Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
M/S MUSTAFA & NAJIBAI TRADING CO., & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/07/1998
BENCH:
S.C. AGARWAL, V.N. KHARE
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
S.C. AGRAWAL, J. :
This appeal, by special leave, has been filed by
Revenue against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated
may 14, 1987 whereby the High Court, while allowing Civil
Writ No. 6142 of 1986 filed by the respondents, has set
aside the order dated April 6, 1984 passed by the Collector
of Customs (Preventive), Bombay [hereinafter referred to as
’the Collector’] as well as the order of the Customs, Excise
and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal [hereinafter referred
to as ’the Tribunal’] dated November 26, 1985. By the said
order of the Collector dated April 6, 1984, which was
affirmed in appeal by the Tribunal, goods valued at Rs.
59,53,560/- c.i.f. (Rs. 1,78,60,680/- at the Indian market
rate) were confiscated under clauses (d) and (f) of Section
111 of the Customs Act, 1962 [hereinafter referred to as
’the Act’]. The gunny bags, white cloth wrappings, wooden
cases and the cartons which were used for keeping the seized
goods were also confiscated under Section 118(1) of the Act.
The vessel, MANSCO-3, containing the said goods was
confiscated under Section 115(2) of the Act but the owner of
the vessel was given an option to redeem it on payment of
fine of Rs. 7,50,000/- within one month of the date of
receipt of the said order and personal penalties were also
imposed under Section 112 of the Act on respondent No. 2,
the Managing Director of respondent No. 1 company (the owner
of the vessel) as well as on the Master of the vessel and
other persons.
In September 1982 408 packets were consigned from Dubai
to Afghanistan via Karachi and were shipped to Karachi on
the vessel ’AMETHYST’. When the said vessel arrived at
Karachi port the Government of Pakistan refused clearance of
the consignment and the goods remained in transit shed at
Karachi port. On April 25, 1983 the Central Board of Revenue
of Pakistan allowed reshipment of the goods back to Dubai.
Thereafter the vessel, MANSCO-3, was sent from Dubai to
Karachi for unloading certain cargo at Karachi and to return
to Dubai with the said consignment of 408 packets which had
been detained at the Karachi port. At Karachi port 408
packets were loaded on the vessel for the purpose of
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reshipment to Dubai. 971 packages of goods of Pakistan
origin were also loaded on the said ship. MANSCO-3 left
Karachi on August 16, 1983 but instead of proceeding to
Dubai the vessel proceeded to Bombay. MANSCO-3 reached the
outer anchorage of Bombay harbour on August 20, 1983. From
the outer anchorage the said vessel entered the inner
anchorage on August 21, 1983 but was sent back to outer
anchorage on the same day. On August 22, 1983 M/s Regent
Shipping and Trading Company, the local agents of the
shipping company which owned the vessel, MANCO-3, contacted
the Captain of the ship as well as the Bombay Port Trust
Pilot Station and the Bombay Port Trust Control. They were
asked to deposit the piloting charges by the Bombay Port
Trust authorities. On August 23, 1983 piloting charges of
Rs. 12,000/- were paid to the Bombay Port Trust by the local
agents and the ship was brought into the inner anchorage of
Port Mazgaon on August 23, 1983 at about 12.20 p.m. On the
morning of August 24, 1983 the officers of the Customs
(Preventive) Wing boarded MANSCO-3 and asked the Captain of
the vessel to produce the crew list, crew property list,
store list and the Import General Manifest. The Captain of
the vessel could not produce any of the above referred
documents. On questioning the Captain the Customs Officers
came to know that the Chief Officer and the Chief Engineer
of the vessel had left the vessel in a fishing craft without
completing the customs, health and immigration formalities
and had gone ashore when the vessel was at the outer
anchorage.
Thereafter the officers inspected the holds of the
vessel and found a large number of white cloth wrapped
packages bearing the markings ’Star Dubai’, Prince Dubai’,
etc. They further found a large number of gunny covered
packages bearing the marking ’In Transit to Afghanistan via
Karachi and Chamman’ below the white cloth covered packages.
Having regard to the markings it appeared to the officers
that the goods were meant for shipment to Afghanistan and
the Captain had port clearance for Dubai from Karachi and
not for Bombay. The customs officers also came to know that
the vessel had on its own attempted to come to the inner
anchorage of Bombay harbour even before Bombay Port Trust
charges were paid and without being escorted by the Port
Trust Pilot and that there was a direction by the harbour
pilot to go back to the outer anchorage. The 408 gunny
packages bearing the markings ’In Transit to Afghanistan via
Karachi and Chamman’ were found to contain VCRs, Video
Cassettes, Car Cassettes Players, textiles, TV sets. All
these packages originated from Dubai and were valued at Rs.
56,21,320/- c.i.f. and Rs. 1,68,63,960/- (market value). The
other packets found in the vessel contained ready-made
garments, PVC pipes, footwears, aluminium utencils packed in
971 packing and were valued at Rs. 3,32,240/- c.i.f. and Rs
9,96,720/- (market value) and the said goods originated from
Pakistan. The Customs Officers recorded the statements of
the Captain of the vessel as well as the representative of
the local agents at Bombay. Since the captain and the local
agents did not take any steps to file the Import general
Manifest and other documents for the purpose of voyage to
Bombay, the Customs Officers seized all the 1379 packets
found on board of the vessel. After completing the
investigation Show Cause Notices dated December 31, 1983
were issued by the Assistant Collector of Customs, R & I,
Bombay. A reply dated February 19,1984 to the said Show
Cause Notice was submitted on behalf of M/s Mustafa &
Najibai Trading Co., Dubai, respondent No. 1, the owners of
MANSCO-3 and respondent No. 2 the Managing Director of
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respondent No. 1. The Captain and others sent their replies
to the Show Cause Notice on February 20, 1984. After holding
an inquiry the Collector passed the order dated April 6,
1984 for the confiscation of the goods that had been seized,
valued at Rs. 59,53,560/- c.i.f. and Rs. 1,78,60,680/- at
the Indian market rate under clauses (d) and (f) of Section
111 of the Act as well as for confiscation of the gunny
bags, white cloth wrappings, wooden cases and the cartons
which were used for keeping the seized goods under Section
118(1) of the Act. MANSCO-3 was ordered to be confiscated
under Section 115(2) of the Act but the owner of the vessel
was given an option to redeem it on payment of fine of Rs.
7,50,000/- within one month of the date of receipt of the
said order. A personal penalty of Rs. 3,00,000/- was imposed
on Mustafa Najibi, respondent No. 2, the Managing Director
of respondent No. 1, and a penalty of Rs. 2,00,000/- was
imposed on Abdul Rahim Kharti, the master of the vessel.
Personal penalties were also imposed on certain other
persons, viz, Mohammed Yousef Abdulla, M/s Aero Maritime
Ltd., Karachi, Ramesh Amritlal Shah, Abedin Ghadialy,
Ramanlal P. Pandya and Dawood Sharafuddin Kaldane. Feeling
aggrieved by the said order of the Collector, an appeal C.D.
