Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7
PETITIONER:
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
KANNAPALLI CHINNA VENKATACHALAMAYYA SASTRI
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
30/03/1962
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
CITATION:
1962 AIR 1687 1963 SCR (1) 155
CITATOR INFO :
R 1978 SC 771 (61)
ACT:
Land-lord and a Tenant-Estate-Reduction of rent of ryoti
land--Whether unreasonable restriction-Madras Estates Land
(Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Mad. XXX of 1947), s. 3(4)--
Constitution of India Art 19(1) (f).
HEADNOTE:
The Respondent, the sole inamdar of village Chinnaven-
katapuram in the Parlakimidi Zamindari in the District of
srikakulam filed a Writ Petition before the High Court chal-
lenging lnter-alia the notification issued under s. 3 (4) of
the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act by which the
rents in respect of ryoti lands included in his Estate were
reduced. He also challenged the provisions of the Act. The
High Court accepted the challenge to the notification on the
ground that the net income from rents was reduced to less
than 25% of the original income and that the reduction was
so substantial as to amount to an unreasonable restriction
on the respondent’s right to hold property under Art. 19 (1)
(f ) of the Constitution. On appeal by a certificate.
Held, that the provisions of the Act were valid as they laid
down reasonable restrictions in the interest of ameliorating
the conditions of tenants of ryoti land in ’Estates’ who
were at a disadvantage compared to tenants of ryotwari
lands.
Held, further, that it is only in a theoretical case where a
land-holder would be virtually’ deprived of his income by
the reduction of rents that it can be said that the
reduction was unreasonable. By the reduction the income of
the Respondent was brought on a par with that of the highest
prevailing rents in ryotwari lands and so it cannot be said
that the reduction of rents made by the notification was
violative of the land holders’ rights under Art. 19 (f ).
The method of comparing the rents prior to reduction with
the rents after reduction for the purpose of deciding the
unreasonableness of the restriction was not sound as not
humane landholders but those who were charging
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7
unconscionable rents would benefit thereby.
156
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 242 of 1960.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 11, 1957,
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 201 of
1952.
R. Can-apathy Iyer, T. V. R. Tatachari, D. Venkatappaya
Sastri and P. D. Menon, for the appellants.
K. Bhimasankaram and T. Satyanarana, for the respondent.
1962., March 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-This appeal on a certificate granted by the
Andhra Pradesh High Court raises a question of the
constitutionality of the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of
Rent) Act, No. XXX of 1947, as amended, (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) and a notification issued
thereunder. The brief facts necessary for present purposes
are these. The respondent was the sole inamdar of village
Chinnavenkatapuram in the Parlakimidi zamindari in the
district of Srikakulam. The legislature the composite State
of Madras passed the Act, which came into force from January
7, 1948, to provide for the reduction of rents payable by
ryots in estates governed by the Madras Estates Land Act,
No. 1 of 1908, approximately to the level of the assessments
levied on lands in ryotwari areas in the neighborhood and
for the collection of such rents exclusively by the State
Government. The Act applied to all estates as defined in s.
