GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI vs. UNION OF INDIA

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2357 OF 2017 Government of NCT of Delhi     … Appellant Versus Union of India & Another     … Respondents WITH CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 175 OF 2016 IN WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 539 OF 1986 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2358 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO.  2359 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2360 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2361 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2362 OF 2017 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2363 OF 2017  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2364 OF 2017 AND CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 277 OF 2017 J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, CJI (for himself, A.K. Sikri and                              A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ.)   Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by CHETAN KUMAR Date: 2018.12.08 11:00:53 IST Reason: 2 CONTENTS

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A. Prologue : The present reference to the Constitution Bench has its own complexity as the centripodal issue in its invitation of the interpretation of Article 239AA of the Constitution invokes a host of concepts, namely, constitutional objectivity navigating through the core structure with the sense and sensibility of having a real test of constitutional structure; the culture of purposive interpretation because the Court is concerned with the   sustenance   of   glory   of   constitutional   democracy   in   a 4 Democratic Republic as envisioned in the Constitution;   and understanding the idea of citizenry participation viewed with the lens of progressive perception inherent in the words of a great living document emphasizing on the democratic theme to achieve the requisite practical goal in the world of reality. We may   call   it   as   pragmatic   interpretation   of   a   constitutional provision, especially the one that has the effect potentiality to metamorphose a workable provision into an unnecessary and unwarranted   piece   of   ambiguity.   In   such   a   situation,   the necessity is to scan the anatomy of the provision and lift it to the pedestal of constitutional ethos with the aid of judicial creativity that breathes essentiality of life into the same. It is the   hermeneutics   of   law   that   works.   It   is   the   requisite constitutional stimulus to sustain the fundamental conception of participative democracy so that the real pulse is felt and further the constitutional promise to the citizens is fulfilled. It gets rid of the unpleasant twitches and convulsions. To put it differently, the assurance by the insertion of Article 239AA by the   Constitution   (Sixty­ninth   Amendment)   Act,   1991   by 5 exercise of the constituent power is not to be renounced with any kind of rigid understanding of the provision. It is because the   exercise   of   constituent   power   is   meant   to   confer democratic, societal and political powers on the citizens who reside within the National Capital Territory of Delhi that has been granted a special status.  2. The   principal   question   is   whether   the   inhabitants   or voters of NCT of Delhi remain where they were prior to the special   status   conferred   on   the   Union   Territory   or   the amended constitutional provision that has transformed Delhi instills “Prana” into the cells. Let it be made clear that any ingenious effort to scuttle the hope and aspiration that has ignited the idea of “march ahead” among the inhabitants by any   kind   of   linguistic   gymnastics   will   not   commend acceptation. The appellant claims that the status of the voters of  NCT   Delhi   after   the  Sixty­Ninth  Amendment   has   moved from notional to real but the claim has been negatived by the Delhi High Court. Learned counsel for the appellant criticize the   judgment   and   order   of   the   High   Court   by   contending, 6 apart from other aspects, that the language employed in the entire   Chapter   containing   Article   239AA,   unless   appositely interpreted,  shall denude the appellant, the National Capital Territory of Delhi, of its status. 3. The   criticism   is   founded   on   the   base   that   the Constitution of India, an organic and continuing document, has concretised their desire and enabled the people to have the right to participate as a collective in the decision making process that shall govern them and also pave the path of their welfare. The participation of the collective is the vital force for larger public interest and higher constitutional values spelt out in the Constitution and the silences therein and the same are to be protected. It is the assertion that the collective in a democracy speak through their elected representatives seeking mitigation of the grievances.  4. This Court, being the final arbiter of the Constitution, in such a situation, has to enter into the process of interpretation with the new tools such as constitutional pragmatism having due regard for sanctity of objectivity, realization of the purpose 7 in the truest sense by constantly reminding one and all about the sacrosanctity of democratic structure as envisaged by our Constitution, elevation of the precepts of constitutional trust and morality, and the solemn idea of decentralization of power and, we must say, the ideas knock at the door to be invited. The compulsive invitation is the warrant to sustain the values of democracy in the prescribed framework of law. The aim is to see that in the ultimate eventuate, the rule of law prevails and the   interpretative  process  allows  the  said  idea  its  deserved space, for when the rule of law is conferred its due status in the sphere of democracy, it assumes significant credibility.  5. We would like to call such a method of understanding “confluence of the idea and spirit of the Constitution”, for it celebrates the grand idea behind the constitutional structure founded on the cherished values of democracy.  6. As we have used the words “spirit of the Constitution”, it becomes our obligation to clarify the concept pertaining to the same.  The canon of constitutional interpretation that glorifies the   democratic   concepts   lays   emphasis   not   only   on   the 8 etymology of democracy but also embraces within its sweep a connotative expansion so that the intrinsic and innate facets are included. 7. A   seven­Judge   Bench   of   the   Court   in   Keshavan 1 Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay  observed:­ “An argument founded on what is claimed to be the spirit of the Constitution is always attractive, for it has a powerful appeal to sentiment and emotion; but a court of law has to gather the spirit of the Constitution from the language of the Constitution. What one may believe or think to be the spirit of the Constitution cannot prevail if the language of the Constitution   does   not   support   that   view.   Article 372(2) gives power to the President to adapt and modify   existing   laws   by   way   of   repeal   or amendment.   There   is   nothing   to   prevent   the President, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by that article, from repealing, say the whole or any part of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. If the President does so, then such repeal will at once attract Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. In such a situation all prosecutions under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, which were   pending   at   the   date   of   its   repeal   by   the President would be saved and must be proceeded with notwithstanding the repeal of that Act unless an   express   provision   was   otherwise   made   in   the repealing Act. It is therefore clear that the idea of the preservation of past inchoate rights or liabilities and pending proceedings to enforce the same is not foreign or abhorrent to the Constitution of India. We are,   therefore,   unable   to   accept   the   contention 11951 SCR 228 9 about the spirit of the Constitution as invoked by the learned counsel in aid of his plea that pending proceedings   under   a  law   which   has   become   void cannot be proceeded with.  Further, if it is against the   spirit   of   the   Constitution   to   continue   the pending prosecutions under such a void law, surely it should be equally repugnant to that spirit that men who have already been convicted under such repressive law before the Constitution of India came into   force   should   continue   to   rot   in   jail.   It   is, therefore, quite clear that the court should construe the   language   of   Article   13(1)   according   to   the established rules of interpretation and arrive at its true meaning uninfluenced by any assumed spirit of the Constitution.” [Emphasis is ours] The   aforesaid   decision   has   to   be   understood   in   the context of the phraseology ‘spirit of the Constitution’. As we understand, the Court has not negatived the concept as an alien   one.   It   has   laid   emphasis   on   the   support   from   the language used. It has not accepted the assumed spirit of the Constitution.  Needless to say, there cannot be assumptions. Every proposition should have a base and the Constitution of India to be an organic and living one has to be perceived with progressive   dynamism   and   not   stuck   with   inflexibility. 10 Flexibility has to be allowed room and that is what we find in later authorities.  8. In   Madhav   Rao   Jivaji   Rao   Scindia   and   others   v. 2 Union of India and another , Hegde, J, in his concurring opinion, emphasized on the spirit of the Constitution.   The learned Judge, while not accepting the exercise of power for collateral reasons, stated:­ “Exercise of power for collateral reasons has been considered by this Court in several decisions as a fraud on that power — see  Balaji  v.  State of Mysore . Breach of any of the Constitutional provisions even if made to further a popular cause is bound to be a dangerous precedent. Disrespect to the Constitution is   bound   to   be   broadened   from   precedent   to precedent and before long the entire Constitution may   be   treated   with   contempt   and   held   up   to ridicule.   That   is   what   happened   to   the   Weimar Constitution.   If   the   Constitution   or   any   of   its provisions have  ceased to serve the needs of the people, ways must be found to change them but it is impermissible   to   by­pass   the   Constitution   or   its provisions.  Every contravention of the letter or the spirit of the Constitution is bound to have chain reaction. For that reason also the impugned orders must be held to be ultra vires Article 366(22).” [underlining is ours] 2(1971) 1 SCC 85 11 9. In  State of Kerala and another v. N.M. Thomas and 3 , Krishna Iyer, J., in his concurring opinion, opined others thus:­ “106.   Law,   including   constitutional   law,   can   no longer “go it alone” but must be illumined in the interpretative process by sociology and allied fields of knowledge. Indeed, the term “constitutional law” symbolises   an   intersection   of   law   and   politics, wherein issues of political power are acted on by persons trained in the legal tradition, working in judicial institutions, following the procedures of law, thinking   as   lawyers   think.   So   much   so,   a   wider perspective   is   needed   to   resolve   issues   of constitutional law. Maybe, one cannot agree with the   view   of   an   eminent   jurist   and   former   Chief Justice of India: “The judiciary as a whole is not interested in the policy underlying a legislative measure.” Moreover, the Indian Constitution is a great social document,   almost   revolutionary   in   its   aim   of transforming a medieval, hierarchical society into a modern, egalitarian democracy. Its provisions can be comprehended only by a spacious, social­science approach,   not   by   pedantic,   traditional   legalism. Here we are called upon to delimit the amplitude and decode the implications of Article 16(1) in the context   of   certain   special   concessions   relating   to employment, under the Kerala State (the appellant), given to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (for short,   hereinafter   referred   to   as   harijans)   whose social   lot   and   economic   indigence   are   an   Indian reality   recognized   by   many   articles   of   the 3(1976) 2 SCC 310 12 Constitution.   An   overview   of   the   decided   cases suggests the need to reinterpret the dynamic import of   the   “equality   clauses”   and,   to   stress   again, beyond reasonable doubt that the paramount law, which is organic and regulates our nation’s growing life,   must   take   in   its   sweep   “ethics,   economics, politics   and   sociology”.   Equally   pertinent   to   the issue mooted before us is the lament of Friedmann: “It   would   be   tragic   if   the   law   were   so petrified   as   to   be   unable   to   respond   to   the unending   challenge   of   evolutionary   or revolutionary changes in society.” The   main   assumptions   which   Friedmann makes are: “First, the law is, in Holmes’ phrase, not a   ‘brooding   omnipotence   in   the   sky’,   but   a flexible instrument of social order, dependent on the political values of the society which it purports to regulate . . . .” 107. Naturally surges the  interrogation, what are the   challenges   of   changing   values   to   which   the guarantee of equality must respond and how? To pose the problem with particular reference to our case,   does   the   impugned   rule   violate   the constitutional creed of equal opportunity in Article 16 by resort to a suspect classification or revivify it by making the less equal more equal by a legitimate differentiation?  Chief   Justice   Marshall’s   classic   statement   in       McCulloch       v.       Maryland     followed   by   Justice Brennan in      Katzenbach      v.      Morgan    remains a beacon light: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which   are   appropriate,   which   are   plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, 13 but consist  with the  letter  and  spirit of  the Constitution, are constitutional”.” [Emphasis is added] 10.   In   Supreme Court Advocates­on­Record Association 4 and another v. Union of India , this Court observed that a fortiori any construction of the constitutional provisions which conflicts   with   the   constitutional   purpose   or     negates   the avowed object has to be eschewed, being opposed to the true meaning and spirit of the Constitution and, therefore, being an alien concept. 11. We have referred to the aforesaid precedents to state that the spirit of the Constitution has its own signification.  In the context of  the  case  at hand,  the  democratic  nature of  our Constitution and the paradigm of representative participation are undoubtedly comprised in the “spirit of the Constitution”. While interpreting the provisions of the Constitution, the safe and   most   sound   approach   is   to   read   the   words   of   the Constitution in the light of the avowed purpose and spirit of the   Constitution   so   that   it   does   not   result   in   an   illogical outcome which could have never been the intention of the 4(1993) 4 SCC 441 14 Constituent Assembly or of the Parliament while exercising its constituent  power.   Therefore,   a  constitutional  court,  while adhering to the language employed in the provision, should not abandon the concept of the intention, spirit, the holistic approach and the constitutional legitimate expectation which combinedly   project   a   magnificent   facet   of   purposive interpretation.   The   Court   should   pose   a   question   to   itself whether   a   straight,   literal   and   textual   approach   would annihilate the sense of the great living document which is required to be the laser beam to illumine. If the answer is in the affirmative, then the constitutional courts should protect the sense and spirit of the Constitution taking aid of purposive interpretation as that is the solemn duty of the constitutional courts   as   the   final   arbiters   of   the   Constitution.   It   is   a constitutional summon for performance of duty. The stress has   to   be   on   changing   society,   relevant   political   values, absence of any constitutional prohibition and legitimacy of the end to be achieved by appropriate means. We shall refer to the aspect   of   purposive   interpretation   regard   being   had   to   the 15 context and other factors that gain primacy to be adverted to at a subsequent stage.   12. Having prefaced thus, we shall now proceed to state the controversy in brief since in this batch of appeals which has been referred to the Constitution Bench, we are required to advert  to   the   issue   that   essentially   pertains   to   the   powers conferred on the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and the executive power exercised by the elected Government of NCT of Delhi. The facts involved and the controversy raised in each individual appeal need not be dwelled upon, for we only intend to answer the constitutional issue. 13. The primordial adjudication, as is presently the requisite, commands our focus on the interpretation of Article 239AA of the Constitution of India.  The said interpretation, be it noted, is not to be done in an exclusive compartment but in the context in which it has been introduced and also keeping in view the conceptual structure of the other relevant articles of the Constitution.   Before we delve into the various facets of 16 Article 239AA and other provisions of the Constitution which have   been   pressed   into   service   by   the   learned   counsel appearing   for   the   appellant   and   the   learned   Additional Solicitor General, we think it appropriate to narrate a brief history of Delhi. 14. On 12.12.1911, Delhi became the capital of India.  Delhi Tehsil and Mehrauli Thana were separate from Punjab and annexed to Delhi headed by a Commissioner and it came to be known as the Chief Commissioner’s province. In 1912, the Delhi   Laws   Act,   1912   came   into   force   with   effect   from 01.10.1912   making   certain   laws   prevalent  in  Punjab   to  be applicable to Delhi.  The Delhi Laws Act, 1915 empowered the Chief Commissioner, Delhi to determine application of laws by issuing appropriate notification in the Gazette of India.   The Government of India Act, 1919 and the Government of India Act, 1935 retained Delhi as a centrally administered territory. On   coming   into   force   of   the   Constitution   of   India   on 26.01.1950, Delhi became a Part C State.  In the year 1951, the   Government   of   Part   C   States   Act,   1951   was   enacted 17 providing,   inter   alia,   for   a   Legislative   Assembly   in   Delhi. Section   21(1)   of   the   1951   Act   empowered   the   Legislative Assembly to make laws on all matters of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution except (i) public order; (ii) police (including   railway   police);   (iii)   constitution   and   powers   of municipal corporations and local authorities, etc.­public utility authorities; (iv) lands & buildings vested in/in possession of the Union situated in Delhi or New Delhi; (v) offences against laws   about   subjects   mentioned   from   (i)   to   (iv);   and   (vi) jurisdiction of courts with respect to the above matters and court fee thereon.  15. On   19.10.1956,   the   Constitution   of   India   (Seventh Amendment)   Act,   1956   was   passed   to   implement   the provisions of the States Re­organization Act, 1956 which did away with Part A, B, C and D States and only two categories, namely,   States   and   Union   Territories   remained   and   Delhi became   a   Union   Territory   to   be   administered   by   an administrator   appointed   by   the   President.     The   Legislative Assembly of Delhi and the Council stood abolished.   In the 18 year 1953, the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 was enacted to provide for Legislative Assemblies and Council of Ministers for various Union Territories but the provisions of the said Act were not made applicable to Delhi.   The Delhi Administration Act, 1966 was enacted to provide for limited representative Government for Delhi through a Metropolitan Council comprising of 56 elected members and five nominated members.   In the same year, on 20.08.1966, the Ministry of Home Affairs issued S.O. No. 2524 that provided,   , inter alia that   the   Lieutenant   Governor/Administrator/Chief Commissioner shall be subject to the control of the President of India and exercise such powers and discharge the functions of a State Government under the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952   within   the   Union   Territories.     In   the   year   1987,   the Balakrishnan   Committee   was   set   up   to   submit   its recommendations with regard to the status to be conferred on Delhi and the said Committee recommended that Delhi should continue   to   be   a   Union   Territory   but   there   must   be   a Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers responsible to 19 the   said  Assembly  with  appropriate  powers;  and   to  ensure stability, appropriate constitutional measures should be taken to confer the National Capital a special status.   The relevant portion   of   the   Balakrishnan   Committee   report   reads   as follows:­ “6.5.5 In paragraphs 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 we have briefly summarised the arguments for and against making Delhi a   constituent State of the Union. After the most careful consideration of all the arguments and on an objective  appraisal,  we  are fully  convinced that most of the arguments against making Delhi a State of the Union are very substantial, sound and valid   and   deserve   acceptance.   This   was   also   the view expressed before us by some of the eminent and knowledgeable persons whom we interviewed. As   these   arguments   are   self­evident   we   find   it unnecessary to go into them in detail except those relating   to   constitutional   and   financial   aspects covered by them. 6.5.6   The   important   argument   from   the Constitutional angle is based on the federal type of our   Constitution   under   which   there   is   a constitutional   division   of   powers   and   functions between the Union and the State. If Delhi becomes a full­   fledged   State,   there   will   be   a   constitutional division   of   sovereign,   legislative   and   executive powers between the Union and the State of Delhi. One of the consequences will be that in respect of matters in the State List, Parliament will have no power on jurisdiction to make any law except in the special and emergency situations provided for under the   Constitution   and   to   that   extent   the   Union 20 Executive   cannot   exercise   executive   powers   or functions.   The   constitutional   prohibition   on   the exercise   of   powers   and   functions   will   make   it virtually impossible for the Union to discharge its special  responsibilities   in  relation  to  the   national capital   as   well   as   to   the   nation   itself.   We   have already indicated in an earlier chapter the special features  of   the  national capital  and   the  need   for keeping   it   under   the   control   of   the   Union Government. Such control is vital in the national interest irrespective of whether the subject matter is in   the   State   field   or   Union   field.   If   the administration of the natural capital is divided into rigid compartments of State of field and Union field, conflicts are likely to arise in several vital matters, particularly   if   the   two   Governments   are   run   by different   political   parties.   Such   conflicts   may,   at times, prejudice the national interest…… x x x 6.5.9 We are also impressed with the argument that Delhi as the national capital belongs to the nation as a whole and any constituent State of the Union of which   Delhi   will   become   a   part   would   sooner   or later acquire a predominant position in relation to other States. Sufficient constitutional authority for Union intervention in day­to­day matters, however vital some of, them may be, will not be available to the Union, thereby prejudicing the discharge of its national duties and responsibilities. x x x LT. GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 6.7.19 As a necessary corollary to the establishment of a responsible Government for Delhi the structure 21 of   the   executive   should   be   more   or   less   on   the pattern provided by the Constitution. Accordingly, there should be a Head of the Administration with a Council of Ministers answerable to the Legislative Assembly. As Delhi will continue to have the status of a Union territory, Article 239 will apply to it and so   it   will   have   an   Administrator   with   such designation   as   may   be   specified.   The   present designation of the Lt. Governor may be continued and recognized in the Constitution itself. … x x   x 6.7.21   The   Administrator   should   be   expressly required to perform his functions on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The expression "to aid and advice" is a well understood term of art to denote the implications of the Cabinet system of Government   adopted   by   our   Constitution.   Under this system, the general rule is that the exercise of executive functions by the Administrator has to be on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers which means that it is virtually the Ministers that should take decisions on such matters. However, for Delhi,   the   following   modifications   of   this   general rule will have to be adopted: (i) Firstly, the requirement of acting on the aid   and   advice   of   the   council   of   Ministers cannot   apply   to   the   exercise   by   the Administrator of any judicial or quasi­judicial functions.   The reason is obvious because in respect of such functions there is no question of acting on the advice of another person. (ii) Secondly,   the   requirement   is   only   in relation   to   matters   in   respect   of   which   the Legislative Assembly has the powers to make 22 laws.     This   power   will   be   subject   to   the restrictions   already   dealt   with   earlier   in   the Report.   Accordingly, the Council of Ministers will not have jurisdiction to deal with matters excluded from the purview of the Legislative Assembly.  (iii)   Thirdly,   there   is   need   for   a   special provision   to   resolve   differences   between   the Administrator and his Council of Ministers on any   matter   concerning  the   administration  of Delhi.   Normally,   the   general   principle applicable   to   the   system   of   responsible Government under the Constitution is that the Head   of   the   Administration   should   act  as   a mere Constitutional figurehead and will have to accept the advice of the Council of Ministers except when the matter is left to his discretion. However,   by   virtue   of   Article   239   of   the Constitution,   the   ultimate   responsibility   for good administration of Delhi is vested in the President   acting   through   the   Administrator. Because of this the Administrator has to take a somewhat   more   active   part   in   the administration than the Governor of a State. It is,   therefore,   necessary   to   reconcile   between the   need   to   retain   the   responsibility   of   the Administrator to the Centre in this regard and the need to enforce the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the Legislature. The best way of doing this is to provide that in case of difference of opinion which cannot be resolved   between   the   Administrator   and   his Council   of   Ministers,   he   should   refer   the question to the President and the decision of the President thereon will be final. In cases of urgency, if immediate action is necessary, the Administrator  may direct  action to be taken 23 pending   such   decision   of   the   President.   A provision of this kind was made for this very reason not only in the 1951 Act, but also in the 1963 Act relating to the Union territories as well as in the 1978 Bill.” 16. As the chronology would show, after due deliberation, the Parliament, in exercise of its constituent power, amended the Constitution by the Constitution (Sixty­ninth Amendment) Act in the year 1991 and inserted Articles 239AA and 239AB in the   Constitution  to  which  we   shall  refer  at  an  appropriate stage when we dwell upon the interpretative process.   B. Rivalised Submissions: 17. Now, we may note the rivalised submissions at the Bar. We   have   heard   Mr.   P.   Chidambaram,   Mr.   Gopal Subramaniam,   Dr.   Rajiv   Dhawan,   Ms.   Indira   Jaising   and Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf   of   the   Government   of   NCT   of   Delhi.   Mr.   Maninder Singh,   learned   Additional   Solicitor   General   of   India,   has advanced arguments on behalf of the Union of India and the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi. 24 18. A common written submission has been filed on behalf of the  Government of  NCT of  Delhi and Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, has filed written submissions on behalf  of  both the  Union of India and the Lieutenant Governor of NCT of Delhi. 19. An application for intervention being I.A. No. 10556 of 2017 was filed by the applicant, Reliance Industries Ltd. We have heard Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior counsel on behalf of the said intervenor. Another application for intervention was filed by The Kapila and Nirmal Hingorani Foundation and we have heard Mr. Aman Hingorani, learned counsel on behalf of the said Foundation. B.1   Submissions on behalf of the appellant: 20. It is submitted by learned senior counsel appearing on behalf   of   the   appellant   that   the   NCTD   occupies   a   unique position in the constitutional scheme by virtue of the insertion of Articles 239AA and 239AB and the consequent enactment of   the   1991   Act   that   has   shaped   the   NCTD   into   a constitutional   hybrid   and   has   led   Delhi   to   acquire   certain 25 special characteristics solely attributed to full­fledged States under the Constitution. As per the appellant, the Government of NCT of Delhi enjoys far more power than the administrative set   ups   of   other   Union   Territories   especially   after   the constitutional amendment and coming into force of the 1991 Act. 21. After expansively referring to the constitutional history of the   NCTD,  it  is  urged  on behalf   of  the   appellant  that the insertion   of   Article   239AA   was   intended   to   eradicate   the hierarchical   structure   which   functionally   placed   the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi in a superior position to that of the   Council   of   Ministers,   especially   with   respect   to   the executive   powers   and   the   Lieutenant   Governor   has   to   be treated as a titular head alone in respect of matters that have been assigned to the Legislative Assembly and the Council of Ministers. 22. The   appellant   has   alluded   to   the   nine­Judge   Bench decision in   New Delhi Municipal Corporation v. State of 26 5 Punjab  to contend that the Union Territory of Delhi is a class by itself different from all other Union Territories which our Constitution envisages, and the larger Bench had no occasion to decide in what shape and form the NCTD is different from other   Union   Territories,   for   the   said   issue   did   not   arise therein.   Nevertheless,  the   majority   opinion  clearly   rules as regards   Delhi’s   unique   constitutional   status   unlike   other Union   Territories   by   virtue   of   the   constitutionally   created Legislative Assembly, Council of Ministers and Westminster style cabinet system of government that have been brought by the Sixty­ninth Amendment and the 1991 Act. 23. It is further submitted by the appellant that the Sixty­ Ninth   Amendment   to   the   Constitution   and   the   consequent 1991 Act were passed with the aim to give the citizens of NCT of Delhi a larger say in the governance of NCTD. Democracy being   one   of   the   facets   of   the   basic   structure   of   the Constitution,   the   Sixty­ninth   amendment   was   aimed   at furthering   democracy   in   Delhi   and   hence,   Article   239AA 5(1997) 7 SCC 339 27 should be interpreted in the backdrop of the fact that Delhi has been conferred special status among various UTs and in such a way that democracy in its true sense is established in Delhi. 24. It is submitted that constitutional jurisprudence in the Indian context has undergone a sea change after the decisions 6 7 in   R.C.   Cooper   v.   U.O.I   and   Maneka   Gandhi   v.   U.O.I . Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submit   that   this   Court should   adopt  a  more   purposive  and   an  organic   method of interpretation as adopted by this Court in a catena of cases including the recent one in  Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) 8 and   another   v.   U.O.I.   and   others   wherein   the   majority observed that the decisions of this Court prior to  R.C. Cooper