(Bom.) A No. 548 of 1984 was filed by Abdul Rahim Khatri,
master of the vessel MANSCO-3 and C.D. (Bom.) A No. 549 of
1984 was filed by M/s Mustafa & Najibi Trading Co.,
respondent No. 1 and Nuruddin Nustafa, respondent No. 2,
Managing Director of respondent No. 1. Both these appeals
were dismissed by the Tribunal by order dated November 26,
1985. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal,
Writ Petition No. 6142 of 1986 was filed in the Bombay High
Court by M/s Mustafa & Najibi Trading Co., respondent No. 1,
the owners of the vessel MANSCO-3, Nuruddin Mustafa,
respondent No. 2, the Managing Director of respondent No. 1
company, and Mahmood Mohmed Abrahim Benzad, respondent No. 3
herein, who claims to be the owner of some of the packages
which had been shipped from Dubai to Karachi and which were
seized from MANSCO-3 by the customs authorities at Bombay
port and were ordered to be confiscated. The said Writ
Petition has been allowed by the High Court by the impugned
judgment. Hence this appeal.
We have heard Shri M.S. Usgaonkar for the Union of
India and Ms. A.J. Rana, the learned counsel for the
respondents.
As mentioned earlier, the orders passed by the
Collector and the Tribunal, which have been quashed by the
High Court, involve:-
(i) confiscation of the goods which were found in
MANSCO-3 during the course of inspection of the
vessel by the customs authorities on August 24,
1983 and had been seized;
(ii) confiscation of the vessel, MANSCO-3; and
(iii) Imposition of personal penalties on respondent
No. 2, the Managing Director of respondent No. 1
company and on the Master of the vessel.
We will first take up the matter of confiscation of the
goods. As indicated earlier, the goods were ordered to be
confiscated in exercise of power conferred under clauses (d)
and (f) of Section 111 of the Act which are reproduced as
follows :-
"111. Confiscation of improperly
imported goods, etc.-The following
goods brought from a place outside
India shall be liable to
confiscation:-
(d) any goods which are imported or
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attempted to be imported or are
brought within the Indian customs
waters for the purpose of being
imported, contrary to any
prohibition imposed by or under
this Act or any other law for the
time being in force;
(f) any duitable or prohibited
goods required to be mentioned
under the regulations in any import
manifest or import report which are
not so mentioned;"
The expressions "Import", "Import manifest", "India"
and "Indian Customs Waters" are defined in Section 2 of the
Act in the following terms:-
"2(23). ’Import’, with its
grammatical variations and cognate
expressions, means bringing into
India from a place outside India."
"2(24). ’Import manifest’ or
’import report’ means the manifest
or report required to be delivered
under Section 30."
"2(27). ’India’ includes the
territorial waters of India."
"2(28). ’Indian Customs Water’
means the waters extending into the
sea upto the limit of contiguous
zone of India under section 5 of
the Territorial Waters Continental
Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and
other Maritime Zones Act, 1976,
(80 of 1976) and includes any bay,
gulf, harbour, creek or tidal
river."
In Section 30 of the Act the following provision is
made with regard to delivery of import manifest in the case
of a vessel or aircraft:-
"30. Delivery of import manifest or
import report.-(1) the person-in-
charge of a conveyance carrying
imported goods shall, within
twenty-four hours after arrival
thereof at a customs station,
deliver to the proper officer, in
the case of a vessel or a aircraft,
an import manifest, and in the case
of a vehicle, an import report, in
the prescribed form:
Provided that,-
(a) In the case of a vessel bay
such manifest may be delivered to
the proper officer before the
arrival of the vessel;
(b) if the proper officer is
satisfied that there was sufficient
cause for not delivering the import
manifest or import report or any
part thereof within twenty-four
hours after the arrival of the
conveyance, he may accept it at any
time thereafter.
(2) The person delivering the
import manifest or import report
shall at the foot thereof make and
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subscribe to a declaration as to
the truth or its contents.
(3) If the proper officer is
satisfied that the import manifest
or import report is in any way
incorrect or incomplete, and that
there was no fraudulent intention,
he may permit it is to be amended
or supplemented."
Regulation 3 in the Import Manifest (Vessels)
Regulations, 1971 [hereinafter referred to as ’the Import
Manifest Regulations’] framed under Section 157 of the Act,
as in force at the relevant time, required that the import
manifest must be delivered in duplicated and should cover
all the goods carried in a vessel and shall consist of :-
(i) a general declaration in form I,
(ii) a Cargo declaration in form II,
(iii) a Vessel’s Stores List in form III,
(iv) a list of the private property in the possession
of the Master, Officers and crew in form IV.
In Regulation 5(1) of the Import Manifest Regulations
it was provided that the cargo declaration shall be
delivered in separate sheets in respect of each of the
following categories of cargo, namely, (a) cargo to be
landed, (b) Unaccompanied baggage, (c) goods to be
transshipped, and (d) same bottom or retention cargo.
The Collector held that the seized goods had been
imported into India without an import licence and hence in
contravention of the prohibition imposed under Section 3 of
the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and clause 3 of
the Imports (Control) Order, 1955 and were, therefore,
liable to confiscation under Section 111(d) of the Act and
that the goods were also liable to be confiscated under
Section 111(f) of the Act because there was failure on the
part of the Master of the vessel MANSCO -3 and the agents of
the owners of the vessel at Bombay to file the Import
General Manifest as required under Section 30 read with the
Import Manifest Regulations within 24 hours of the arrival
of the vessel in the port Bombay. The submission of the
respondents that the goods were not meant for being unloaded
in India and being ’same bottom cargo’ they were covered by
clause 11(e) of the Import (Control) Order and no import
licence was required for bringing them in this country, was
rejected by the Collector on the ground that under the
Import Manifest Regulations same bottom cargo or retention
cargo carried on a vessel has to listed on a separate sheet
in the Import Manifest which has to be delivered in the
manner laid down in Section 30 of the Act within 24 hours of
the arrival of the vessel in any customs port in India and
that no import manifest indicating the goods as same bottom
cargo was delivered under Section 30 of the Act. In the
absence of an import manifest listing the goods as same
bottom cargo, the said goods, which had crossed the
territorial waters of India, had to be treated as having
been imported into India in view of the definition of
’Import’ contained in Section 2(23) of the Act and,
therefore, they were liable to be confiscated under Section
111(d) of the Act since there was no import licence
authorising their import.
On behalf of the respondents reliance was placed on
clause (b) of the proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act and it
was submitted that it provided for a situation where the
Import General Manifest is not delivered within 24 hours of
the arrival of the vessel at the port and enables its
acceptance by the proper officer at any time thereafter. The
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submission was the words "may accept" in the said proviso
should be read as "shall accept". Reliance was also placed
by the respondents on sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the
Act which provides that the Import Manifest may be permitted
to be amended or supplemented by the proper officer if he is
satisfied that the Import Manifest is in any way incorrect
or incomplete and that there was no fraudulent intention.
