Raju @ Nirpendra Singh vs. The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 27-02-2025

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Full Judgment Text

2025 INSC 392
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1172 OF 2014

RAJU @ NIRPENDRA SINGH …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS
THE STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH ...RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1173 OF 2014
AND CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2575 OF 2014

O R D E R
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. The instant appeals have been preferred by the
accused-appellants against the common
judgment dated 15.05.2013 passed by the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal Appeal
No. 1850 of 2010 and other connected matters
wherein the High Court had dismissed the
appellants’ appeals and affirmed the conviction
and sentences for the offences under Section
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2025.03.25
18:21:19 IST
Reason:
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366 and 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code,
1
1860 .
2. The appeals arise from a common set of facts
and interlinked offences which have been briefly
stated below. The prosecution case is that the
prosecutrix, who at the relevant point of time
was an unmarried girl aged about 17 years, and
was residing with her paternal aunt named
Premwati since childhood in village Chowka
Sonvarsha. Indrapal (Accused No. 2, i.e. “A2”)
was the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Dhoraha
whereas Sheshmani (Accused No. 1, i.e. “A1”)
was the husband of Sarpanch of Gram
Panchayat Chowka Sonvarsh. Houses
belonging to A1 Sheshmani and Premwati were
located in the same neighbourhood.
th th
3. It was alleged that around 4 /5 June, 2005,
A1 Sheshmani assured the prosecutrix, who by
then had studied upto Class X, of securing her
employment in near future. Nearly 25 days
later, A2 Indrapal and Surendra (Accused No. 5,
i.e. “A5”) and two unknown persons who were

1
IPC
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introduced as brothers-in-law of A5 Surendra
came to the house of the prosecutrix and she
was told that A5 Surendra is a resident of Sidhi
and posted at Bhopal, and will be able to secure
a job for the prosecutrix.
4. Thereafter, on 06.07.2005 at around 12 noon,
A1 Sheshmani visited the house of Premwati
and asked the prosecutrix to accompany him to
Rewa where she has been called in by A2
Indrapal and A5 Surendra for the purpose of
providing employment. When the prosecutrix
wished to seek permission from Premwati, A1
Sheshmani insisted on not informing Premwati
who was asleep at that time. As such, A1
Sheshmani took the prosecutrix to a house
located near LPG godown in Rewa where A2
Indrapal and Raju (Accused No. 3, i.e. “A3”)
were already present. After a while, A5 Surendra
also came there and all the three accused
persons, i.e. A2, A3 and A5 committed rape
upon the prosecutrix. Thereafter, she was made
to stay at that house till 10.07.2005 where she
was repeatedly subjected to gang rape at the
hands of the appellants.
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5. Subsequently, on 10.07.2005, the prosecutrix
was taken by A2 Indrapal and A3 Raju to Sidhi
where Suresh (Accused No. 4, i.e. “A4”) was
telephoned, post which he also came there and
took the prosecutrix to Prince Hotel where she
was again subjected to rape. Thereafter, the
prosecutrix was taken to the house of one Kalli
@ Kalawati with whom she was made to reside
till 14.07.2005.
6. Then on 15.07.2005, the prosecutrix was
brought back to the house occupied by A2
Indrapal at Rewa where he and A3 Raju again
committed gang rape on her. On the same day,
they took her to Malhar wherefrom they boarded
a train. There was a woman in the same train
who was previously known to A2 Indrapal and
A3 Raju and the prosecutrix was handed over to
the said woman for being taken to A5
Surendra’s place at Bhopal. However, the
woman took the prosecutrix to an unknown
destination near Delhi where she was made to
reside with the said woman in a house till
10.09.2005. In the intervening period, A2
Indrapal and A3 Raju frequently visited that
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house and subjected the prosecutrix to rape
repeatedly.
7. It was only on 08.09.2005 that A2 Indrapal
informed the prosecutrix about a report alleging
his involvement in her kidnapping, post-which
the woman deputed a boy to render assistance
to the prosecutrix for boarding a train to
Allahabad. The prosecutrix reached Allahabad
on 11.09.2005 and from there, she straightaway
proceeded to the Police Station at Laur, where
upon an application made by Premwati, a case
of missing person had already been registered.
Further, in light of the statement of the
prosecutrix, the SHO of P.S. Laur, district Rewa
registered a case under Sections 363, 366 and
376(2)(g) of the IPC against the accused-
appellants and others including the unknown
woman.
8. Subsequently, the prosecutrix was sent to GMC,
Rewa where she was examined by Dr. Rajshri
Bajaj who prepared two slides from vaginal
smear of the prosecutrix and observed that she
was accustomed to sexual intercourse. The
prosecutrix was also examined by a Dental
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Surgeon, Dr. R.J. Sharma, who by noticing the
number and position of teeth erupted,
ascertained the age of the prosecutrix as below
17 years.