their historical context. 25. Article 239AA has deliberately excluded the words "assist and advice" as were used in the 1963 and 1966 Acts, rather 6AIR 1970 SC 564 7AIR 1978 SC 597 8(2017) 10 SCC 1 28 the said Article employs the expression "aid and advice" and, therefore,   it   consciously   obviates   the   requirement   of   the Lieutenant Governor’s concurrence on every matter. Thus, it is the proponement of the appellant that Article 239AA of the Constitution which has conferred a Westminster style cabinet system   of   government   for   the   NCT   of   Delhi   makes   the Lieutenant   Governor   bound   by   the   'aid   and   advice'   of   the Council of Ministers. To buttress its argument, the appellant has referred to the judgments in   Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya 9 and Kapur and Ors. v. State of Punjab    Shamsher Singh 10 which,   as   per   the   appellant,   though v.  State  of   Punjab   arose in the context of the State of Punjab, decided that since our Constitution has conferred a Westminster style cabinet system for the Government of State of Punjab, an executive Government established under the aegis of the Constitution should be able to exercise all executive powers necessary to fulfill the needs that the situation warrants and consequently, the Governor has to act in accordance with the aid and advice 9AIR 1955 SC 549 10AIR 1974 SC 2192 29 tendered by the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as its head. 26. It is further argued that GNCTD has the sole power to take   executive   actions   on   all   matters   on   which   the   Delhi Legislature is competent to pass laws irrespective of whether or   not   the   Legislature   has   actually   passed   a   law   on   the subject.   Emphasis   is   laid   on   the   principle   of   collective responsibility to a democratically elected legislative body and, on that basis, it is proponed that the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi   is   bound   by   the   aid   and   advice   of   the   Council   of Ministers of Delhi. It is put forth that such an interpretation can   alone   meet   the   purpose   of   constitutionally   mandated governance in Delhi post insertion of Article 239AA in the Constitution. 27. It   is   the   stand   of   the   appellant   that   the   extent   of executive powers of the Government of NCT of Delhi can be understood   by   appositely   juxtaposed   reading   of   Article 239AA(3)   with   Article   239AA(4)   which   stipulates   that   the Government of NCT of Delhi has exclusive executive powers in 30 relation   to   matters   which   fall   within   the   purview   of   Delhi Assembly's legislative competence. Article 239AA(3) gives the Delhi   Legislative   Assembly   the   legislative   powers   over   all except three subjects in the State List and all subjects in the Concurrent List and as a natural corollary, Article 239AA(4) confers executive power on the Council of Ministers over all those   subjects   in   respect   of   which   the   Delhi   Legislative Assembly has the legislative power to legislate. 28. It is asserted by the counsel for the appellant that Article 239AA preserves the Parliament's legislative powers over all subjects in the State and the Concurrent Lists, but no such executive   power   is   reserved   for   the   Union.   The   appellant contends   that   there   is   conscious   difference   between   the language of Article 239AA(3) which gives overriding legislative powers to the Parliament and that of Article 239AA(4) which refrains from doing the likewise in the context of executive powers. The Centre's executive power stems from Article 73 and   would   normally   be   co­extensive   with   the   Parliament's legislative   powers,   but   this   is   explicitly   subject   to   other 31 provisions of the Constitution which has to include Article 239AA. Thus, Article 239AA has, in the case of Delhi, whittled down   the   executive   power   of   the   Centre   to   only   the   three reserved subjects falling outside the purview of the executive power of the Council of Ministers of Delhi. 29. The appellant has argued that though Article 73 of the Constitution   lays   down   the   principle   that   there   may   exist under the Constitution concurrent legislative powers between the Parliament and the State Legislative Assemblies, yet there can never be concurrent executive powers between the Central and the State Governments as such a situation would result in chaos in the absence of any responsibility/accountability for   executive   actions.   This   principle,   as   per   the   appellant, must apply equally in relation to matters contained in List II and List III of the Seventh Schedule and the effect of Article 239AA(3) is that all matters on which the Delhi Legislative Assembly has power to legislate are effectively equivalent to matters of the Concurrent List. 32 30. Article   239AB   would   become   redundant   if   it   is   to   be accepted that the Constitution allows the Union Government to override all executive actions/decisions of the GNCTD in the ordinary course of things, as in such a situation, it would never be necessary to invoke the special provision in the form of Article 239AB for the Union Government to take over the administration of Delhi. Further, Article 239AB stipulates that if the administration of Delhi is not carried out in accordance with Article 239AA, the President may suspend the operation of   any   part   or   whole   of   Article   239AA.   This,   as   per   the appellant, clearly shows that when an elected government is in place, the administration of Delhi has to be carried out in accordance with Article 239AA. 31. After   quoting   Dr.   Ambedkar   on   federalism   in   the Constituent   Assembly   Debates   dated   25.11.1949,   the appellant has contended that Article 239AA is an example of the hallmark of federalism in our Constitution which reserves legislative primacy of the Parliament in certain limited areas but   there   is   no   such   corresponding   provision   in   the 33 Constitution   which   reserves   the   executive   powers   of   the Central Government vis­a­vis GNCTD. 32. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that there is necessity   for   uniform   and   consistent   interpretation   of   the phrase   'aid   and   advice'   used   in   different   articles   of   the Constitution such as Article 74, Article 163 and Article 239AA in the context of the functions of the President, the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor respectively. It is urged that the provisions of the Constitution being on a higher pedestal than ordinary statutory provisions require to be interpreted in a different manner and in view of the same, Article 239AA(4) deserves to be interpreted in a manner as other provisions of the Constitution and, hence, there is warrant for interpreting the phrase 'aid and advice' in a broad sense so that such 'aid and advice' is binding on the nominee of the President, i.e., the   Lieutenant   Governor.   It  would   be   an   anathema   to   the constitutional   philosophy   to   surmise   that   just  because  the Constitution   permits   a   difference   of   opinion   between   the Lieutenant Governor and the Council of Ministers, the 'aid and 34 advice' tendered by the Council of Ministers is not binding upon the Lieutenant Governor. 33. The appellant has further submitted that under Article 239AA(4), the Government of NCT of Delhi and the Council of Ministers of the NCT of Delhi have exclusive power over all matters in relation to subjects under List II (excluding Entries 1, 2 and 18 thereof and Entries 34, 65 and 66 in so far as they apply to Entries 1, 2 and 18 thereof) and List III of the Seventh Schedule. According to the appellant, the substantive part of Article 239AA(4) itself lays down the exception to it, i.e., when the Lieutenant Governor is to act in his discretion under the law and not as per the advice of the Council of Ministers. The proviso to Article 239AA(4), as per the appellant, comes into play where the 'aid and advice' of the Council of Ministers transgresses the areas constitutionally prescribed to it and the proviso   does   not   allow   the   Lieutenant   Governor   to   have   a different view on the merits of the 'aid and advice' that has been tendered by the Council of Ministers. According to the appellant,   the   proviso   to   Article   239AA(4)   operates   only   in 35 exceptional situations and is not a general norm. Any attempt to expand the scope of the proviso beyond exceptional matters is not tenable as it would have the effect of rendering the main part of Article 239AA(4) otiose. To rely upon the proviso to Article 239AA(4) to say that the 'aid and advice' of the Council of Ministers is not binding upon the Lieutenant Governor in areas in which the Delhi Legislative Assembly has competence to legislate would defeat the purpose for which institutions necessary to operationalize democracy in Delhi were created. It is submitted by the appellant that the 1991 Act as well as the Rules   themselves   cannot   be   used   to   interpret   the constitutional  provisions  inasmuch  as  they   only  reflect the scheme of governance. B.2 Submissions on behalf of the respondents: 34. The   submissions   put   forth   by   Mr.   Maninder   Singh, learned   Additional  Solicitor   General   of   India,   appearing  on behalf   of   the   respondents,   Union   of   India   and   Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, revolve around the argument that although the insertion of Article 239AA envisages the constitution of a 36 Legislative   Assembly   for   the   National   Capital   Territory   of Delhi,   yet   the   President   shall   remain   its   Executive   head, acting through the Lieutenant Governor, and that the powers of the Parliament in respect of the Union Territories shall not be   derogated   in   any   manner   by   the   insertion   of   the   said Article 239AA. 35. The respondents submit that the constitutional scheme envisaged for the Union Territories has been dealt with in

although   the   Court   in   this   case   had   contemplated   three categories   of   Union   Territories,   yet   it   had   arrived   at   the conclusion that those surviving as Union Territories and not having acquired Statehood shall remain so and Delhi, now referred to as "National Capital Territory of Delhi", is still a Union Territory. The respondents further submit that once it has   been   determined   that   Delhi   continues   to   be   a   Union Territory, its governance shall be regulated by the provision of Article 239 which stipulates that all Union Territories shall be 37 governed by the President of India and neither a plain textual reading nor a contextual reading of Article 239AA stipulates any   vertically   divided   exclusive   jurisdiction   with   the Legislative Assembly or the Council of Ministers. 36. The respondents, thereafter, in their submissions, after citing several authorities, have sought to impress upon this Court   that   Article   239AA   be   given   its   literal   and   true interpretation   as   there   exists   no   ambiguity   attracting   the requirement  of  purposive interpretation.      The respondents have   also   submitted   that   since   it   was   on   the recommendations   made   by   the   Balakrishnan   Committee, which   had   been   accepted   in   toto,   that   the   Sixty­ninth amendment   and   the   1991   Act   came   into   force,   the   Court should consider the report of the Committee and the reasons provided therein in order to ascertain the true intention of the exercise   of   the   constituent   power   of   the   Parliament   for bringing about the said amendment as well as the GNCTD Act. 38 37. It is also asserted by the respondents that Article 239 is an integral part of the Constitution and the foundation stone of Part VIII and that Article 239AA shall be read conjointly with   Article   239   which   provides   that   the   ultimate administration with respect to Delhi shall remain with the President acting through its administrator. 38. The   respondents   also   contend   that   although   Article 239AA confers on the Legislative Assembly of Delhi the power to legislate with respect to subject matters provided in List II and List III of the Seventh Schedule, yet the said power is limited by the very same Article when it employs the phrase "in   so   far   as   any   such   matter   is   applicable   to   Union Territories...."   and   also   by   specifically   excluding   from   the legislative power of the Assembly certain entries as delineated in Article 239AA(3)(a). This restriction, as per the respondents, limits the power of the Legislative Assembly to legislate and this   restriction   has   to   be   understood   in   the   context   of conferment of special status.   39 39. To reiterate the position that the President remains the Executive head for all Union Territories, Mr. Singh has drawn the attention of the Court to Articles 53 and 73 read with Article   246(4)   of   the   Constitution.   It   is   further   urged   that nowhere   in   the   Constitution,   including   Articles   239A   or 239AA, it has been stipulated that the executive power of a Union   Territory   shall   vest   in   the   Council   of Ministers/Legislative Assembly. It has been argued that the contention of the appellant that on the creation of Legislative Assembly,   there   was   an   automatic   investiture   of   executive power on the said Assembly is flawed as the constitutional scheme does not envisage any conferment of automatic power on the Council of Ministers. Further, as the submission is structured, Article 239AA(4) employs the phrase "Lieutenant Governor   and   his   Ministers"   which   implies   that   it   is   the "Lieutenant Governor" and not the "Council of Ministers" who is responsible for the administration of the Union Territory. That apart, the provisions of Articles 298, 299 and 239AB of the Constitution and Section 52 of the 1991 Act also reiterate 40 the   position   that   the   Constitution   does   not   stipulate   any automatic conferral of executive power and the same is echoed in the Balakrishnan Committee Report. 40. The   respondents   contend   that   the   contention   of   the principle laid down in the judgment of  Ram Jawaya Kapur (supra),  that wherever there is existence of legislative power there   is   co­extensive   existence   of   executive   power,   is   with respect to only the Union and the States and is not applicable to   Union   Territories   as   the   same   would   be   against   the constitutional mandate as laid down in its various provisions. 41. The   respondents,   to  further   advance   their   arguments, have pointed out the distinction between Articles 239AB and 356 of the Constitution and have submitted that Article 356 envisages   that   the   President   shall   assume   to   himself   the functions of the State Government and the powers vested in the Governor in case of failure of "constitutional machinery” but in the case of Union Territories, this clause would become inapplicable   as   the   executive   power   of   a   Union   Territory remains  vested with the  President.  The respondents would 41 further   submit   that   Article   239AB   does   not   stipulate   any "assumption of powers" by the President but merely provides for suspension of operation of Article 239AA in the NCT of Delhi in case the President is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for the proper administration of NCT of Delhi. 42. The respondents, in their submissions,  also point out that a close reading of Article 239 with Article 239AA along with Section 44 of the GNCTD Act, 1991 would reveal that the expression "Executive action of the Lt. Governor" and not the "Executive action of NCT of Delhi" has been stipulated in the said provisions. The said intention can also be seen from the fact that the phrase Lieutenant Governor "with the Ministers" has been used in Section 44(1)(b) and further Article 239AA(4) also   engages   the   phrase   "his   functions".   This   leads   to  the implication that the extent of contribution/participation to be made by the Council of Ministers is only to render aid and advice to the Lieutenant Governor. 43. It   has   been   further   submitted   on   behalf   of   the respondents that the aid and advice rendered by the Council 42 of Ministers is not binding upon the Lieutenant Governor and he  is   empowered   to  form  an  opinion  that  differs   from  the opinion of the Council of Ministers. In such a situation, the proviso to Article 239AA(4) comes into play which provides that in case of such difference of opinion, the decision of the President shall be final. Learned Additional Solicitor General has stressed that this is in recognition of the fact that the ultimate responsibility in relation to the administration of the Union   Territories   lies   with   the   Union   and   there   is   clear demarcation   of   difference   as   regards   the   manner   of governance between States and Union Territories whereby in case   of   the   former,   the   Governor   is   bound   by   the   advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. 44. The   respondents   further   point   out   that   a   combined reading of Article 239AA(4) and Section 41(2) of the 1991 Act would suggest that when the question arises if a matter is one where the Lieutenant Governor shall exercise his discretion, the decision of the Lieutenant Governor shall be final. Article 239AA(4) and the proviso thereto is not an exception and, 43 hence,   should   not   be   given   a   restrictive   meaning   and   the phrase "any matter" has been deliberately kept of the widest import. To bring home the point, reliance has been placed on the dictum laid down in   Tej Kiran Jain and others v. N.

been said to mean  "everything". Therefore, the phrase "any matter" has to be interpreted to mean "every matter". The said interpretation,  as per the respondents,  would be in accord with the objective of the Constitution that the Union shall retain the ultimate authority to legislate on any matter with respect to the National Capital Territory of Delhi. 45. The respondents also submit that Article 239AA does not contemplate a new scheme and it is similar to that envisaged under Article 239A which pertains to the administration and governance   of   the   Union   Territory   of   Puducherry.   A comparison of the scheme provided under Article 239, Article 239A read with the 1963 Act for Puducherry on one hand and Article 239, Article 239AA read with the 1991 Act for Delhi on 11(1970) 2 SCC 272 44 the other hand would reveal that both the schemes are similar to the extent that the intention is to retain the continuing control of the President and the Parliament for the executive and legislative functioning of the Union Territories. 46. The   respondents   contend   that   Article   239AA,   and   in particular, clause 4 of the said provision, is not the first of its kind and a similar provision in the form of Section 44 existed in the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 and that the issue of interpretation of this Section had come up before this Court in several cases wherein it has been laid down that the "State   Government"   with   respect   to   Union   Territory   would mean "Central Government" in terms of Section 3(60) of the General Clauses Act. Hence, when a similar provision such as Article   239AA(4)   has   already   been   given   a   certain interpretation by this Court, then merely because of the fact that special provisions have been placed in the Constitution for the NCT of Delhi, which is not so in the case of other Union Territories, it shall not bar the Courts from adopting an 45 interpretation of Article 239AA which is similar to Section 44 of the 1963 Act. 47. The   respondents   finally   submit   that   as   per   the constitutional   mandate,   the   ultimate   responsibility   with respect to all matters governing the NCT of Delhi fall within the   domain   of   the   Union  Government.   To  bolster   the   said stand,  the  respondents  have placed reliance  upon relevant portions   of   the   Balakrishnan   Committee   Report   and   also various other provisions of the Constitution of India and the 1991   Act.   Further,   the   respondents   argue   that   to   devolve exclusive   legislative   or   exclusive   executive   power   on   the Legislative Assembly or Council of Ministers of the NCT of Delhi would result in elevating a Union Territory to the status of   a   State,   a   demand   which   has   been   rejected   by   the Constitution   makers   on   several   instances.   That   apart,   it would   be   impermissible   under   any   interpretation   of   the constitutional   text   and   also   contrary   to   the   constitutional mandate. 46 48. Before we dwell upon the submissions, we are of the considered view that we should state certain principles and analyse certain constitutional concepts.  Frankly speaking, we feel   the   necessity   as   we   are   really   concerned   with   the interpretation of a constitutional provision having regard to its operational perspective in a democracy. We have said so in the prelude. We do not think and we are not persuaded to think that the present controversy can rest on either of the extremes   propagated before us.   We are convinced that a holistic   approach   has   to   be   adopted   from   a   constitutional vision which is bound to encapsulate crystalline realism. C. Ideals/principles of representative governance: 49. Representative   Governance   in   a   Republican   form   of democracy is a kind of democratic setup wherein the people of a nation elect and choose their law making representatives. The representatives so elected are entrusted by the citizens with the task of framing policies which are reflective of the will of   the   electorate.   The   main   purpose   of   a   Representative Government is to represent the public will, perception and the 47 popular sentiment into policies. The representatives, thus, act on behalf of the people at large and remain accountable to the people   for   their   activities   as   lawmakers.   Therefore, representative form of governance comes out as a device to bring to fore the popular will. 50. Bernard   Manin   in   “The   Principles   of   Representative 12 Government”   has   deliberated   on   the   postulate   that   the concept  of   representation  has   its  origin around  the   Middle ages in the context of the church and in the context of cities in their relation to the king or the emperor. The idea, as Manin says, was to send out delegates having power to connect to those who appointed them in the first place and there lies the kernel of the concept of representation. This technique then got transferred and used for other purposes.   51. Thomas  Jefferson,  in the  United  States  Declaration of Independence   (1776),   highlights   on   the   stipulation   that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.   This   idea,   simply   put,   reflects   the   concept   of 12 Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, Cambridge University Press, 1997 48 representative governance. The cogent factors for constituting the representative form of government are that all citizens are regarded as equal and the vote of all citizens, which is the source of governing power, is assigned equal weight. In this sense, the views of all citizens carry the same strength and no one can impose his/her views on others. 52. The   Constitution   of   India   has   embraced   the representative   model   of   governance   at   all   levels,   i.e.,   local, State and the Union. Acknowledging the representative form of governance   adopted   by   our   Constitution   and   the   elected representatives   being   the   instruments   for   conveying   the popular will of the people, the Court in  State of Bihar and

"...Besides providing a quasi federal system in the country and envisaging the scheme for distribution of   legislative   powers   between   the   State   and   the center, it emphasizes the establishment of the rule of law. The form of Government envisaged under a parliamentary   system   of   democracy   is   a representative democracy in which the people of the country   are   entitled   to   exercise   their   sovereignty through the legislature which is to be elected on the basis   of   adult   franchise   and   to   which   the executive, namely, the Council of Ministers 13(2000) 4 SCC 640 49   is   responsible.   The   legislature   has   been   acknowledged   to   be   a   nerve   center   of   the   State activities.   It   is   through   parliament   that   elected representatives   of   the   people   ventilate   people's grievances. [Emphasis is ours] 53. Thus perceived, the people are the sovereign since they exercise the power of adult franchise that ultimately builds the structure   of   representative   democracy.   That   apart,   every constituent   of   the   sovereign   is   entitled   to   air   his/her grievances through their elected representatives. The twin idea establishes the cornerstone of the precept of accountability to the   public   because   there   rests   the   origin   of   power   and responsibility. 54. A representative form of government should not become a government by elites where the representatives so elected do nothing to give effect to the will of the sovereign. The elected representatives   must   not   have   an   ulterior   motive   for representing their constituents and they should not misuse the   popular   mandate   awarded   to   them   by   covertly transforming it into ‘own rule’.   The inherent value of public accountability can never be brushed aside. 50 55. Another   ideal   for   representative   governance   is accessibility and approachability. Since responsiveness to the needs and demands of the people is the basic parameter for evaluating the effectiveness of representative governance, it is necessary   that   elected   representatives   develop   a   sense   of belonging with their constituents.   The sense of belonging has its limitation also. If the desire of the constituent is rational and draws strength from legal paradigms, it deserves to be given due acceptance but if the aspiration blows from some illogical or unacceptable proposition, the same should not be allowed any space. It is because in a representative form of government,   aspirations   and   desires   are   canvassed   and propounded   on   the   bedrock   of   constitutional   principles. Hence, we may say that inherent constitutional aspirations should   draw   inspiration   from   the   Constitution.   There   can never be sacrifice of constitutional conscience.  56. Be   it   remembered,   when   elected   representatives   and constitutional functionaries enter their office, they take oath to  bear   allegiance   to   the   Constitution   and   uphold  the 51 Constitution. Thus, it is expected of them not only to remain alive to the provisions of the Constitution but also to concepts like   constitutionalism,   constitutional   objectivity   and constitutional   trust,   etc.   The   support   expressed   by   the sovereign in the form of votes cannot become an excuse to perform actions which fall foul to the Constitution or are  ultra vires . Though the elected representatives are expected to act as instruments of transforming popular will into policies and laws,   yet   they   must   do   so   within   the   contours   of   the Constitution. They must display constitutional objectivity as a standard of representative governance, for that is ingrained in the   conceptual  democratic   majority  which  neither   tolerates ideological fragmentation nor encourages any kind of utopian fantasy. It lays stress on  realizable constitutional ideologies.  D. Constitutional morality: 57. Constitutional morality in its strictest sense of the term implies  strict  and complete adherence to the  constitutional principles as enshrined in various segments of the document. When a country is endowed with a Constitution, there is an 52 accompanying promise which stipulates that every member of the country right from its citizens to the high constitutional functionaries   must   idolize   the   constitutional   fundamentals. This duty imposed by the Constitution stems from the fact that the Constitution is the indispensable foundational base that functions as the guiding force to protect and ensure that the   democratic   setup   promised   to   the   citizenry   remains unperturbed. The constitutional functionaries owe a greater degree of responsibility towards this eloquent instrument for it is   from   this   document   that   they   derive   their   power   and authority and, as a natural corollary, they must ensure that they cultivate and develop a spirit of constitutionalism where every action taken by them is governed by and is in strict conformity with the basic tenets of the Constitution.  58. In   this   context,   the   observations   made   by   Dr.   B.R. Ambedkar are of great significance:­ “Constitutional   morality   is   not   a   natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated. We must realize that our people are yet to learn it. Democracy in 53 India   is   only   a   top­dressing   on   an   Indian   soil, 14 which is essentially undemocratic.” 59. Constitutional morality is that fulcrum which acts as an essential check upon the high functionaries and citizens alike, as experience has shown that unbridled power without any checks and balances would result in a despotic and tyrannical situation which is antithetical to the very idea of democracy. 15 The following passage from  Manoj Narula v. Union of India can aptly be quoted to throw some light on the idea:­ “If   men   were   angels,   no   government   would   be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external   nor   internal   controls   on   government would   be   necessary.   In   framing   a   government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the   next   place   oblige   it   to   control   itself.   A dependence   on   the   people   is,   no   doubt,   the primary   control   on   the   government;   but experience has taught mankind the necessity of 16 auxiliary precautions. ” 60. In the said case, it has been further observed:­ “Regard   being   had   to   the   aforesaid   concept,   it would   not   be   out   of   place   to   state   that 14Constituent Assembly Debates 1989: VII, 38. 15 (2014) 9 SCC 1 16James Madison as Publius, Federalist 51 54 institutional   respectability   and   adoption   of precautions for the sustenance of constitutional values   would   include   reverence   for   the constitutional structure. It is always profitable to remember the famous line of Laurence H. Tribe that   a   Constitution   is   “written   in   blood,   rather 17 than ink” .” 61. Constitutional morality acts as a check against lapses on the part of the governmental agencies and colourable activities aimed   at   affecting   the   democratic   nature   of   polity.   In 18 Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar and others , it has been explained thus:­ “Democracy,  which has  been best defined  as  the government of the people, by the people and for the people, expects prevalence of genuine orderliness, positive   propriety,   dedicated   discipline   and sanguine   sanctity   by   constant   affirmance   of constitutional morality which is the pillar stone of good governance.” Constitutional   morality,   appositely   understood,   means the morality that has inherent elements in the constitutional norms   and   the   conscience   of   the   Constitution.   Any   act   to garner   justification   must   possess   the   potentiality   to   be   in 17Laurence H. Tribe, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 29 (2008) (2015) 3 SCC 467 18 55 harmony   with   the   constitutional   impulse.   We   may   give   an example. When one is expressing an idea of generosity, he may not be meeting the standard of justness.   There may be an element of condescension. But when one shows justness in action, there is no feeling of any grant or generosity.  That will come   within   the   normative   value.   That   is   the   test   of constitutional   justness   which   falls   within   the   sweep   of constitutional   morality.   It   advocates   the   principle   of constitutional   justness   without   subjective   exposition   of generosity.   E. Constitutional objectivity: 62. Our Constitution, in its grandness, resolutely embraces the theory of "checks and balances". This concept of checks and   balances,   in   turn,   gives   birth   to   the   principle   of "constitutional   objectivity".   The   Constitution   expects   the organs   of   the   State   adorned   by   high   constitutional functionaries that while discharging their duties, they remain alive to the allegiance they bear to the Constitution. Neutrality as envisaged under the constitutional scheme should guide 56 them in the performance of their duties and functions under the   Constitution.   This   is   the   trust   which   the   Constitution reposes in them.  63. The founding fathers of our Constitution had a vision for our   Nation   whose   ultimate   aim   was   to   make   right   the upheaval   that   existed   before   setting   up   of   the   Constituent Assembly. The concept of constitutional objectivity is, by itself, inherent in this vision and it is incumbent upon the organs of the State to make comprehensive efforts towards realization of this vision. But, at the same time, they must remain true to the   Constitution   by   upholding   the   trust   which   the Constitution places in them and thereby exhibit constitutional objectivity in its truest sense. In  Indra Sawhney v. Union of 19 , the Court observed:­ India and others "...Therefore,   the   permissible   judicial   creativity   in tune with the Constitutional objectivity is essential to the interpretation of the Constitutional provisions so that the dominant values may be discovered and enforced.   At   the   same   time,   one   has   to   be   very cautious and careful in approaching the issues in a very pragmatic and realistic manner." 19AIR 1993 SC 477 57 The aforesaid passage tells us in an illuminating manner how the Court is expected to proceed on the path of judicial creativity in consonance with constitutional objectivity having a keen sense of pragmatism.  64. It can be said without inviting any controversy that the concept of constitutional objectivity has to be equally followed by the Executive and the Legislature as it is the Constitution from   which   they   derive   their   power   and,   in   turn,   the Constitution expects them to be just and reasonable in the exercise of such power. The decisions taken by constitutional functionaries, in the discharge of their duties, must be based on normative acceptability. Such decisions, thus, have to be in accord with the principles of constitutional objectivity which, as   a   lighthouse,   will   guide   the   authorities   to   take   a constitutionally right decision. This action, needless to say, would be in the spirit of the Constitution. It may be further noted here that it is not only the decision itself but also the process adopted in such decision making which should be in tune   with   constitutional   objectivity.   A   decision   by   a 58 constitutional   functionary   may,   in   the   ultimate   analysis, withstand scrutiny but unless the process adopted for arriving at such a decision is in tandem with the idea of constitutional objectivity, it invites criticism. Therefore, the decision making process   should   never   by­pass   the   established   norms   and conventions which are time tested and should affirm to the idea of constitutionalism. F. Constitutional   governance   and   the   conception   of legitimate constitutional trust: 65. The concept of constitutional governance in a body polity like ours, where the Constitution is the supreme fundamental law, is neither hypothetical nor an abstraction but is real, concrete and grounded. The word 'governance' encapsulates the   idea   of   an   administration,   a   governing   body   or organization   whereas   the   word   'constitutional'   means something sanctioned by or consistent with or operating under the fundamental organic law, i.e., the Constitution. Thus, the word 'governance' when qualified by the term 'constitutional' conveys a form of governance/government which adheres to the concept of constitutionalism. The said form of governance 59