The Collector, however, rejected the said contention on the
view that there is nothing on record to show that the Master
of the vessel MANSCO-3 or its agents in Bombay at any time
filed the manifest or thy had at any time made a request for
being permitted to file the manifest and that in the absence
of the manifest the question of request being entertained
for amending or supplementing the manifest under Section
30(3) of the act does not arise.
While dealing with the contention based on the
provisions of Section 30(3) of the Act, the Collector
considered the question whether the voyage of the vessel
MANSCO-3 to Bombay was bonafide and found that the said
voyage was not bonafide having regard to inconsistencies in
the statements of the Master of the vessel and the other
crew members and the agents of the owner regarding the
purpose of the visit of the vessel to Bombay. It was pointed
out that Aabdul Khatri in his statement had said that he
received a telex from the owners of the vessel from Dubai
asking him to proceed to Bombay to take 125 tons cargo for
Dubai and further that the radar and V.H.F. sets of the
vessel MANSCO-3 were not working and they were to be
repaired at Bombay port.
As regards the explanation based on the telex message
that the vessel was directed to proceed to Bombay to load
cargo for Dubai, the Collector has pointed out that Ramesh
Shah, Director of M/s Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd.,
the local agents of the owners of the vessel at Bombay, in
his statement dated August 24, 1983, had stated that a telex
was received in his office on August 16, 1983 from Dubai
saying that the vessel MANSCO-3 was sailling from Karachi
and was expected to reach Bombay on August 18, 1983 and that
the vessel was proceeding to Bombay as the radar and V.H.F.
sets of the vessel were out of order and they were to be
repaired at Bombay. He had further stated that he did not
have any intimation regarding the cargo to be lifted by the
vessel MANSCO-3 at Bombay and no cargo had been kept ready
by him for loading. Abedin Abdul Hussain Ghadiali, another
Director of M/s Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd., in his
statement dated August 24, 1983, mentioned about repair of
radar and V.H.F. which showed that both Ramesh Shah and
Abedin Abdul Hussain Ghadiall, the Directors of the local
agents at Bombay, did not have knowledge that the vessel had
arrived at Bombay for lifting cargo for Dubai. Mohammed
Yousuf Abdulla, who claimed to be the promoter of M/s Regent
Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd., in his statements dated August
25, 1983 and September 7, 1982, had made conflicting and
inconsistent statements. Relying upon the statement of
Ramesh shah, the Collector held that no cargo was available
at Bombay for being shipped on board the vessel MANSCO-3 and
the agents at Bombay would not have been in a position to
arrange for 100 to 150 tons of cargo which the Master of the
vessel had been instructed to lift from Bombay.
The explanation that the vessel MANSCO-3 was brought to
Bombay for repairing or radar and V.H.F. sets was also not
accepted by the Collector in view of the statement of the
Captain of the vessel dated August 25, 1983 wherein he had
confirmed that the Radar was out of order even when the
vessel left Dubai and repairs to the Radar were carried out
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at Karachi before the vessel left that port and that the
V.H.F. set was also in working order when the vessel left
Karachi port and according to Mirza Beg, Cadet on board the
vessel, this equipment went out of order only when the
vessel was about 100 to 150 nautical miles from Bombay. The
Collector held that the voyage of the vessel MANSCO-3 from
Karachi to Bombay was neither to have the radar and V.H.F.
equipments repaired, nor was it for lifting 100 to 150 tons
of cargo from Bombay as stated by the Captain and that the
real purpose of the visit of the vessel MANSCO-3 to Bombay
was known only to the owners of the vessel at Dubai, the
agents at Karachi and Mohamed Yousuf Abdulla who were in
constant touch with each other over telephone and through
telex and that it could not be said that the voyage was
bonafide and there was no fraudulent intention. In this
context, the Collector pointed out that in order to make the
voyage look bonafide a large number of cartons containing
very cheap quality of goods of Pakistani origin which could
not have any market in Dubai were also placed on board the
vessel and the packages containing electronic goods and
textiles which bear markings to show that they were in
transit to Afghanistan were kept hidden below the packages
containing cheap quality Pakistani goods. The Collector also
referred to the fact that the agents at Karachi even after
having informed the Captain that he was to sail for Bombay
chose to give him a port clearance for the port of Dubai in
a sealed cover which casts serious doubt about the bonafides
of the voyage since such practice is not indulged in by
shipping companies engaged in regular and bonafide shipping
operations and this irregularity on the part of agents of
the owners of the vessel MANSCO-3 at Karachi lent support to
the view that the intention of the owners, the agents in
Karachi and the Master and the persons controlling the
affairs of the agents firm in Bombay were fraudulent. It was
also observed that the Captain of the vessel MANSCO-3 after
arrival at the outer anchorage of the Bombay harbour on
August 20, 1983 surreptitiously and without getting in touch
with the control tower of the Bombay Port Trust and without
completing the Port Trust formalities brought the ship to
the inner anchorage which would not have been done in case
his intention was bonafide.
It was urged on behalf of the respondents that the
Captain brought the vessel inside the inner anchorage on his
own because his wife was not feeling well and he was running
short of provisions. The said explanation was, however, not
accepted by the Collector on the view that the purpose for
which the Captain entered the inner anchorage was obviously
other than the sickness of his wife or shortage of
provisions on board the vessel because in his evidence on
February 25, 1984 during the course of cross-examination the
Harbour Pilot Captain Mavin Kurve had deposed that when he
boarded the vessel MANSCO-3 on seeing it anchored in an
unauthorised spot in the inner anchorage he was told by the
Captain that there was nothing seriously wrong with his wife
and that she was feeling better and as regards the shortage
of provisions, the Collector observed that in case the
Captain was short of provisions and was not able to convey
the message to the total agents because of the breakdown of
V.H.F. equipment shortly before the arrival of the vessel in
Bombay harbour, the Captain could have requested the harbour
pilot Captain Mavin Kurve to convey the message to his
agents through the Bombay Port Trust Control Tower and that
instead of taking this course, the Captain chose to send two
senior officers on board the vessel, viz., the Chief
Engineer and the Chief Officer, without completing Customs,
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Health and Immigration formalities, on a fishing craft in a
manner which is highly irregular from the customs angle
since instances of lakhs worth or precious metal being
smuggled by people by carrying it on their person are not
uncommon and that these two crew members after contacting
Mohammed Yousuf Abdulla disappeared and remained away from
the vessel for quite some time. Having regard to the
aforesaid facts and circumstances, the Collector recorded
the finding that the intentions of the owners of the vessel
MANSCO-3, the Captain and the agents, including Mohammed
Yousuf Abdulla, were fraudulent and, therefore, the question
of exercising the discretion for extending the period for
filling the import manifest as provided under Section 30(1)
of the Act or for considering amendment or supplementation
of the manifest would not arise even if a request would have
been made for such extension of the time limit for filling
of the manifest or for its amendment.