9. After due investigation and charge-sheet being
filed, which showed all the accused-appellants
as absconding, the case was committed to the
Court of Session for Trial.
10. The Trial Court, after duly examining the
witnesses and appreciating the evidence on
record, held that the accused Indrapal, Suresh
and Surendra kidnapped the prosecutrix, who
was below 18 years of age, from lawful
guardianship of her paternal aunt Premwati for
committing illicit intercourse with her and
accused Indrapal, Suresh, Surendra and Raju
committed gang rape on prosecutrix several
times during the period from 06.07.2005 to
12.09.2005 against her will. The accused
persons were convicted under the following
sections and subjected to punishment as
follows:


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AccusedConvictionPunishment
A1<br>Sheshmani366 IPCRigorous imprisonment<br>of ten years along with<br>fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in<br>default, further rigorous<br>imprisonment of one year
A2 Indrapal363 IPCRigorous imprisonment<br>of seven years along with<br>fine of Rs. 1,000/-; in<br>default, further rigorous<br>imprisonment of six<br>months
366 IPCRigorous imprisonment<br>of ten years along with<br>fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in<br>default, further rigorous<br>imprisonment of one year
376(2)(g) IPCRigorous imprisonment<br>of ten years along with<br>fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in<br>default, further rigorous<br>imprisonment of one year
A3 Raju376(2)(g) IPCRigorous imprisonment<br>of ten years along with<br>fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in<br>default, further rigorous<br>imprisonment of one year
A4 Suresh363 IPCRigorous imprisonment<br>of seven years along with<br>fine of Rs. 1,000/-; in<br>default, further rigorous<br>imprisonment of six<br>months
366 IPCRigorous imprisonment<br>of ten years along with<br>fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in<br>default, further rigorous<br>imprisonment of one year
376(2)(g) IPCRigorous imprisonment<br>of ten years along with<br>fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in

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default, further rigorous<br>imprisonment of one year
A5<br>Surendra363 IPCRigorous imprisonment<br>of seven years along with<br>fine of Rs. 1,000/-; in<br>default, further rigorous<br>imprisonment of six<br>months
366 IPCRigorous imprisonment<br>of ten years along with<br>fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in<br>default, further rigorous<br>imprisonment of one year
376(2)(g) IPCRigorous imprisonment<br>of ten years along with<br>fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in<br>default, further rigorous<br>imprisonment of one year

The sentence terms awarded to accused Suresh,
Indrapal and Surendra were to run
concurrently.

11. All the five accused persons preferred
appeals against the conviction before the High
Court. The High Court re-examined the grounds
of defence put forth by the accused persons as
well as the contentions supporting the
prosecution’s case and held that the ingredients
of the offences punishable under Sections 363,
366 and 376(2)(g) of the IPC were made out
beyond all reasonable doubt. However, for want
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of charge, it was not possible to hold A3 Raju
guilty of the offence of kidnapping. Further,
double punishment awarded to A2 Indrapal, A4
Suresh and A5 Surendra for the offences
punishable under Sections 363 and 366 was
held to be in violation of Section 71 of the IPC
and accordingly, separate sentences for the
offence under Section 363 of the IPC awarded to
A2 Indrapal, A4 Suresh and A5 Surendra was
set aside. It was also observed that A1
Sheshmani ought to have been charged and
convicted for the offence under Section 376(2)(g)
of the IPC. Accordingly, the appeals were
dismissed and the convictions and the
consequent sentences for the offences under
Sections 366 and 376(2)(g) of the IPC were
affirmed.
12. Aggrieved by the impugned order, all the
accused persons except A5 Surendra had
approached this Court. While granting leave in
this matter, vide order dated 09.05.2014,
suspension of sentence was granted to the
appellants subject to them furnishing respective
bail bonds in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- along with
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two sureties each in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the Trial Court concerned.
Consequently, since the appellant Sheshmani
had since expired in the year 2016, his appeal
stood dismissed as abated, as noted vide order
dated 23.01.2025.
13. We have heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the material on record.
14. The chief contention of the counsel for the
appellants hinged on the argument that the
prosecutrix had given her consent to the act.
The appellants attempted to derive such
consent from the fact that she had left her home
with the appellants willingly without informing
her guardian and that the prosecutrix remained
in the company of the appellants for a period of
two months and during this period, she visited
many places like Siddhi, Rewa, Allahabad and
Delhi using public transport where she could
have easily raised call or alarm for help, but she
did not do so, which clearly showed that
prosecutrix was a consenting party. Further, it
was submitted that the medical report
suggested that the prosecutrix was accustomed
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to sexual intercourse and there were no injuries
on her body, thereby supplementing the
argument that there was no forcible sexual
intercourse, the prosecutrix had consented to
the act throughout and there was no offence of
rape as alleged.
15. It was also submitted by the appellants
that there was a delay of about 2 months in
lodging the FIR and such a delay was completely
unjustified and unexplained. Lastly, a challenge
was also raised as to the age of the prosecutrix,
as was also done before both the Courts below,
arguing that the prosecutrix had attained the
age of majority at the time of the incident and
therefore, on account of her being a consenting
adult party, no offence of kidnapping or rape
was made out.
16. On the other hand, the counsel for the
respondent State submitted that the testimony
of the prosecutrix is reliable and without any
contradictions which inspires complete
confidence of the Court. Since it is well settled
law that conviction for the offence of rape could
be safely recorded on the sole testimony of the
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prosecutrix provided that her evidence does not
suffer from any basic infirmity and probabilities
2
factor and the Trial Court as well as the High
Court had found prosecutrix testimony to be
reliable without any infirmities, therefore, the
appeal deserves to be dismissed on this ground
alone.
17. Further, it was submitted that the delay in
lodging the FIR was on account of prosecutrix
being held captive/kidnapped by the accused
persons for a period of two months. With regard
to the issue of consent, it was submitted that
even if in arguendo, it is assumed that the
prosecutrix came with A1 Sheshmani out of her
own will, considering that the Courts below
have conclusively found the prosecutrix to be
below 17 years of age and therefore, the accused
persons would be liable for offences under
Sections 366 and 376(2)(g) of the IPC.
18. Considering the facts and circumstances
of the case, the statements of the witnesses on
record and the findings of the Courts below, we