67.   It   is   axiomatic   that   the   Constitution   of   India   is   the suprema lex , i.e., the paramount law of the land. All the three wings of the State, i.e., the legislature, the judiciary and the executive   derive   their   power   and   authority   from   the Constitution. It is the Constitution which endows the requisite amount   of   oxygen   and   other   necessary   supplies   which,   in turn, enable these organs to work for the betterment of the nation and the body polity.  In the context of the supremacy of 60 the Constitution, the Court in  Kalpana Mehta and others v. 20 Union of India and others  has laid down:­ "The   Constitution   of   India   is   the   supreme fundamental   law   and   all   laws   have   to   be   in consonance or in accord with the Constitution. The constitutional   provisions   postulate   the   conditions for   the   functioning   of   the   legislature   and   the executive and prescribe that the Supreme Court is the   final   interpreter   of   the   Constitution.   All statutory   laws   are   required   to   conform   to   the fundamental   law,   that   is,   the   Constitution.   The functionaries   of   the   three   wings,   namely,   the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, as has   been stated in     His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati 21   Sripadagalvaru   v.   State   of   Kerala   and   another      . derive   their   authority   and   jurisdiction   from   the Constitution.  The   Parliament   has   the   exclusive authority   to   make   laws   and   that   is   how   the supremacy   of   the   Parliament   in   the   field   of legislation   is   understood.   There   is   a   distinction between   parliamentary   supremacy   in   the   field   of legislation   and   constitutional   supremacy.  The Constitution   is   the   fundamental   document   that provides   for   constitutionalism,   constitutional governance and also sets out morality, norms and values   which   are   inhered   in   various   articles   and sometimes are decipherable from the constitutional silence.  Its   inherent   dynamism   makes   it   organic and,   therefore,   the   concept   of   —constitutional sovereignty   is   sacrosanct.  It   is   extremely   sacred and,   as   stated   earlier,   the   authorities   get   their powers   from   the   Constitution.   It  is   —the   source. 20(2018) 7 SCALE 106 21AIR 1973 SC 1461 : (1973) 4 SCC 225 61 Sometimes,   the   constitutional   sovereignty   is described as the supremacy of the Constitution. [Emphasis is ours] 68. Thus,   the   concept   of   constitutional   governance   is   a natural   consequent   of   the   doctrine   of   constitutional sovereignty.     The   writings   of   Locke   and   Montesquieu   also throw light on the concept of constitutional governance. Locke lays stress on the fiduciary nature of public power and argues that   sovereignty   lies   with   the   people.   Montesquieu,   on   the other hand, in his postulate of constitutional governance, has laid more stress on the system of "checks and balances" and "separation of powers" between the executive, legislature and the judiciary. According to the ideas of Montesquieu, it can be said   that   constitutional   governance   involves   the   denial   of absolute power to any one organ of the State and a system of checks and balances is the basic foundation of constitutional governance. In constitutional form of Government, power is distributed amongst the three organs of the State in such a way that the constitutional goal as set out in the Preamble of our Constitution is realised.  62 69. The   postulates   laid   by   Locke   and   Montesquieu   are inherent   in   our   constitutional   scheme   and   have   also   been recognized by the Court. Therefore, it can safely be said that the nomenclature of constitutional governance has at its very base a Constitution which is the supreme law of the land and the conception, in its width, embraces two more ideas, i.e., fiduciary nature of public power and the system of checks and balances. 70. We may hasten to add that the Court, while interpreting various provisions of the Constitution on different occasions, has   always   been   alive   to   the   concept   of   constitutional 22 governance. In   B.R. Kapur v. State of T.N. and another , the majority, while dealing with the issue of a writ of quo warranto, ruled that if a non­legislator could be sworn in as the Chief Minister under Article 164 of the Constitution, then he or she must satisfy the qualification of membership of a legislator as provided under Article 173. Recently, in   Manoj 22(2001) 7 SCC 231 63 Narula   (supra),   while   interpreting   Article   75(1)   of   the Constitution, the Court observed:­ "...In a controlled Constitution like ours, the Prime Minister   is   expected   to   act   with   constitutional responsibility   as   a   consequence   of   which   the cherished   values   of   democracy   and   established norms of good governance get condignly fructified. The framers of the Constitution left many a thing unwritten by reposing immense trust in the Prime Minister. The scheme of the Constitution suggests that there has to be an emergence of constitutional governance which would gradually grow to give rise to constitutional renaissance." [Emphasis is ours] 71. The   provisions   of   the   Constitution   need   not   expressly stipulate   the   concepts   of   constitutionalism,   constitutional governance or constitutional trust and morality, rather these norms   and   values   are   inherent   in   various   articles   of   the Constitution   and   sometimes   are   decipherable   from   the constitutional silences as has been held in   Kalpana Mehta (supra). 72. Having   discussed   about   the   concept   of   constitutional governance, in the obtaining situation, we may allude to the 64 conception of legitimate constitutional trust. In this regard, the speech of Dr. Ambedkar reflects his concern:­ "I feel that the Constitution is workable; it is flexible and it is strong enough to hold the country together both in peacetime and in wartime. Indeed, if I may say   so,   if   things   go   wrong   under   the   new Constitution the reason will not be that we had a bad Constitution. What we will have to say is that Man was vile." 73. In   Re:   Dr.   Ram   Ashray   Yadav,   Chairman,   Bihar 23 , the Court discussed the role of Public Service Commission the   members   of   Public   Service   Commissions   and,   treating them as constitutional trustees, observed that the credibility of the institution of Public Service Commission is founded upon the faith of the common man on its proper functioning. The faith would be eroded and confidence destroyed if it appears that the Chairman or the Members of the Commission act subjectively and not objectively.   In   Subhash Sharma and others and Firdauz Taleyarkhan v. Union of India and 24 another ,  in the context of appointment of Judges, it has 23(2000) 4 SCC 309 241990 (2) SCALE 836 65 been   stated   that   it   "is   essentially   a   discharge   of   a constitutional   trust   of   which   certain   constitutional functionaries are collectively repositories." 74. The framers of the Constitution also did recognize that the adoption of the Constitution would not   ipso facto , like a magic   wand,   instill   in   the   countrymen   the   values   of constitutionalism.   The   founding   fathers   expected   that constitutional functionaries who derive their authority from the Constitution shall always remain sincerely obeisant to the Constitution.   The   Court   in   Manoj   Narula   (supra),  while highlighting the responsibility conferred on the Prime Minister under   the   Constitution,   discussed   the   doctrine   of constitutional   trust   and,   in   that   context,   reproduced   what Edmund Burke had said centuries ago:­ "All persons possessing any portion of power ought to be strongly and awfully impressed with the idea that they act in trust: and that they are to account for   their   conduct   in   that   trust   to   the   one   great Master, Author and Founder of Society." 75. Thereafter, the Court went on to state:­ 66 "This Court, in re Art. 143, Constitution of India 25 and   Delhi   Laws   Act   (1912) ,   opined   that   the doctrine of constitutional trust is applicable to our Constitution   since   it   lays   the   foundation   of representative democracy. The Court further ruled that   accordingly,   the   Legislature   cannot   be permitted   to   abdicate   its  primary   duty,   viz.   to determine   what   the   law   shall   be.   Though   it   was stated in the context of exercise of legislative power, yet   the   same   has   signification   in   the   present context,   for   in   a   representative   democracy,   the doctrine of constitutional trust has to be envisaged in every high constitutional functionary." 76. The Court further observed:­ "... we shall proceed to deal with the doctrine of "constitutional   trust".   The   issue   of   constitutional trust   arises   in   the   context   of   the   debate   in   the Constituent   Assembly   that   had   taken   place pertaining to the recommendation for appointment of   a   Minister   to   the   Council   of   Ministers. Responding   to   the   proposal   for   the   amendment suggested   by   Prof.   K.T.   Shah   with   regard   to   the introduction   of   a   disqualification   of   a   convicted person becoming a Minister, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had replied: ­ "His last proposition is that no person who is convicted may be appointed a Minister of the State.   Well,   so   far   as   his   intention   is concerned, it is no doubt very laudable and I do not think any Member of this House would like to differ from him on that proposition. But the whole question is this whether we should introduce   all   these   qualifications   and disqualifications in the Constitution itself. Is it 25AIR 1951 SC 332 67 not   desirable,   is   it   not   sufficient   that   we should   trust   the   Prime   Minister,   the Legislature and the public at large watching the actions of the Ministers and the actions of the Legislature to see that no such infamous thing is done by either of them? I think this is a   case   which   may   eminently   be   left   to   the good­ sense of the Prime Minister and to the good sense of the Legislature with the general public holding a watching brief upon them. I therefore   say   that   these   amendments   are unnecessary." And again:­ “98. From the aforesaid, it becomes graphically vivid that the Prime Minister has been regarded as the repository   of   constitutional   trust.   The   use   of   the words “on the advice of the Prime Minister” cannot be   allowed   to   operate   in   a   vacuum   to   lose   their significance. There can be no scintilla of doubt that the   Prime   Minister’s   advice   is   binding   on   the President   for   the   appointment   of   a   person   as   a Minister to the Council of Ministers unless the said person   is   disqualified   under   the   Constitution   to contest the election or under the 1951 Act, as has been held in  B.R. Kapur case . That is in the realm of disqualification.   But,   a   pregnant   one,   the   trust reposed in a high constitutional functionary like the Prime Minister under the Constitution does not end there.   That   the   Prime   Minister   would   be   giving apposite   advice   to   the   President   is   a   legitimate constitutional   expectation,   for   it   is   a   paramount constitutional concern. In a controlled Constitution like ours, the Prime Minister is expected to act with constitutional   responsibility   as   a   consequence   of which   the   cherished   values   of   democracy   and established norms of good governance get condignly 68 fructified. The Framers of the Constitution left many a thing unwritten by reposing immense trust in the Prime   Minister.   The   scheme   of   the   Constitution suggests   that   there   has   to   be   an   emergence   of constitutional   governance   which   would   gradually grow to give rise to constitutional renaissance. x x x x x 100. Thus, while interpreting Article 75(1), definitely a disqualification cannot be added. However, it can always be legitimately expected, regard being had to the role of a Minister in the Council of Ministers and keeping in view the sanctity of oath he takes, the Prime Minister, while living up to the trust reposed in him, would consider not choosing a person with criminal   antecedents   against   whom   charges   have been   framed   for   heinous   or   serious   criminal offences   or   charges   of   corruption   to   become   a Minister of the Council of Ministers. This is what the   Constitution   suggests   and   that   is   the constitutional expectation from the Prime Minister. Rest   has   to   be   left   to   the   wisdom   of   the   Prime Minister. We say nothing more, nothing less.” 77. The Constitution of India, as stated earlier, is an organic document that requires all its functionaries to observe, apply and protect the constitutional values spelt out by it. These values constitute the constitutional morality. This makes the Constitution of India a political document that organizes the governance of Indian society through specific functionaries for requisite ends in an appropriate manner. The constitutional 69 culture stands on the fulcrum of these values.  The element of trust is an imperative between constitutional functionaries so that Governments can work in accordance with constitutional norms.  It may  be  stated  with definiteness  that when  such functionaries exercise their power under the Constitution, the sustenance   of   the   values   that   usher   in   the   foundation   of constitutional   governance   should   remain   as   the   principal motto.   There   has   to   be   implicit   institutional   trust   between such functionaries. We shall elaborate the functional aspect of this   principle   when  we   scan   the   language   employed   under Article 239AA and other adjunct articles to decipher the true purpose   of   the   said   provision   from   the   perspective   of   the workability of the Constitution in the sphere of governance.

70

71 Parliament   you   remember   how   the   English   King used to disrupt the British Cabinet. He had what was called a  Party of  King's Friends both in the Cabinet as well as in Parliament. That sort of thing was put a stop to by collective responsibility. As I said, collective responsibility can be achieved only through the instrumentality of the Prime Minister. Therefore, the Prime Minister is really the keystone of the arch of the Cabinet and unless and until we create   that   office   and   endow   that   office   with statutory   authority   to   nominate   and   dismiss Ministers there can be no collective responsibility." 79. In   State   of   Karnataka   v.   Union   of   India   and 26 another ,     the Court, after reproducing a few passages from Sir Ivor Jennings and Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, observed:­

26(1978) 2 SCR 1 72

27 Hartley T.C. and Griffith J.A.G., Government and Law; an introduction to the working of the nd Constitution in Britain 2 edition, 1981 London; Weidenfeld and Nicholson 73

28 (1993) 3 SCR 802 29 (1999) 6 SCC 667 74 governed by the party in power on the basis of the policies adopted and laid down by it in the Cabinet Meeting.   "Collecting   Responsibility"   has   two meanings : The first meaning which can legitimately be ascribed to it is that all members of a Govt, are unanimous   in   support   of   its   policies   and   would exhibit that unanimity on public occasions although while   formulating   the   policies,   they   might   have expressed   a   different   view   in   the   meeting   of   the Cabinet. The other meaning is that Ministers, who had   an   opportunity   to   speak   for   or   against   the policies in the Cabinet are thereby personally and morally responsible for its success and failure.” 83.   The   principle   of   collective   responsibility   is   of   immense significance in the context of ‘aid and advice’ of the Council of Ministers.   The   submission   of   the   learned   counsel   of   the appellant   is   that   when   after   due   deliberation   between   the Chief   Minister   and   the   Council   of   Ministers   a   decision   is taken,   but   the   same   is   not   given   effect   to   because   of interdiction of the Lieutenant Governor, the value of collective responsibility that eventually gets transformed into a Cabinet decision   stands   absolutely   denuded.   It   is   emphatically submitted that if the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers is not given the expected weightage, there will be 75 corrosion   of   the   essential   feature   of   representative government. H. Federal functionalism and democracy: 84. Democracy   is   a  form   of   government  where   the  people rule. Aristotle viewed democracy as a form of government in which the supreme powers are in the hands of freemen and where   people   form   a   majority   in   an   elected   sovereign government to exercise some role in decision making. Thomas Jefferson defined democracy as a "government by its citizens in   mass,   acting   directly   and   personally,   according   to   rules established   by   the   majority".   Abraham   Lincoln   defined democracy as “a government of the people, by the people, and for the people”. The Black's Law Dictionary defines democracy as:­ "That form of government in which the sovereign power resides in and is exercised by the whole body of free citizens; as distinguished from a monarchy, aristocracy, or oligarchy. According to the theory of a pure democracy, every citizen should participate directly   in   the   business   of   governing,   and   the legislative   assembly   should   comprise   the   whole 30 people." th 30 Black's Law Dictionary 6 Edition Pg. 432 76 85. The   Preamble   to   our   Constitution,   at   the   outset, proclaims that India is a sovereign democratic republic. The citizens   of   India   are   the   sovereign   and   participate   in   the process of governance by exercising their virtuous right to vote under the system of universal adult suffrage. The citizens elect their representatives and send them to the Parliament and State Legislatures for enacting laws and shaping policies at the Union and State level respectively which are reflective of the popular will of the collective. 86. The parliamentary form of democracy as envisaged by the Constitution has at its very base the power bestowed upon people to vote and make the legislature accountable for their functioning to the people. If the legislature fails to transform the popular will of the people into policies and laws, the people in   a   democracy   like   ours   have   the   power   to   elect   new representatives by exercise of their vote. The political equality makes people aware of their right in unison and there is a consistent endeavour to achieve the same.  77 87. In this context, we may turn to a passage from  Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Election Commissioner,

approval the statement of Sir Winston Churchill which is to the following effect:­  "At the bottom of all tributes paid to democracy is the little man, walking into a little booth, with a little pencil, making a little cross on a little bit of paper   ­   no   amount   of   rhetoric   or   voluminous discussion can possibly diminish the overwhelming importance of the point." 88. Thus, democratic set up has its limbs firmly entrenched in the ability of the people to elect their representatives and the faith that the representatives so elected will best represent their interest. Though this right to vote is not a fundamental right, yet it is a right that lies at the heart of democratic form of government. The right to vote is the most cherished value of democracy as it inculcates in the people a sense of belonging. 32 In , the  Raghbir Singh Gill v. S. Gurcharan Singh Tohra learned Judges, after referring to  Mohinder Singh Gill's  case, 31AIR 1978 SC 851 32AIR 1980 SC 1362 78 stated   that   nothing   can   diminish   the   overwhelming importance of the cross or preference indicated by the dumb sealed lip voter. That is his right and the trust reposed by the Constitution in him is that he will act as a responsible citizen in choosing his representatives for governing the country. 89. The   aforesaid   situation   warrants   for   reciprocative functionalism by thought, action and conduct.  It requires the elected representatives to uphold the faith which the collective have  reposed in them. Any  undue  interference amounts to betrayal   of   the   faith   of   the   collective   in   fulfilment   of   their aspirations of democratic self­governance. In   Kesavananda

postulates of democracy are faith in human reason and faith in human nature and that there is no higher faith than faith in democratic process. The Court further stated that democracy on adult suffrage is a great experiment with its roots in the faith in the common man.  P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J., in his opinion, stated that the republican and democratic form of government is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution 79 and the Parliament has no power to abrogate or emasculate the basic elements or fundamental features of the Constitution such as the sovereignty of India and the democratic character of   our   polity.   Further,   he   stated   that   the   framers   of   the Constitution   adopted   a   sovereign   democratic   republic   to secure for the citizens of India the objectives of justice, liberty and equality as set out in the Preamble to our Constitution. 90. Dealing with the concept of democracy, the majority in 33 ruled that 'democracy' Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain   as an essential feature of the Constitution is unassailable. The said principle has been reiterated in   T.N. Seshan, CEC of 34  and  India v. Union of India and others. Kuldip Nayar v. 35 Union   of   India   others. .    When   it   is   conceived   that democracy is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, the   essential   value   of   democracy   has   to   be   condignly understood   and   that   is   why   we   have   referred   to   certain precedents.  The correctness or fallacy of the interpretation of 33AIR 1975 SC 2299 34(1995) 4 SCC 611 35AIR 2006 SC 3127 80 Articles 239 to 239AB would depend upon our appreciation of democratic form of government in a mature body polity.   91. The Court in   (supra), while delineating   Manoj Narula   the concept of democracy, stated that democracy has been best defined as the Government of the People, by the People and   for   the   People,   which   expects   prevalence   of   genuine orderliness,   positive   propriety,   dedicated   discipline   and sanguine   sanctity   by   constant   affirmance   of   constitutional morality which is the pillar stone of good governance. Further, it is stated that democracy in India is a product of rule of law which aspires to establish an egalitarian social order and that it is not only a political philosophy but also an embodiment of constitutional   philosophy.   Democracy   being   a   cherished constitutional   value   needs   to   be   protected,   preserved   and sustained and for that purpose, instilment of certain norms in the marrows of the collective is absolutely necessitous. In the said case, the Court, while emphasizing that good governance is a  sine qua non  for a healthy democracy, stated thus:­ 81 "In   a   democracy,   the   citizens   legitimately   expect that   the   Government   of   the   day   would   treat   the public   interest   as   primary   one   and   any   other interest   secondary.   The   maxim   Salus   Populi Suprema Lex,   has not only to be kept in view but also has to be revered. The faith of the people is embedded in the root of the idea of good governance which means reverence for citizenry rights, respect for Fundamental Rights and statutory rights in any governmental   action,   deference   for   unwritten constitutional   values,   veneration   for   institutional integrity,   and   inculcation  of   accountability  to  the collective at large. It also conveys that the decisions are   taken   by   the   decision   making   authority   with solemn sincerity and policies are framed keeping in view the welfare of the people, and including all in a homogeneous   compartment.   The   concept   of   good governance   is   not   an   Utopian   conception   or   an abstraction. It has been the demand of the polity wherever   democracy   is   nourished.  The   growth   of democracy is dependant upon good governance in reality and the aspiration of the people basically is that the administration is carried out by people with responsibility with service orientation." [Emphasis supplied] 92. Now,   we   shall   proceed   to   discuss   the   concept   of federalism   in   the   context   of   the   Constitution   of   India. Encyclopedia Britannica defines federalism as:­ "Federalism,   mode   of   political   organization   that unites separate states or other polities within an overarching political system in such a way as to allow each to maintain its own fundamental political integrity. Federal systems do this by requiring that 82 basic policies be made and implemented through negotiation in some form, so that all the members can share in making and executing decisions. The political   principles   that   animate   federal   systems emphasize the primacy of bargaining and negotiated coordination   among   several   power   centres;   they stress the virtues of dispersed power centres as a means   for   safeguarding   individual   and   local liberties." 93. In common parlance, federalism is a type of governance in   which   the   political   power   is   divided   into   various   units. These units are the Centre/Union, States and Municipalities. Traditional jurists like Prof. K.C. Wheare lay emphasis on the independent   functioning   of   different   governing   units   and, thus, define federalism as a method of dividing powers so that the general/central and regional governments are each within a sphere co­ordinate and independent. As per Prof. Wheare "the   systems   of   Government   embody   predominantly   on division of powers between Centre and regional authority each of   which   in   its   own   sphere   is   coordinating   with   the   other independent   as   of   them,   and   if   so   is   that   Government 36 federal?" 36 Prof. K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 1963 Edn. at page 33 83 94. However,   modern   jurists   lay   emphasis   on   the   idea   of interdependence   and   define   federalism   as   a   form   of government in which there is division of powers between one general/central and several regional authorities, each within its sphere interdependent and co­ordinate with each other. 95. The framers of our Constitution, during debates in the Constituent Assembly on the draft Constitution, held elaborate discussions   on   whether   to   adopt   a   unitary   system   of government   or   federal   system   of   government.   During   the Constituent   Assembly   debates,   Shri   T.T.   Krishnamachari said:­ “...Are we framing a unitary Constitution? Is this Constitution centralizing power in Delhi? Is there any way provided by means of which the position of people in various areas could be safeguarded, their voices   heard   in   regard   to   matters   of   their   local administration? I think it is a very big charge to make   that   this   Constitution   is   not   a   federal Constitution,   and   that   it   is   a   unitary   one.   We should not forget that this question that the Indian Constitution   should   be   a   federal   one   has   been settled by our Leader who is no more with us, in the Round Table Conference in London eighteen years back.” “I would ask my honourable friend to apply a very simple test so far as this Constitution is concerned to find out whether it is federal or not. The simple 84 question   I   have   got   from   the   German   school   of political philosophy is that the first criterion is that the   State  must  exercise  compulsive  power  in  the enforcement of a given political order, the second is that these powers must be regularly exercised over all the inhabitants of a given territory; and the third is the most important and that is that the activity of the State must not be completely circumscribed by orders handed down for execution by the superior unit.   The   important   words   are   'must   not   be completely   circumscribed',   which   envisages   some powers of the State are bound to be circumscribed by the exercise of federal authority. Having all these factors in view, I will urge that our Constitution is a federal Constitution. I urge that our Constitution is one   in   which   we   have   given   power   to   the   Units which are both substantial and significant in the legislative sphere and in the executive sphere.” 96. In this context, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, speaking on the floor of the Constituent Assembly, said:­ "There is only one point of Constitutional import to which   I propose to make a reference. A serious complaint is  made on the ground that there is too much   of   centralization   and   that   the   States   have been reduced to  Municipalities. It is clear that this view is not only an exaggeration, but is also founded on   a   misunderstanding   of   what   exactly   the Constitution   contrives   to   do.   As   to   the   relation between the Centre and the States, it is necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principle on which it rests. The basic principle of Federalism is that the legislative   and   executive   authority   is   partitioned between the Centre and the States not by any law to be made by the Centre but the Constitution itself. This   is   what   the   Constitution   does.   The   States, under our Constitution, are in no way dependent 85 upon   the   Centre   for   their   legislative   or   executive authority. The Centre and the States are co­equal in this   matter.   It   is   difficult   to   see   how   such   a Constitution   can   be   called   centralism.   It   may   be that the Constitution assigns to the Centre too large a   field   for   the   operation   of   its   legislative   and executive authority than is to be found in any other Federal Constitution. It may be that the residuary powers   are   given   to   the   Centre   and   not   to   the States. But these features do not form the essence of federalism. The chief mark of federalism, as I said lies in the partition of the legislative and executive authority between the Centre and the Units by the Constitution. This is the principle embodied in our Constitution." 97. The Court in  In re: Under Article 143, Constitution of 37 India, (Special Reference No. 1 of 1964)  observed that the essential   characteristic   of   federalism   is   the   distribution   of limited   executive,   legislative   and   judicial   authority   among bodies which  are coordinate with  and independent of  each other. Further, the Court stated that the supremacy of the Constitution is fundamental to the existence of a federal State in order to prevent either the legislature of the federal unit or those of the member States from destroying or impairing that delicate   balance   of   power   which   satisfies   the   particular requirements of States which are desirous of union, but not 37AIR 1965 SC 745 86 prepared   to   merge   their   individuality   in   a   unity.   This supremacy of the Constitution, the Court stated, is protected by the authority of an independent judicial body to act as the interpreter of a scheme of distribution of powers and, thus, the dominant characteristic of the British Constitution cannot be claimed by a Federal Constitution like ours. 98. Gajendragadkar, C.J., in the said case, observed that our Constitution   has   all   the   essential   elements   of   a   federal structure as  was  the   case  in the   Government of   India Act 1935,   the   essence   of   federalism   being   the   distribution   of powers between the federation or the Union and the States or the provinces.  In   State   of   Karnataka   v.   Union   of   India (supra),   Untwalia,   J.   (speaking   for   Justice   Singhal,   Justice Jaswant Singh and for himself) observed that the Constitution is not of a federal character where separate, independent and sovereign States could be said to have joined to form a nation as in the United States of America or as may be the position in some other countries of the world. It is because of this reason 87 that sometimes it has been characterized as quasi­federal in nature.

founding fathers accepted the parliamentary system of quasi­ federalism while rejecting the substance of Presidential style of Executive. Dr. Ambedkar stated on the floor of the Constituent Assembly that the Constitution is "both unitary as well as federal   according   to   the   requirement   of   time   and circumstances". He further stated that the Centre would work for   the   common   good   and   for   the   general   interest   of   the country as a whole while the States would work for the local interest. He also refuted the plea for exclusive autonomy of the States.