The Tribunal, while confirming the order of the
Collector regarding confiscation of goods under clauses (d)
and (f) of Section 111 of the Act, has considered the
evidence that was produced before the Collector. The
Tribunal did not accept the explanation offered by the
owners and master of the vessel that the vessel MANSCO-3 had
come to Bombay from Karachi for lifting another 100 to 125
tons of cargo from Bombay for Dubai and for repair of Radar
and V.H.F. equipment. The Tribunal has referred to the
statements of Ramesh Shah and Abedin Abdul Hussain Ghadiali,
the two Directors, and Mohammed Yousuf Abdulla, the promoter
of M/s Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd., the local agents
of the owners of the vessel at Bombay that they had no
information that the ship was coming to Bombay for loading
additional cargo and that they had not arranged any cargo to
be located and has held that if the vessel’s voyage from
Karachi to Bombay was for avowed purpose of lifting 100 to
125 tons of cargo there was no reason for the Bombay agents
to deny knowledge. The Tribunal has pointed out that they
have not merely denied the knowledge but were categorical
that they have no such information and no cargo had been
arranged. In so far as repair of V.H.F. equipment was
concerned, the Tribunal found that it was working at the
time the vessel left Karachi till it was about 150 nautical
miles away from Bombay and, therefore, the question of the
vessel salling to Bombay for repair of the V.H.F, could not
be true. As regard repair of Radar the Tribunal has taken
note of the statement of the Captain of the vessel that the
radar was out of order even when the vessel sailed from
Dubai and that some repairing of the radar were carried out
at Karachi and for want of time the entire repairs could not
be carried out, and has observed that if the repairing of
the radar was so important as to require the vessel to be
sent from Karachi to Bombay no reason was forthcoming as to
why the vessel did not wait at Karachi for carrying out full
repairs and that the repair theory was invented for the
purpose of the case. On the basis of the circumstances set
out in sub-paras (i) to (xvii) of para 23 of the judgment
the Tribunal has concluded that the voyage of the vessel for
Karachi to Bombay was not for the avowed purpose of repair
of Radar and loading of additional cargo of 100 to 125 tons
and that the vessel’s entry in Bombay port was for
clandestine disposal of 408 packages containing electronic
and textile goods of foreign origin.
As regards the non-filing of Import Manifest at Bombay
the Tribunal has pointed out that the explanation offered by
the Captain was that he was under the belief that customs
formalities would be attended to by the local agents, while
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Ramesh Shah, one of the Directors of the local agents, had
stated that since no cargo was to be unloaded he thought it
was not necessary to file the Import General Manifest and
has held that the Captain was an experienced Captain who
knew his responsibilities and on earlier voyage he did file
a ’NIL’ manifest at another port and in his statement
recorded on September 2, 1983 the Captain had stated that he
was aware that the manifest has to be delivered to the
customs immediately when the vessel enters the customs area
even if the vessel comes in Ballast and that, therefore,
there was no good reason for the Captain to be under the
impression that the agents would attend to the customs
formalities and that the explanation of Ramesh Shah that no
Import General Manifest was required to be filed because no
cargo was to be unloaded at Bombay was also not based on any
reasonable ground. The Tribunal rejected the contention
based on clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 30 of the Act on the view that not only no manifest
was filed but there was not even a request for accepting the
manifest after the expiry of 24 hours after arrival of the
vessel at the Port of Bombay. The Tribunal did not accept
the contention that in view of sub-section (3) of Section 30
of the Act it was the responsibility of the customs officer
to inform the Captain or the agents to file the manifest and
that non-delivery of the manifest could not have been made a
ground for confiscation of the cargo. The Tribunal held that
Section 30(3) is an enabling provision which only confers a
power on the proper officer to permit the manifest being
amended or supplemented if the manifest is any way incorrect
or incomplete and that it was not the case of the
respondents herein that they had filed a manifest which was
incorrect or incomplete. The Tribunal, therefore, held that
since neither the Master of the vessel nor the agents of the
owners of the vessel MANSCO-3 at Bombay filed the Import
General Manifest, there was a clear violation of Section 30
of the Act and since violation of the provisions of Section
30(1) of the Act was intentional, the Collector committed no
error in ordering the seizure of the goods under section
111(f) of the Act.
With regard to the confiscation of goods under Section
111(d) of the Act, the submission of the respondents before
the Tribunal was that import of good takes place only when
the goods imported in the vessel are unloaded and get mixed
up with the mass and reliance was placed n decisions of High
Courts wherein the expression "import" had been construed.
The Tribunal rejected the said contention and has observed
that the American doctrine of "original package" which holds
that importation is not over so long as the goods are still
in the original package has no application in this country
in view of the decision of this Court in State of Bombay v.
F.N. Balsara, 1951 SCR 682. Relying upon the decision of
this Court in Radhakrishan v. Union of India, 1965(2) SCR
213, the Tribunal held that importation of goods is complete
when the goods have crossed the customs frontier. The
decisions of the High Courts on which reliance was placed by
the respondents were held to be inapplicable on the ground
that they were given in the context of the particular
provision under consideration and not in the context of
Section 111(d) of the Act. The Tribunal also observed that
admittedly the goods were prohibited goods which required
import licence to import into India and admittedly no such
import licence was obtained and that there had been
violation of the Import and Export (Control) Act, Import
(Control) Order and the provisions of the Act.
The High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under
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Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, has reversed the
concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Collector and
the Tribunal regarding the avowed purpose of the voyage of
the vessel MANSCO-3 from Karachi to Bombay, viz., picking up
additional cargo and repair of Radar. Disagreeing with the
findings recorded by the Collector as well as the Tribunal,
the High Court has accepted the explanation offered by the
owners and the master of the vessel MANSCO-3 for its coming
to Bombay from Karachi. The High Court has held that there
was nothing to show that there was any fraudulent intention
on the part of the owners of the vessel, the Captain and the
agents at Karachi in the vessel MANSCO-3 coming to Bombay
from Karachi.
Shri Usgaonkar has assailed the said view of the High
Court and has urged that in interfering with the findings of
fact recorded by the Collector as well as the Tribunal, the
High Court has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution inasmuch as the
findings recorded by the Collector and the Tribunal do not
suffer from any infirmity which could justify interference
by the High Court. The said contention, in our opinion, must
be accepted.
While exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution it is not open to the High Court
to re-appreciate the evidence produced before the
subordinate tribunal and on the basis of such re-
appreciation of the evidence to arrive at a finding
different from that recorded by such tribunal. The finding
of fact recorded by the subordinate tribunal can be
interfered with by the High Court only if it is found to be
based on no evidence or if such a finding can be regarded as
perverse. The high Court cannot convert itself into a court
of appeal. Reference, in this context, may be made to the
decision of this Court in Collector of Customs, Madras &
Ors. v. D. Bhoormall, 1974 (2) SCC 544, wherein it has been
said:-
"Even if the Division Bench of the
High Court felt that this
circumstantial evidence was not
adequate enough to establish the
smuggled character of the goods,
beyond doubt, then also, in our
opinion that was not a good ground
to justify interference with the
Collector’s order in the exercise
of the writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
The function of weighing the
evidence or considering its
sufficiency was the business of the
Collector or the appellate
authority which was the final
tribunal of fact. "For weighing
evidence and drawing interference
from it", said Birch, J. in R. V.
