Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
S. PARTHASARATHI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT20/09/1973
BENCH:
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
BENCH:
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
CITATION:
1973 AIR 2701 1974 SCR (1) 697
1974 SCC (3) 459
CITATOR INFO :
R 1976 SC2428 (11)
ACT:
Hyderabad Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal, Rules 1955 Appellant was under direct control of the
Enquiring Officer-He was refused access to certain relevant
files and documents-Whether the enquiry was vitiated and
whether the enquiry officer had Jurisdiction under the
Rules.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant, a clerk-cum-typist was under the direct
control of one M, the Deputy Director of Information and
Public Relations Department in the State of Andhra Pradesh.
The appellant’s case is that M was inimical towards him and
harassed him in various ways. As Director-in-charge, M
caused the appellant to be suspended from service, and
thereafter he framed certain charges against the appellant.
The appellant protested against M conducting the enquiry.
In spite of protest M. conducted the enquiry. The appellant
wanted to inspect several files, and documents, but was
refused. The appellant, therefore, did not participate in
the enquiry. The enquiry was conducted ex-parte and the
appellant was found guilty of some of the charges.
On the basis of the Inquiry Report, the Director issued a
show cause notice to the appellant. The appellant submitted
a written explanation stating that the inquiry was vitiated
on account of the bias of the Inquiry Officer, that he was
not given reasonable opportunity of defending himself as he
was not supplied with the copies of the relevant documents
and that the Inquiry Officer had no jurisdiction to conduct
the enquiry. The Director however, found the appellant
guilty and passed an order removing him from service.
Thereafter, on the recommendation of the Public Service
Commission, the Government modified the order of removal and
ordered the compulsory retirement of the appellant from
service.
Thereafter, the appellant filed a suit for declaration that
the order of the Director was null and void and asked for
consequential reliefs etc. The trial. court decreed the
suit, but the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed
the suit. Before this Court the following points were
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raised by the appellant :(i) the enquiring officer was
biased against the appellant; (ii) the Enquiring Officer had
no authority to conduct the enquiry (iii) that the appellant
was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as
he was denied access to several files which had a material
bearing upon his defence. Dismissing, the judgment and
decree of the High Court, but restoring the decree passed by
the trial court,
HELD : (i) The Inquiring Officer was biased and he adopted a
procedure which is contrary to the rules of natural justice.
Therefore, the order of his compulsory retirement is bad.
The cumulative effect of the circumstances, with the
exhibits [e.g. Medical Officer’s reply (Ex. 8) stating that
the appellant was not insane, as suggested by M etc., and
other evidence showed that the Inquiring Officer was
inimical towards the appellant.
(ii) The test of likelihood of bias which has been applied
in a number of cases is based on a "reasonable apprehension"
of a reasonable man fully cognizant of the facts. The
courts have quashed decisions, on the strength of the
reasonable suspicion of the party aggrieved without having
made any finding that a real likelihood of bias in fact
existed.
R. v. Huggins [1895] 1 Q.B. 563, R v. Sussex If., Ex. P.
McCarthy, [1924] 1 IC B. 256, Cottle v. Cottle, [1939] 2 AU
E.R. 535 and R. v. Abingdon JJ., Ex P. Cousins, [1964] 108
S.J. 840. referred to.
In R. v. Camborne, JJ. Ex. P. Pearce, [1955] 1 Q.B. 41 and
51, the court, after a review of the relevant cases, held
that real likelihood of bias was the proper W. and that a
real likelihood of bias had to be made to appear not only
from the materials in fact ascertained by the party
complaining, but from such further facts as he might readily
have ascertained and easily verified in the course of hi,
inquiries.
698
(iii) The question, as to whether a real likelihood of
bias existed in a particular case, is to be determined on
the probabilities to be inferred from the circumstances by
the court objectively, or, upon the basis of the impression
that might reasonably be left on the minds of the party
aggrieved or She public at large. The tests of "real
likelihood", and "reasonable suspicion" are really
inconsistent with each other. The reviewing authority,
therefore, must make a determination on the basis of the
whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would, in
the circumstances, infer that there is real likelihood of
bias. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable
men think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer
will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The court will
not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a
reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing
circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced,that
is .sufficient to ash the decision Per Lord Denning M.R. in
Metropolitan Properties (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lanon and Ors.