considered the nature of federalism under the Constitution of India.   A.M.   Ahmadi,   J.   (as   the   learned   Judge   then   was) observed:­ "In order to understand whether our Constitution is truly federal, it is essential to know the true concept of federalism. Dicey calls it a political contrivance 38(1994) 3 SCC 1 88 for a body of  States which desire Union but not unity.   Federalism   is,   therefore,   a   concept   which unites   separate   States   into   a   Union   without sacrificing their own fundamental political integrity. Separate States, therefore, desire to unite so that all the member­States may share in formulation of the basic policies applicable to all and participate in the execution of decisions made in pursuance of such basic policies. Thus the essence of a federation is the existence of the Union and the States and the distribution   of   powers   between  them.   Federalism, therefore, essentially implies demarcation of powers in a federal compact." 101. P.B. Sawant, J. (on behalf of himself and Kuldip Singh, J.) opined that the States are constitutionally recognised units and not mere convenient administrative divisions as both the Union and the States have sprung from the provisions of the Constitution.   After   quoting   extensively   from   H.M.   Seervai's commentary ­ Constitutional Law of India, he expressed thus:­ "99.   The   above   discussion   thus   shows   that   the States have an independent constitutional existence and they have as important a role to play in the political, social, educational and cultural life of the people as the Union. They are neither satellites nor agents   of   the   Centre.   The   fact   that   during emergency and in certain other eventualities their powers are overridden or invaded by the Centre is not destructive of the essential federal nature of our Constitution.   The   invasion   of   power   in   such circumstances   is   not   a   normal   feature   of   the Constitution. They are exceptions and have to be 89 resorted to only occasionally to meet the exigencies of the special situations. The exceptions are not a rule. 100.   For   our   purpose,   further   it   is   really   not necessary   to   determine   whether,   in   spite   of   the provisions of the Constitution referred to above, our Constitution is federal, quasi­federal or unitary in nature. It is not the theoretical label given to the Constitution but the  practical  implications   of  the provisions   of   the   Constitution   which   are   of importance to decide the question that arises in the present   context,   viz.,   whether   the   powers   under Article   356(1)   can   be   exercised   by   the   President arbitrarily and unmindful of its consequences to the governance in the State concerned. So long as the States are not mere administrative units but in their own right constitutional potentates with the same paraphernalia as the Union, and with independent Legislature   and   the   Executive   constituted   by   the same process as the Union, whatever the bias in favour   of   the   Centre,   it   cannot   be   argued   that merely   because   (and   assuming   it   is   correct)   the Constitution is labeled unitary or quasi­federal or a mixture   of   federal   and   unitary   structure,   the President   has   unrestricted   power   of   issuing Proclamation under Article 356(1).” 102.   K. Ramaswami, J., in paragraphs 247 and 248 of his separate judgment, observed:­ "247. Federalism envisaged in the Constitution of India is a basic feature in which the Union of India is   permanent   within   the   territorial   limits   set   in Article 1 of the Constitution and is indestructible. The State is the creature of the Constitution and the law   made   by   Articles   2   to   4   with   no   territorial integrity,   but   a   permanent   entity   with   its 90 boundaries alterable by a law made by Parliament. Neither   the   relative   importance   of   the   legislative entries   in   Schedule   VII,   Lists   I   and   II   of   the Constitution, nor the fiscal control by the Union per se are decisive to conclude that the Constitution is unitary.   The   respective   legislative   powers   are traceable to Articles 245 to 254 of the Constitution. The   State   qua   the   Constitution   is   federal   in structure   and   independent   in   its   exercise   of legislative and executive power. However, being the creature of the Constitution the State has no right to secede or claim sovereignty. Qua the Union, State is quasi­federal. Both are coordinating institutions and ought to exercise their respective powers with adjustment, understanding and accommodation to render socio­economic and political justice to the people, to preserve and elongate the constitutional goals including secularism. 248. The preamble of the Constitution is an integral part   of   the   Constitution.   Democratic   form   of Government, federal structure, unity and integrity of the nation, secularism, socialism, social justice and   judicial   review   are   basic   features   of   the Constitution." 103. B.P.  Jeevan Reddy, J., writing a separate  opinion (for himself   and   on   behalf   of   S.C.   Agrawal,   J.),   concluded   in paragraph 276 thus:­ "276.   The   fact   that   under   the   scheme   of   our Constitution, greater power is conferred upon the Centre   vis­a­vis   the   States   does   not   mean   that States are mere appendages of the Centre. Within the   sphere   allotted   to  them,   States   are   supreme. The Centre cannot tamper with their powers. More particularly,   the   courts   should   not   adopt   an 91 approach, an interpretation, which has the effect of or tends to have the effect of whittling down the powers   reserved   to   the   States.   It   is   a   matter   of common   knowledge   that   over   the   last   several decades,   the   trend   the   world   over   is   towards strengthening   of   Central   Governments   be   it   the result of advances in technological/scientific fields or otherwise, and that even In USA the Centre has become   far   more   powerful   notwithstanding   the obvious bias in that Constitution in favour of the States. All this must put the court on guard against any conscious whittling down of the powers of the States.   Let   it   be   said   that   the   federalism   in   the Indian Constitution is not a matter of administrative convenience, but one of principle the outcome of our own   historical   process   and   a   recognition   of   the ground realities. This aspect has been dealt with elaborately by Shri M.C. Setalvad in his Tagore Law Lectures   "Union   and   State   relations   under   the Indian Constitution" (Eastern Law House, Calcutta, 1974).   The   nature   of   the   Indian   federation   with reference   to   its   historical   background,   the distribution   of   legislative   powers,   financial   and administrative   relations,   powers   of   taxation, provisions   relating   to   trade,   commerce   and industry, have all been dealt with analytically. It is not   possible   nor   is   it   necessary   for   the   present purposes to refer to them. It is enough to note that our   Constitution   has   certainly   a   bias   towards Centre vis­a­vis the States..." 104. In   ITC   Ltd.   v.   Agricultural   Produce   Market 39 ,  the  Court   observed   that   the   Constitution   of Committee India   deserves   to   be   interpreted,   language   permitting,   in  a 39(2002) 9 SCC 23 92 manner that it does not whittle down the powers of the State Legislature and preserves federalism while also upholding the central supremacy as contemplated by some of its articles. 105. In (supra), the Court, while dealing with   Kuldip Nayar   the question of state domicile for elections to the Rajya Sabha, opined that it is true that the federal principle is dominant in our  Constitution and  the  said  principle  is  one  of  its  basic features but it is equally true that federalism under the Indian Constitution leans in favour of a strong Centre, a feature that militates against the concept of strong federalism. Some of the provisions that can be referred to in this context include the power of the Union to deal with extraordinary situations such as during emergency and in the event of a proclamation being issued under Article 356 that the governance of a State cannot be   carried   on   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the Constitution;   the   power   of   the   Parliament   to   legislate   with respect to a matter in the State List in the national interest in case there is a resolution of the Council of States supported by prescribed majority; the power of the Parliament to provide for 93 the creation and regulation of All India Services common to the Union and the States in case there is a resolution of the Council   of   States   supported   by   not   less   than   two­thirds majority; the existence of only one citizenship, namely, the citizenship of India; and, perhaps most important, the power of the Parliament in relation to the formation of new States and alteration of areas, boundaries or names of States. 106. From the foregoing discussion, it is clear as day that both the concepts, namely, democracy, i.e., rule by the people and federalism   are   firmly   imbibed   in   our   constitutional   ethos. Whatever be the nature of federalism present in the Indian Constitution, whether absolutely federal or quasi­federal, the fact of the matter is that federalism is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution as every State is a constituent unit which has an exclusive Legislature and Executive elected and constituted by the same process as in the case of the Union   Government.   The   resultant   effect   is   that   one   can perceive the distinct aim to preserve and protect the unity and 94 the territorial integrity of India. This is a special feature of our constitutional federalism.  107. It is self­evident that there is a meaningful orchestration between the concepts of federalism and nature of democracy present   in   our   Constitution.   It   would   not   be   a   fallacious metaphor if we say that just as in a fusion reaction two or more atomic nuclei come together to form a bigger and heavier nucleus, the founding fathers of our Constitution envisaged a fusion of federalism and democracy in the quest for achieving an   egalitarian   social   order,   a   classical   unity   in   a contemporaneous diversity. The vision of diversity in unity and the   perception   of   plurality   in   eventual   cohesiveness   is embedded in the final outcome of the desire to achieve the accomplished   goal   through   constitutional   process.   The meeting of the diversity in unity without losing identity is a remarkable synthesis that the Constitution conceives without even permitting the slightest contrivance or adroitness.  I. Collaborative federalism: 95 108.   The   Constituent   Assembly,   while   devising   the   federal character of our Constitution, could have never envisaged that the   Union   Government   and   the   State   Governments   would work in tangent. It could  never have been the Constituent Assembly’s intention that under the garb of quasi­federal tone of our Constitution, the Union Government would affect the interest   of   the   States.   Similarly,   the   States   under   our constitutional   scheme   were   not   carved   as   separate   islands each having a distinct vision which would unnecessarily open the doors for a contrarian principle or gradually put a step to invite anarchism. Rather, the vision enshrined in the Preamble to our Constitution, i.e., to achieve the golden goals of justice, liberty,   equality   and   fraternity,   beckons   both   the   Union Government and the State Governments, alike. The ultimate aim is to have a holistic structure.  109.   The   aforesaid   idea,   in   turn,   calls   for   coordination amongst the Union and the State Governments. The Union and the States need to embrace a collaborative/cooperative federal architecture for achieving this coordination.  96 110. Corwin, an eminent thinker,  in the context of the United States, coined the term 'Collaborative Federalism' and defined it as:­ “...the   National   Government   and   the   States   are mutually   complementary   parts   of   a   single governmental mechanism all of whose powers are intended   to   realize   the   current   purposes   of 40 government.” 111. The U.S. Supreme Court in   Carmichael v. S. Coal & 41   propounded that a State Unemployment Statute Coke Co. had not been coerced by the adoption of the Social Security Act and the United States and the State of Alabama are not alien governments but they coexist within the same territory. Unemployment within it is their common concern. The U.S. Supreme Court further observed that the two statutes embody a   cooperative   legislative   effort   by   the   State   and   National governments   for  carrying  out a  public  purpose   common to both,   which   neither   could   fully   achieve   without   the cooperation of the other and the Constitution does not prohibit such cooperation. 40Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA.L.REV. 1, 4 (1950) 41 301 U.S. 495, 525 – 26 (1937) 97 112. Geoffrey  Sawer proposes that cooperative federalism is evidenced by the following characteristics:  ‘each of the parties to the arrangement has a reasonable degree of autonomy, can bargain about the terms of cooperation, and at least if driven 42 too hard, decline to cooperate ’ . 113.   Later,   Cameron   and   Simeon   described   "collaborative federalism," as:­ “[T]he process by which national goals are achieved, not by the federal government acting alone or by the federal   government   shaping   provincial   behavior through the exercise of its spending power, but by some or all of the governments and the territories 43 acting collectively.” Although the said statement of law may not be strictly applicable, yet the need for co­operation to sustain the federal structure has its own importance as an idea.  114.   Thus,   the   Union   and   the   State   Governments   should always work in harmony avoiding constitutional discord. In such a collaboration,  the  national  vision  as set out in the Preamble to our Constitution gets realized. The methods and 42 Geoffrey Sawer, Modern Federalism (Pitman Australia, 1976), 1. 43 Cameron, D. and Simeon, R. 2002. Intergovernmental relations in Canada: The emergence of collaborative federalism. Publius , 32(2):49– 72 98 approach for the governments of the Union and the States may sometimes   be   different   but   the   ultimate   goal   and   objective always   remain   the   same   and   the   governments   at   different levels   should   not   lose   sight   of   the   ultimate   objective.   This constitutional   objective   as   enshrined   in   the   Constitution should be the guiding star to them to move on the path of harmonious co­existence and interdependence. They are the basic tenets of collaborative federalism to sustain the strength of constitutional functionalism in a Welfare State.  115.   In   a   Welfare   State,   there   is   a   great   necessity   of collaborative federalism. Martin Painter, a leading Australian proponent   of   collaborative   federalism,   lays   more   stress   on negotiations   for   achieving   common   goals   amongst   different levels of governments and, thus, says:­ “The practical exigencies in fulfilling constitutionally sanctioned functions should bring all governments from   different   levels   together   as   equal   partners based on negotiated cooperation for achieving the common   aims   and   resolving   the   outstanding 44 problems.”  44 Martin Painter, Collaborative federalism: Economic reform in Australia in the 1990s. Cambridge University Press, 2009. 99 116. In the Australian context, Prof. Nicholas Aroney in his 45 book  has said:­ "Rather   than   displaying   a   strictly   defined distribution of responsibility between two or more “co­ordinate” levels of government, federal systems tend in practice to resemble something more like a “marble cake”, in which governmental functions are shared between various governmental actors within the   context   of   an   ever­shifting   set   of   parameters shaped   by   processes   of   negotiation,   compromise and, at times, cooperation.” 117.   Thus,   the   idea   behind   the   concept   of   collaborative federalism is negotiation and coordination so as to iron out the differences which may arise between the Union and the State Governments in their respective pursuits of development. The Union   Government   and   the   State   Governments   should endeavour to address the common problems with the intention to arrive at a solution by showing statesmanship, combined action and sincere cooperation.   In collaborative federalism, the Union and the State Governments should express their readiness to achieve the common objective and work together for achieving it. In a functional Constitution, the authorities 45 Prof. Nicholas Aroney, The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth: The Making and Meaning of the Australian Constitution, 2009 100 should   exhibit   sincere   concern   to   avoid   any   conflict.   This concept has to be borne in mind when both intend to rely on the constitutional provision as the source of authority. We are absolutely unequivocal that both the Centre and the States must   work   within   their   spheres   and   not   think   of   any encroachment.   But   in   the   context   of   exercise   of   authority within their spheres, there should be perception of mature statesmanship   so   that   the   constitutionally   bestowed responsibilities   are   shared   by   them.   Such   an   approach requires   continuous   and   seamless   interaction   between   the Union and the State Governments. We may hasten to add that this idea of collaborative federalism would be more clear when we understand the very essence of the special status of NCT of Delhi and the power conferred on the Chief Minister and the Council   of   Ministers   on   the   one   hand   and   the   Lieutenant Governor on the other by the Constitution.   118. The idea of cooperative/collaborative federalism is also 46 not   new   to   India.   M.P.   Jain   in   his   book ,   in   a   different manner, sets forth the perception thus:­  46 M.P. Jain, Some aspects of Indian federalism, 1968 101 “Though the Constitution provides adequate powers to the Centre to fulfil its role, yet, in actual practice, the   Centre   can   maintain   its   dynamism   and initiative not through a show of its powers — which should   be   exercised   only   as   a   last   resort   in   a demonstrable   necessity — but on the cooperation of   the   States   secured   through   the   process   of discussion,   persuasion   and     compromises.   All governments have to appreciate the essential point that they are not independent but interdependent, that they should act not at cross­ purposes but in union for the maximisation of the common good.”  47 119. In  , State of Rajasthan and others v. Union of India the   Court   took   cognizance   of   the   concept   of   cooperative federalism as perceived by G. Austin and A.H Birch when it observed:­ “Mr. Austin thought that our system, if it could be called   federal,   could   be   described   as   "cooperative federalism." This term was used by another author, Mr. A.H. Birch (see: Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation   in   Canada,   Australia   and   the   United States p. 305), to describe a system in which:  “...the   practice   of   administrative   cooperation between general and regional governments, the partial   dependence   of   the   regional governments upon payments from the general governments   and   the   fact   that   the   general governments, by the use of conditional grants, frequently   promote   developments   in   matters which   are   constitutionally   assigned   to   the regions"... ” 47 (1978) 1 SCR 1 102 120. We have dealt with the conceptual essentiality of federal cooperation as that has an affirmative role on the sustenance of constitutional philosophy.  We may further add that though the   authorities   referred   to   hereinabove   pertain   to   Union   of India and State Governments in the constitutional sense of the term “State”, yet the concept has applicability to the NCT of Delhi   regard   being   had   to   its   special   status   and   language employed in Article 239AA and other articles.  J. Pragmatic federalism: 121. In this context, we may also deal with an ancillary issue, namely, pragmatic federalism. To appreciate the said concept, we are required to analyse the nature of federalism that is conceived under the Constitution. Be it noted, the essential characteristics   of   federalism   like   duality   of   governments, distribution   of   powers   between   the   Union   and   the   State Governments, supremacy of the Constitution, existence of a written Constitution and most importantly, authority of the 103 Courts  as final interpreters of  the Constitution are all present under our constitutional scheme. But at the same time, the Constitution   has   certain   features   which   can   very   well   be perceived as deviations from the  federal character. We may, in brief, indicate some of these features to underscore the fact that though our Constitution broadly has a federal character, yet  it  still  has   certain   striking   unitary   features   too.   Under Article   3   of   the   Constitution,   the   Parliament   can   alter   or change the areas, boundaries or names of the States. During emergency, the Union Parliament is empowered to make laws in relation to matters under the State List, give directions to the States and empower Union officers to execute matters in the State List.   That apart, in case of inconsistency between the Union and the State laws, the Union Law shall prevail. Additionally, a Governor of a State is empowered to reserve the bill passed by the State Legislature for consideration of the President and the President is not bound to give his assent to such a bill. Further, a State Legislature can be dissolved and President’s rule can be imposed in a State either on the report 104 of   the   Governor   or   otherwise   when   there   is   failure   of   the constitutional machinery in the State.  122. We have referred to the above aspects to lay stress on the 'quasi­federal' nature of our Constitution which has been so held by the Court in many a decision. We may state that these theoretical   concepts   are   to   be   viewed   from   the   practical perspective. In  case, while interpreting Article S.R. Bommai’s  356, the Court observed:­ “That   is   why   the   Constitution   of   India   is differently   described,   more   appropriately   as 'quasi­federal'   because   it   is   a   mixture   of   the federal   and   unitary   elements,   leaning   more towards the  latter but then what is there in a name, what is important to bear in mind is the thrust and implications of the various provisions of the Constitution bearing on the controversy in regard   to   scope   and   ambit   of   the   Presidential power under Article 356 and related provisions.”  123. Thus,   the   need   is   to   understand   the   thrust   and implication of a provision. To put it differently, the acceptance of 'pragmatic federalism' is the need of the day. One aspect needs to be clarified.   The acceptance of the said principle should not be viewed as a simplistic phenomenon entrenched 105 in innocence. On the contrary, it would require disciplined wisdom   on   the   part   of   those   who   are   required   to   make  it meaningful. And, the meaning, in essentiality, shall rest on pragmatic orientation.   124. The   expression     'pragmatic   federalism'   in   the   Indian context   has   been   used   by   Justice   A.M.   Ahmadi   in   S.R.  (supra) wherein he observes:­ Bommai “It would thus seem that the Indian Constitution has,   in   it,   not   only   features   of   a   pragmatic federalism   which,   while   distributing   legislative powers   and   indicating   the   spheres   of Governmental   powers   of   State   and   Central Governments,   is   overlaid   by   strongly   'unitary' features,   particularly   exhibited   by   lodging   in Parliament the residuary legislative powers, and in the Central Government the executive power of appointing   certain   Constitutional   functionaries including High Court and Supreme Court Judges and   issuing   appropriate   directions   to   the   State Governments   and   even   displacing   the   State Legislatures   and   the   Government   in   emergency situations,   vide   Articles   352   to   360   of   the Constitution.” 125. The concept of pragmatic federalism is self explanatory. It is a form of federalism which incorporates the traits and attributes of sensibility and realism. Pragmatic federalism, for 106 achieving the constitutional goals, leans on the principle of permissible practicability. 126. It is useful to state that pragmatic federalism has the inbuilt ability to constantly evolve with the changing needs and   situations.   It   is   this   dynamic   nature   of   pragmatic federalism which makes it apt for a body polity like ours to adopt. The foremost object of the said concept is to come up with innovative solutions to problems that emerge in a federal setup of any kind. K. Concept of federal balance: 127.   Another   complementary   concept   in   this   context,   we think, is “federal balance”. Federalism in contradistinction to centralism is a concept which envisions a form of Government where there is a distribution of powers between the States and the Centre. It has been advocated by the patrons of the federal theory that the States must enjoy freedom and independence as much as possible and at the very least be on an equal footing with the Centre. The Indian Constitution prescribes a federal   structure   which   provides   for   division   of   powers 107

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111 truest sense as the contemporaneous documents leading to the amendment would show.  They would submit that though Delhi has been conferred a special status, yet that does not bring any new incarnation. The submission, as we perceive, destroys the fundamental marrows of the conception, namely, special status. It, in fact, adorns the Lieutenant Governor with certain   attributes   and   seeks   to   convey   that   NCT   of   Delhi remains   where   it   was.   The   approach   in   extremes   is   to   be adjudged   and   the   adjudication,   as   it   seems   to   us,   would depend upon the concepts we have already adumbrated and further   we   have   to   carefully   analyse   the   principles   of   the interpretation of the Constitution.   133. The task of interpreting an instrument as dynamic as the Constitution   assumes   great   import   in   a   democracy.   The Constitutional Courts are entrusted with the critical task of expounding   the   provisions   of   the   Constitution   and   further while carrying out this essential function, they are duty bound to ensure and preserve the rights and liberties of the citizens without disturbing the very fundamental principles which form 112 the   foundational   base   of   the   Constitution.     Although, primarily, it is the literal rule which is considered to be the norm   which   governs   the   courts   of   law   while   interpreting statutory and constitutional provisions, yet mere allegiance to the dictionary or literal meaning of words contained in the provision may, sometimes, annihilate the quality of poignant flexibility   and   requisite   societal   progressive   adjustability. Such an approach may not eventually subserve the purpose of a living document.  134. In this regard, we think it appropriate to have a bird’s eye view as to how the American jurists and academicians have contextually   perceived   the   science   of   constitutional interpretation.   The   most   important   aspect   of   modern constitutional theory is its interpretation. Constitutional law is a fundamental  law of   governance  of   a  politically   organised society   and   it   provides   for   an   independent   judicial  system which has the onerous responsibility of decisional process in the   sphere   of   application   of   the   constitutional   norms.   The resultant consequences do have a vital impact on the well­ 113 being   of   the   people.   The   principles   of   constitutional interpretation, thus, occupy a prime place in the method of adjudication. In bringing about constitutional order through interpretation,   the   judiciary   is   often   confronted   with   two ― propositions     whether   the   provisions   of   the   Constitution should be interpreted as it was understood  at the time of framing of the Constitution unmindful of the circumstances at the time when it was subsequently interpreted or whether the constitutional provisions should be interpreted in the light of contemporaneous needs, experiences and knowledge. In other words,   should   it   be   historical   interpretation   or 49 contemporaneous   interpretation.   The   theory   of   historical perspective   found   its   votary   in   Chief   Justice   Taney   who 50 categorically stated in   that as long as Dred Scott v Sanford the   Constitution  continues   to exist  in  the   present form, it speaks not only in the same words but also with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the   hands   of   the   framers.   Similar   observations   have   been

114

51 Home Building and Loan Association v Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) see West Coast Hotel Co., v Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937) where he observed, the meaning of the Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic events that (if)the words of the Constitution mean today what they did not mean when written is to rob that instrument of the essential element... 52 17 US (4Wheat) 316 (1819) 53State v Superior Court (1944) at 547 54 Gompers v US 233 (1914) 55Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, Yale University Press, 1921 115 56 constitutional provisions . The Constitution makers in their wisdom must have reasonably envisaged the future needs and attempted   at   durable   framework   of   the   Constitution.   They must not have made the Constitution so rigid as to affect the future.   There   is   a   difference   between   modification   and subversion   of   the   provisions   of   the   Constitution   through interpretation. The view is that there is sufficient elasticity but fundamental   changes   are   not   envisaged   by   interpretation. Thus,   there   is   a   possibility   of   reading   into   the   provisions certain  regulations  or amplifications  which are not directly dealt with. There is yet another angle that the libertarian's absolutism principle never allows for restrictions to be read into   the   liberties   which   are   not   already   mentioned   in   the 57 Constitution. 135. Our Constitution, to repeat at the cost of repetition, is an organic   and   living   document.   It   contains   words   that potentially do have many a concept.   It is evident from the 56Burnett v Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 US (1932) 57 The activist libertarians like Justice Black and Douglas never allowed reading such restrictions. See American Communication Association v Douds 339 US (1950) and dissenting in Poulos v New Hamshire, 345 US(1953) 116 following passage from  R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India and 58 others :­ “In the interpretation of a constitutional document, "words   are   but   the   framework   of   concepts   and concepts may change more than words themselves". The   significance   of   the   change   of   the   concepts themselves is vital and the constitutional issues are not solved by a mere appeal to the meaning of the words   without   an   acceptance   of   the   line   of   their growth.   It   is   aptly   said   that   "the   intention   of   a Constitution is rather to outline principles than to engrave details"".” 136.   Professor   Richard   H.   Fallon   has,   in   his   celebrated 59 work ,   identified   five   different   strands   of   interpretative considerations which shall be taken into account by judges while interpreting the Constitution. They read thus:­  “Arguments from the plain, necessary, or meaning of   the   constitutional   text;   arguments   about   the intent of the framers; arguments of constitutional theory that reason from the hypothesized purposes that   best   explain   either   particular   constitutional provisions   or   the   constitutional   text   as   a   whole; arguments based on judicial precedent; and value arguments   that   assert   claims   about   justice   and 60 social policy.” 58AIR 1993 SC 1804 59 Richard H. Fallon, “A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation”, Harvard Law Review Association, 1987 60 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189-90 (1987).10 117 137. Comparing the task of interpretation of statute to that of interpretation of musical notes, Judge Hand in the case of 61 stated:­ Helvering v. Gregory   “The meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the words.” 62 138. Jerome N. Frank , highlighting the corresponding duty of the public in allowing discretion to the Judges, has observed:­ “a “wise composer” expects a performer to transcend literal   meaning   in   interpreting   his   score;   a   wise public should allow a judge to do the same.” 139. The room for discretion while interpreting constitutional provisions allows freedom to the Judges to come up with a formula   which   is   in   consonance   with   the   constitutional precepts while simultaneously resolving the conflict in issue. The   following   observations   made   in   S.R.   Bommai’s   case , throw light on the aforesaid perception:­ “Constitutional   adjudication   is   like   no   other decision­making.   There   is   a   moral   dimension   to every major constitutional case; the language of the text   is   not   necessarily   a   controlling   factor.   Our 6169 F. 2d 809, 810-II (1934) 62 Jerome N. Frank, “Words and Music: Some remarks on Statutory Interpretation,” Columbia Law Review 47 (1947): 1259-1367 118 Constitution works because of its generalities, and because   of   the   good   sense   of   the   judges   when interpreting it. It is that informed freedom of action of the judges that helps to preserve and protect our basic document of governance.” 140. It is imperative that judges must remain alive to the idea that the Constitution was never intended to be a rigid and inflexible document and the concepts contained therein are to evolve   over   time   as   per   the   needs   and   demands   of   the situation. Although the rules of statutory interpretation can serve as a guide, yet the constitutional courts should not, for the sake of strict compliance to these principles, forget that when the controversy in question arises out of a constitutional provision,   their   primary   responsibility   is   to   work   out   a solution. 141. In   Supreme Court Advocates­on­Record Association (supra) ,   this Court, acknowledging the   sui generis   nature of the Constitution, observed thus:­ “The constitutional provisions cannot be cut down by technical construction rather it has to be given liberal and meaningful interpretation. The ordinary rules and presumptions, brought in aid to interpret the   statutes,   cannot   be   made   applicable   while interpreting the provisions of the Constitution. In 119 Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher (1979) 3 AER 21 dealing   with   Bermudian   Constitution,   Lord Wilberforce   reiterated   that   a   Constitution   is   a document   "sui   generis,   calling   for   principles   of interpretation of its own, suitable to its character””