Madhub Chunder "there can be canon.
Each case presents its own
peculiarities and in each common
sense and shrewdness must be
brought to bear upon the facts
elicited". It follows from this
observation that so long as the
Collector’s appreciation of the
circumstantial evidence before him
was not illegal, perverse or devoid
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 20
of common sense, or contrary to
rules of natural justice, there
would be no warrant for disturbing
his finding under Article 226." [p.
555]
Similarly, in Indru Ramchand Bharvani & Ors. v. Union
or India & Ors., 1988 (4) SCC 1, this Court has said:-
"It must be reiterated that the
conclusions arrived at by the fact-
finding bodies, the Tribunal or the
statutory authorities, on the
facts, found that cumulative effect
or preponderance of evidence cannot
be interfered with where the fact-
finding body or authority has acted
reasonably upon the view which can
be taken by any reasonable man,
courts will be reluctant to
interfere in such a situation.
Where, however, the conclusions of
the fact-finding authority are
based on no evidence then the
question of law arises and that may
be looked into by the courts but in
the instant case the facts are
entirely different.[pp. 9,10]
In the present case, the Collector as well as the
Tribunal, after carefully considering the evidence produced
during course of the proceedings, arrived at the conclusion
that the explanation offered by the owners and master of the
vessel MANSCO-3 for voyage of vessel from Karachi to Bombay,
namely, to pick up additional cargo at Bombay and to get the
Radar and V.H.F. equipment repaired at Bombay was
unacceptable. Reversing the said view the High Court has
accepted the said explanation. The explanation that the
vessel MANSCO-3 came to Bombay to pick additional cargo was
rejected by the Collector as well as the Tribunal in view of
the statements of Ramesh Shah and Abedin Abdul Hussain
Ghadiali, the two Directors of M/s Regent Shipping and Trade
Pvt. Ltd., the agents of the owners of the vessel at Bombay
that they had no knowledge that the vessel had arrived at
Bombay for lifting cargo and that no cargo was available at
Bombay which could be picked up by the vessel and that in
the telex which was received by the local agents at Bombay
from the owners of the vessel at Dubai there was no mention
about picking of additional cargo by the vessel at Bombay.
No reliance was placed on the testimony of Mohammed Yousef,
the promoter of M/s Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd., for
the reason that he had made conflicting and inconsistent
statements as regards the purpose of the visit of the vessel
MANSCO-3 to Bombay. The High Court has proceeded on the
basis that no importance could be attached to the statements
of Ramesh Shah and Abedin Abdul Hussain Ghadiali since they
are not "well versed in the field and have not much
experience to their credit". The High Court, while observing
that "the tendency exhibited by Mohamed Yousef to
prevaricate in that behalf is so eloquent that it gives rise
to a strong inference to be drawn against him", has chosen
to rely on his statement that in his conversation with
Mustafa (respondent No.2) on telephone he had "promised that
he would arrange the cargo for the ship to compensate the
expenses of previous dealing". The said statement was
subsequently contradicted as wrong by Mohammed Yousuf in his
statement. The High Court has discarded the subsequent
disclaimer and has said:
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"However, the fact remains that he
had been in contact with the Dubai
persons and was anxious to supply
additional cargo and at the
relevant time had full knowledge
that the vessel was reaching Bombay
to lift additional cargo and
therefore it follows with necessary
implications that he had promised
that he would supply the cargo when
the ship comes to promise that the
ship officials at Dubai thought it
proper to direct the ship to go to
Bombay from Karachi to pick up the
additional cargo for being brought
to Dubai."
There is nothing to corroborate the statement of
Mohammed Yousef on which reliance had been placed by the
High Court. On the other hand, the said statement about
Mohammed Yousef having promised to arrange for the cargo at
Bombay does not find support from the telex received at the
office of the agents at Bombay on August 16, 1983 from Dubai
and it is belied by the fact that no cargo was available at
the Bombay port for loading on the vessel when it arrived at
Bombay.
Similarly, as regards repair of Radar and V.H.F.
Equipment the Collector and the Tribunal have found that the
Radar was not functioning when the vessel left Dubai and
that it had been repaired at Karachi and that the V.H.F.
equipment was working till the vessel reached about 100 to
150 nautical miles from Bombay port which shows that repair
of Radar and V.H.F. equipment could not be the reason for
the vessel MANSCO-3 proceeding to Bombay from Karachi. The
High Court, while accepting the explanation that one of the
reasons for the vessel to proceed to Bombay was to have the
Radar and V.H.F. equipment repaired at Bombay, has laid
stress on the fact that at the time when the vessel reached
Bombay V.H.F. equipment was not working and that two
mechanics were taken to the vessel for repairing of Radar
and V.H.F. equipment. The fact that the Radar and V.H.F.
equipment had to be repaired at Bombay does not, however,
mean that they were not functioning when the vessel left
Karachi and it cannot be said that the vessel had to proceed
to Bombay for repair of Radar and V.H.F. equipment.
A Perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court
shows that while dealing with the Writ Petition, the High
Court embarked upon re-appreciation of the evidence and has
dealt with the matter as if it was hearing an appeal on
facts. Such a course, as indicated earlier, was not
permissible. The Collector and the Tribunal, after carefully
considering the evidence produced during the course of the
proceedings, had concurrently arrived at the finding that
the vessel MANSCO-3 had not come to Bombay from Karachi for
a bonafide purpose and that the explanation offered for the
vessel proceeding to Bombay from Karachi could not be
accepted. The said finding cannot be regarded as
unreasonable or perverse. We are, therefore, unable to
uphold the decision of the High Court in reversing the said
finding of fact recorded by the Collector and the Tribunal.
Moreover, bonafides of the owners or the master of the
vessel has a bearing only on the applicability of sub-
section (3) of Section 30 which enables the proper officer
to permit the import manifest or import report to be
amended or supplemented if he is satisfied that the said
import manifest or import report is in any way incorrect or
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incomplete and there is no fraudulent intention. In the
present case, the question of applicability of sub-section
(3) of Section 30 does not arise because no import manifest
was delivered by the Master of the vessel at any time. The
intention of the owners or master of the vessel has no
bearing on the exercise of the power of confiscation of
goods under Section 111 of the Act because, as laid down by
this Court, confiscation of goods is an action in rem
directed against the goods in respect of which the
contravention rendering them liable to be confiscated has
taken place. [See :Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. The
Collector of Customs & Ors., 1959 SCR 821 at p. 838; and
Collector of Customs, Madras & Ors. v. D. Bhoormall (supra)
]. In the matter of confiscation of goods under Section
111(d) of the Act intention has, therefore, no bearing. What
is required to be seen is whether the goods had been
imported or attempted to be imported or brought within the
Indian customs water for the purpose of being imported
contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under the Act or
any other law for the time being in force. If it is found
that any goods have been imported or attempted to be
imported or brought within the Indian customs water for the
purpose of being imported contrary to any prohibition
imposed by or under the Act or any other law for the time
being in force the said goods would be liable to
confiscation under Section 111(d) and the question whether
the person importing or bringing the said goods intended to
commit violation of the provisions of the Act or any other
law for the time being in force would be of no consequence.