2
Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hiribhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753
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find that the appellants have not made any good
ground on the basis of which the concurrent
findings of the two Courts below could be
interfered with.

19. Firstly, the most relevant point for
consideration is the age of the prosecutrix. The
dental examination of the prosecutrix was
conducted and the dental surgeon (PW-8) had
opined the age of the prosecutrix to be less than
seventeen years. There was further evidence
produced to prove that the prosecutrix was
minor at the relevant point of time, such as
photocopies of school register, transfer
certificate, which were further corroborated by
the statement of the Principal of school. In all
such documents, the date of the prosecutrix
was shown as 10.08.1988 and the date of the
incident was 06.07.2005, therefore the
prosecutrix was aged less than seventeen years
of age at the starting date of the continuing
offence. To further strengthen the finding of the
prosecutrix’s age, it must be noted that the
guardian of the prosecutrix, Premwati (PW-13),
had also stated the age of the prosecutrix to be
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less than 18 years of age in the missing person’s
report as well as in her deposition before the
Trial Court.
20. Once the age of the prosecutrix at the time
of the incident is established to be that of
minority, the question of consent per se
becomes irrelevant and the act shall qualify as
statutory rape nevertheless. However, even if
the argument of consent is to be considered, we
cannot lose sight of the fact that the accused-
appellants were men who had held the
prosecutrix, who was of a tender age, captive for
a prolonged period of time by threatening her
life. It would be illogical to rule out the role
played by constant fear that the prosecutrix was
operating under as she was being subjected to
rape by the accused persons over the period of
two months. Such a subjection to sexual
intercourse under fear of accused persons can
in no way be understood to mean as consent on
part of the prosecutrix.
21. Further, the reliance of the appellants on
the medical report which suggested that the
prosecutrix was accustomed to sexual
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intercourse shall not further their contention of
the sexual act to be consensual in nature. This
is simply for the reason that such an expression
as “being accustomed to sexual intercourse” is
nothing but an archaic notion of sexual purity
which intends to morally shame the victim and
downplay the role of consent, or the lack
thereof, in an offence of rape. Moreover, the lack
of injuries on the body of the prosecutrix shall
also not be an important factor in the facts of
the case since the offence continued for a period
of two months and the medical investigation
was conducted much after the first incidence of
rape was committed.
22. The issue of delay shall also be
inconsequential to the case since firstly, the
normal rule of delay does not apply to rape
cases and further, the prosecutrix was held
captive by the appellants for a period of two
months and had no means to register the FIR
earlier.
23. Further, we find it of utmost importance to
note here that the statement of the prosecutrix
made in the chief-examination regarding sexual
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assaults committed by the accused persons
remained totally unimpeached even after being
subjected to a lengthy cross-examination. It is
to be noted that none of the so-called
discrepancies in the evidence of the prosecutrix
with reference to her case diary statement
shook the veracity of the prosecution case.
24. Lastly, the counsel for the appellants had
argued in favour of reducing the sentence
awarded to the period already undergone
considering that the accused-appellants have
been enlarged on bail for a considerable period
of time now. However, we find no mitigating
circumstances in the instant case so as to
reduce the punishment as lesser than the
minimum statutory sentence prescribed in the
IPC. We are in no way inclined to trivialize the
misery and exploitation that has been suffered
by the prosecutrix, a young girl from a village
who was kidnapped on the pretext of securing
her a job by men in whom she imposed some
level of trust, and then subjected to an offence
as heinous as gang rape for an elongated period
of two months. The ends of justice shall be met
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only when the accused-appellants have suffered
the entire period of sentence that they have
been awarded and thereby, no leniency is
merited in the facts of the case.

25. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed
and the impugned order is upheld. The
accused-appellants, who are currently enlarged
on bail, are hereby directed to serve the
remaining period of sentence, as awarded by the
High Court. As such, eight weeks’ time is
granted to the appellants to surrender before
the concerned Trial Court.
26. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
………………………..J.
[VIKRAM NATH]


…………………………..J.
[SANJAY KAROL]


NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 27, 2025
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