63[1984] 2 SCR 145 120 143. The Supreme Court of Canada also reiterated this view   when it held that the meaning of 'unreasonable' cannot be determined by recourse to a dictionary or, for that matter, by reference   to   the   rules   of   statutory   construction.   The   Court pointed   out   that   the   task   of   expounding   a   Constitution   is crucially   different   from   that   of   construing   a   statute,   for   a statute defines present rights and obligations and is easily enacted   and   as   easily   repealed   whereas   a   Constitution   is drafted with an eye to the future and its function is to provide a   continuing   framework   for   the   legitimate   exercise   of governmental power. Further, the Court observed that once enacted, constitutional provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended   and   hence,   it   must   be   capable   of   growth   and development   over   time   to   meet   new   social,   political   and historical realities often unimagined by its framers and the judiciary, being the guardian of the Constitution, must bear these considerations in mind while interpreting it. The Court further stated that the judges must take heed to the warning of Professor Paul Freund when he said that the role of the 121 judges is “not to read the provisions of the Constitution like a last will and testament, lest it becomes one”. 144. This idea had pervaded the legal system way back in 1930   when   the   Privy   Council   through   Lord   Sankey   LC   in 64 Edwards   v   Attorney   General   for   Canada   had   observed that the Constitution must be approached as “a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits”. 65 145. Professor Pierre­André Côté in his book  has highlighted the action based approach by stating that it must be kept in mind that the end goal of the process of legal interpretation is resolution of conflicts and issues. It would be apt to reproduce his words:­ “Legal interpretation goes beyond the mere quest for historical truth. The judge, in particular, does not interpret   a   statute   solely   for   the   intellectual pleasure of reviving the thoughts that prevailed at the time the enactment was drafted. He interprets it with an eye to action: the application of the statute. Legal  interpretation  is  thus  often  an  "interpretive operation’’, that is, one linked to the resolution of concrete issues.” M. Purposive interpretation: 64[1930] AC 124, 136 nd 65 Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada 2 Ed (Cowansville. Quebec:Les Editions Yvon Blais. Inc. 1992) 122 146.   Having   stated   the   principles   relating   to   constitutional interpretation we, as presently advised, think it apt to devote some space to purposive interpretation in the context, for we shall   refer   to   the   said   facet   for   understanding   the   core controversy. It needs no special emphasis that the reference to some   precedents   has   to   be   in   juxtaposition   with   other concepts   and   principles.   As   it   can   be   gathered   from   the discussion as well as the authorities cited above, the literal rule is not to be the primary guiding factor in interpreting a constitutional  provision,   especially   if   the   resultant   outcome would   not   serve   the   fructification   of   the   rights   and   values expressed in the Constitution. In this scenario, the theory of purposive   interpretation   has   gained   importance   where   the courts shall interpret the Constitution in a purposive manner so   as   to   give   effect   to   its   true   intention.   The   Judicial Committee in  Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. 66 Whiteman  has observed:­ “The   language   of   a   Constitution   falls   to   be construed, not in a narrow and legalistic way, but 66[1991] 2 AC 240, 247 123 broadly and purposively, so as to give effect to its spirit…” 67 147. In , a  S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab and others three­Judge Bench has opined that constitutional provisions are required to be understood and interpreted with an object­ oriented approach and a Constitution must not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense. The Court, while holding that the   Constituent   Assembly   debates   can   be   taken   aid   of, observed the following:­ “The words used may be general in terms but, their full import and true meaning, has to be appreciated considering the true context in which the same are used and the purpose which they seek to achieve.” (Emphasis is ours) 148. The Court further highlighted that the Constitution is not just a document in solemn form but a living framework for the government   of   the   people   exhibiting   a   sufficient   degree   of cohesion   and   its   successful   working   depends   upon   the democratic spirit underlying it being respected in letter and in spirit. 67(2001) 7 SCC 126 124 149. We have duly noted in the earlier part of the judgment that   the   judiciary   must   interpret   the   Constitution   having regard   to   the   spirit   and   further   by   adopting   a   method   of purposive interpretation. That is the obligation cast on the judges. In   Ashok Kumar Gupta and another v. State of 68 , the Court observed that while  interpreting U.P. and others the Constitution, it must be borne in mind that words of width are both a framework of concepts and means to the goals in the Preamble and concepts may keep changing to expand and elongate the rights. The Court further held that constitutional issues are not solved by mere appeal to the meaning of the words without an acceptance of the line of their growth and, therefore, the judges should adopt purposive interpretation of the dynamic concepts of the Constitution and the Act with its interpretative armoury to articulate the felt necessities of the time. Finally, the Court pointed out:­ “To construe law one must enter into its spirit, its setting and history.” 68(1997) 5 SCC 201 125 150.  In  Indian Medical Association v. Union of India and 69 , referring to the pronouncement in   others M. Nagaraj v. 70 Union of India , the Court said:­ “In   M.   Nagaraj,   Kapadia   J.,   (as   he   then   was) speaking for the Court, recognized that one of the cardinal principles of constitutional adjudication is that the mode of interpretation ought to be the one that is purposive and conducive to ensure that the constitution endures for ages to come. Eloquently, it was   stated   that   the   "Constitution   is   not   an ephemeral legal document embodying a set of rules for the passing hour".” (Emphasis is ours) 151. The emphasis on context while interpreting constitutional provisions has burgeoned this shift from the literal rule to the purposive method in order that the provisions do not remain static and rigid. The words assume different incarnations to adapt themselves to the current demands as and when the need arises. The House of Lords in   Regina (Quintavalle) v. 71  ruled:­ Secretary of State for Health 69(2011) 7 SCC 179 70 (2006) 8 SCC 202 71(2003) UKHL 13 : (2003) 2 AC 687 : (2003) 2 WLR 692 (HL) 126 “The   pendulum   has   swung   towards   purposive methods   of   construction.  This   change   was   not initiated by the teleological approach of European Community   jurisprudence,   and   the   influence   of European legal culture generally, but it has been accelerated   by   European   ideas:   see,   however,   a classic early statement of the purposive approach by Lord Blackburn in River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877) LR 2 AC 743 at p. 763 (HL). In any event,   nowadays   the   shift   towards   purposive interpretation is not in doubt.  The qualification is that the degree of liberality permitted is influenced by the context. ...” [Emphasis is supplied]  152.   Emphasizing   on   the   importance   of   determining   the purpose and object of a provision, Learned Hand, J. in  Cabell 72 v. Markham   enunciated:­ “Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the   most   reliable,   source   of   interpreting   the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of   a   mature   and   developed   jurisprudence   not   to make   a   fortress   out   of   the   dictionary;   but   to remember that statutes always have some purpose or   object   to   accomplish,   whose   sympathetic   and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.” 72148 F 2d 737 (2d Cir 1945) 127 153. The components of purposive interpretation have been elucidated   by   Former   President   of     the   Supreme   Court   of Israel, Aharon Barak, who states:­ "Purposive   interpretation   is   based   on   three components:   language,   purpose,   and   discretion. Language shapes the range of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses the   legal   meaning   of   the   text   from   among   the (express   or   implied)   semantic   possibilities.   The semantic   component   thus   sets   the   limits   of interpretation by restricting the interpreter to a legal meaning   that   the   text   can  bear   in   its   (public   or 73 private) language." 154.       As   per   the   observations   made   by   Aharon   Barak, judges interpret   a   Constitution   according to its purpose which comprises of the objectives,  values and principles that the constitutional text is designed to actualize.   Categorizing this   purpose   into   objective   and   subjective   purpose,   he 74 states :­ “Subjective   component   is   the   goals,   values,   and principles that the constituent assembly sought to achieve   through   it,   at   the   time   it   enacted   the constitution. It is the original intent of the founding fathers.   Purposive   interpretation   translates   such 73Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, Princeton University Press, 2005 - Law 74ibid 128 intent   into   a   presumption   about   the   subjective purpose, that is, that the ultimate purpose of the text is to achieve the (abstract) intent of its authors. There is also, however, the objective purpose of the text ­   the goals, values, and principles that the constitutional   text   is   designed   to   achieve   in   a modern democracy at   the time of interpretation. Purposive   interpretation   translates   this   purpose into the presumption that the ultimate purpose of the constitution is its objective purpose.” [Emphasis supplied] 155. It is also apt to reproduce the observations made by him in   the   context   of   the   ever   changing   nature   of   the Constitution:­   “A constitution is at the top of a normative pyramid. It is designed to guide human behavior for a long period of time. It is not easily amendable. It uses many   open   ended   expressions.   It   is   designed   to shape the character of the state for the long term. It lays the foundation for the state's social values and aspirations.   In   giving   expression   to   this constitutional   uniqueness,   a   judge   interpreting   a constitution  must  accord  significant weight  to  its objective   purpose   and   derivative   presumptions. Constitutional   provisions   should   be   interpreted according to society's basic normative positions at the time of interpretation.” 156. He has further pointed out that both the subjective as well as the objective purposes have their own significance in the interpretation of constitutional provisions:­ 129 “The intent of the constitutional founders (abstract subjective intent” remains important. We need the past to understand the present. Subjective purpose confers historical depth, honoring the past and its importance. In purposive interpretation, it takes the form   of   presumption   of   purpose   that   applies immediately, throughout the process of interpreting a constitution. It is not, however, decisive. Its weight is substantial immediately following the founding, but   as   time   elapses,   its   influence   diminishes.   It cannot   freeze   the   future   development   of   the constitutional provision. Although the roots of the constitutional provision are in the past, its purpose is determined by the needs of the present, in order to solve problems in the future. In a clash between subjective   and   objective   purposes,   the   objective purpose of a constitution prevails. It prevails even when   it   is   possible   to   prove   subjective   purpose through   reliable,   certain,   and   clear   evidence. Subjective   purpose   remains   relevant,   however,   in resolving   contradictions   between   conflicting 75 objective purposes.” N. Constitutional culture and pragmatism: 157. "Constitutional culture" is inherent in the concepts where words are transformed into concrete consequences. It is an interlocking system of practices, institutional arrangements, norms and habits of thought that determine what questions 75ibid 130 we ask, what arguments we credit, how we process disputes 76 and how we resolve those disputes. 158.   The   aforestated   definition   of   the   term   ‘constitutional culture’ is to be perceived as set of norms and practices that breathe life into the words of the great document. It is the conceptual normative spirit that transforms the Constitution into a dynamic document. It is the constitutional culture that constantly enables the words to keep in stride with the rapid and swift changes occurring in the society.  159. The  responsibility  of  fostering  a constitutional culture falls   on   the   shoulders   of   the   State   and   the   populace.   The allegiance to promoting a constitutional culture stems from the crying need of the sovereign to ensure that the democratic nature of our society remains undaunted and the fundamental tenets of the Constitution rest on strong platform.  160. The following observations made by the Court in   R.C. Poudyal   (supra)   throw   light   on   this   duty   cast   upon   the functionaries and the citizens:­ 76 Andrew M. Siegel, Constitutional Theory, Constitutional Culture, 18 U.PA.J. Const. L. 1067 (2016) 131 “Mere existence of a Constitution, by itself, does not ensure constitutionalism or a constitutional culture. It is the political maturity and traditions of a people that   import   meaning   to   a   Constitution   which otherwise   merely   embodies   political   hopes   and ideals.” 161.   The   Constitutional   Courts,   while   interpreting   the constitutional   provisions,   have   to   take   into   account   the constitutional culture, bearing in mind its flexible and evolving nature,   so   that   the   provisions   are   given   a   meaning   which reflect the object and purpose of the Constitution. 162. History reveals that in order to promote and nurture this spirit   of   constitutional   culture,   the   Courts   have   adopted   a pragmatic approach of interpretation which has ushered in an era of “constitutional pragmatism”.  163. In this context, we may have some perspective from the American   approach.    The   perception   is   that   language   is   a social and contextual enterprise; those who live in a different society and use language differently cannot reconstruct the original meaning. Justice Brennan observed:­  “We current Justices read the Constitution in the only   way   that   we   can:   as   Twentieth­Century Americans. We look to the history of the time of 132 framing   and   to   the   intervening   history   of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and   gone,   but   in   the   adaptability   of   its   great principles   to   cope   with   current   problems   and current   needs.   What   the   constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be their measure to the vision of our time. Similarly,  what those  fundamentals  mean  for  us, our descendants will learn, cannot be the measure 77 to the vision of their time.” 164.   In   Supreme   Court   Advocates­on­Record­Association 78 , the Court, while emphasizing and others v. Union of India on   the   aspect   of   constitutional   culture   that   governs   the functioning of any constitutional body, has observed:­  “The functioning of any constitutional body is only disciplined by appropriate legislation. Constitution does not lay down any guidelines for the functioning of   the   President   and   Prime   Minister   nor   the Governors   or  the   Chief   Ministers.  Performance   of constitutional   duties   entrusted   to   them   is structured by legislation and constitutional culture. The provisions of the Constitution cannot be read like a last will and testament lest it becomes one.” 77 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, in Interpreting The Constitution: The Debate Over Original Intent at 23, 27 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) 78(2016 ) 5 SCC 1 133 165.   Further,   the   Court   also   highlighted   that   a   balance between   idealism   and   pragmatism   is   inevitable   in   order   to create a workable situation ruling out any absurdity that may arise while adopting either one of the approaches:­ “The rule of law envisages the area of discretion to be the minimum, requiring only the application of known   principles   or   guidelines   to   ensure   non­ arbitrariness, but to that limited extent, discretion is   a   pragmatic   need.   Conferring   discretion   upon high   functionaries   and,   whenever   feasible, introducing the element of plurality by requiring a collective   decision,   are   further   checks   against arbitrariness. This is how idealism and pragmatism are reconciled and integrated, to make the system workable in a satisfactory manner. xxx xxx xxx It   is   this   pragmatic   interpretation   of   the Constitution that was postulated by the Constituent Assembly, which did not feel the necessity of filling up every detail in the document, as indeed it was not possible to do so.” 166.   In   The   State   of   Karnataka   and   another   v.   Shri 79 Ranganatha Reddy and another , the Court had laid stress on the obligation and the responsibility of the judiciary not to limit itself to the confines of  rigid principles or textualism and rather   adopt   an   interpretative   process   which   takes   into 79AIR 1978 SC 215 134 consideration   the   constitutional   goals   and   constitutional culture:­ “When cryptic phrases expressive of constitutional culture and aspirational future, fundamental to the governance   of   the   nation,   call   for   interpretative insight, do we merely rest content to consult the O.E.D. and alien precedents, or feel the philosophy and share the foresight of the founding fathers and their telescopic faculty? Is the meaning of meanings an artless art?” And again, “There   is   a   touch   of   swadeshi   about   a   country's jurisprudence and so our legal notions must bear the   stamp   of   Indian   Developmental   amplitude linked to constitutional goals.” 167.   Laying   emphasis   on   the   need   for   constitutional pragmatism, the Court in  (supra) noted the Indra Sawhney    observations made by Lord Rockill in his presidential address to   the   Bentham   Club   at   University   College   of   London   on February 29, 1984 on the subject "Law Lords, Reactionaries or Reformers?" which read as follows:­ “Legal policy now stands enthroned and will I hope remain one of the foremost considerations governing the   development   by   the   House   of   Lords   of   the common   law.   What   direction   should   this development   now   take?   I   can   think   of   several occasions upon which we have all said to ourselves 135 "this case requires a policy decision ­ what is the right policy decision?"   The answer is, and I hope will hereafter be, to follow that route which is most consonant  with   the   current  needs   of   the  society, and   which   will   be   seen   to   be   sensible   and   will pragmatically thereafter be easy to apply. No doubt the Law Lords will continue to be the targets for those academic lawyers who will seek intellectual perfection rather than imperfect  pragmatism. But much of the common law and virtually all criminal law, distasteful as it may be to some to have to acknowledge it, is a blunt instrument by means of which human beings, whether they like it or not, are governed and subject to which they are required to   live,   and   blunt   instruments   are   rarely   perfect intellectually   or   otherwise.   By   definition   they operate bluntly and not sharply.”” [Emphasis is ours] 168. The Court also observed:­ “Be that as it may, sitting as a Judge one cannot be swayed   either   way   while   interpreting   the Constitutional   provisions   pertaining   to   the   issues under controversy by the mere reflexes of the opinion of   any   section   of   the   people   or   by   the   turbulence created in the society or by the emotions of the day. We are very much alive to the fact that the issues with   which   we   are   now   facing   are   hypersensitive, highly   explosive   and   extremely   delicate.  Therefore, the permissible judicial creativity in tune with the Constitutional   objectivity   is   essential   to   the interpretation of the Constitutional provisions so that the dominant values may be discovered and enforced. At the same time, one has to be very cautious and careful in approaching the issues in a very pragmatic and realistic manner. 136 Since   this   is   a   constitutional   issue   it   cannot   be resolved   by   clinches   founded   on   fictional mythological  stories   or   misdirected   philosophies   or odious comparisons without any regard to social and economic conditions but by pragmatic, purposive and value oriented approach to the Constitution as it is the   fundamental   law   which   requires   careful navigation by political set up of the country and any deflection or deviation disturbing or threatening the social balance has to be restored, as far as possible, by the judiciary.” [Emphasis is supplied] 169. Earlier, in   Union of India   v. Sankalchand Himatlal 80 Sheth and another , the Court had observed that:­ “…in   a   dynamic   democracy,   with   goals   of transformation   set   up   by   the   Constitution,   the Judge, committee to uphold the founding faiths and fighting creeds of the nation so set forth, has to act heedless   of   executive   hubris,   socio­economic pressures   and   die­hard   obscurantism.   This occupational   heroism,   professionally   essential, demands the inviolable independence woven around the judiciary by our Constitution. Perfection baffles even the framers of a Constitution, but while on statutory   construction   of   an   organic   document regulating   and   coordinating   the   relations   among instrumentalities, the highest Court must remember that law, including the  suprema lex, is a principled,   for  the  behavioral needs pragmatic, holistic recipe and   norms   of   life   in   the   raw­of   individuals, instrumentalities   and   the   play   of   power   and freedom” 80(1978) 1 SCR 423 137 170. The   aforesaid   passages   set   two   guidelines.   First,   it permits judicial creativity and second, it mentions one to be conscious of pragmatic realism of the obtaining situation and the controversy. That apart, there is a suggestion to take note of the behavioural needs and norms of life.  Thus, creativity, practical   applicability   and   perception   of   reality   from   the societal   perspective   are   the   warrant   while   engaging   oneself with the process of interpretation of a constitutional provision. O. Interpretation of Articles 239 and 239A: 171. To settle the controversy at hand, it is imperative that we dig deep and perform a meticulous analysis of Articles 239, 239A, 239AA and 239AB all of which fall in Part VIII of the Constitution bearing the heading, ‘The Union Territories'. For this purpose, let us reproduce the aforesaid Articles one by one   and   carry   out   the   indispensable   and   crucial   task   of interpreting them. 172. Article   239   provides   for   the   administration   of   Union Territories. It reads as follows:­ “239. Administration of Union Territories. —(1) Save as otherwise provided by Parliament by law, 138 every Union territory shall be administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through an administrator to be appointed by him with such designation as he may specify. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Part VI, the President may appoint the Governor of a State as the administrator of an adjoining Union territory, and   where   a   Governor   is   so   appointed,   he   shall exercise   his   functions   as   such   administrator independently of his Council of Ministers.” (Emphasis is ours) 173. The   said   Article   was   brought   into   existence   by   the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956. Clause (1) of Article   239,   by   employing   the   words   ‘shall’,   makes   it abundantly clear that every Union territory is mandatorily to be administered by the President through an administrator unless otherwise provided by Parliament in the form of a law. Further, clause (1) of Article 239 also stipulates that the said administrator shall be appointed by the President with such designation as he may specify. 174. Clause (2) thereafter, being a non­obstante clause, lays down that irrespective of anything contained in Part VI of the Constitution,   the   President  may   appoint  the   Governor   of a 139 State to act as an administrator of a Union Territory which is adjacent and/or contiguous to the State of which he is the Governor. The Governor of a State who is so appointed as an administrator of an adjoining UT shall exercise his functions as   an   administrator   of   the   said   UT   independently   and autonomously and not as per the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of the State of which he is the Governor.  175. In   this   regard,   the   Court,   in   the   case   of   Shamsher  (supra), has observed thus:­ Singh "The provisions of the Constitution which expressly require the Governor to exercise his powers in his discretion   are   contained   in   Articles   to   which reference   has   been   made.   To   illustrate,   Article 239(2) states that where a Governor is appointed an Administrator   of   an   adjoining   Union   Territory   he shall exercise his functions as such administrator independently of his Council of Ministers." 176. Again, the Court, while interpreting Article 239 in  Union 81 of India and others v. Surinder S , observed:­ "The   unamended   Article   239   envisaged administration of the States specified in Part C of the   First   Schedule   of   the   Constitution   by   the President   through   a   Chief   Commissioner   or   a Lieutenant   Governor   to   be   appointed   by   him   or 81 (2013) 1 SCC 403 140 through the Government of a neighbouring State. This was subject to other provisions of Part VIII of the Constitution. As against this, amended Article 239 lays down that subject to any law enacted by Parliament   every   Union   Territory   shall   be administered   by   the   President   acting   through   an Administrator   appointed   by   him   with   such designation as he may specify. In terms of Clause (2)   of   Article   239   (amended),   the   President   can appoint the Governor of a State as an Administrator of   an   adjoining   Union   territory   and   on   his appointment, the Governor is required to exercise his function as an Administrator independently of his   Council   of   Ministers.   The   difference   in   the language of the unamended and amended Article 239   makes   it   clear   that   prior   to   1.11.1956,   the President could administer Part C State through a Chief Commissioner or a Lieutenant Governor, but, after   the   amendment,   every   Union   Territory   is required   to   be   administered   by   the   President through an  Administrator   appointed  by  him  with such   designation   as   he   may   specify.   In  terms   of Clause 2 of Article 239 (amended), the President is empowered to appoint the Governor of State as the Administrator to an adjoining Union Territory and once  appointed,  the  Governor,  in his  capacity  as Administrator,   has   to   act   independently   of   the Council of Ministers of the State of which he is the Governor." 177. Now,   let   us   proceed   to   scan   Article   239A   of   the Constitution which deals with the creation of local legislatures or Council of Ministers or both for certain Union Territories. It reads as follows:­ 141 "239A. Creation of local Legislatures or Council of Ministers or both for certain Union territories . —(1) Parliament may by law create for the Union territory of Puducherry— (a) a body, whether elected or partly nominated and partly elected, to function as a Legislature for the Union territory, or (b) a   Council   of   Ministers,   or   both   with   such constitution,   powers   and   functions,   in   each case, as may be specified in the law.  (2) Any such law as is referred to in clause (1) shall not   be   deemed   to   be   an   amendment   of   this Constitution   for   the   purposes   of   article   368 notwithstanding   that   it   contains   any   provision which amends or has the effect of amending this Constitution." 178. The   aforesaid   Article   was   brought   into   force   by   the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act, 1962. Prior to the year 1971, under Article 239A, the Parliament had the power to create by law legislatures and/or Council of Ministers for the   then   Union   territories   of   Himachal   Pradesh,   Tripura, th Manipur,   Goa   and   Daman   and   Diu.   Thereafter,   on   25 January,   1971,   Himachal   Pradesh   acquired   statehood   and consequently,   Himachal   Pradesh   was   omitted   from   Article st 239A.   Subsequently,   on   21   January   1972,   Tripura   and 142 Manipur were granted statehood as a consequence of which both Manipur and Tripura were omitted from Article 239A. 179. Likewise, with the enactment of the Goa, Daman and Diu th Reorganisation Act, 1987 on 30   May 1987, both Goa and Daman   and   Diu   were   omitted   from   Article   239A.   The Parliament, under the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, created legislatures for the then Union Territories and th accordingly,   even   after   30   May,   1987,   the   applicability   of Article 239A stands limited to UT of Puducherry.  180. As a natural corollary, the Union Territory of Puducherry stands on a different footing from other UTs of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Daman and Diu, Dadar and Nagar Haveli, Lakshadweep and Chandigarh. However, we may hasten to add that Puducherry cannot be compared with the NCT of Delhi as it is solely governed by the provisions of Article 239A. P. Interpretation of Article 239AA of the Constitution 181. We   shall   now   advert   to   the   interpretation   of   Articles 239AA and 239AB of the Constitution which are the gravamen of the present batch of appeals. The said Articles require an 143 elaborate interpretation and a thorough analysis to unearth and   discover   the   true   intention   of   the   Parliament   while inserting the said Articles, in exercise of its constituent power, by the Constitution (Sixty­ninth Amendment) Act, 1991. The said articles read as follows:­ " 239AA. Special provisions with respect to Delhi . —(1)   As   from   the   date   of   commencement   of   the Constitution   (Sixty­ninth   Amendment)   Act,   1991, the   Union   territory   of   Delhi   shall   be   called   the National Capital Territory of Delhi (hereafter in this Part referred to as the National Capital Territory) and   the   administrator   thereof   appointed   under article 239 shall be designated as the Lieutenant Governor. (2) (a) There shall be a Legislative Assembly for the National   Capital   Territory   and   the   seats   in   such Assembly   shall   be   filled   by   members   chosen   by direct election from territorial constituencies in the National Capital Territory. (b) The  total number  of seats in the  Legislative Assembly,   the   number   of   seats   reserved   for Scheduled   Castes,   the   division   of   the   National Capital   Territory   into   territorial   constituencies (including the basis for such division) and all other matters relating to the functioning of the Legislative Assembly   shall   be   regulated   by   law   made   by Parliament. (c) The provisions of articles 324 to 327 and 329 shall   apply   in   relation   to   the   National   Capital Territory, the Legislative Assembly of the National 144 Capital Territory and the members thereof as they apply,   in   relation   to   a   State,   the   Legislative Assembly   of   a   State   and   the   members   thereof respectively; and any reference in articles 326 and 329 to "appropriate Legislature" shall be deemed to be a reference to Parliament. (3) (a) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislative Assembly shall have power to make laws   for   the   whole   or   any   part   of   the   National Capital Territory with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or in the Concurrent List in so far as any such matter is applicable to Union   territories   except   matters   with   respect   to Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List and Entries 64, 65 and 66 of that List in so far as they relate to the said Entries 1, 2 and 18. (b) Nothing in sub­clause (a) shall derogate from the powers of Parliament under this Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union territory or any part thereof. (c)  If   any   provision   of   a   law   made   by   the Legislative Assembly with respect to any matter is repugnant   to   any   provision   of   a   law   made   by Parliament   with   respect   to   that   matter,   whether passed   before   or   after   the   law   made   by   the Legislative Assembly, or of an earlier law, other than a law made by the Legislative Assembly, then, in either case, the law made by Parliament, or, as the case may be, such earlier law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislative Assembly shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void: Provided   that   if   any   such   law   made   by   the Legislative   Assembly   has   been   reserved   for   the consideration of the President and has received his 145 assent,   such   law   shall   prevail   in   the   National Capital Territory: Provided   further   that   nothing   in   this   sub­ clause   shall   prevent   Parliament   from   enacting   at any time any law with respect to the same matter including   a   law   adding   to,   amending,   varying   or repealing   the   law   so   made   by   the   Legislative Assembly.  (4) There   shall   be   a   Council   of   Ministers consisting of not more than ten per cent, of the total number   of   members   in   the   Legislative   Assembly, with   the   Chief   Minister   at   the   head   to   aid   and advise the Lieutenant Governor in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters with respect to which the Legislative Assembly has power to make laws, except in so far as he is, by or under any law, required to act in his discretion: Provided that in the case of difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and his Ministers on any matter, the Lieutenant Governor shall refer it to the President for decision and act according to the   decision   given   thereon   by   the   President   and pending such decision it shall be competent for the Lieutenant Governor in any case where the matter, in his opinion, is so urgent that it is necessary for him to take immediate action, to take such action or to give such direction in the matter as he deems necessary. (5) The Chief Minister shall be appointed by the President and other Ministers shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Chief Minister and   the   Ministers   shall   hold   office   during   the pleasure of the President. (6) The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly. 146 (7) (a) Parliament may, by law, make provisions for giving   effect   to,   or   supplementing   the   provisions contained   in   the   foregoing   clauses   and   for   all matters incidental or consequential thereto. (b)  Any such law as is referred to in sub­clause (a) shall not be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution   for   the   purposes   of   article   368 notwithstanding   that   it   contains   any   provision which amends or has the effect of amending, this Constitution. (8) The provisions of article 239B shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the National Capital Territory,   the   Lieutenant   Governor   and   the Legislative Assembly, as they apply in relation to the Union   territory   of   Puducherry,   the   administrator and its Legislature, respectively; and any reference in that article to "clause (1) of article 239A" shall be deemed to be a reference to this article or article 239AB, as the case may be.