Similarly, clause (f) of Section 111 provided for
confiscation of any dutiable or prohibited goods which are
required to be mentioned under the regulations in any import
manifest, or import report and which are not so mentioned
therein. In the matter of confiscation of goods under
Section 111(f) what is required to be seen is whether the
goods are dutiable or prohibited goods and are required to
be mentioned in the import manifest or import report under
the regulations made under the Act and whether they are
mentioned in the import manifest/import report. If it is
found that the goods are dutiable or prohibited goods and
are required to be mentioned under the regulations made
under the Act in the import manifest/import report but have
not been so mentioned, the goods would be liable to be
confiscated and the intention of the default would have no
bearing on the exercise of power to confiscate the goods.
Since mens rea is not essential for invoking the power of
confiscation of the goods under Section 111 of the Act, the
intention of the master of the vessel or the owners of
vessel and the circumstances under which the vessel
containing the goods came to Bombay has no bearing on the
exercise of the power of confiscation of goods under
Sections 111(d) and 111(f) and all that has to be seen is
whether the conditions prescribed under the said provisions
were fulfilled so as to justify the confiscation of the
goods.
As regards the non-filing of the Import General
Manifest either by the Captain of the vessel or the agents
of the owners of the vessel at Bombay, the High Court has
held that the Manifest is required to be filed "within
twenty four hours after the arrival of the vessel at a
customs station" and that time for filing the said Manifest
would have started running only after the Bombay Port Trust
charges had been paid and the said cargo charges were paid
on August 23, 1983. According to the High Court, the customs
officials boarded the vessel on the morning of August 24,
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1983 at about 9/10 a.m. and seized the goods immediately
thereafter mainly on the ground that no Import General
Manifest had been filed by that time. According to the High
Court, the period of twenty four hours had not expired and
there was still time to file the Import General Manifest. We
find it difficult to agree with the said view of the High
Court. Under Section 30(1) an import manifest has to be
delivered within twenty four hours after the arrival of the
conveyance at a customs station. The expression ’customs
station’ is defined in Section 2(13) to mean "any customs
port, customs airport or land customs station." The
expression "customs port" is defined in Section 2(12) to
mean "any port appointed under clause (a) of section 7 to be
a customs port and includes a place appointed under clause
(aa) of that section to be an inland container depot". In
the present case, the vessel MANSCO-3 had arrived at the
outer anchorage of the Bombay Port on August 20, 1983. The
outer anchorage is a part of the Bombay Port. This would
show that the vessel MANSCO-3 had arrived at the customs
port of Bombay on August 20, 1983. In view of Section 30(1)
of the Act the Import General Manifest should have been
delivered within twenty four hours of the arrival of the
vessel at the outer anchorage on August 20,1983. The High
Court was in error in holding that the vessel would be
treated to have arrived at the customs port of Bombay on
August 23, 1983 after the Bombay Port Trust charges had been
paid and the signal had been given for the vessel to be
brought into the inner anchorage or on after August 23,
1983. Proviso (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 30, which
empowers the proper officer to accept the import manifest or
import report at any time after the expiry of the period of
twenty four hours if he is satisfied that there was
sufficient cause for not delivering the import manifest or
import report or any part thereof within twenty four hours
after the arrival of the conveyance, has no application in
the present case because the Collector as well as the
Tribunal have found that no request for filling the Import
General Manifest after the expiry of the period of twenty
four hours was made at any time either by the Captain of the
vessel or by the local agents at Bombay.
The Tribunal has held that the Goods that were seized
from the vessel were prohibited goods and the said finding
has not been upset by the High Court. In the circumstances,
it must be held that there was contravention of the
requirement regarding mentioning of the goods in the Import
General Manifest by the captain of the vessel and the local
agents of the owner of the vessel at Bombay and the goods
seized were liable to be confiscated under Section 111(f) of
the Act.
The High Court has held that the goods were obviously
in transit to Dubai which was the port of clearance and the
visit to Bombay port was not illegitimate or illegal. In
holding that there was no contravention of the provisions of
clauses (d) and (f) of Section 111 the High Court has
proceeded on the basis that since the vessel had come to
Bombay for legitimate purpose and there was no lack of
bonafides on the part of the master and the owners of the
vessel in the ship having come to Bombay, it cannot be said
that there was violation of the provisions of Section 111(d)
and (f) of the Act. As indicated earlier, the finding of the
High Court that there was no lack of bonafides on the part
of the master of the vessel and the owners of the ship in
the ship having come to Bombay, has been arrived at by the
High Court after reversing the finding of fact recorded by
the Collector and the Tribunal and it cannot be sustained.
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We have also indicated that mens rea is not essential for
invoking the power of confiscation under Section 111 of the
Act and, therefore, the intention of the owners of the
vessel or the master of the vessel has no bearing on the
exercise of the power to confiscate the goods under clauses
(d) and (f) of Section 111 of the Act.
The High Court has also held that direction regarding
of the goods could not be sustained for the reason that no
notice as required under Section 124 of the Act was given by
the Collector to the owners of the goods ordered to be
confiscated before passing the order of confiscation of
goods and the notice that was given to the local agents of
the owners of the vessel cannot be a substitute for a notice
which is required to be given to the owners of the cargo
since the local agents have no concern whatsoever with the
owners of the cargo. Section 124 of the Act reads as
follows:-
"124. Issue of showcause notice
before confiscation of goods, etc.-
No order confiscation any goods or
imposing any penalty on any person
shall be made under this Chapter
unless the owner of the goods or
such person-
(a) is given a notice in writing
informing him of the grounds on
which it is proposed to confiscate
the goods or to impose a penalty;
(b) is given an opportunity of
making a representation in writing
within such reasonable time as may
be specified in the notice against
the ground or confiscation or
imposition of penalty mentioned
therein; and
(c) is given a reasonable
opportunity of being heard in the
matter:
Provided that the notice referred
to in clause (a) and the
representation referred to in
clause (b) may at the request of
the person concerned be oral."
Shri Usgaonkar has urged that confiscation of goods
under Section 111 of the Act is in the nature of a penalty
in rem which attached to the goods and is district from
personal penalty that can be imposed under Section 112 of
the Act which is a penalty in personam. The submission is
that while a notice under Section 124 is required to be
issued to the person on whom penalty under Section 112 is to
be imposed, the notice to the owner of the goods is not
required to be given in every case and there may be cases in
which the notice has to be given to the person from whose
possession the goods were seized instead of the owner of the
goods. Shri Usgaonkar has, in this context, pointed out that
under Section 123 of the Act in a case where any goods to
which the said section applies are seized under the Act in
the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the
burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be,
in a case where such seizure is made from the possession of
any person, on the person, on the person from whose
possession the goods were seized.