etc., [1968] 3 W.L.R. 694, referred to. In the present
case, as there was real likelihood of bias in the sense
explained above, the enquiry and the orders based on the
inquiry were bad. [702D-703D]
(iv) M was not authorised to conduct the inquiry ordered by
the Government after he ceased to be the Director in-charge
and became a Deputy Director. The Government wanted the
Director to conduct the inquiry. Even assuming that as
Director-in-charge, M was authorised to conduct the‘
inquiry, that authority came to an end when he ceased to be
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the Director-and became the Deputy Director. Beyond framing
the charges, M had taken no steps in the inquiry before he
ceased to be the Director-in-charge. All the witnesses were
examined by M after he ceased to be the Director-in-charge
and after. his reversion as Deputy Director. [704D-E]
Further rule 22 of the Hyderabad Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1955 provides
that in every case, where it is proposed to impose on a
Government servant any of the penalties mentioned in items
(v), (vi) etc. the authority competent to order an inquire
an 1 appoint an inquiry officer, shall be, in the case
of subordinate services, the head of the office, the
appointing authority or the higher authority. When the
Government made it clear that the Director should conduct
the inquiry, the Director, as Head of the Department, cannot
delegate his power to another person to conduct the inquiry.
Therefore, the delegation by the Director to another person
the power to inquire into the allegations was contrary to
the intention of the Government and therefore was beyond his
competence. [705C]
(v) There is no justification for the refusal of the
inquiring officer to give access of the files to the
appellant and not granting the prayer of the appellant to
inspect the files containing the proceedings on the ground
that the appellant was appraised of the earlier proceedings
especially when it is seen that these proceedings have been
relied upon by the inquiry officer in his report to
substantiate one of the charges against the appellant. it
was too much to assume that the appellant would be
remembering the details of the proceedings of 1951 at the
time of the inquiry. Therefore, the trial on this score was
also vitiated. [706C]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 656 of 1971.
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and decree dated
April 17, 1970 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Hyderabad in, GC.C. Appeal No, 56 of 1966.
B.R.L. Aiyanagar and H.K.Puri, for the appellant.
P. Rwn Reddy and P. Parmeswararao, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MATHEW, J. The appellant filed a suit for quashing the order
passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh on November 10.
1961 retiring him compulsorily on the basis of the finding
in a disciplinary
699
proceeding against him. The trial court decreed the suit.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh appealed against the decree
to the, High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal and
dismissed the suit. This appeal, by certificate, is against
that decree.
The appellant was appointed in the service of Andhra Pradesh
Government in 1940 as Clerk-cum-Typist in the Public Works
Department. It is not necessary to trace the subsequent
career of the appellant in the service.. Suffice it to say
that on June 7, 1952, he was posted as Office Superintendent
in the Information and Public Relations Department and was
confirmed in the post in 1956. The Deputy Director of
Information and Public Relations Department, during the
period from 1956, to 1957 was one Narsing Rao Manvi,
hereinafter referred to as Manvi The appellant was under his
immediate administrative control.
The, appellant’s case in the plaint was as follows: The
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Deputy Director was inimical towards him and harassed him in
various ways. Manvi was appointed as Director-in-charge, on
August 1, 1957. As Director-in-charge, Manvi caused the
appellant to be suspended from service and thereafter he
framed certain charges against the appellant on May 13, 1959
and they were communicated to the appellant. The appellant
protested saying that Manvi should not conduct the enquiry
on the basis of the charges for the reason that Manvi had
bias against him and that he was not duly authorised to
conduct the enquiry. In spite of the protest Manvi
conducted the enquiry. The appellant wanted to inspect
several files and documents in the enquiry for the purpose
of his defence, but his requests in that behalf were not
granted. The appellant, therefore, refused to participate in
the enquiry. The enquiry was conducted and the appellant
was found guilty of some of the charges. On the basis of
the enquiry report, the Director issued a show cause notice
to the appellant why he should not be dismissed from
service. The appellant submitted a written explanation
stating that the enquiry was vitiated on account of the bias
of the inquiring officer, that he was not given reasonable
opportunity of defending himself in the enquiry as he was
not supplied with copies of the relevant documents nor given
an opportunity to inspect the. concerned files and that the
enquiring officer had no jurisdiction to ?conduct the
enquiry.
The Director, however, found the appellant guilty and passed
an order removing him from service with effect from April 11
1960. Thereafter, the Government, on the recommendation of
the Public Service Commission, modified the order of removal
and ordered the compulsory retirement of the appellant from
service.