(a) that   a   situation   has   arisen   in   which   the administration   of   the   National   Capital   Territory cannot   be   carried   on   in   accordance   with   the provisions of article 239AA or of any law made in pursuance of that article; or (b) that   for   the   proper   administration   of   the National   Capital   Territory   it   is   necessary   or expedient   so   to   do,   the   President   may   by   order suspend  the   operation  of   any  provision  of   article 239AA or of all or any of the provisions of any law made in pursuance of that article for such period 147 and subject to such conditions as may be specified in   such   law   and   make   such   incidental   and consequential provisions as may appear to him to be   necessary   or   expedient   for   administering   the National  Capital  Territory   in accordance   with  the provisions of article 239 and article 239AA." [Emphasis supplied] 182. We   deem   it   appropriate   to   refer   to   the   Statement   of Objects and Reasons for the amendment which reads thus:­ “The   question   of   re­organisation   of   the Administrative set­up in the Union territory of Delhi has   been   under   the   consideration   of   the Government   for   some   time.   The   Government   of India appointed on 24­12­1987 a Committee to go into   the   various   issues   connected   with   the administration   of   Delhi   and   to   recommend measures   inter   alia   for   the   streamlining   of   the administrative set­up. The Committee went into the matter   in   great   detail   and   considered   the   issues after holding discussions with various individuals, associations, political parties and other experts and taking   into   account   the   arrangements   in   the national Capitals of other countries with a federal set­up   and   also   the   debates   in   the   Constituent Assembly as also the reports by earlier Committees and Commissions. After such detailed inquiry and examination,   it   recommended   that   Delhi   should continue to be a Union territory and provided with a Legislative   Assembly   and   a   Council   of   Ministers responsible   to   such   Assembly   with   appropriate powers   to   deal   with   matters   of   concern   to   the common   man.   The   Committee   also   recommended that with a view to ensure stability and permanence the   arrangements   should   be   incorporated   in   the 148 Constitution to give the National Capital a special status among the Union territories. 2.   The   Bill   seeks   to   give   effect   to   the   above proposals.” The   aforesaid,   as   we   perceive,   really   conceives   of conferring special status on Delhi. This fundamental grammar has   to   be   kept   in   view   when   we   penetrate   into   the interpretative dissection of Article 239AA and other articles that are pertinent to understand the said provision. Q. Status of NCT of Delhi: 183. The first proposition that has been built centering around the conferment of special status on NCT of Delhi is that it is a State  for  all  purposes  except the  bar  created  pertaining  to certain legislative matters. The bedrock has been structured by placing heavy reliance on the purpose of the constitutional amendment, the constitutional assurance to the inhabitants of Delhi and the language employed in sub­article 3(a) of Article 239AA of the Constitution. We have already referred to the 149 historical background and also the report submitted by the Balakrishnan Committee.  184. Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General, would contend that the aid and assistance of the Committee Report   can   be   taken   into   consideration   to   interpret   the constitutional provisions and also the statutory provisions of the 1991 Act. He has referred to certain authorities for the said purpose. We shall refer to the said authorities at a later stage. First, we think it seemly to advert to the issue whether the NCT of Delhi can be called a State in the sense in which the Constitution expects one to understand. The said maze has to be cleared first.  185. We may now focus on the decision in  Shamsher Singh (supra).   The   issue   centered   around   the   role   and   the constitutional status of the President. In that context, it has been held that the President and the Governor act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and the Constitution does not stipulate that the President or the Governor shall act personally without or against the aid and advice of the Council 150 of Ministers. Further, the Court held that the Governor can act on his own accord in matters where he is required to act in his own discretion as specified in the Constitution and even while exercising the said discretion, the Governor is required to act in harmony with the Council of Ministers. We may hasten to add that the President of India, as has been held in the said case, has a distinguished role on certain occasions. We may, in this context, reproduce below certain passages from the opinion of Krishna Iyer, J.:­ "The   omnipotence   of   the   President   and   of   the Governor   at   State   level   —   is   euphemistically inscribed in the pages of our Fundamental Law with the   obvious   intent   that   even   where   express conferment of power or functions is written into the articles,   such   business   has   to   be   disposed   of decisively   by   the   Ministry   answerable   to   the Legislature and through it vicariously to the people, thus   vindicating   our   democracy   instead   of surrendering   it   to   a   single   summit   soul   whose deification is incompatible with the basics of our political   architecture   —   lest   national   elections become   but   Dead   Sea   fruits,   legislative   organs become   labels   full   of   sound   and   fury   signifying nothing   and   the   Council   of   Ministers   put   in   a quandary   of   responsibility   to   the   House   of   the People and submission to the personal decision of the head of State. A Parliamentary­style Republic like   ours   could   not   have   conceptualised   its   self­ liquidation   by   this   process.   On   the   contrary, 151 democratic   capital­formation   to   strengthen   the people's   rights   can   be   achieved   only   through invigoration   of   the   mechanism   of   Cabinet­House­ Elections. We   declare   the   law   of   this   branch   of   our Constitution to be that the President and Governor, custodians of all executive and other powers under various articles shall, by virtue of these provisions, exercise   their   formal   constitutional   powers   only upon and in accordance with the advice of their Ministers   save   in   a   few   well­known   exceptional situations.  Without being dogmatic or exhaustive, these situations relate to (a) the choice of Prime Minister   (Chief   Minister),   restricted   though   this choice is by the paramount consideration that he should command a majority in the House; (b) the dismissal   of   a   Government   which   has   lost   its majority in the House, but refuses to quit office; (c) the dissolution of the House where an appeal to the country is necessitous, although in this area the head   of   State   should   avoid   getting   involved   in politics and must be advised by his Prime Minister (Chief   Minister)   who   will   eventually   take   the responsibility for the step. We do not examine in detail   the   constitutional   proprieties   in   these predicaments except to utter the caution that even here the action must be compelled by the peril to democracy and the appeal to the House or to the country must become blatantly obligatory. We have no doubt that de Smith's statement regarding royal assent holds good for the President and Governor in India: "Refusal of the royal assent on the ground that the Monarch strongly disapproved of a Bill or that   it   was   intensely   controversial   would nevertheless­   be   unconstitutional.   The   only 152 circumstances in which the withholding of the royal assent might be justifiable would be if the Government itself were to advise such a course — a highly improbable contingency — or possibly if it was notorious that a Bill had been   passed   in   disregard   to   mandatory procedural   requirements;   but   since   the Government in the latter situation would be of the opinion that the deviation would not affect the validity of the measure once it had been assented   to.   prudence   would   suggest   the giving of assent." [Emphasis supplied] 186. That apart, A.N. Ray, C.J., in  Shamsher Singh  (supra), has stated thus:­ "Article 163(1) states that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and   advice   the   Governor   in   the   exercise   of   Was functions, except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution, required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion. Article 163(2) states that if any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion,   the   decision   of   the   Governor   in   his discretion shall be final and the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground that ought or ought not to have acted in   his   discretion.   Extracting   the   words   "in   his discretion" in relation to exercise of functions, the appellants   contend   that   the   Council   of   Ministers may   aid   and   advise   the   Governor   in   Executive functions   but   the   Governor   individually   and personally   in   his   discretion   will   exercise   the constitutional   functions   of   appointment   and 153 removal   of   officers   in   State   Judicial   Service   and other State Services. It is noticeable that though in Article 74 it is stated that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and   advise   the   President   in   the   exercise   of   his functions,   there   is   no   provision   in   Article   74 comparable to Article 163 that the aid and advice is except in so far as he is required to exercise his functions   or   any   of   them   in   his   discretion.   It   is necessary to find out as to why the words, in his discretion' are used in relation to some powers of the Governor and not in the case of the President. Article 143 in the Draft Constitution became Article 163 in the Constitution. The draft constitution in Article   144(6)   said   that   the   functions   of   the Governor   under   Article   with   respect   to   the appointment   and   dismissal   of   Ministers   shall   be exercised   by   him   in   his   discretion.   Draft   Article 144(6) was totally omitted when Article 144 became Article 164 in the Constitution. Again Draft Article 153(3) said that the functions of the Governor under clauses (a) and (c) of clause (2) of the Article shall be exercised   by   him   in   his   discretion.   Draft   Article 153(3) was totally omitted when it became Article 174 of our Constitution. Draft Article 175 (proviso) said that the Governor "may in his discretion return the Bill together with a message requesting that the House will reconsider the Bill". Those words that "the Governor may in his discretion" were omitted when it became Article 200. The Governor under Article   200   may   return   the   Bill   with   a   message requesting that the House will reconsider the Bill. Draft Article 188 dealt with provisions in case of grave   emergencies,   clauses   (1)   and   (4)   in   Draft Article   188   used   to   words   "in   his   discretion   in relation to exercise of power by the Governor. Draft Article 188 was totally omitted Draft Article 285(1) and (2) dealing with composition and staff of Public 154 Service   Commission   used   the   expression   "in   his discretion" in relation to exercise of power by the Governor in regard to appointment of the Chairman and Members and making of regulation. The words "in his discretion" in relation to exercise of power by the Governor were omitted when it became Article 316.   In   Paragraph   15   (3)   of   the   Sixth   Schedule dealing with annulment or suspension of acts or suspension of acts and resolutions of District and Regional Councils it was said that the functions of the   Governor   under   the   Paragraph   shall   be exercised by him in his discretion. Subparagraph 3 of Paragraph 15 of the Sixth Schedule was omitted at the time of enactment of the Constitution.  It  is,   therefore,   understood   in  the   background   of these illustrative draft articles as to why Article 143 in the Draft Constitution which became Article 163 in   our   Constitution   used   the   expression   "in   his discretion"   in   regard   to   some   powers   of   the Governor." [Emphasis supplied] 187. Thereafter,  A.N. Ray, C.J. discussed the provisions of the Constitution as well as a couple of paragraphs of the Sixth Schedule wherein the words "in his discretion" are used in relation to certain powers of the Governor to highlight the fact that   a   Governor   can   act   in   his   discretion   only   when   the provisions of the Constitution so permit. 188. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in  Devji Vallabhbhai Tandel and others v. Administrator 155 82 of Goa, Daman   and Diu and another .   In the said case, the issue that arose for consideration was whether the role and functions   of   the   Administrator   stipulated   under   the   Union Territories Act, 1963 is similar to those of a Governor of a State and as such, whether the Administrator has to act on the "aid and advice" of the Council of Ministers. The Court considered the  relevant provisions and after comparing the language of Articles 74 and 163 of the Constitution with the language of Section 44 of the Union Territories Act, 1963, it observed that the Administrator, even in matters where he is not required to act in his discretion under the Act or where he is not exercising any judicial or quasi­judicial functions, is not bound   to   act   according   to   the   advice   of   the   Council   of Ministers and the same is manifest from the proviso to Section 44(1). The Court went on to say:­ "It transpires from the proviso that in the event of a difference of opinion between the Administrator and his Ministers on any matter, the Administrator shall refer the matter to the President for decision and act according   to   the   decision   given   thereon   by   the President.   If   the   President   in   a   given   situation agrees with what the Administrator opines contrary 82 (1982) 2 SCC 222 156 to the advice of the Council the Administrator would be   able   to   override   the   advice   of   the   Council   of Ministers and on a reference to the President under the   proviso,   obviously   the   President   would   not according to the advice of the Council of Ministers given under Article 74.  Virtually, therefore, in the event of a difference of opinion between the Council of   Ministers   of   the   Union   territory   and   the Administrator, the right to decide would vest in the Union Government and the Council of Ministers of the   Union   territory   would   be   bound   by   the   view taken   by   the   Union   Government.  Further,   the Administrator enjoys still some more power to act in derogation of the advice of the Council of Ministers. The   second   limb   of   the   proviso   to   Section   44(1) enables   the   Administrator   that   in   the   event   of   a difference of opinion between him and the Council of Ministers not only he can refer the matter to the President   but   during   the   interregnum   where   the matter   is   in   his   opinion   so   urgent   that   it   is necessary for him to take immediate action, he has the   power   to   take   such   action   or   to   give   such directions in the matter as he deems necessary. In other   words,   during   the   interregnum   he   can completely   override   the   advice   of   the   Council   of Ministers and act according to his light. Neither the Governor nor the President enjoys any such power. This basic functional difference in the powers and position enjoyed by the Governor and the President on the one hand and the Administrator on the other is so glaring that it is not possible to hold on the analogy of the decision in Shamsher Singh's case that   the   Administrator   is   purely   a   constitutional functionary   bound   to   act   on   the   advice   of   the Council of Ministers and cannot act on his own.” [Emphasis supplied] 157 189. Be it noted,  Devji Valabhbhai   Tandel  (supra) depicts a pre Sixty­ninth amendment scenario. On that foundation, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant to buttress the submission that after the amendment, the status of NCT of   Delhi   is   that   of   State   and   the   role   of   the   Lieutenant Governor is equivalent to that of the Governor of State who is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. 190. Now, let us allude to the post Sixty­ninth amendment nine­Judge   Bench   decision   in   New   Delhi   Municipal Corporation  (supra) wherein B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J., speaking for the majority after taking note of the rivalised submissions pertaining to "Union Taxation", referred to the decisions in 83 Sea Customs Act, Re  and came to hold thus:­ "152.   ...   In   the   year   1991,   the   Constitution   did provide for a legislature for the Union Territory of Delhi   [National   Capital   Territory   of   Delhi]   by   the Sixty­Ninth (Amendment) Act (Article 239­AA) but even here the legislature so created was not a full­ fledged legislature nor did it have the effect of — assuming that it could — lift the National Capital Territory of Delhi from Union Territory category to the   category   of   States   within   the   meaning   of Chapter I of Part XI of the  Constitution. All this 83 AIR 1963 SC 1760 : (1964) 3 SCR 787 158 necessarily   means   that   so   far   as   the   Union Territories are concerned, there is no such thing as List I, List II or List III. The only legislative body is Parliament —  or  a  legislative  body  created   by  it. Parliament can make any law in respect of the said territories   —   subject,   of   course,   to   constitutional limitations  other than  those specified in Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution.” And again:­ "155. ... it is necessary to remember that all the Union Territories are not situated alike. There are certain Union territories (i.e., Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Chandigarh) for which there can be no legislature   at   all­as   on   today.   There   is   a   second category of Union Territories covered by Article 239­ A   (which   applied   to   Himachal   Pradesh,   Manipur, Tripura, Goa, Daman and Diu and Pondicherry ­ now, of course, only Pondicherry survives in this category, the rest having acquired Statehood) which have   legislatures   by   courtesy   of   Parliament.   The Parliament can, by law, provide for Constitution of legislatures for these States and confer upon these legislatures   such   powers,   as   it   may   think appropriate.   The   Parliament   had   created legislatures   for   these   Union   territories   under   the "The   Government   of   India   Territories   Act,   1963", empowering   them   to   make   laws   with   respect   to matters in List­II and List­Ill, but subject to its over­ riding power. The third category is Delhi. It had no legislature with effect from November 1, 1956 until one has been created under and by virtue of the Constitution   Sixty­Ninth   (Amendment)   Act,   1991 which introduced Article 239­AA. We have already dealt with the special features of Article 239­AA and need   not   repeat  it.  Indeed,   a  reference   to   Article 239­B read with Clause (8) of Article 239­AA shows 159 how the Union Territory of Delhi is in a class by itself but is certainly not a State within the meaning of Article 246 or Part­VI of the Constitution. In sum, it is also a territory governed by Clause (4) of Article 246. ..." [Emphasis supplied] 191. Thus,  New Delhi Municipal Corporation  (supra) makes it   clear   as   crystal   that   all   Union   Territories   under   our constitutional scheme are not on the same pedestal and as far as the NCT of Delhi is concerned, it is not a State within the meaning of Article 246 or Part­ VI of the Constitution. Though the NCT of Delhi partakes a unique position after the Sixty­ Ninth Amendment, yet in sum and substance, it remains a Union Territory which is governed by Article 246(4) of the Constitution and to which the Parliament, in the exercise of its   constituent   power,   has   given   the   appellation   of   the 'National Capital Territory of Delhi'. 192. For ascertaining the binding nature of aid and advice upon the President and the Governor on one hand and upon the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi on the other, let us conduct a comparative analysis of the language employed in Articles 74 and 163 on one hand and Article 239AA on the other. For 160 this purpose, we may reproduce Articles 74 and 163 which read thus:­ “74.   Council   of   Ministers   to   aid   and   advise President (1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice: Provided that the President may require the council of   Ministers   to   reconsider   such   advice,   either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration. (2) The   question   whether   any,   and   if   so   what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the President shall not be inquired into in any court. 163.   Council   of   Ministers   to   aid   and   advise Governor's (1) There shall be a council of Ministers with the chief  Minister  at  the  head  to aid  and   advise  the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except in so far as he is by or under this constitution required to   exercise   his   functions   or   any   of   them   in   his discretion. (2) If any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion,   the   decision   of   the   Governor   in   his discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question 161 on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion (3) The   question   whether   any,   and   if   so   what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the Governor shall not be inquired into in any court.” 193. It is vivid from Article 74 that the President is always bound by the aid and advice of the Union Council of Ministers except   a   few   well   known   situations   which   are   guided   by constitutional  conventions.   The  Constitution,   however,   does not lay down any express provision which allows the President to act as per his discretion. 194. The Governor of a State, as per Article 163, is bound by the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers in the exercise of his functions except where he is, by or under the Constitution, required   to   exercise   his   functions   or   any   of   them   in   his discretion. Thus, the Governor may act in his discretion only if he is so permitted by an express provision of the Constitution. 195. As far as the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi is concerned, as per Article 239AA(4), he is bound by the aid and advice of his   Council   of   Ministers   in   matters   for   which   the   Delhi Legislative Assembly has legislative powers. However, this is 162 subject to the proviso contained in Clause (4) of Article 239AA which gives the power to the Lieutenant Governor that in case of any difference between him and his Ministers, he shall refer the same to the President for a binding decision. This proviso to clause (4) has retained the powers for the Union even over matters   falling   within   the   legislative   domain   of   the   Delhi Assembly. This overriding power of the Union to legislate qua other Union Territories is exposited under Article 246(4).  196. In the light of the aforesaid analysis and the ruling of the nine­Judge   Bench   in   New   Delhi   Municipal   Corporation (supra),   it   is   clear   as   noon   day   that   by   no   stretch   of imagination, NCT of Delhi can be accorded the status of a State under our present constitutional scheme and the status of the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi is not that of a Governor of a   State,   rather   he   remains   an   Administrator,   in   a   limited sense, working with the designation of Lieutenant Governor.  R. Executive power of the Council of Ministers of Delhi: 197. We may note here that there is a serious contest with regard to the appreciation and interpretation of Article 239AA 163 and Chapter VIII where it occurs. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the Government of NCT of Delhi has been conferred the executive power that co­exists with its legislative power and the role of the Lieutenant Governor is controlled by the phrase ‘aid and advice’ of the Council of Ministers.   The   learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   would submit   with   equal   force   that   the   Lieutenant   Governor functions   as   the   administrator   of   NCT   of   Delhi   and   the constitutional   amendment   has   not   diminished   his administrative authority. 198. Analysing the provision, it is submitted by Dr. Dhawan and   other   senior   counsel   that   the   Government   of   Delhi  is empowered   under   the   Constitution   to   aid   and   advise   the Lieutenant Governor in the exercise of its functions in relation to matters in respect of which the Delhi Legislative Assembly has the legislative power to make laws and the said aid and advice is binding on the Lieutenant Governor.   Commenting on   the   proviso,   it   is   earnestly   canvassed   that   the   words ‘difference on any matter’ has to be restricted to the field of 164

165

166

167 200. The legislative power conferred upon the Delhi Legislative Assembly is to give effect to legislative enactments as per the needs and requirements of Delhi whereas the executive power is   conferred   on   the   executive   to   implement   certain   policy decisions. This view is also strengthened by the fact that after the   Seventh   Amendment   of   the   Constitution   by   which   the words 'Part C States' were substituted by the words 'Union Territories', the word 'State' in the proviso to Article 73 cannot be read to mean Union Territory as such an interpretation would   render   the   scheme   and   purpose   of   Part  VIII   (Union Territories) of the Constitution infructuous. S. Essence of Article 239AA of the Constitution: 201. It   is   perceptible   that   the   constitutional   amendment conceives of conferring special status on Delhi. This has to be kept   in   view   while   interpreting   Article   239AA.   Both   the Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons   and   the   Balakrishnan Committee   Report,   the   relevant   extracts   of   which   we   have already reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment, serve as an enacting history and corpus of public knowledge relative 168 to the introduction of Articles 239AA and 239AB and would be handy   external   aids   for   construing   Article   239AA   and unearthing   the   real   intention   of   the   Parliament   while exercising its constituent power. 202. At   the   outset,   we   must   declare   that   the   insertion   of Articles 239AA and 239AB which specifically pertain to NCT of Delhi is reflective of the intention of the Parliament to accord Delhi a  sui generis  status from the other Union Territories as well as from the Union Territory of Puducherry to which Article 239A is singularly applicable as on date. The same has been authoritatively   held   by   the   majority   judgment   in   the   New Delhi Municipal Corporation case  to the effect that the NCT of Delhi is a class by itself. 203. The Legislative Assembly, Council of Ministers and the Westminster style cabinet system of government brought by the  Sixty­ninth   amendment   highlight   the   uniqueness attributed to Delhi with the aim that the residents of Delhi have a larger say in how Delhi is to be governed. The real purpose   behind   the   Constitution   (Sixty­ninth   Amendment) 169 Act, 1991, as we perceive, is to establish a democratic setup and representative form of government wherein the majority has   a   right   to   embody   their   opinion   in   laws   and   policies pertaining   to   the   NCT   of   Delhi   subject   to   the   limitations imposed by the Constitution. For paving the way to realize this real purpose, it is necessary that we give a purposive interpretation   to   Article   239AA   so   that   the   principles   of democracy   and   federalism   which   are   part   of   the   basic structure of our Constitution are reinforced in NCT of Delhi in their truest sense. 204. The   exercise   of   establishing   a   democratic   and representative   form   of   government   for   NCT   of   Delhi   by insertion of Articles 239AA and 239AB would turn futile if the Government of Delhi that enjoys the confidence of the people of Delhi is not able to usher in policies and laws over which the Delhi Legislative Assembly has power to legislate for the NCT of Delhi. 205. Further, the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Constitution   (Seventy­fourth   Amendment)   Bill,   1991   which 170 was   enacted   as   the   Constitution   (Sixty­ninth   Amendment) Act,   1991   also   lends   support   to   our   view   as   it   clearly stipulates that in order to confer a special status upon the National Capital, arrangements should be incorporated in the Constitution itself. 206. We may presently carefully peruse each clause of Article 239AA   for   construing   the   meaning.   A   cursory   reading   of

the  Union Territory of Delhi was  renamed as the  National Capital Territory of Delhi and it was to be administered by a Lieutenant Governor from the date of coming into force of the Sixty­ninth Amendment Act. 207. Sub­clause (a) of clause (2) specifies that the National Capital Territory of Delhi shall have a Legislative Assembly, the seats of which shall be filled by members chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Sub­clause (b) of clause (2) stipulates that the total number of seats in the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi so established under sub­ 171 clause (a), the number of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes in the said Legislative Assembly, the division of the National Capital   Territory   of   Delhi   into   territorial   constituencies (including the basis for such division) and all other matters relating to the functioning of the said Legislative Assembly shall  be  regulated   by  law  made   by  Parliament.  Thereafter, sub­clause (c) of clause (2) simply provides that the provisions of Articles 324 to 327 and 329 which pertain to elections and fall under Part XV of the Constitution shall also apply to the National Capital Territory of Delhi, its Legislative Assembly and the members thereof in the same manner as the said provisions   apply   to   the   States.   Further,   sub­clause   (c) provides that the phrase "appropriate legislature" in Articles 326   and   329   shall,   in   the   context  of   the   National  Capital Territory of Delhi, mean the Parliament. 208. We must note here the stark difference in the language of Article 239A clause (1) and that of Article 239AA clause (2). Article 239A clause (1) uses the word 'may' which makes it a mere directory provision with no obligatory force. Article 239A 172 gives discretion to the Parliament to create by law for the Union Territory of Puducherry a Council of Ministers and/or a body which may either be wholly elected or partly elected and partly nominated to perform the functions of a Legislature for the Union Territory of Puducherry. 209. On the other hand, Article 239AA clause (2), by using the word 'shall', makes it mandatory for the Parliament to create by   law   a   Legislative   Assembly   for   the   National   Capital Territory   of   Delhi.   Further,   sub­clause   (a)   of   clause   (2) declares very categorically that the members of the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi shall be chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Unlike Article 239A clause (1) wherein the body created by the Parliament by law to   perform   the   functions   of   a   Legislature   for   the   Union Territory of Puducherry may either be wholly elected or partly elected and partly nominated, there is no such provision in the context of the Legislative Assembly of the NCT of Delhi as 173 per   which   members   can   be   nominated   to   the   Legislative Assembly. This was a deliberate design by the Parliament. 210. We have highlighted this difference to underscore and emphasize   the   intention   of   the   Parliament,   while   inserting Article 239AA in the exercise of its constituent power, to treat the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi as a set of elected representatives of the voters of the NCT of Delhi and to treat the government of the NCT of Delhi as a representative form of government.  211. The Legislative Assembly is wholly comprised of elected representatives who are chosen by direct elections and are sent to Delhi's Legislative Assembly by the voters of Delhi. None   of   the   members   of   Delhi's   Legislative   Assembly   are nominated.   The   elected   representatives   and   the   Council   of Ministers of Delhi, being accountable to the voters of Delhi, must   have   the   appropriate   powers   so   as   to   perform   their functions  effectively  and efficiently. This is also discernible from the Balakrishnan Committee Report which recommended that though Delhi should continue to be a Union Territory, yet 174 it   should   be   provided   with   a   Legislative   Assembly   and   a Council   of   Ministers   responsible   to   such   Assembly   with appropriate powers to deal with matters of concern to the common man. 212. Sub­clause (a) of clause (3) of Article 239AA establishes the power of the Delhi Legislative Assembly to enact laws for the NCT of Delhi with respect to matters enumerated in the State List and/or Concurrent list except in so far as matters with respect to and which relate to entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List. 213. Sub­clause   (b)   of   clause   (3)   lays   down   that   the Parliament has the powers to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union Territory including the NCT of Delhi or any part thereof and sub­clause (a) shall not derogate such powers of   the   Parliament.   Sub­clause   (c)   of   clause   (3)   gives   the Parliament the overriding power to the effect that where any provision of any law made by the Legislative Assembly of Delhi is repugnant to any provision of law made by the Parliament, then the law made by the Parliament shall prevail and the law 175 made by the Delhi Legislative Assembly shall be void to the extent of repugnancy. 214. Thus, it is evident from clause (3) of Article 239AA that the Parliament has the power to make laws for the NCT of Delhi on any of the matters enumerated in the State List and the   Concurrent   List   and   at   the   same   time,   the   Legislative Assembly of Delhi also has the legislative power with respect to matters enumerated in the State List and the Concurrent List except matters with respect to entries which have been explicitly excluded from Article 239AA(3)(a). 215. Now, it is essential to analyse clause (4) of Article 239AA, the   most   important   provision   for   determination   of   the controversy at hand. Clause (4) stipulates a Westminster style cabinet system of government for the NCT of Delhi where there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Lieutenant Governor in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters with respect to which the Delhi Legislative Assembly has power to enact laws except 176 in  matters   in respect  of  which the  Lieutenant  Governor is required to act in his discretion. 216. The   proviso   to   clause   (4)  stipulates   that  in  case   of a difference of opinion on any matter between the Lieutenant Governor  and  his   Ministers,  the  Lieutenant Governor  shall refer   it   to   the   President   for   a   binding   decision.   Further, pending such decision by the President, in any case where the matter, in the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor, is so urgent that it is  necessary for  him  to take  immediate  action, the proviso makes him competent to take such action and issue such directions as he deems necessary. 217. A conjoint reading of Article 239AA (3) (a) and Article 239AA(4) reveals that the executive power of the Government of NCT of Delhi is co­extensive with the legislative power of the Delhi   Legislative   Assembly   which   is   envisaged   in   Article 239AA(3) and which extends over all but three subjects in the State List and all subjects in the Concurrent List and, thus, Article 239AA(4) confers executive power on the Council of 177 Ministers   over   all   those   subjects   for   which   the   Delhi Legislative Assembly has legislative power. 218. Article 239AA(3)(a) reserves the  Parliament's legislative power on all matters in the State list and Concurrent list, but clause (4) nowhere reserves the executive powers of the Union with   respect   to   such   matters.   On   the   contrary,   clause   (4) explicitly grants to the Government of Delhi executive powers in relation to matters for which the Legislative Assembly has power to legislate. The legislative power is conferred upon the Assembly to enact whereas the policy of the legislation has to be given effect to by the executive for which the Government of Delhi has to have co­extensive executive powers. Such a view is in consonance with the observation in the case of   Ram  (supra) which has been discussed elaborately Jawaya Kapur in the earlier part of the judgment. 219. Article   239AA(4)   confers   executive   powers   on   the Government of NCT of Delhi whereas the executive power of the Union stems from Article 73 and is co­extensive with the Parliament's legislative power. Further, the ideas of pragmatic 178 federalism and collaborative federalism will fall to the ground if we are to say that the Union has overriding executive powers even   in   respect   of   matters   for   which   the   Delhi   Legislative Assembly has legislative powers. Thus, it can be very well said that the executive power of the Union in respect of NCT of Delhi is confined to the three matters in the State List for which the legislative power of the Delhi Legislative Assembly has   been   excluded   under   Article   239   AA   (3)   (a).   Such   an interpretation would thwart any attempt on the part of the Union Government to seize all control and allow the concepts of   pragmatic   federalism   and   federal   balance   to   prevail   by giving the NCT of Delhi some degree of required independence in its functioning subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution. 220.   Another   important   aspect   is   the   interpretation   of   the phrase   ‘aid   and   advise’   in   Article   239AA(4).   While   so interpreting, the authorities in  Shamsher Singh  (supra) and Devji Ballabhbhai Tandel   (supra) have to be kept in mind. Krishna   Iyer,   J.,   in   (supra),   has   Shamsher   Singh 179 categorically held that the President and the Governor, being custodians of all executive powers, shall act only upon and in accordance with the aid and advice of their Ministers save in a few   well   known   exceptional   situations.   Devji   Ballabhbhai Tandel   (supra), on the other hand, has observed that there is a functional difference in the powers and the position enjoyed by   the   President   and   Governor   on   one   hand   and   the Administrator on the other hand. It has also been observed that   it   is   not   possible   to   hold   to   the   view   laid   down   in   (supra)   in   the   context   of   Governor   and Shamsher   Singh President   to   mean   that   the   Administrator   is   also   purely   a constitutional functionary who is bound to act on the ‘aid and advice’ of the Council of Ministers and cannot act on his own. 221. It   is   necessary   to   note   with   immediacy   that   Devji   (supra)   represents   a   pre ― Sixty­ninth Ballabhbhai   Tandel Amendment   view   and   that   too   in   the   context   of   a   Union Territory which does not have a unique position as the NCT of Delhi   does.   Presently,   the   scheme   of   Article   239AA(4)   is different.  It requires the Lieutenant Governor to act as per the 180 'aid and advice' of the Council of Ministers with respect to all matters for which the Legislative Assembly of Delhi has the power   to   enact   laws   except   what   has   been   stated   in   the proviso which requires a thoughtful interpretation. 222. The   language   employed   in   the   proviso   has   to   be understood   keeping   in   view   the   concepts   which   we   have elaborately   adumbrated   hereinbefore.   As   noted   earlier,   the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Lieutenant   Governor   can   only   exercise   the   power   or   take refuge to the proviso to Article 239AA(4) where the said ‘aid and advice’ of the Council of Ministers transgresses the area constitutionally   prescribed   to   them   by   virtue   of   Article 239AA(3)(a). 223. We may note here that a narrow or restricted meaning in respect of the words, namely, “on any matter” as is suggested by   the   appellant,   takes   away   the   basic   concept   of interpretative   process,   for   the   said   expression   does   not remotely convey that it is confined to the excepted legislative fields.  Similarly, a broad or unrestricted interpretation of the 181 term to include every difference would obstruct the idealistic smooth stream of governance.   Therefore, the Court has the duty to place such a meaning or interpretation on the phrase that is workable and the need is to establish the norm of fine constitutional balance.   224. The counsel for the respondents has sought to impress upon this Court that the term "any" occurring in the proviso to clause (4) of Article 239AA should be given widest import in order to include everything within its ambit and for the said purpose, reliance has been placed upon   (supra). It Tej Kiran has been highlighted in the earlier part of this judgment that while interpreting a constitutional provision and construing the meaning of specific word(s) occurring in a constitutional provision, the Court must read the same in the context in which the word(s) occurs by referring to the annexing words of the said provision and also bearing in mind the concepts that we have adverted to. As regards the importance of context while deciphering the true meaning and importation of a term, Austin has made the following observations:­ 182 “When   I   see   the   word   "any"   in   a   statute,   I immediately know it's unlikely to mean "anything" in the universe. Any" will have a limitation on it, depending   on   the   context.   When   my   wife   says, "there   isn't   any   butter."   I   understand   that   she's talking   about   what   is   in   our   refrigerator,   not worldwide. We look at context over and over, in life 84 and in law." 225. In  this context,  the  observations made in  the case of 85  are relevant to be noted:­ Small v. United States "The question before us is whether the statutory reference   "convicted   in   any   court"   includes   a conviction   entered   in   a   foreign   court.   The word "any" considered alone cannot answer this question.  In ordinary life, a speaker who says, "I'll see any film," may or may not mean to include films shown in another city. In law a legislature that uses the statutory phrase "'any person'" may or may not mean to include "'persons'" outside "the jurisdiction of the state." 226. Further,   words   of   wide   import   must   be   construed   by placing reliance upon the intention with which the said words have   been   used.   Elucidating   the   importance   of   intention, Marshall, C.J. of the Supreme Court of U.S. in the case of 86 observed:­ United States v. Palmer   84 J.L Austin, How to do things with words, The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University, 1955 85 544 U.S. 385 (2005) 86 16 U.S. 3 Wheat .610610(1818) 183 “The   words   "any   person   or   persons"   are   broad enough   to   comprehend   every   human   being.   But general  words   must  not   only   be   limited   to   cases within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them.   Did   the   legislature   intend   to   apply   these words to the subjects of a foreign power who in a foreign ship may commit murder or robbery on the high seas? The   8th   section   also   commences   with   the   words "any person or persons." But these words must be limited   in   some   degree,   and   the   intent   of   the legislature   will   determine   the   extent   of   this limitation.   For   this   intent   we   must   examine   the law”.” 227. At home, it has also been acknowledged that the word 'any’ can have different meanings depending on the context in which it has been used and the Courts must not mechanically interpret   it   to   mean   'everything'.     In   Shri   Balaganesan 87 ,   this Metals   v.   M.N.   Shanmugham   Chetty   and   others Court has observed:­ "The word "any" has the following meaning:­ Some; one out of many; an indefinite number. One indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity.” Word "any" has a diversity of meaning and may be employed   to   indicate   "all"   or   "every"   as   well   as "some" or "one" and its meaning in a given statute 87 (1987) 2 SCC 707 184 depends upon the context and the subject matter of the statute." It is often synonymous with "either", "every" or "all". Its generality may be restricted by context; (Black's Law Dictionary; Fifth Edition)." 88 228. In   Kihoto   Hollohan   v.   Zachillhu   and   others ,   the Court has stated:­ "...the   words   "any   direction"   would   cost   it   its constitutionality' does not commend to us. But we approve the conclusion that these words require to be   construed   harmoniously   with   the   other provisions and appropriately confined to the objects and purposes of the Tenth Schedule. Those objects and purposes define and limit the contours of its meaning. The assignment of a limited meaning is not to read it down to promote its constitutionality but because such a construction is a harmonious construction in the context. There is no justification to give the words the wider meaning." 229. In   A.V.S. Narasimha Rao and Ors. v. The State of 89 Andhra   Pradesh   and   another ,  while   interpreting   the expressions "any law” and “any requirement”, the Court has refused   to   give   a   wide   import   to   the   said   phrases.   The observations in that regard read thus:­ "The   words   'any   requirement'   cannot   be   read   to warrant   something   which   could   have   been   said