In the context of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 this Court
has pointed out the distinction between penalty in rem and
penalty in personam. In the case of Shewpujanrai Indrasanrai
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Ltd. (supra) this Court was dealing with Section 167(8) of
the Sea Customs Act, 1878 wherein it was prescribed that it
would be an offence "if any goods the importation or
exportation of which is for the time being prohibited or
restricted by or under Chapter IV of this Act, be imported
into or exported from India contrary to such prohibition or
restriction" and that "such goods would be liable to
confiscation and any person concerned in any such offence
shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding three times the
value of the goods or not exceeding one thousand rupees".
This Court, after pointing out that ’a distinction must at
once be drawn between an action in rem and a proceeding in
personam’, has observed that under Section 167(8) of the Sea
Customs Act:-
"The penalty provided is that the
goods shall be liable to
confiscation. There is a further
provision in the penalty column
that any person concerned in any
such offence shall be liable to a
penalty not exceeding three time
the value of the goods etc. The
point to note is that so far as the
confiscation of the goods is
concerned, it is a proceeding in
rem and the penalty is enforced
against the goods whether the
offender is known or not known; the
order of confiscation under s. 182,
Sea Customs Act, operates directly
upon the status of the property,
and under s. 182 transfers an
absolute title to Government." [pp.
836,837]
By way of illustration the Court has referred to a case
’where the offender (the smuggler, for example) is not
known, but the goods in respect of which the contravention
has taken place are known and have been seized."
Similarly, in the case of D. Bhoormall (supra) this
Court, while considering the provisions of Section 167(8) of
the Sea Customs Act, 1878, has pointed out that proceedings
for confiscation of contraband goods are proceedings in rem
and the penalty of confiscation is enforced against the
goods irrespective of whether offender is known or unknown
and it is not necessary for the customs authorities to prove
that any particular person is concerned with their illicit
importation or exportation and it is enough if the
department furnishes prima facie proof of the goods being
smuggled stocks. It was observed that the second kind of
penalty which is enforced against the person concerned in
the smuggling of the goods is one in personam and in the
case of the said penalty the Department have to prove
further that the person proceeded against was concerned in
the smuggling. It was held that "goods found to be smuggled
goods can, therefore, be confiscated without proceeding
against any person and without ascertaining who is their
real owner or who was actually concerned in their illicit
import." [pp. 550, 551 and 554]
This distinction between the nature of the two
penalties , viz., penalty in rem and penalty in personam,
has been maintained in the Act. The provision regarding
confiscation of goods contained in Sections 111 and 113 of
the Act is a penalty in rem which is enforced against the
goods, while the personal penalties imposed under Section
112 and other provisions of the Act are in the nature of
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penalty in personam which are enforced against the person
concerned.
Section 124 of the Act, which incorporates the rule of
audi altrem partem, one of the two basic tenets of the
principles of natural justice, does not have the effect of
making any alteration in the nature of these penalties.
There may be situations where the goods are found to be
smuggled goods and are seized but the identity of the owner
of the goods is not known. Can it be said that since notice
cannot be issued to the owner of the goods under Section 124
of the Act, the goods which are found to be smuggled goods
cannot be confiscated under Section 111 of the Act? In our
view, this question must be answered in the negative because
confiscation of goods under Section 111 of the Act is a
penalty in rem which attached to the goods which are the
subject matter of the proceedings for confiscation and if it
is found that the goods are liable to be confiscated under
Section 111 of the Act, they can be confiscated without
ascertaining their real owner. Moreover, in so far as the
rule of audi altrem partem is concerned, the position is
well settled that an order passed in disregard of the said
principle would not be invalidated if it can be shown that
as a result of denial of the opportunity contemplated by the
said rule the person seeking to challenge the order has not
suffered any prejudice. Since Section 124 of the Act
incorporates the said principle of natural justice, failure
to give the notice to the owner of goods would not, by
itself, ivalidate an order of confiscation. What has to be
seen is whether the owner of the goods has suffered
prejudice on account of the failure on the part of the
officer passing the order for confiscation of goods to give
a notice to the owner of the goods before passing the order
for confiscation of goods. the owner of goods ordered to be
confiscated cannot be said to have suffered any prejudice in
a case where notice has been given to the person responsible
for the alleged contravention on which the order for
confiscation of goods is founded and who alone is in a
position to offer an explanation for such contravention. The
requirement regarding issuing of notice to the owner of the
goods under Section 124 cannot, therefore, be constructed as
a mandatory requirement so as to have the effect of
invalidating an order. An order of confiscation would not be
rendered invalid if there is substantial compliance with the
requirements of Section 124 in the sense that before passing
an order of confiscation a notice has been given either to
the owner of the goods or a person who is responsible for
the contravention on which the order for confiscation of
goods is founded and who alone is in a position to offer an
explanation for such contravention.
In the present case, Show Cause Notice dated December
31, 1983 were issued by the Assistant Collector of Customs,
R & I, Bombay, to M/s Mustafa & Najibai Trading Co., Dubai,
respondent No. 1, the owners of the vessel, MANSCO-3,
Nuruddin Mustafa, respondent No. 2, the Managing Director of
respondent No. 1, Abdul Rahim Khatri, the Captain of the
vessel, MANSCO-3, the Promoter and the two Directors of M/s
Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd., the local agents of the
owners of the vessel at Bombay, M/s Aero Meritimes Ltd., the
agents of the owners of the vessel at Karachi and certain
other persons. Replies to the said Show Cause Notices were
filed on behalf of the owners of the vessel as well as by
the Master of the vessel and the local agent of the owners
at Bombay. The owners of the cargo did not appear before the
Collector. None of the owners of the cargo challenged the
order for confiscation of goods passed by the Collector
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before the Tribunal and the order of the Collector regarding
confiscation of goods became final as against the owners of
the goods. In the Writ Petition filed before the High Court
respondent No. 3, claiming to be the owner of a part of the
cargo which was seized and confiscated., for the first time
sought to challenge the orders passed by the Collector as
well as the Tribunal regarding the confiscation of the
goods. In Para 8 of the Writ Petition it has been averred
that before the Collector it was pointed out that the cargo
belonged to various parties and mainly to respondent No. 3
and the names of the owners and other persons were furnished
to the Collector and other customs officers and that they
should be given an opportunity of hearing if any judicial
order is passed in respect of the cargo belonging to
respondent No. 3 and other persons. The replies that were
filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 before the Collector in
response to the Show Cause Notice do, not, however, support
the said averment. Nor is there anything in the order passed
by the Collector to show that any such contention was
advanced before him. the judgment of the Tribunal also does
not indicate that any such plea was raised. the said
contention appears to have been raised for the first time
before the High Court. Moreover, under the Show Cause
Notices the seized goods were proposed to be confiscated
under Sections 111(d) and 111(f) of the Act. The owners of
the vessel, MANSCO-3, the Master of the said vessel and the
local agents of the owners of the vessel at Bombay were the
best persons who could offer an explanation and show that
there was no contravention which could justify the
confiscation of goods under Sections 111(d) and 111(f) of
the Act. Since the owners of the goods were not present on
the scene and had no personal knowledge, they could not
offer an explanation other than that offered by the owners
of the vessel, the Master of the vessel and the local agent
of the owners of the vessel at Bombay. In the circumstances,
it cannot be said that the failure to issue a notice under
Section 124 to the owners of the goods has resulted in any
prejudice to the owners of the goods that have been ordered
to be confiscated of goods passed under Sections 111(d) and
111(f) of the Act. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the
impugned judgment of the Higher Court setting aside the
order for confiscation of the goods passed under Sections
111(d) and 111(f) of the Act.