The prayer of the appellant in the suit was for a
declaration that the order of the Director of Information
and Public Relations dated April 11. 1960 as modified-by the
order of the Government compulsorily retiring him from
service was null and void and that he was entitled to
arrears of salary and damages to the tune of Rs. 65,000/-.
700
The trial court held that Manvi as Director-in-charge had no
jurisdiction to conduct the enquiry and that, at any rate,
he had no authority to continue the enquiry after he ceased
to be the Director-in-charge, that the enquiry was vitiated
as the appellant was not given a reasonable opportunity of
defending himself and as the inquiring officer was biased
against him. The court therefore passed a decree setting
aside the impugned orders and declaring that the appellant
must be deemed to have continued in service and that he
would be entitled to the arrears of salary claimed in the
plaint.
It was against this decree that the State of Andhra Pradesh
filed the appeal before the High Court.
The High Court found that there was no material to show that
the inquiring officer was biased against the appellant, that
the Government had authorised the Director-in-charge to
conduct the enquiry, that at any rate, the Director
authorized the Deputy Director to conduct the enquiry and
that the Government subsequently accepted the suggestion of
the Director that the Deputy Director may continue the
enquiry and therefore, the inquiring officer had
jurisdiction to conduct the enquiry. The court further
found that there were no materials from which it could be
inferred that the inquiring officer was biased against the
appellant and that the appellant was not denied reasonable
opportunity of defending himself as he was not denied access
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to any Me which had a material bearing upon his defence.
The. High Court, therefore, reversed the judgment and
decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit.
In this appeal, counsel for the appellant submitted that
the inquiring officer was biased against the appellant, that
the inquiring officer had no authority to conduct the
enquiry and that the appellant was not given a reasonable he
was denied access to several files which ‘ on his defence.
The trial court had relied upon the following circumstances
for its conclusion that the inquiring officer was biased
against the appellant. By Ex. A-10 dated 15-10-1955.
Manvi who was the Assistant Director at the time, called for
the explanation of the Appellant regarding theft of 164
files in the Weeding Section in which the appellant was the
Superintendent. The appellant replied by Ex. A-97 dated
October 18, 1955 stating that he had no idea of the missing
files till his return from privilege leave in the first week
of July, 1955. Ex. A-18 dated January 10, 1958 is a
Memorandum served on the appellant by Manvi to show cause
why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for
giving false statement relating to his residence. By Ex. A-
19 the appellant denied that he had given any false
statement in the particulars furnished by him. Ex. A-21
dated March 12, 195 8 is a.Memorandum served on the
appellant by Manvi threatening disciplinary action for being
negligent in his duties. In his reply (EX. A-22) the
appellant said that no files were pending with him and that
be was not negligent. Ex. A-23 dated March 13, 1958 is a
Memo-
701
random served upon the appellant by manvi, again threatening
him with disciplinary action for negligence of duties. By
Ex. A-24 the appellant denied the charge of negligence.
Manvi as Deputy Director overlooked the claim of the
appellant for promotion. The appellant complained about it
to higher authorities. Ex. A-33 is a letter addressed to
the inquiring officer on 3-11-1958 informing him that he was
never absent without leave and without prior application and
requesting the Director-in-charge that deductions made by
him from the salary may be paid to him. Ex. A-34 shows
that his explanation was accepted by the Director-in-charge.
Ex. A-36 is a Memorandum served on the appellant on
November 20, 1958 to show cause why disciplinary action
should not be taken against him for accumulation of arrears
of work. Ex. A-37 is the reply of the appellant wherein he
has protested against the attitude of the Director-in-charge
towards him. By Ex. A-41 order dated December 1, 1958 and
signed by the Assistant Director, the appellant was asked to
take charge of the Weeding Section. The appellant
complained against that posting by Ex. A-42 and in that he
said that if the Record Keeper of the Weeding Section Sri
Kazim Ali is required to hand over charge of the ,several
thousand files, and registers, all of them being very old
and mainly- in Urdu, two clerks, knowing English and Urdu
should be posted to the Weeding Section to check each file
in a manner prescribed by Government. By Ex. A-13 the
Assistant Director ordered that the appellant should take
charge immediately and comply with the earlier order in Ex.
A-41. By Ex. A-47 the appellant was threatened with
disciplinary action unless he took charge in compliance with
the order. By Ex. A-49 the Director-in-charge said that
the appellant should take charge of the entire files in the
Weeding Section and that no further arrangement is possible,
apparently referring to the requirement of two clerks for
taking charge.