3 (2) of the Madras Estates Land Act. Section 2 provided
for the appointment of a special officer for any estate or
estates for the purpose of recommending fair and equitable
rates of rent for the ryoti lands in such estate or estates
and laid down the procedure to be followed by the Special
officer for
157
such purpose, and gave power to the special officer to
determine after necessary enquiries the extent if any to
which the rates of rent payable for each class of ryoti
lands should in his opinion be reduced and to fix the rates
of rent payable for each class of ryots after such
reductions. Under a. 3, the special officer had to submit a
report after completion of his inquiry to the State
Government on the two points mentioned above and after
considering the recommendations of the special officer and
the remarks of the Board of Revenue thereon, the State
government was empowered by order published in the gazette
to fix the rates of rent in respect of each class of ryoti
land in each village in the estate, and the order so passed
by the State Government was to take effect from the
commencement of the Fasli year 1357. Section 3 (4) then
provided for the recovery of rents so fixed by the State
Government and the amount so recovered in respect of each
year, after deducting therefrom the cost of such recovery as
may be determined according to the Rules to be framed and
also after deducting the peshkash, cesses and other moneys
due from the landholder to the State Government, was to be
paid to the landholder. Section 3 (7) laid down that the
landholder shall not be entitled to collect rents
thereafter. Sections 5 and 6 made special provisions with
regard to religious, educational and charitable
institutions. Section 7 provided for the framing of rules
and sections 4, 8 and 9 made incidental provisions which are
however not material for our purposes.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7
In pursuance of the provisions of the Act a notifications
was issued by the State Government with respect to the
estate of the respondent fixing the rates of rent for
various classes of ryoti lands in the estate. In the case
of wet and dry lands the rate was reduced to half of the
then existing rates and in the case of dry land (when
agraharam well water
158
was used) the rate was reduced to one-sixth of the existing
rate. Thereupon the respondent filed a writ petition on
March 21. 1952, challenging the above notification. The
first challenge was on the ground that the estate of the
respondent was not an estate within the meaning of the
Madras Estates. Land Act and therefore the Act was not
applicable to it. Secondly, it was contended that the
reduction in the ’rents made by the notification was so
drastic as to result virtually in depriving the respondent
of his right to hold and enjoy his property, as the
out goings were far in excess of the income after the
reduction in rents. Consequently, the notification amounted
to an unreasonable restriction on the right of the
respondent to hold property under Art. 19 (1) (f) of the
constitution.
The petition was opposed on behalf of the State and it was
contended that it was incorrect to say that the outgoings
were more than the income after the reduction of rents made
by the impugned notification. It was pointed out that after
meeting the cess, the quit-rent and ten per centum for
collection charges, the respondent would have a net income
of Rs. 603/- and the reduction in the circumstances could
not be said to be so drastic as to virtually deprive the
respondent of his right to hold property under Art. 19 (1)
(6).
When the matter came to be argued before the High Court,
three points were raised by the respondent, namely, (i) that
the village in dispute was not an estate, (ii) that even if
it was an estate the notification under the Act offended
Art. (19) (1) (f) of the Constitution because of the drastic
nature of the reduction, and (iii) that the Act itself was
ultra vires for the reason that it was contrary to the terms
of Art. 31 of the Constitution and s. 299 of the Government
of India Act, 1935. The third of these contentions, though
it was not raised in the petition by the respondent, was
eventually referred to a Full
159
Bench and the question put to the Full Bench was in these
terms:-
"Whether the decision in Rajah of Bobbili V.
State of Madras (1) insofar as that Madras Act
XXX of 1947 does not offend against section
299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, is
good law?"
It may be mentioned here that the Act was challenged soon
after it was passed by the Rajah of Bobbili on various
grounds one of which was that the Act was bad as it
contravened s. 299 (2) of the Government of India Act. This
challenge to the Act was repelled by the Madras High Court
in the case of Rajah of Bobbili(1) and it was held that mere
reduction of rent was not acquisition of property within the
meaning of s. 299 (2) of the Government of India Act and the
effect of the Act was held to be that the landholder
continued to be the owner of the estate as before, his title
being left untouched. It was further pointed out that it
was the tenant who was entitled ’to possession, the right of
the landholder being only to recover rent and that right
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7
again was left unaffected by the legislation, the only
change being that the collection of rent was to be made not
by the landholder but by the Government. Further though the
learned Judges in Rajah of Bobbili’s case (1) were
apparently of opinion that the acquisition contemplated by
s. 299 (2) of the Government of India Act was acquisition of
title, they went on to say that even assuming that s. 299
(2) of the Government of India Act, covered cases of posses-
sion, there was no such taking of possession in the case
before them tinder the Act as would attract that provision.
The reference to the Full Bench in the High Court was due to
the challenge to the narrow view of the word "acquisition"
which was said to have been taken in Rajah of Bobbili’8 case
(1) in view of
(1) (1952) 1 M.L.J. 174.
160
certain later decisions of this Court. Eventually, however,
the Full Bench held that even if a wider interpretation was
given to the word "’acquisition’ as used in s. 299(2) of the
Government of India Act, there was no deprivation of the
property of the landholder by the Act within the meaning of
s.299(2) and therefore the decision in the Rajah of
Bobbili’s case (1) was still good law. The Full Bench also
held that the provisions of the Act only regulated the
relationship of landholder and tenant and as there was no
acquisition by the Government even in the wider meaning to
be given to the word "acquisition" in s. 299(2) of the
Government of India Act, the Act was not hit by Art.