185 more specifically. These words bear upon the kind of residence or its duration rather than its location within the State. We accept the argument of Mr. Gupte that the Constitution, as it stands, speaks of a   whole   State   as   the   venue   for   residential qualification and it is impossible to think that the Constituent Assembly was thinking of residence in Districts, Taluqas, cities, towns or villages. The fact that this clause is an exception and came as an amendment   must   dictate   that   a   narrow construction upon the exception should be placed as indeed the debates in the Constituent Assembly also   seem   to   indicate.   We   accordingly   reject   the contention  of Mr. Setalvad  seeking to put  a very wide and liberal construction upon the words 'any law'   and   any   requirement'.   These   words   are obviously controlled by the words 'residence within the   State   or   Union   territory'   which   words   mean what   they   say,   neither   more   nor   less.   It   follows, therefore, that Section 3 of the Public Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957, in so far as it relates to Telengana (and we say nothing about the other parts) and Rule 3 of the Rules under it are ultra vires the Constitution." 230. To   lend   support   to   this   view,   we   can   refer   to   the observations   made   by   Lindley   LJ   in   Warburton   v. 90 wherein he has stated:­ Huddersfield Industrial Society   "I cannot myself avoid coming to the conclusion that 'any lawful purpose' in sub­s (7) means any lawful purpose   which   is   consistent   with   the   rules.   It cannot   mean   anything   inconsistent   with   the rules...can it mean 'any lawful purpose' under the sun', or is it 'any lawful purpose of the society? If

186 you look at the context, that which precedes and that   which   follows,   I   do   not   think   'anybody, certainly (I do not think any lawyer would construe any lawful purpose, in the wide way in which Mr Cohen invites us to construe it." 231. That apart, the Court in   Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea 91 Estate   v.   The   Management   of   Dimakuchi   Tea   Estate held:­ "A little careful consideration will show,  however, that the expression "any person" occurring in the third   part   of   the   definition   clause   cannot   mean anybody and everybody in this wide world. First of all. the subject matter of dispute must relate to (i) employment   or   non­employment   or   (ii)   terms   of employment or conditions of labour of any person; these necessarily import a limitation in the sense that   a   person   in   respect   of   whom   the   employer­ employee   relation   never   existed   or   can   never possibly   exist   cannot   be   the   subject   matter   of   a dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the context of the   subject   matter   and   scheme   of   the   Act,   and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act." 232. From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the words 'any matter' occurring in the proviso to Article 239AA(4) does not necessarily need to be construed to mean 'every matter'. As highlighted in the authorities referred to hereinabove, the 91AIR 1958 SC 353 187 word ‘any’ occurring in a statute or constitutional provision is not to be mechanically read to mean 'every' and the context in which the word has been used must be given due weightage so as to deduce the real intention and purpose in which the word has been used.   233.   It has to be clearly understood that though ‘any’ may not mean ‘every’, yet how it should be understood is extremely significant.   Let   us   elaborate.   The   power   given   to   the Lieutenant   Governor   under   the   proviso   to   Article   239AA(4) contains the rule of exception and should not be treated as a general   norm.   The   Lieutenant   Governor   is   to   act   with constitutional objectivity keeping in view the high degree of constitutional   trust   reposed   in   him   while   exercising   the special power ordained upon him unlike the Governor and the President   who   are   bound   by   the   aid   and   advice   of   their Ministers. The Lieutenant Governor need not, in a mechanical manner, refer every decision of his Ministers to the President. He has to be guided by the concept of constitutional morality. There   has   to   be   some   valid   grounds   for   the   Lieutenant 188 Governor to refer the decision of the Council of Ministers to the President in order to protect the interest of the NCT of Delhi and the principle of constitutionalism.  As per the 1991 Act and Rules of Business, he has to be apprised of every decision taken by the Council of Ministers. He cannot change the decision. That apart, there is no provision for concurrence. He has the authority to differ. But it cannot be difference for the sake of difference. It cannot be mechanical or in a routine matter. The power has been conferred to guide, discuss and see that the administration runs for the welfare of the people and also NCT of Delhi that has been given a special status. Therefore, the word ‘any’ has to be understood treating as a guidance meant for the constitutional authority. He must bear in mind the constitutional objectivity, the needed advice and the realities.  234. The proviso to Article 239AA(4), we say without any fear of contradiction, cannot be interpreted in a strict sense of the mere words employed treating them as only letters without paying heed to the thought and the spirit which they intend to 189 convey. They are not to be treated as bones and flesh without nerves and neurons that make the nerves functional. We feel, it   is   necessary   in   the   context   to   read   the   words   of   the provision   in   the   spirit   of   citizenry   participation   in   the governance   of   a   democratic   polity   that   is   republican   in character.   We may hasten to add that when we say so, it should not be construed that there is allowance of enormous entry of judicial creativity, for the construction one intends to place   has   its   plinth   and   platform   on   the   Preamble   and precedents   pertaining   to   constitutional   interpretation   and purposive   interpretation   keeping   in   view   the   conception   of sense and spirit of the Constitution. It is, in a way, exposition of judicial sensibility to the functionalism of the Constitution. And we call it constitutional pragmatism. 235.   The   authorities   in   power   should   constantly   remind themselves that they are constitutional functionaries and they have   the   responsibility   to   ensure   that   the   fundamental purpose of administration is the welfare of the people in an ethical   manner.     There   is   requirement   of   discussion   and 190 deliberation.   The fine nuances are to be dwelled upon with mutual respect. Neither of the authorities should feel that they have been lionized.  They should feel that they are serving the constitutional norms, values and concepts. 236. Interpretation   cannot   ignore   the   conscience   of   the Constitution. That apart, when we take a broader view, we are also alive to the consequence of such an interpretation. If the expressions “in case of difference” and “on any matter” are construed to mean that the Lieutenant Governor can differ on any   proposal,   the   expectation   of   the   people   which   has   its legitimacy   in   a   democratic   set   up,   although   different   from States   as   understood   under   the   Constitution,   will   lose   its purpose in simple semantics. The essence and purpose should not be lost in grammar like the philosophy of geometry cannot be allowed to lose its universal metaphysics in the methods of drawing.   And   that   is   why,   we   deliberated   upon   many   a concept.     Thus,   the   Administrator,   as   per   the   Rules   of Business,  has   to  be  apprised  of  each  decision  taken  by a Minister or Council of Ministers, but that does not mean that 191 the   Lieutenant   Governor   should   raise   an   issue   in   every matter.  The difference of opinion must meet the standards of constitutional trust and morality, the principle of collaborative federalism   and   constitutional   balance,   the   concept   of constitutional  governance   and   objectivity   and   the   nurtured and cultivated idea of respect for a representative government. The   difference   of   opinion   should   never   be   based   on   the perception of “right to differ” and similarly the term “on any matter” should not be put on such a platform as to conceive that as one can differ, it should be a norm on each occasion. The difference must meet the concept of constitutional trust reposed   in   the   authority   and   there   has   to   be   objective assessment of the decision that is sent for communication and further   the   rationale   of   difference   of   opinion   should   be demonstrable   and   it   should   contain   sound   reason.   There should   not   be   exposition   of   the   phenomenon   of   an obstructionist but reflection of the philosophy of affirmative constructionism   and   a   visionary.   The   constitutional amendment does not perceive a situation of constant friction 192 and difference which gradually builds a structure of conflict. At the same time, the Council of Ministers being headed by the Chief Minister should be guided by values and prudence accepting the constitutional position that the NCT of Delhi is not a State.  T. The   Government   of   National   Capital   Territory   of Delhi Act, 1991 and the Transaction of Business of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Rules, 1993 237. Our attention, in the course of the proceedings, has also been drawn to the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991 (for brevity, “the 1991 Act') which came into nd force with effect from 2   January, 1992. The 1991 Act was enacted by the Parliament by virtue of the power conferred upon   it   by   clause   (7)(a)   of   Article   239AA.   We   think   it appropriate to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said enactment. It is as follows:­ " STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS Under   the   new   article   239­AA   proposed   to   be inserted   by   the   Constitution   (Seventy­fourth Amendment) Bill, 1991, a Legislative Assembly and Council   of   Ministers   will   be   established   for   the National Territory. Clause (7) (a) of the said article provides   that   Parliament   may   by   law   make 193

194 239. Upon scanning the anatomy of the   1991   Act, we find that the Act contains fifty six Sections and is divided into five Parts, each dealing with different fields. Now, we may refer to some of the provisions contained in Part IV of the 1991 Act titled 'Certain Provisions relating to Lieutenant Governor and Ministers' which are relevant to the case at hand. Section 41 deals with matters in which the Lieutenant Governor may act in his discretion and reads thus:­ “ Section   41­   Matters   in   which   Lieutenant Governor   to   . ­(l)   The act   in   his   discretion Lieutenant Governor shall act in his discretion in a matter­ (i) which falls outside the purview of the powers conferred on the Legislative Assembly but in respect   of   which   powers   or   functions   are entrusted   or   delegated   to   him   by   the President; or (ii) in which he is required by or under any law to act in his discretion or to exercise any judicial or quasi­judicial functions. (2) If   any   question   arises   as   to   whether   any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Lieutenant   Governor   is   by   or   under   any   law required to act in his discretion, the decision of the Lieutenant Governor thereon shall be final. (3) If   any   question   arises   as   to   whether   any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the 195

196 Ministers to the Lieutenant Governor shall not be inquired into in any court." 242. The wordings and phraseology of Section 42 of the 1991 Act   is   identical   to   that   of   clause   (2)   of   Article   74   of   the Constitution which also is an indication that the expression 'aid   and   advice'   should   receive   a   uniform   interpretation subject to other constitutional provisions in the form of the proviso to clause (4) of Article 239AA of the Constitution of India. In other words, the 'aid and advice' given by the Council of Ministers is binding on the Lieutenant Governor so long as the Lieutenant Governor does not exercise the power conferred upon him by the proviso to clause (4) of Article 239AA and refer the matter to the President in exercise of that power for his ultimate binding decision. 243.   Section 44 that deals with the conduct of business in the NCT of Delhi reads thus:­

(a) for the allocation of business to the Ministers in so far as it is business with respect to which the Lieutenant Governor is required to act on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers; and 197

198 Delhi Rules, 1993 (for brevity, ‘TBR, 1993’). The 1991 Act and the   TBR,   1993,   when   read   together,   reflect   the   scheme of governance   for   the   NCT   of   Delhi.   We   will   scrutinize   and analyze the relevant rules from the TBR, 1993 after analyzing the other relevant provisions of the 1991 Act. 246. Now,   Section   45   deals   with   the   duties   of   the   Chief Minister of Delhi regarding furnishing of information to the Lieutenant Governor and reads as below:­

199 obligatory   for   the   Chief   Minister   of   the   NCT   of   Delhi   to communicate to the Lieutenant Governor all decisions of the Council   of   Ministers   relating   to   the   administration   of   the affairs of the NCT of Delhi and proposals for legislation. Having said that, the real purpose of such communication is not to obtain concurrence of the Lieutenant Governor on all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to the administration of the affairs of the NCT of Delhi and on proposals for legislation, but in actuality, the objective is to have the Lieutenant Governor in synergy, to keep him in the loop and to make him aware of all   decisions   of   the   Council   of   Ministers   relating   to   the administration of the affairs of the NCT of Delhi and proposals for   legislation   so   as   to   enable   the   Lieutenant   Governor   to exercise   the   power   conferred   upon   him   by   the   proviso   to clause (4) of Article 239AA. 248. Another important provision is Section 49 of the 1991 Act which falls under Part V of the Act titled 'Miscellaneous and Transitional   Provisions"   and   stipulates   the   relation   of   the 200

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Rule   14   deals   with   the   decision   of   the   Council   on different proposals. Sub­rule (1) of Rule 14 provides that once a decision  of   the   Council has   been approved  by  the   Chief Minister or the Minister presiding, the said approved decision shall   be   forwarded   by   the   Secretary   to   the   Council   to   the Lieutenant Governor. 256. Rule   23,   elaborating   on   the   classes   of   proposals   or matters, enumerates as under:­ 207 “Rule   (23)  The   following   classes   of   proposals   or matters   shall   essentially   be   submitted   to   the Lieutenant   Governor   through   the   Chief   Secretary and   the   Chief   Minister   before  issuing   any  orders thereon, namely: (i) matters which affect or are likely to affect the peace and tranquility of the capital; (ii) matters which affect or are likely to affect the interest of any minority community. Scheduled Castes and backward classes; (iii) matters   which   affect   the   relations   of   the Government with any State Government , the Supreme Court of India or the High Court of Delhi; (iv) proposals or matters required to be referred to the   Central   Government   under   the   Act   or under Chapter V; (v) matters   pertaining   to   the   Lieutenant Governor's   Secretariat   and   personnel establishment and other matters relating to his office; (vi) matters   on   which   Lieutenant   Governor   is required   to   make   order   under   any   law   or instrument in force; (vii) petitions   for   mercy   from   persons   under sentence for death and other important cases in   which   it   is   proposed   to   recommend   any revision of a judicial sentence; (viii) matters   relating   to   summoning,   prorogation and   dissolution   of   the   Legislative   Assembly, removal   of   disqualification   of   voters   at elections to the Legislative Assembly, Local Self Government   Institutions   and   other   matters connected with those: and 208