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Besides the circumstances relied on by the trial court, the
appellant urged the following circumstances to support his
case that the inquiring officer was biased. Manvi had
written on April 29, 1959, a letter enclosing certain
documents requesting for an opinion from Dr. R. Natarajan,
Superintendent, Hospital for Mental Diseases, Hyderabad,
about the mental condition of the appellant. This letter
was not produced in court. We are left to gather the
contents of the letter from the reply of Dr. Natarajan (Ex.
B-8). It would seem from the reply that Manvi wanted to get
rid of the services of the appellant without taking any
disciplinary action- against him and without holding an
enquiry, for the reason that he was mentally unsound. In
his "reply, Dr. Natarajan said :
"Unfortunately, I cannot, on medical grounds,
advice his, retrenchment or removal and,
therefore, I would suggest you .to deal with
him departmentally and take appropriate action
according to the seriousness of the offenses
he has committed in the office’ This is a case
that would be dealt with departmentally and
disciplinary and I am sorry I will not be able
to help you further as he cannot be termed
insane in the spirit of which it is
understood".
702
It was after this letter was received by Manvi, the
Director-in-charge, ,that he started the disciplinary
proceedings against the appellant.
According to the High Court, none of the circumstances
relied on by the appellant was sufficient to establish bias
on the part of the .inquiring officer. The High Court said
that it was because various ,officers had complained to
Manvi while he was the Director-in-charge ,about the conduct
and behavior of the appellant that he wanted a medical
opinion as to his mental condition and that as the letter
written by Manvi to the Medical Officer was not produced
before the ,court nor the Medical Officer examined, no
inference of bias could be made.
The letter written by the Medical Officer (Ex. B-8) would
indicate that Manvi wanted to get rid of the services of the
appellant on the ground of his mental imbalance and it was
for that purpose that he tried to get a certificate to the
effect that the appellant was mentally unsound. We are of
the opinion that the cumulative effect of the circumstances
stated above was sufficient to create in the mind of a
reasonable man the impression that there was a real
likelihood of bias in the inquiring officer. There must be
a "real likelihood" of bias and that means there must be a
substantial possibility of bias. The court will have to
judge of the matter as a reasonable man would judge of any
matter in the conduct of as own business (see R. v.
Sunderland JJ.)(1).
The test of likelihood of bias which has been applied in a
number of cases is based on the "reasonable apprehension" of
a reasonable man fully cognizant of the facts. The courts
have quashed decisions on the ,strength of the reasonable
suspicion of the party aggrieved without having made any
finding that a real likelihood of bias in fact existed [see
R. v. Huggins(2)]; R. v. Sussex JJ., ex. p. McCarthy(3);
Cottle v. Cottle(4); R. v. Abingdon JJ. ex. p. Cousins(5).
But in R. v. Camborne ff., ex. p. Pearce(6), the Court,
after a review of the relevant cases held that real
likelihood of bias was the proper test and, that a real
likelihood of bias had to be made to appear not only from
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the materials in fact ascertained by the party complaining,
but from such further facts as he might readily have
ascertained and easily verified in the course of his
inquiries.
The question then is : whether a real likelihood "of bias
existed is to be determined on the probabilities to be
inferred from the circumstances by court objectively, or,
upon the basis of the impressions that might reasonably be
left on the minds of the party aggrieved or the public at
large.
The tests of "real likelihood" and "reasonable suspicion"
are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the
reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis
of the whole evidence before
(1) [1901] 2 K. B. 357 at 373.
(2) [1895] 1 Q. B. 563.
(3) [1924] 1 K. B. 256.
(4) [1939] 2 Ail E. R. 535.
(5) [1964] 108 S. J. 840.
(6) [1955] 1 Q. B. 41 at 51.
703
it whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer
that there is real likelihood of bias. The court must look
at the impression which other people have. This follows
from the principle that justice must not only be done but
seen to be done. If right minded persons would think that
there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring
officer, be must not conduct the enquiry; nevertheless,
there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or
conjecture would not be enough. There must exist
circumstances from which reasonable men would think it
probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be
prejudiced against the delinquent. The court will not
inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable
man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances
that. he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to
quash the decision [see per Lord Denning, M.R. in Metropoli-
tan Properties Co, (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon and Others,
etc.(1)]. We should not, however, be understood to deny that
the court might with greater propriety apply the "reasonable
suspicion" test in criminal or in proceedings analogous to
criminal proceedings.