19(1)(f) and was a reasonable restriction on the right to
hold property and in the interest of the general public.
The Full Bench further held that, though prima facie .the
reduction of rents to the ryotwari level could not be said
to be unreasonable, the view expressed in the Rajah of
Bobblli’s case (1) that if in a particular case the result
of the reduction of rates of rent had the effect of total or
substantial deprivation of the landholder of his net income
it would offend Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
After this opinion of the Full Bench, the matter was again
placed before a Division Bench, for final decision. At that
stage it seems that the point that the village in dispute
was not an estate was given up and the only point urged was
that the reduction was so drastic as to amount to an unrea-
sonable restriction on the fundamental right to hold
property under Art. 19(1)(f). The learned Advocate General
placed before the Bench the effect of the reduction based on
the notification of June 27,1950. It was found that prior
to the reduction the net income of the respondent was Rs.
3,875/-, and after the reduction his net income was reduced
to Rs. 457/13/8. It was urged by’. the learned Advocate
General that the respondent was getting the rent at the
highest rate prevalent in- the ryotwari
(1) (1952) 1 M.L.J. 174.
161
areas of the district and that it could not be said that the
reduction of rates of rent to the level of the highest
ryotwari rate was an unreasonable restriction on the right
of the respondent to hold property. The Bench, however,
observed that though ordinarily the reduction of rates of
rent of the ryotwari level might be reasonable, there might
be circumstances in a particular case to hold that the.
reduction was so drastic that it would be an unreasonable
restriction. It was observed that the State might reduce
the rent to such a level after deducting the legal charges
and the cost of collection fixed on an arbitrary basic that
there might be nothing left to the landholder. In such a
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7
case in the name of regulation of rents and collection
thereof the State took away the grain and gave the husk to
the landholder. The Bench then added that though it was
easy to state the principle it was difficult to apply it to
the facts of each case. It then :went on to consider the
circumstances under which it could be held that reduction
was so drastic that the landholder was substantially
deprived of his income., and was of opinion that having
regard to the object of the Act, if the income of the
landholder after reduction of rents did not fall below 25
per centum of his previous income it could be held that the
reduction was not an unreasonable restriction on the right
to hold property enshrined in Art. 19 (1) (f). As in this
case, however, the income of the respondent fell far below
25 per centum of the income which be was getting before the
reduction, the Bench held that the notification was bad.
Thereupon the State Government asked for a certificate to
appeal to this Court, which was granted; and that is how the
matter has come up before us.
So far as the constitutionality of the Act is concerned,
there was no serious challenge to it by the respondent. If
one refers to the main provisions of the Act relating to
reduction of rents
162
which we have already set out above, it will appear that the
object of the Act was to put a check on rack-renting in
estate as defined in the Madras Estates Land Act. As such
agricultural tenants formed a considerable group of
cultivators in the State, it was thought necessary to
ameliorate their condition. The Act was therefore enacted
under the powers conferred on the provincial legislature
under item 21, of List II of Schedule VII to the Government
of India Act dealing with land. It provided for reduction
of rent to the level at which the rents prevailed in the
neighbouring area where there was ryotwari settlement. In
these circumstances it cannot possibly be said that the
reduction of the prevailing rents to the ryotwari level was
an unreasonable restriction on the right of the landholder
of an estate to hold property under Art. 19 (1) (f). We
must therefore hold that the Act is constitutional and lays
down reasonable restrictions on the right of the landholder
to hold his estate.
The attack based on reading the term ’,acquisition" in s.299
of the Government of India Act, 1935 in the wide sense of
any interference with property even when the title thereto
does not pass to the State, which was the point debated
before the Full Bench is no longer a live issue since the
matter is concluded against the respondent by the decision
of this Court in Guru Dutt Sharma v. State of Bihar (1).
