Act.
There seems to be hardly any dispute about the factual
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position. The execution of the agreement dated 25
March, 1975 is not disputed. There is also no serious
dispute that the entire consideration has been paid.
Further the transaction is duly substantiated by the
contemporaneous records like the balance sheet, profit
and loss account, the resolution passed by the Board of
Directors, etc. During the period 1975 to 1998 the
property has been dealt with by the petitioner as its
own property. It has been let out to various Government
bodies from time to time. The rent in respect of the
subject premises has been collected by the petitioner
and the tax has always been paid by the petitioner.
Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act furnishes
a statutory defence to a person who has no registered
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title deed in his favour to maintain his possession if
he can prove a written and signed contract in his
favour and some action on his part in part performance
of that contract.”
12. From bare perusal of paragraph 35 of decision in Sitaram Mills
Ltd. it is apparent that in the said case the learned counsel for
the Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union filed a detailed tabular chart
before the Court to demonstrate that the Real Estate Division was
part and parcel of the textile undertaking. In the said chart it
was mentioned that ‘of the remaining plots, on plot no.4
admeasuring 9765 square yards there were certain old godowns of the
textile mill and they were sold by the petitioners (i.e. SSML) to a
charitable trust of the tantias in 1974-75 for setting off loans
taken from the trust for the textile business.’
The aforesaid chart produced by one of the parties before this
Court was though noticed but no finding has been given by this
Court that the property in question was sold by the textile
undertaking prior to commencement of 1983 Act. On the other hand
if show that the land in question was point of the textile mills.
13. The agreement to sell relied upon by respondent no.1 itself
contains clause 1(d), 2, 3, 6 etc. which mandates the execution of
registered sale-deed or conveyance deed within three years.
However, the same was never done. A suit for specific performance
was filed by respondent no.1 before Bombay High Court against SSML
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25 years after unregistered agreement to sell dated 25 March,
1975, thereby, acknowledging that there was no registered document
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of title with respondent no.1. The said suit is still pending.
Section 4 of 1995 Act relates to general effect of vesting.
14.
Relevant parts of which read as follows:-
“ 4(1). The textile undertakings referred to in Section 3
shall be deemed to include all assets, rights,
leaseholds, powers, authorities and privilege and all
property, moveable and immovable including lands,
buildings, workshops, stores, instruments, machinery
and equipment, cash balances, cash on hand, reserve
funds, investments and book debts pertaining to the
textile undertakings and all other rights and interests
in, or arising out of, such property as were
immediately before the appointed day in the ownership,
possession, power or control of the textile company in
relation to the said undertakings, whether within or
outside India, and all books of account, registers and
all other documents of whatever nature relating thereto
and shall also be deemed to include the liabilities and
obligations specified in sub-section (2) of Section 5.”
All property as aforesaid which have vested in
“4(2)
the Central Government under sub-section (1) of Section
3 shall, by force of such vesting, be freed and
discharged from any trust, obligation, mortgage,
charge, lien and all other incumbrances affecting it,
and any attachment, injunction or decree or order of
any court or other authority restricting the use of
such property in any manner shall be deemed to have
been withdrawn.”
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared
“4(5)
that the mortgage of any property referred in
sub-section (2) or any other person holding any charge,
lien or other interest in, or in relation to, any such
property shall be entitled to claim, in accordance with
his rights and interests, payment of the mortgage money
or other dues, in whole or in part, out of the amounts
specified in relation to such property in the First
Schedule, but no such mortgage, charge, lien or other
interest shall be enforceable against any property
which has vested in the Central Government.”
“4(6) If, on the appointed day, any suit, appeal or
other proceeding of whatever nature in relation to any
property which has vested in the Central Government
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under section 3, instituted or preferred by or against
the textile company is pending, the same shall not
abate, be discontinued or be, in any way, prejudicially
affected by reason of the transfer of the textile
undertakings or of anything contained in this Act, but
the suit, appeal or other proceeding may be continued,
prosecuted or enforced by or against the National
Textile Corporation.”
Thus, it is clear that all other rights and interests in or
arising out of such property as were existing immediately before
the appointed day in the ownership, possession, power or control of
the textile company in relation to the said undertaking vested with
the Central Government and by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section
(3) stood transferred to, and vested in, the National Textile
Corporation. Liability if any of the owner of a textile
undertaking i.e. SSML of any period to the appointed day is
liability of such owner (SSML) and can be enforceable against him
and not against the Central Government or the National Textile
Corporation in view of Section 5(1) of 1995 Act, which reads as
follows:
“5(1) Every liability, other than the liability
specified in sub-section (2), of the owner of a textile
undertaking, in relation to the textile undertakings in
respect of any period prior to the appointed day, shall
be the liability of such owner and shall be enforceable
against him and not against the Central Government or
the National Textile Corporation.”