As there was real likelihood of bias in the sense explained
above, think that the inquiry and the orders based on the
inquiry were bad. The decision of this Court in the State
of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh(2) makes it clear that if
an inquiring officer adopts a procedure which is contrary to
the rules of natural justice, the ultimate decision based on
his report of inquiry is liable to be quashed. We see no
reason for not applying the same principle here as we find
that the inquiring officer was biased.
The next point for consideration is whether the inquiring
officer was authorised to conduct the enquiry. On April 13,
1959, Manvi, , as Director-in-charge, appointed Siddiqui,
the Assistant Director as inquiring officer. Siddiqui,
Assistant Director passed an order suspending the appellant
on April 13, 1959 and served a Memorandum of charges on him
on May 12, 1959. The appellant objected to the framing of
charges by Siddiqui on May 26, 1959, by Ex. B-16. On July
1, 1959, by Ex. B-1 order, the Government directed that the
enquiry must be conducted by the Director himself. On July
6, 1959 Manvi as Director-in-charge issued a Memorandum of
charges containing practically the same charges as framed as
Siddiqui. On July 15, 1959 the appellant protested against
Manvi conducting the enquiry. On July 16, 1959 Manvi
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communicated to the appellant that be was conducting the
enquiry in pursuance to the Government order, and that the
written statement should be filed by the appellant before
July 27, 1959. On July 27, 1959 Manvi went on leave; Luther
was appointed as Director on August 1, 1959. On October 10,
1959, by Ex A-65, the appellant again protested that Manvi
was biased against him and a person unconnected with the
Department should be appointed as inquiring officer. On
October 20, 1959, Luther, as Director, authorised Manvi,
Deputy Director to continue the enquiry (see Ex. A- 114-B).
But on October 27, 1959, by Ex-B-4, the Government enquired
of Luther whether it was the Deputy Director who was
conducting the enquiry and said that the Director himself
should conduct the enquiry. Ex-B-4
(1) (1968) 3 W. L. R. 694 at 707.
(2) [1958] S.C.R. 595.
5-L392Sup.CI/74
704
was not communicated to the appellant or shown to Manvi. On
November 6, 1959, Luther wrote to Government explaining the
practical difficulties in his conducting the enquiry and
stating that it would be expedient if the Deputy Director
was allowed to continue the enquiry On November 24, 1959 the
enquiry was completed. On December 3, 1959 the Government-
agreed to the suggestion of Luther that Manvi might continue
the enquiry.
It is not clear from Ex. B-1 that although Manvi was the
Director,in-charge at the time, he Was the person intended
by the Government to conduct the enquiry, for by that
document the Government only authorized the Director to
conduct the enquiry. But Ex. B-4 is clear that the
Government wanted the Director to conduct the enquiry. In
that communication the Government said that it was the
intention of the Government that the Director himself should
conduct the enquiry and that if Manvi, the Deputy Director
was conducting the enquiry, the Director should take up the
matter and proceed with the enquiry. Even assuming for a
moment that by Ex. B-1, the Director-in-charge at the time,
namely Manvi, was authorised to conduct the enquiry, it
would not follow that Manvi, when he ceased to be the
Director-in-charge and became the Deputy Director, was
authorised to continue the enquiry. In other words, even
assuming that as Director-in-charge Manvi was authorised to
conduct the enquiry, that authority came to in end when he
ceased to be the Director-in-charge and became the Deputy
Director. Beyond framing the charges, Manvi had taken no
steps in the enquiry before he ceased to be the Director-in-
charge. All the witnesses were examined by Manvi after he
ceased to be the Dirctor-in-charge and after his reversion
as Deputy Director. The order of the Government accepting
the suggestion of Luther, the Director, that Manvi might
continue the enquiry was passed only on December 3, 1959 and
at that time Manvi had already completed the enquiry and
drawn up his report of the inquiry. As we said, assuming
that the Director-in-charge was authorised to conduct the
enquiry by Ex. B-1, Manvi was not authorised to conduct the
enquiry after he ceased to be the Director-in-charge and Ex.
B-4 makes that position clear. The order of Government
dated December 3, 1959, accepting the suggestion of Luther
that Manvi might continue, the enquiry, as it did not in
terms clothe Manvi with authority to conduct the inquiry
after he became the Deputy Director, is of no avail because
it did not either expressly or by implication have retros-
pective operation, even if it be assumed that the Government
’could give that order retrospective effect.