This brings us to the main point that has been argued before
us by counsel for the parties. It is urged on behalf of the
appellant that the High Court was wrong in holding that
where the reduction is such that the previous net income is
reduced below 25 per centum there would be an unreasonable
restriction on the right to hold property, merely because of
this circumstances It is said that the fixation of this
percentage at 25 per centum is more
(1) [1962] 2 S. C. R, 29
163
or less arbitrary. In any case it means that where a
landholder had been successful enough previously to practice
rack-renting as an art and to increase the rents of his
tenants unconscionably, he would get protection because in
such a case it was likely that the reduction would be
drastic and may even result in the reduced net income being
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7
less than 25 per centum of the previous net income. On the
other hand in the case of a landholder who was a humane
person and did not increase his rents unconscionably, the
reduction of ’rents on the basis of the same rate which
might be used in the case of the former landholder who was a
rack-renter may not be hit because in his case the reduction
may not be below 25 per centum. So it is urged that if the
reasonableness is to depend upon by how much the previous
net income is reduced after the reduction, it will always
work in favour of a landholder who was a rack-renter even
though the basis of reduction may be on the same rates in
the case of a rack-renting landholder and in the case of a
humane landholder. Therefore, it is urged that if the
reduction is reasonable in the case of a humane landholder
because it is brought into line with the prevailing rates of
rent in the neighbouring areas under the ryotwari
settlement, there is no reason why such reduction should not
continue to be reasonable in the case of the other
landholder. The fact that in one case the reduction may not
be below 25 per centum while in the other case it may go
below 25 per centum will make no difference to the reasonab-
leness of the reduction, for in either case the basis of the
reduction is the same. We are of opinion that there is
force in this argument and it must be accepted. What we
have to see is whether the Act when it provides for
reduction of rent proceeds on a reasonable basis i.e.
whether the reduction of rent to the level of the prevailing
rent for the same class of land in the neighbouring areas
where ryotwari settlement prevails is reasonable. This in
our
164
opinion is a reasonable basis on which the rent in estates
covered by the Madras Estates Land Act can be reduced. Once
this basis is accepted ’as reasonable, we fail to see how
the ratio between what the landholder was getting before the
reduction and what he gets after the’ redaction will’ make
what is per se reasonable into an unreasonable restriction.
Theoretically. it may be possible to say that the reduction
may be so much that nothing may be left to the landholder.
This is what the respondent tried to make out in his writ
petition, for his case therein was that the rents were so
far reduced in his case that instead of getting an income
of Rs. 3,875/- he would be getting no income at all and
would be actually suffering a net loss of Rs. 655/- by his
holding the estate after reduction of rents.’ This of
course has been found by the High Court to be
incorrect and in actual fact the landholder is left with a
net income of Rs. 457/- and odd after the reduction in
rent. Therefore. except for the theoretical
possibility where the landholder may be left with nothing
on reduction of rents, it cannot be said from the mere fact
that in some cases the ratio- of net income falls after
reduction of rent as compared to the net income before reduction
below 25 per centum that the restrictions imposed by the Act
are unreasonable. , Actually ’we feel that there cannot
possible be any case where after the reduction there will be
nothing left to the landholder. We cannot therefore agree
with the High Court that simply because in a particular case
the net income after reduction falls below 25 per centum of
the net income before reduction the notification which
results in such a position, is an unreasonable restriction
on the right of the land-holder to hold his estate. As we
have said already, the ratio by which the net income will
fall after reduction will depend upon whether the
landholder whose rents are being reduced was a rack
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7
renter or humane person; in the case of a rack-renter the
165
fall may be heavier while in the case of a humane person the
fall may be less. But if the basis on which the, reduction
is made is the same in both cases and is reasonable, we see
no reason for holding that a notification which may in a
given case result in a fall of the net income which is even
below 25 per centum of the previous net income would
necessarily be bad as an unreasonable restriction on the
right of the landholder to hold his estate. It is important
in this connection to remember that the rent allowed to the
respondent compares favorably with the highest rent payable
by the ryotwari tenants in the locality. Therefore, the
basis on which rents are being reduced under the Act being
good and reasonable the result of such reduction would not
make the,notification in a particular case bad except where
that theoretical case is reached where there is no income
left to the landholder after reduction, which in our opinion
is impossible. We therefore allow the appeal and setting
aside the order of the High Court dismiss the writ petition
with costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
166