The order of confiscation of the vessel MANSCO-3 was
passed under Section 115(2) of the Act. At the relevant
time, Section 115 provided as under :-
"115. Confiscation of conveyances.-
(1) The following conveyances shall
be liable to confiscation.-
(a) any vessel which is or has been
within the Indian customs water,
any aircraft which is or has been
in India, or any vehicle which is
or has been in a customs area,
while constructed, adapted, altered
or fitted in any manner for the
purpose of concealing goods;
(b) any conveyance from which the
whole or any part of the goods is
thrown overboard, starved or
destroyed so as to prevent seizure
by an officer of customs;
(c) any conveyance which having
been required to stop or land under
section 106 fails to do so, except
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for the good and sufficient cause;
(d) any conveyance from which any
warehoused goods cleared for
exportation, or any other goods
cleared for exportation under a
claim for drawback, are unloaded,
without the permission of the
proper officer;
(e) any conveyance carrying
imported goods which has entered
India and is afterwards found with
the whole or substantial portion of
such goods missing, unless the
master of the vessel or aircraft is
able to account for the loss of ,
or deficiency in, the goods.
(2) Any conveyance or animal used
as a means of transport in the
smuggling of any goods or in the
carriage of any smuggled goods
shall be liable to confiscation,
unless the owner of the conveyance
or animal proves that it was so
used without the knowledge or
connivance of the owner himself,
his agent, if any, and the person
in charge of the conveyance or
animal and that each of them had
taken all such precautions against
such use as are for the time being
specified in the rules:
Provided that where any such
conveyance is used for the carriage
of goods or passengers for hire,
the owner of any conveyance shall
be given an option to pay in lieu
of the confiscation of the
conveyance a fine not exceeding the
market price of the goods which are
sought to be smuggled or the
smuggled goods, as the case may be.
Explanation.- In this section,
"market price" means market price
at the date when the goods are
seized."
The consideration which weighed with the High Court to
set aside the order regarding the confiscation of the goods
also weighed with it for setting aside the order for
confiscation of the vessel under Section 115(2) of the Act
inasmuch as the High Court has found that there was no
fraudulent intention on the part of the owners of the vessel
in directing the vessel to proceed to Bombay from Karachi to
lift additional cargo and the purpose for which the vessel,
MANSCO-3, was directed to proceed to Bombay was to lift the
said additional cargo and also to have the Radar and V.H.F.
equipment repaired. We have already considered the said
aspect of the case while dealing with the matter of
confiscation of the goods and have held that the said
finding of the High Court cannot be upheld. The High Court
has set aside the confiscation of the vessel also on the
ground that no notice was issued to the owners of the vessel
under Section 124 of the Act. In this regard, it may be
stated that the Show Cause Notice dated December 31, 1983,
indicates that the said notice was issued to Mustafa Najibi,
respondent No. 2, on behalf of respondent No. 1, the owners
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of the vessel, as well as to Abdul Rahim Khatri, the master
of the vessel and the promoter and the two directors of M/s
Regent Shipping and Trade Pvt. Ltd., the agents of the
owners of the vessel at Bombay. Respondent No. 1, the owners
of the vessel, had full knowledge of the said Show Cause
Notice because a reply to the said notice was filed on their
behalf as well as on behalf of respondent No. 2 and they had
contested the proceedings before the Collector. In these
circumstances, we are of the view that the order regarding
confiscation of the vessel could not be set aside on the
ground that no notice under Section 124 of the Act was
issued to the owners of the vessel.
As regards the penalty that has been imposed under
Section 112 of the Act, Shri Rana, the learned counsel for
respondent No. 2, has urged that the Collector and the
Tribunal were in error in imposing penalty on respondent
No.2 is the owner of the vessel. It has been submitted that
respondent No.2 is only a Managing Director or respondent
No. 1 company which is the owner of the vessel. It has also
been urged that at the relevant time respondent No. 2 was
not in Dubai and that he had no role in the vessel being
directed to proceed to Bombay from Karachi and, therefore,
penalty under Section 112 of the Act cannot be imposed on
him. The order passed by the Collector proceeds on the basis
that respondent No. 2 is the owner of the vessel. It appears
that no contention was raised before the Collector that
respondent No. 2 was not the owner of the vessel and that he
had no particular role in the vessel being directed to
proceed to Bombay from Karachi. Before the Tribunal.
however, a contention was raised that respondent NO. 2 was
only the Managing Director of respondent No. 1 company and
not the owner of the vessel and reliance was placed on the
affidavit of respondent No. 2 dated March 25, 1985 which was
filed before the Tribunal wherein it was stated that the
deviation of voyage from Karachi to Bombay was without his
pre knowledge as at that time he was away from Dubai and was
in Europe in connection with his business. On behalf of the
appellants reliance was placed on the reply to the Show
Cause Notice wherein respondent No. 2 was described as the
joint owner of the vessel. The Tribunal rejected the
contention urged on behalf of respondent No. 2 and has
observed that no independent evidence has been adduced to
establish that respondent No. 1 company is owned by any
other person other than respondent No. 2 and that it in the
reply to the Show Cause Notice respondent No. 2 had been
mentioned as the owner of the vessel. The Tribunal has also
referred to the statement of Mohammed Yousef that he had
received the telex dated August 16, 1983 from respondent No.
2 and has observed that the said statement clearly
established that respondent NO. 2 knew about the voyage of
the vessel from Karachi to Bombay. On that view the Tribunal
upheld the penalty imposed on respondent No. 2 under Section
112 of the Act. We do not find any infirmity in the said
view of the Tribunal. We are, therefore, unable to uphold
the contention of Shri Rana that the Tribunal was in error
in affirming the penalty of Rs. 3,00,000/- imposed on
respondent No. 2 by the Collector.
In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned
judgment of the High Court is set aside and, while restoring
the orders of the Collector and the Tribunal, the Writ
Petition filed by the respondents is dismissed. No order as
to costs.