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Rule 22 of the Hyderabad Civil Service (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1955, so far as it is material,
provides :
"22(1) in, every case where it is proposed to
impose on a Government servant any of the
penalties mentioned in items (v), (vi), (vii)
and (viii) of rule 12, or in any other case
where disciplinary action into the conduct of
a Government servant is considered necessary,
the authority competent
705
to order an enquiry- and appoint an Inquiry
Officer shall be as follows:
Class of members of the State Authority competent to
Subordinate Service enquiry and/or to appoint
an Inquiry Officer
(a) Subordinate Service (Class The Head of the Officer,
III service) the appointing authority
or, any higher authority".
We think that when the Government made it clear that the
Director should conduct the enquiry, the Director as Head of
the Department cannot exercise his power under the rule by
designating another person to conduct the enquiry and
therefore the order passed by Luther (Ex. A-I 14-B)
authorising Manvi as Deputy Director to conduct the enquiry
could not invest him with the power to do so. We think that
the Director, as Head of the office bad no power to
designate or appoint an inquiry officer, as Government, the
appointing authority, had already directed that the Director
should himself conduct the enquiry. It would be anomalous
to hold that both the appointing authority, namely, the
Government and the Head of the Office, namely, the Director,
could, in the same case, appoint two persons to conduct the
enquiry. We cannot, therefore, agree with the reasoning of
the High Court that Manvi, as Deputy Director, was invested
with authority to conduct the enquiry by the Director by Ex.
A-114-B. The High Court said that since Ex. B-4 order was
not communicated to the appellant, he cannot found an
argument upon it and say that the Director alone was autho-
rized to conduct the enquiry. We see little substance in
the reasoning. The question is whether the Government, as
appointing authority, had manifested its intention that the
Director alone should conduct the enquiry. Whether Ex. B-4
was communicated to the, appellant or not, .it manifested
the intention of Government to invest, only the Director
with power to conduct the enquiry. That is all what is
relevant. No doubt, the Government could have changed that
order. But in this case when it changed the order and
authorized Manvi to continue the enquiry by its order dated
December 3, 1959, Manvi had already completed the enquiry
and drawn up the report. As we said, the order dated
December 3, 1959 was not retrospective in character and,
therefore’ it did not invest Manvi with authority to conduct
the inquiry from an anterior date. Nor do we think that
when the Director alone was invested with power to conduct
the inquiry by Ex. B- I read in the light of Ex.B-4, he
could have delegated that power to Manvi, as we think ,that
the Government had manifested its intention in Ex-B-4 that
the Director alone should conduct the
enquiry and so any delegation by the Director of that power
would have been contrary to the intention of the Government.
The trial court was of the view that the appellant was not
given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself as the
inquiring officer did not give him facility for inspecting
the relevant files. The High Court found that although the
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appellant was not allowed to inspect the confidential record
of some of the witnesses for the purpose of enabling the
706
appellant to cross-examine them, that would not be a denial
of reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the,
enquiry. The High Court also found that Exhibits 3 and 4
(R.D. File No. Estt/89 of 1951 Pt. II p.17 and H.D. File
No. Est/89 of 1951 Pt-11 paras 253 to 258 pp.55 also found
that Exhibits 3 and 4 (R.D. File No. Estt/89 of 1951 Pt. II
were not material for the purpose of defence, that the
appellant was made aware of the contents of those,
proceedings and therefore, the inquiring officer was
justified in not giving copies of these proceedings or in
not acquainting the delinquent of them. Ex. 3 relates to a
file regarding the transfer of the appellant in 1951 from
the Secretariat to the Information Department. Ex.4 relates
to a proceeding against the appellant which resulted in a
censure on the basis of a complaint in 1951. Whatever night
be said in justification of the refusal of the inquring
officer to give access to the appellant of the confidential
records relating to the witnesses we see no justification
for not granting the prayer of the appellant to inspect the
files containing the proceedings on the ground that the
appellant was appraised of the proceedings in 1951,
especially when it is seen that these proceedings have been
relied upon by the inquiring officer in his report to sub-
stantiate one of the charges against the appellant. it was
too much to assume that the appellant would be remembering
the details of the proceedings of 1951 at the time of the
inquiry.
We set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and
restore the decree passed by the trial court, but in the
circumstances, we make no order to costs.
S.C. Appeal allowed.
707