Therefore respondent no.1 cannot derive any advantage against
15.
the Central Government or the National Textile Corporation on the
ground of pendency of a suit against the owner (SSML).
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16. In M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors,
while dealing with a case involving National
(1988) 2 SCC 299,
Textile Corporation-appellant herein, the Court noticed the meaning
of the expressions “arising out of, pertaining to and in relation
to” and observed:
“49. The words “arising out of” have been used in the
sense that it comprises purchase of shares and lands
from income arising out of the Kanpur undertaking. We
are of the opinion that the words “pertaining to” and
“in relation to” have the same wide meaning and have
been used interchangeably for among other reasons,
which may include avoidance of repetition of the same
phrase in the same clause or sentence, a method
followed in good drafting. The word “pertain” is
synonymous with the word “relate”, see Corpus Juris
Secundum, Volume 17, page 693.
50. The expression “in relation to” (so also
“pertaining to”), is a very broad expression which
presupposes another subject matter. These are words of
comprehensiveness which might have both a direct
significance as well as an indirect significance
depending on the context, see State Wakf Board v. Abdul
Azeez29, following and approving Nita Charan Bagchi v.
Suresh Chandra Paul30, Shyam Lal v. M. Shyamlal31 and
76 Corpus Juris Secundum 621. Assuming that the
investments in shares and in lands do not form part of
the undertakings but are different subject matters,
even then these would be brought within the purview of
the vesting by reason of the above expressions. In this
connection reference may be made to 76 Corpus Juris
Secundum at pages 620 and 621 where it is stated that
the term “relate” is also defined as meaning to bring
into association or connection with. It has been
clearly mentioned that “relating to” has been held to
be equivalent to or synonymous with as to “concerning
with” and “pertaining to”. The expression “pertaining
to” is an expression of expansion and not of
contraction.”
The First Schedule of the 1995 Act provides the amount which
17.
the Central Government has to pay to the owner of every textile
undertaking for the transfer and vesting of such undertaking to
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it. This provision cannot be the starting point of investigation
as to which amount relates to which property or as a guide to
construction (See paragraph 54 of M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v.
Union of India & Ors, (1988) 2 SCC 299).
In the said case of the Court
M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd.
further held:
“ The expression “and all other rights and interests
57.
in or arising out of such property, as were immediately
before the appointed day, in the ownership, possession,
power or control of the company in relation to the said
undertakings”, appearing in sub-section (1) of Section
4 of the Act indicates that the shares which have been
purchased from out of the funds of the textile
undertakings and which have been held for the benefit
of the said textile undertakings, would come within the
scope of Section 4 of the Act and thus would also vest
in Central Government under Section 3. The origin of
these shares and their connection with the textile
undertakings have been fully corroborated. The textile
business is the only business of Swadeshi Cotton Mills.
There is interconnection and interrelation between all
the six undertakings. Investments in Swadeshi Polytex
Limited from the funds of Kanpur undertaking have
always been made. Investments in Swadeshi Mining and
Manufacturing Company Ltd. were always made from the
funds of the Kanpur undertaking. Assets/ investments
held and used for the benefit of the textile business
of SCM, were carried on in its textile undertakings.”
Therefore, it is clear that the property in question stood
vested in the Central Government and, in turn, stood transferred
and vested with National Textile Corporation under sub-section (2)
of Section 3 of 1995 Act. Even if it is admitted that respondent
no.1 has acted on the agreement to sell and has paid the entire
consideration, it cannot be a ground to hold that respondent no.1
is authorized occupant within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the
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1971 Act.
We are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court
18.
failed to analyze the provisions correctly and wrongly presumed
that the property in question has been sold to the Textile
Undertaking prior to the commencement of 1983 Act. The Court
wrongly relied on Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act to
hold that respondent no.1 has valid defence available under the
said provision and hence erred in holding that respondent no. 1 is
an authorized occupant within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the
1971 Act.
19. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment
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dated 6 February, 2003 passed by the Division Bench of High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.1552 of 2000 and
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uphold notices dated 17 November, 2000 issued under Sections 4
and 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act, 1971. Now, it is open to the Competent Authority/Court to
proceed in accordance with the provisions of the 1971 Act and pass
an appropriate order. The appeal is allowed but there is no order
as to costs.
………………………………………….J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
………………………………………….J.
(PRAFULLA C. PANT)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 17, 2015.
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ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.4 SECTION IX
(FOR JUDGMENT)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 2788/2005
NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION LTD. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
DURGA TRADING CO. & ORS. Respondent(s)
Date : 17/02/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of
judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mrs. B. Sunita Rao,Adv.
For Respondent(s) M/s. Parekh & Co.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya pronounced the
reportable Judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Prafulla C. Pant.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable
judgment.
(Ashwani Kumar) (Sneh Lata Sharma)
COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)