209

“ CHAPTER­V Referring to the Central Government Rule 48  (Omitted) Rule 49  In case of difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and a Minister in regard to any matter, the Lieutenant Governor shall endeavour bv 210 discussion   on   the   matter   to   settle   any   point   on which such difference of opinion has arisen. Should the   difference   of   opinion   persist,   the   Lieutenant Governor may direct that the matter be referred to the Council.  In case of difference of opinion between the Rule 50 Lieutenant Governor and the Council with regard to any matter, the Lieutenant Governor shall refer it to the   Central   Government   for   the   decision   of   the President and shall act according to the decision of the President.” 260. Rule 49 stipulates the procedure to be adopted in case of difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and a Minister in regard to any matter. In such a scenario, as per Rule 49, the Lieutenant Governor shall endeavour by discussion on the matter to settle any point on which such difference of opinion has arisen. If such an approach and attempt to settle a point of difference by discussion turns out to be futile and the difference of opinion persists, then the   Lieutenant   Governor   may   direct   the   matter   to   be referred to the Council. Rule 49 shows that settlement can be achieved by way of discussion. It further highlights how, by discussion and dialogue, a conflict can be avoided by 211 adopting   an   ideology   of   harmonious   co­existence   which would again be in tune with the concepts of collaborative federalism,   pragmatic   federalism,   federal   balance   and constitutional objectivity. 261. Rule 50, on the other hand, provides the procedure to the effect that in case of difference of opinion between the Council   and   the   Lieutenant   Governor   with   regard   to   any matter, the Lieutenant Governor is required to refer it to the Central Government for the decision of the President and shall act according to the decision of the President. 262. The approach of dialogue, settlement by discussion and suppressing   conflicts   by   harmonious   co­existence   as delineated   by   Rule   49   should   also   be   adopted   in   case   of difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor on one hand and the Council on the other. Such an approach would not only result in acceptance of the role of the Lieutenant Governor but also help the NCT of Delhi to cherish the fruits of a responsive government as intended by the Sixty­ninth Constitutional Amendment. 212 263. We   have   referred   to   the   relevant   rules   of   TBR,   1993 which   require   that   the   Lieutenant   Governor   has   to   be apprised   and   kept   in   the   loop   of   the   various   proposals, agendas   and   decisions   taken   by   the   Council   of   Ministers. However, a careful perusal of these rules nowhere suggests that   the   communication   to   the   Lieutenant   Governor   is   to obtain his concurrence or permission. The TBR, 1993 simply reflect the scheme envisaged for the governance of NCT of Delhi wherein just as an administrator in other UTs has to be apprised, likewise the Lieutenant Governor in Delhi is also to be informed and notified about the business being conducted. 264. The idea behind the aforesaid rules is just to keep the Lieutenant Governor notified of the proposals, agendas and decisions so that he is acquainted with the business carried out by the Council of Ministers. The said view is evident from the various rules which employ the words 'send a copy thereof to   the   Lieutenant   Governor’,   'forwarded   to   the   Lieutenant Governor', 'submitted to the Lieutenant Governor and 'cause to be furnished to the Lieutenant Governor'. 213 265. Thus, the irresistible conclusion is that the Council is only   required   to   communicate   and   inform   its   various proposals, agendas and decisions to the Lieutenant Governor so as to keep him apprised and to enable him to scrutinize the said proposals, agendas and decisions in order to exercise his powers   as   bestowed   upon   him   under   clause   (4)   of   Article 239AA of the 1991 Act read with Rule 50 of the TBR, 1993. 266.   It   has   to   be   clearly   stated   that   requiring   prior concurrence   of   the   Lieutenant   Governor   would   absolutely negate the ideals of representative governance and democracy conceived   for   the   NCT   of   Delhi   by   Article   239AA   of   the Constitution.   Any   view   to   the   contrary   would   not   be   in consonance with the intention of the Parliament to treat Delhi Government as a representative form of government.  267. The   said   interpretation   is   also   in   tune   with   our constitutional   spirit   which   ensures   that   the   voice   of   the citizens does not go unrecognized while making laws and this is only possible if the agency enacting and enforcing the laws comprises of the elected representatives chosen by the free 214 will of the citizens. It is a well recognized principle of a true democracy that the power shall not remain vested in a single person and it is absolutely essential that the ultimate say in all matters shall vest with the representative Government who are responsible to give effect to the wishes of the citizens and effectively address their concerns. 268. A conjoint reading of the 1991 Act and the TBR, 1993 formulated   in   pursuance   of   Section   44   of   the   1991   Act divulges that the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi is not a titular head, rather he enjoys the power of that of an administrator appointed by the President under Article 239AA. At the cost of repetition, we may reiterate that the constitutional scheme adopted   for   the   NCT   of   Delhi   conceives   of   the   Council   of Ministers as the representatives of the people on the one hand and the Lieutenant Governor as the nominee and appointee of the President on the other, who are required to function in harmony   within   the   constitutional   parameters.   In   the   said scheme of things, the Lieutenant Governor should not emerge 215 as an adversary having a hostile attitude towards the Council of Ministers of Delhi, rather he should act as a facilitator. 269. We had earlier stated that Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General, had urged that the report of the Balakrishnan Committee should be taken aid of to interpret the constitutional provision and for the said purpose, he had 92 placed   reliance   on   Maumsell   v.   Olins ,   Eastman Photographic Materials Company v. Comptroller­General 93 of   Patents,   Designs   and   Trademarks ,   Tikri   Banda 94 ,   Dullewe   v.   Padma   Rukmani   Dullewe Black   Clawson International   Ltd.   v.   Papierwerke   Waldhof­ 95 96 ,   ,   Aschaffenburg R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay Shrimant Shamrao   Suryavanshi   v.   Pralhad   Bhairoba 97   and   Suryavanshi TMA   Pai   Foundation   v.   State   of 98 Karnataka .  He had laid emphasis on paragraph 34 of the 92 [1975] AC 373 93 (1989) AC 571 94 (1969) 2 AC 313 95 (1975) AC 591 96 (1984) 2 SCC 183 97 (2002) 3 SCC 676 98 (2002) 8 SCC 481 216 judgment in   A.R. Antulay   (supra).   The relevant part of the said paragraph reads as follows:­ “34. …the basic purpose underlying all canons of construction is the ascertainment with reasonable certainty of the intention of Parliament in enacting the legislation. Legislation is enacted to achieve a certain   object.   The   object   may   be   to   remedy   a mischief   or   to   create   some   rights,   obligations   or impose duties. Before undertaking the exercise of enacting a statute, Parliament can be taken to be aware   of   the   constitutional   principle   of   judicial review   meaning   thereby   the   legislation   would   be dissected   and   subjected   to   microscopic examination. More often an expert committee or a joint   parliamentary   committee   examines   the provisions of the proposed legislation. But language being an inadequate vehicle of thought comprising intention, the eyes scanning the statute would be presented   with   varied   meanings.   If   the   basic purpose underlying construction of a legislation is to   ascertain  the   real  intention  of   the   Parliament, why  should  the  aids  which Parliament availed of such as report of a special committee preceding the enactment, existing state of law, the environment necessitating   enactment   of   legislation,   and   the object  sought  to  be   achieved,  be  denied   to court whose function is primarily to give effect to the real intention   of   the   Parliament   in   enacting   the legislation. Such denial would deprive the Court of a substantial   and   illuminating   aid   to   construction. Therefore,   departing   from   the   earlier   English decisions we are of the opinion that reports of the committee   which   preceded   the   enactment   of   a legislation, reports of joint parliamentary committee, report   of   a   commission   set   up   for   collecting 217 information   leading   to   the   enactment   are permissible external aids to construction.” 270. There can be no quarrel about the proposition that the reports of the Committee enacting a legislation can serve as an external   aid   for   construing   or   understanding   the   statute. However, in the instant case, as we have elaborately dealt with the meaning to be conferred on the constitutional provision that calls for interpretation, there is no necessity to be guided by the report of the Committee.  U. Constitutional renaissance: 271. Before we proceed to record our conclusions, we think it apposite to reflect on a concept that illumines the basic tenet of constitutional governance having requisite veneration for constitutional philosophy and its applicability in the present context. 272. Though ordinarily the term ‘renaissance’ is used in the context of renewed activity especially  pertaining to art and literature, yet the said word is not alien to the fundamental meaning of life in a solid civilized society that is well cultivated 218 in culture.  And, life, as history witnesses, gets entrenched in elevated civilization when there is fair, appropriate, just and societal interest oriented governance.  In such a situation, no citizen feels like a subject and instead has the satisfaction that he is a constituent of the sovereign. When the citizens feel that there   is   participatory   governance   in   accordance   with   the constitutionally   envisaged   one,   there   is   prevalence   of constitutional governance.  273. This   prevalence   is   the   recognition   and   acceptance   of constitutional expectation from the functionaries created by it. It is to remain in a constant awakening as regards the text, context, perspective, purpose and the rule of law. Adherence to rationality, reverence for expected pragmatic approach on the bedrock   of   the   constitutional   text,   context   and   vision   and constant reflection on the valid exercise of the power vested tantamounts   to   resurgent   constitutionalism.     It   may   be understood   in   a   different   manner.   Our   Constitution   is   a constructive one. There is no room for absolutism. There is no space   for   anarchy.   Sometimes   it   is   argued,   though   in   a 219 different context, that one can be a “rational anarchist”, but the   said   term   has   no   entry   in   the   field   of   constitutional governance   and   rule   of   law.     Fulfillment   of   constitutional idealism ostracizing anything that is not permissible by the language of the provisions of the Constitution and showing veneration to its spirit and silence with a sense of reawakening to   the   vision   of   the   great   living   document   is,   in   fact, constitutional renaissance. 274.   Let us come to the present context and elaborate the concept.   The   said   concept   garners   strength   when   there   is rational   difference   by   the   Lieutenant   Governor   on   a constitutional   prism,   any   statutory   warrant,   executive disharmony   between   the   Centre   and   NCT   of   Delhi   on   real justifiable grounds, when an executive decision runs counter to the legislative competence and the decision of the Council of Ministers defeats the national interest. These are only a few illustrations. The Constitution does not state the nature of the difference. It leaves it to the wisdom of the Council of Ministers who   have   the   collective   responsibility   and   the   Lieutenant 220 Governor. That is the constitutional trust which expects the functionaries   under   the   Constitution   to   be   guided   by constitutional morality, objective pragmatism and the balance that is required to sustain proper administration.  The idea of obstinance is not a principle of welfare administration. The constitutional   principles   do   not   countenance   a   nomadic perception. They actually expect governance for the betterment of society, healthy relationship and mutual respect having an open mind for acceptance.  275. The   goal   is   to   avoid   any   disharmony   and   anarchy. Sustenance of constitutionally conferred trust, recognition and acceptance   of   the   principle   of   constitutional   governance, adherence   to   the   principles   and   norms   which   we   have discussed earlier and the constitutional conduct having regard to the elevated guiding precepts stated in the Preamble will tantamount   to   realization   of   the   feeling   of   constitutional renaissance.   When   we   say   renaissance,   we   do   not   mean revival of any classical note with a sense of nostalgia but true blossoming   of   the   constitutional   ideals,   realization   and 221 acceptance   of   constitutional   responsibility   within   the boundaries of expression and silences and sincerely accepting the summon to be obeisant to the constitutional conscience with a sense of reawakening to the constitutional vision. 276.  That is why, the 1991 Act and the TBR, 1993 conceive of discussion,   deliberation   and   dialogue.   The   exercise   of entitlement   to   differ   has   to   be   based   on   principle   and supported by cogent reasons. But, the primary effort has to be to arrive at a solution. That is the constitutional conduct of a constitutional functionary. V. The conclusions in seriatim: 277. In   view   of   our   aforesaid   analysis,   we   record   our conclusions in seriatim:­ (i)   While   interpreting   the   provisions   of   the Constitution, the safe and most sound approach for the Constitutional Courts to adopt is to read the words of the Constitution in the light of the spirit of the   Constitution   so   that   the   quintessential 222 democratic   nature   of   our   Constitution   and   the paradigm of representative participation by way of citizenry   engagement   are   not   annihilated.   The Courts   must   adopt   such   an   interpretation   which glorifies the democratic spirit of the Constitution. (ii) In a democratic republic, the collective who are the sovereign elect their law making representatives for enacting laws and shaping policies which are reflective   of   the   popular   will.   The   elected representatives   being   accountable   to   the   public must   be   accessible,   approachable   and   act   in   a transparent   manner.   Thus,   the   elected representatives   must   display   constitutional objectivity   as   a   standard   of   representative governance   which   neither   tolerates   ideological fragmentation nor encourages any utopian fantasy, rather it lays stress on constitutional ideologies. (iii)  Constitutional morality, appositely understood, means the morality that has inherent elements in 223 the constitutional norms and the conscience of the Constitution. Any act to garner justification must possess the potentiality to be in harmony with the constitutional   impulse.  In   order   to   realize   our constitutional   vision,   it   is   indispensable   that   all citizens   and   high   functionaries   in   particular inculcate a spirit of constitutional morality which negates the idea of concentration of power in the hands of a few. (iv) All the three organs of the State must remain true   to   the   Constitution   by   upholding   the   trust reposed by the Constitution in them. The decisions taken   by   constitutional   functionaries   and   the process by which such decisions are taken must have   normative   reasonability   and   acceptability. Such decisions, therefore, must be in accord with the   principles   of   constitutional   objectivity   and symphonious with the spirit of the Constitution. 224 (v) The Constitution being the supreme instrument envisages the concept of constitutional governance which   has,   as   its   twin   limbs,   the   principles   of fiduciary nature of public power and the system of checks and balances. Constitutional governance, in turn, gives birth to the requisite constitutional trust which   must   be   exhibited   by   all   constitutional functionaries while performing their official duties. (vi)     Ours is a parliamentary form of government guided by the principle of collective responsibility of the Cabinet. The Cabinet owes a duty towards the legislature   for   every   action   taken   in   any   of   the Ministries   and   every   individual   Minister   is responsible   for   every   act   of   the   Ministry.   This principle of collective responsibility is of immense significance in the context of ‘aid and advice'. If a well deliberated legitimate decision of the Council of Ministers is not given effect to due to an attitude to differ on the part of the Lieutenant Governor, then 225 the concept of collective responsibility would stand negated. (vii)   Our   Constitution   contemplates   a   meaningful orchestration of federalism and democracy to put in place an egalitarian social order, a classical unity in a   contemporaneous   diversity   and   a   pluralistic milieu   in   eventual   cohesiveness   without   losing identity. Sincere attempts should be made to give full­fledged effect to both these concepts. (viii)   The   constitutional   vision   beckons   both   the Central and the State Governments alike with the aim to have a holistic edifice. Thus, the Union and the   State   Governments   must   embrace   a collaborative   federal   architecture   by   displaying harmonious co­existence and interdependence so as to   avoid   any   possible   constitutional   discord. Acceptance of pragmatic federalism and achieving federal  balance has  become  a necessity requiring disciplined wisdom on the part of the Union and the 226 State Governments by demonstrating a pragmatic orientation.  (ix)   The   Constitution   has   mandated   a   federal balance wherein independence of a certain required degree   is   assured   to   the   State   Governments.   As opposed to centralism, a balanced federal structure mandates that the Union does not usurp all powers and   the   States   enjoy   freedom   without   any unsolicited   interference   from   the   Central Government   with   respect   to   matters   which exclusively fall within their domain. (x) There is no dearth of authorities with regard to the   method   and   approach   to   be   embraced   by Constitutional   Courts   while   interpreting   the constitutional provisions. Some lay more emphasis on   one   approach   over   the   other,   while   some emphasize   that   a   mixed   balance   resulting   in   a unique methodology shall serve as the best tool. In spite   of   diverse   views   on   the   said   concept,   what 227 must   be   kept   primarily   in   mind   is   that   the Constitution   is   a   dynamic   and   heterogeneous instrument,   the   interpretation   of   which   requires consideration of several factors which must be given their   due   weightage   in   order   to   come   up   with   a solution harmonious with the purpose with which the   different   provisions   were   introduced   by   the framers of the Constitution or the Parliament. (xi)   In   the   light   of   the   contemporary   issues,   the purposive method has gained importance over the literal approach and the Constitutional Courts, with the vision to realize the true and ultimate purpose of the Constitution not only in letter but also in spirit and  armed with the  tools  of  ingenuity and creativity, must not shy away from performing this foremost   duty   to   achieve   constitutional functionalism by adopting a pragmatic approach.  It is, in a way, exposition of judicial sensibility to the functionalism   of   the   Constitution   which   we   call 228 constitutional   pragmatism.   The   spirit   and conscience of the Constitution should not be lost in grammar and the popular will of the people which has its legitimacy in a democratic set up cannot be allowed to lose its purpose in simple semantics.  (xii)   In   the   light   of   the   ruling   of   the   nine­Judge Bench   in   New   Delhi   Municipal   Corporation (supra), it is clear as noon day that by no stretch of imagination,   NCT   of   Delhi   can   be   accorded   the status of a State under our present constitutional scheme.  The status of NCT of Delhi is  sui generis , a class   apart,   and   the   status   of   the   Lieutenant Governor of Delhi is not that of a Governor of a State,   rather   he   remains   an   Administrator,   in   a limited   sense,   working   with   the   designation   of Lieutenant Governor.  (xiii)  With the insertion of Article 239AA by virtue of the   Sixty­ninth   Amendment,   the   Parliament envisaged a representative form of Government for 229 the   NCT   of   Delhi.   The   said   provision   intends   to provide for the Capital a directly elected Legislative Assembly which shall have legislative powers over matters   falling   within   the   State   List   and   the Concurrent   List,   barring   those   excepted,   and   a mandate upon the Lieutenant Governor to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers except when he decides to refer the matter to the President for final decision. (xiv) The interpretative dissection of Article 239AA(3) (a)   reveals   that   the   Parliament   has   the   power   to make laws for the National Capital Territory of Delhi with respect to any matters enumerated in the State List and the Concurrent List.  At the same time, the Legislative Assembly of Delhi also has the power to make laws over all those subjects which figure in the   Concurrent   List   and   all,   but   three   excluded subjects, in the State List. 230 (xv) A conjoint reading of clauses (3)(a) and (4) of Article 239AA divulges that the executive power of the Government of NCTD is co­extensive with the legislative power of the Delhi Legislative Assembly and, accordingly, the executive power of the Council of Ministers of Delhi spans over all subjects in the Concurrent   List   and   all,   but   three   excluded subjects,   in   the   State   List.   However,   if   the Parliament makes law in respect of certain subjects falling in the State List or the Concurrent List, the executive action of the State must conform to the law made by the Parliament.  (xvi) As a natural corollary, the Union of India has exclusive executive power with respect to the NCT of Delhi relating to the three matters in the State List in   respect   of   which   the   power   of   the   Delhi Legislative Assembly has been excluded. In respect of   other   matters,   the   executive   power   is   to   be exercised by the Government of NCT of Delhi.  This, 231 however,   is   subject   to   the   proviso   to   Article 239AA(4)   of   the   Constitution.   Such   an interpretation   would   be   in   consonance   with   the concepts   of   pragmatic   federalism   and   federal balance by giving the Government of NCT of Delhi some required degree of independence subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution. (xvii) The meaning of ‘aid and advise’ employed in Article 239AA(4) has to be construed to mean that the Lieutenant Governor of NCT of Delhi is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and   this   position   holds   true   so   long   as   the Lieutenant   Governor   does   not   exercise   his   power under the proviso to clause (4) of Article 239AA. The Lieutenant Governor has not been entrusted with any independent decision­making power. He has to either   act   on   the   'aid   and   advice’   of   Council   of Ministers or he is bound to implement the decision 232 taken by the President on a reference being made by him. (xviii)   The   words   “any   matter”   employed   in   the proviso   to   clause   (4)   of   Article   239AA   cannot   be inferred to mean “every matter”. The power of the Lieutenant   Governor   under   the   said   proviso represents the exception and not the general rule which   has   to   be   exercised   in   exceptional circumstances by the Lieutenant Governor keeping in mind the standards of constitutional trust and morality,   the   principle   of   collaborative   federalism and   constitutional   balance,   the   concept   of constitutional   governance   and   objectivity   and   the nurtured   and   cultivated   idea   of   respect   for   a representative   government.   The   Lieutenant Governor should not act in a mechanical manner without due application of mind so as to refer every decision of the Council of Ministers to the President. 233 (xix)   The   difference   of   opinion   between   the Lieutenant Governor and the Council of Ministers should have a sound rationale and there should not be   exposition   of   the   phenomenon   of   an obstructionist   but   reflection   of   the   philosophy   of affirmative constructionism and profound sagacity and judiciousness. (xx) The   Transaction   of   Business   Rules,   1993 stipulates   the   procedure   to   be   followed   by   the Lieutenant Governor in case of difference between him   and   his   Ministers.   The   Lieutenant   Governor and the Council of Ministers must attempt to settle any point of difference by way of discussion and dialogue. By contemplating such a procedure, the TBR,   1993   suggest   that   the   Lieutenant   Governor must   work   harmoniously   with   his   Ministers   and must not seek to resist them every step of the way. The need for harmonious resolution by discussion is recognized especially to sustain the representative 234 form of governance as has been contemplated by the insertion of Article 239AA. (xxi) The scheme that has been conceptualized by the insertion of Articles 239AA and 239AB read with the   provisions   of   the   GNCTD   Act,   1991   and   the corresponding   TBR,   1993   indicates   that   the Lieutenant   Governor,   being   the   Administrative head, shall be kept informed with respect to all the decisions   taken   by   the   Council   of   Ministers.   The terminology “send a copy thereof to the Lieutenant Governor”, “forwarded to the Lieutenant Governor”, “submitted to the Lieutenant Governor” and “cause to   be   furnished   to   the   Lieutenant   Governor” employed in the said rules leads to the only possible conclusion   that   the   decisions   of   the   Council   of Ministers must be communicated to the Lieutenant Governor   but   this   does   not   mean   that   the concurrence of the Lieutenant Governor is required. The said communication is imperative so as to keep 235 him apprised in order to enable him to exercise the power conferred upon him under Article 239AA(4) and the proviso thereof.  (xxii)    The authorities in power should constantly remind   themselves   that   they   are   constitutional functionaries   and   they   have   the   responsibility   to ensure   that   the   fundamental   purpose   of administration is  the welfare of  the people in an ethical manner.  There is requirement of discussion and deliberation. The fine nuances are to be dwelled upon with mutual respect. Neither of the authorities should   feel   that   they   have   been   lionized.     They should feel that they are serving the constitutional norms, values and concepts. (xxiii)   Fulfillment   of   constitutional   idealism ostracizing anything that is not permissible by the language of the provisions of the Constitution and showing veneration to its sense, spirit and silence is constitutional renaissance. It has to be remembered 236 that our Constitution is a constructive one. There is no   room   for   absolutism.   There   is   no   space   for anarchy.   Sometimes   it   is   argued,   though   in   a different   context,   that   one   can   be   a   “rational anarchist”, but the said term has no entry in the field of constitutional governance and rule of law. The   constitutional   functionaries   are   expected   to cultivate   the   understanding   of   constitutional renaissance   by   realization   of   their   constitutional responsibility   and   sincere   acceptance   of   the summon   to   be   obeisant   to   the   constitutional conscience   with   a   sense   of   reawakening   to   the vision of the great living document so as to enable true   blossoming   of   the   constitutional   ideals.   The Lieutenant Governor and the Council of Ministers headed   by   the   Chief   Minister   are   to   constantly remain alive to this idealism. 237 278. The Reference is answered accordingly. Matters be placed before the appropriate regular Bench.   ………………………………..CJI (Dipak Misra) ………………………………….J. (A.K. Sikri) …………………………………..J. (A.M. Khanwilkar)  New Delhi;   July 04, 2018   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL/CRIMINAL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 2357 OF 2017 GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI .....APPELLANT Versus UNION OF INDIA ....RESPONDENT WITH CONTEMPT PETITION (C) No.175/2016 In WRIT PETITION (Crl.) No.539/1986, CIVIL APPEAL No.2360/2017, CIVIL APPEAL No.2359/2017, CIVIL APPEAL No.2363/2017, CIVIL APPEAL No.2362/2017, 1 CIVIL APPEAL No.2358/2017, CIVIL APPEAL No.2361/2017, CRIMINAL APPEAL No.277/2017, AND CIVIL APPEAL No.2364/2017 J U D G M E N T Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J INDEX A) Introduction B) Constitutional Morality C) Constitutional Interpretation D) Part VIII of The Constitution: The Union Territories E) Cabinet Form of Government - Collective Responsibility - Aid and Advice F) The Nature of Executive Power G) Constitutional History of the NCT - The Government of Part C States Act, 1951 - The Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 - The Delhi Administration Act, 1966 2 - The Balakrishnan Committee H) NCT: A Special Class among Union Territories? I) The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991 J) The Transaction of Business Rules, 1993 K) Precedents - Literal Interpretation - Relationship between Centre and Union Territories - Decision in NDMC - General Clauses Act - “Insofar as any such matter is applicable to Union territories” L) Construction of the proviso to Article 239AA(4) M) Conclusions A Introduction 1 A batch of petitions in the Delhi High Court addressed unresolved issues between the Lieutenant Governor of the National Capital Territory and its Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. The judgment of the Delhi High Court, delivered on 4 August 2016, travelled to this Court. When 3 the Civil Appeals were heard, a Bench consisting of Hon’ble Mr Justice A K Sikri and Hon’ble Mr Justice R K Agrawal, in an order dated 15 February 2017 was of the opinion that the appeals should be heard by a Constitution Bench as substantial questions of law about the interpretation of Article 239AA of the Constitution are involved. 2 This batch of cases is about the status of Delhi, after the Sixty-ninth  constitutional amendment , but more is at stake. These cases involve vital questions about democratic governance and the role of institutions in fulfilling constitutional values. The Constitution guarantees to every individual the freedom to adopt a way of life in which liberty, dignity and autonomy form the core. The Constitution pursues a vision of fulfilling these values through a democratic polity. The disputes which led to these cases tell us how crucial institutions are to the realization of democracy. It is through them that the aspirations of a democratic way of life, based on the rule of law, are fulfilled. Liberty, dignity and autonomy are constraining influences on the power of the state. Fundamental human freedoms limit the authority of the State. Yet the role of institutions in achieving democracy is as significant. Nations fail when institutions of governance fail. The working of a democratic institution is impacted by the statesmanship (or the lack of it) shown by those in whom the electorate vests the trust to govern. In a society such as ours, which is marked by a plurality of cultures, a diversity of tradition, an intricate web of social identity and a clatter of ideologies, institutional governance to be robust The Constitution (Sixty Ninth Amendment) Act, 1991  4 must accommodate each one of them. Criticism and dissent form the heart of democratic functioning. The responsiveness of institutions is determined in a large measure by their ability to be receptive to differences and perceptive to the need for constant engagement and dialogue. Constitutional skirmishes are not unhealthy. They test the resilience of democracy. How good a system works in practice must depend upon the statesmanship of those who are in decision making positions within them. Hence, these cases are as much about interpreting the Constitution as they are about the role of institutions in the structure of democratic governance and the frailties of those who must answer the concerns of citizens. 3 In the first of a series of articles in the New York Times of 14 December 2017, David Brooks laments events which occurred in various parts of the world, casting a shadow on democracy. Liberal democracy seemed to triumph with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. Many of those aspirations are continuously under challenge. The foundation for addressing the aspirations of a democratic spring are reflected in Brooks’ article titled – ironically – “the Glory of Democracy”. Drawing from Thomas Mann’s “The Coming Victory of Democracy” (1938), he has this to say: “Democracy, Mann continues, is the only system built on respect for the infinite dignity of each individual man and woman, on each person’s moral striving for freedom, justice and truth. It would be a great error to think of and teach democracy as a procedural or political system, or as the principle of majority rule. 5 It is a “spiritual and moral possession.” It is not just rules; it is a way of life. It encourages everybody to make the best of their capacities – holds that we have a moral responsibility to do so. It encourages the artist to seek beauty, the neighbour to seek community, the psychologist to seek perception, the scientist to seek truth. Monarchies produce great paintings, but democracy teaches citizens to put their art into action, to take their creative impulses and build a world around them. “Democracy is thought; but it is thought related to life and action.” Democratic citizens are not just dreaming; they are thinkers who sit on the town council. He quotes the philosopher Bergson’s dictum: “Act as men of thought,  think as men of action.” While we have to interpret the Constitution in deciding this reference, it is well to remind ourselves that how citizens respond to their statesmen has a powerful role in giving meaning to the fine print of law. B Constitutional Morality 4 The Constitution was adopted in an atmosphere of expectation and idealism. The members of the Constituent Assembly had led the constitutional project with a commitment to the future of a nascent nation. “India’s founding fathers and mothers”, Granville Austin observes, “established in the Constitution both the nation’s ideals and the institutions and processes for  achieving them”. These ideals were “national unity and integrity and a David Brooks, “The Glory of Democracy”, The New York Times December 14, 2017), available at  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/opinion/democracy-thomas-mann.html Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press (1966), page xi  6  democratic and equitable society” . The Constitution was designed “to break the shackles of traditional social hierarchies and to usher in a new era of  freedom, equality, and justice” . All this was to be achieved through a  democratic spirit using constitutional and democratic institutions. 5 Democracy is not limited to electing governments. It generates aspirations and inspires passions. Democracy is based on “the recognition that there is no natural source of authority that can exercise power over  individuals”. When India attained independence, it faced a major dilemma. Democracy as an ideal had developed in the course of the nationalist struggle against colonial rule. Democratic political institutions were still to develop, at any rate fully: “Democracy emerged in India out of a confrontation with a power imposed from outside rather than an engagement with the contradictions inherent in Indian society … In the West, the democratic and industrial revolutions emerged together, reinforcing each other and slowly and steadily transforming the whole of society. The economic and social preconditions for the success of democracy grew along with, and sometimes in advance of, the political institutions of democracy. In India, the political argument for democracy was adopted by the leaders of the nationalist movement from their colonial rulers and adapted to their immediate objective which was freedom from colonial rule. The building of new political institutions took second place, and the creation of the economic and social conditions for the successful operation of those institutions, such as education, health care, and  other social services, lagged well behind.” Ibid  Rajiv Bhagava (ed.), Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution, Oxford University Press (2008), at page 15  Granville Austin (Supra Note 3)  Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Burden of Democracy, Penguin Books (2003), at pages 35-36  Andre Beteille, Democracy and its Institutions, Oxford University Press (2012)  7 6 The framers of the Constitution were aware of the challenges which the newly instituted democracy could face. In his address to the Constituent Assembly, Dr Ambedkar stated: “Democracy in India is only a top-dressing on  an Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic”. To tackle these challenges, the Constitution envisaged the existence of a responsible and representative government. Provisions regarding administration of democracy were incorporated, in detail, into the Constitution by the members of the Constituent Assembly. Dr Ambedkar made an impassioned plea that the core values of Indian democracy, to be protected and sustained, ought to be guided by the presence of constitutional morality. 7 While moving the Draft Constitution in the Constituent Assembly on  November 4, 1948 , Dr Ambedkar quoted the Greek historian, Grote: “By constitutional morality, Grote meant… a paramount reverence for the forms of the constitution, enforcing obedience to authority and acting under and within these forms, yet combined with the habit of open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts combined, too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen amidst the bitterness of party contest that the forms of constitution will not be less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than his own.” Dr Ambedkar made it clear that constitutional morality was to be cultivated and learned. Constitutional morality was not a “natural sentiment” and its diffusion could not be presumed. While highlighting that the diffusion of constitutional Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7 (4th November 1948)  Ibid  8 morality is indispensable for “the peaceful working of the democratic constitution”, Dr Ambedkar observed that the form of the Constitution had to be in harmony with the form of its administration: “One is that the form of administration must be appropriate to and in the same sense as the form of the Constitution. The other is that it is perfectly possible to pervert the Constitution, without changing its form by merely changing its form of administration and to make it inconsistent and opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. ” (emphasis added) 8 If the moral values of our Constitution were not upheld at every stage, the text of the Constitution may not be enough to protect its democratic values. In order to truly understand what constitutional morality reflects, it is necessary to answer “what it is that the Constitution is trying to say” and to  identify “the broadest possible range… to fix the meaning of the text” .  Bhargava’s work titled “Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution” focuses on the necessity to identify the moral values of the Constitution: “There is… a pressing need to excavate the moral values embedded in the Constitution, to bring out their connections, and to identify the coherent or not-so-coherent ethical worldviews within it. It is not implausible to believe that these values are simply out there, holding their breath and waiting to be discovered. The Constitution is a socially constructed object, and therefore it does not possess the hard objectivity of natural objects. This element of the Constitution is the ground for contesting interpretations. It is high time we identified these interpretations and debated their moral  adequacy.” Rajiv Bhagava (Supra note 5), at page 6  Ibid  Ibid, at page 9  9 9 Constitutional morality does not mean only allegiance to the substantive provisions and principles of the Constitution. It signifies a constitutional culture which each individual in a democracy must imbibe. Pratap Bhanu Mehta identifies certain features of constitutional morality  chief amongst them being liberal values  which governed the making of India’s Constitution and created expectations from the polity: “The Constitution was made possible by a constitutional morality that was liberal at its core. Not liberal in the eviscerated ideological sense, but in the deeper virtues from which it sprang: an ability to combine individuality with mutual regard, intellectualism with a democratic sensibility, conviction with a sense of fallibility, deliberation with decision, ambition with a commitment to institutions, and hope for a future with due regard for  the past and present. ” (Emphasis supplied) One of the essential features of constitutional morality, thus, is the ability and commitment to arrive at decisions on important issues consensually. It requires that “despite all differences we are part of a common deliberative  enterprise.” It envisages partnership and coordination between various institutions created by the Constitution. Mehta has underlined the importance of constitutional partnerships by referring to the working of the Constituent Assembly: “The ability to work with difference was augmented by another quality that is rarer still: the ability to acknowledge true value. This may be attributed to the sheer intellectualism of so many of the members. Their collective philosophical depth, historical knowledge, legal and forensic acumen and sheer command over language is enviable. It ensured that the Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “What is constitutional morality?”, Seminar (2010), available at http://www.india-  seminar.com/2010/615/615_pratap_bhanu_mehta.htm . Ibid  10 grounds of discussion remained intellectual. Also remarkable was their ability to acknowledge greatness in others. It was this quality that allowed Nehru and Patel, despite deep differences in outlook and temperament, to acknowledge each other. Their statesmanship was to not let their differences produce a debilitating polarization, one that could  have wrecked India. They combined loyalty and frankness.” 10 Constitutional morality places responsibilities and duties on individuals who occupy constitutional institutions and offices. Frohnen and Carey formulate the demands of the concept thus: “Constitutional moralities… can be understood as anticipated norms of behavior or even duties primarily on the part of individuals within our constitutional institutions. We use the term morality and refer to constitutional morality with regard to these norms or duties principally because of the purpose they serve; they can be viewed as imposing an obligation on individuals and institutions to ensure that the constitutional system operates in a coherent way, consistent with its basic  principles and objectives.” 11 Another major feature of constitutional morality is that it provides in a Constitution the basic rules which prevent institutions from turning tyrannical. It warns against the fallibility of individuals in a democracy, checks state power and the tyranny of the majority. Constitutional morality balances popular morality and acts as a threshold against an upsurge in mob rule: “It is important not to forget that human beings are fallible, that they sometimes forget what is good for them in the long run, and that they yield to temptations which bring them pleasure now but pain later. It is not unknown for people to acquire the mentality of the mob and act on the heat of the moment only to rue the consequences of the decision later. By providing a framework of law culled over from years of collective experience and wisdom, constitutions prevent people from succumbing to currently fashionable whims and Ibid  Bruce P. Frohnen and George W. Carey, “Constitutional Morality and the Rule of Law”, Journal of Law and  Politics (2011), Vol. 26, at page 498 11 fancies. Constitutions anticipate and try to redress the excessively mercurial character of everyday politics. They make some dimensions of the political process beyond the  challenge of ordinary politics.” 12 No explanation of constitutional morality will be complete without understanding the uniquely revolutionary character of the Constitution itself. Granville Austin has referred to the Indian Constitution as a “social revolutionary” document, the provisions of which are aimed at furthering the  goals of social revolution. Austin described the main features of the Indian Constitution as follows: “It was to be a modernizing force. Social revolution and democracy were to be the strands of the seamless web most closely related. Democracy, representative government, personal liberty, equality before law, were revolutionary for the society. Social-economic equitableness as expressed in the Directive Principles of State Policy was equally revolutionary. So were the Constitution’s articles allowing abolishing untouchability and those allowing for compensatory discrimination in education  and employment for disadvantaged citizens.” (Emphasis supplied) The core of the commitment to social revolution, Austin stated, lies in the Fundamental Rights and in the Directive Principles of State Policy, which are the “conscience of the Constitution” and connect India’s future, present, and  past. Constitutional morality requires the existence of sentiments and dedication for realizing a social transformation which the Indian Constitution seeks to attain. Rajiv Bhagava (Supra note 5), at pages 14-15  Granville Austin (Supra note 3), at page 63  Ibid, at page xiii  Ibid, at page 63.  12 13 Constitutional morality highlights the need to preserve the trust of the people in institutions of democracy. It encompasses not just the forms and procedures of the Constitution, but provides an “enabling framework that  allows a society the possibilities of self-renewal” . It is the governing ideal of institutions of democracy which allows people to cooperate and coordinate to pursue constitutional aspirations that cannot be achieved single-handedly. Andre Beteille in “Democracy and its Institutions” (2012) speaks of the significance of constitutional morality: “To be effective, constitutional laws have to rest on a substratum of constitutional morality… In the absence of constitutional morality, the operation of a Constitution, no matter how carefully written, tends to become arbitrary, erratic, and capricious. It is not possible in a democratic order to insulate completely the domain of law from that of politics. A Constitution such as ours is expected to provide guidance on what should be regulated by the impersonal rule of law and what may be settled by the competition for power among parties, among factions, and among political leaders. It is here that the significance of constitutional morality lies. Without some infusion of constitutional morality among legislators, judges, lawyers, ministers, civil servants, writers, and public intellectuals, the Constitution becomes a plaything  of power brokers.” 14 Constitutional morality underscores the ethics of politics in a country. It gives politics the identity to succeed. In his last address to the Constituent Assembly on November 25, 1949, Dr Ambedkar discussed the importance of the role of the people and political parties in a constitutional democracy: Pratap Bhanu Mehta (Supra note 14)  Andre Beteille, Democracy and its Institutions, Oxford University Press (2012)  13 “I feel, however good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work it, happen to be a bad lot. However bad a Constitution may be, it may turn out to be good if those who are called to work it, happen to be a good lot. The working of a Constitution does not depend wholly upon the nature of the Constitution. The Constitution can provide only the organs of State such as the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. The factors on which the working of those organs of the State depend are the people and the political parties they will set up as their instruments to  carry out their wishes and their politics.” He also invoked John Stuart Mill to caution the nascent Indian democracy of the perils of personifying institutions or laying down liberty “at the feet of even a great man, or to trust him with power which enables him to subvert their institutions”. In Dr Ambedkar’s words: “[I]n India, Bhakti or what may be called the path of devotion or hero-worship, plays a part in its politics unequalled in magnitude by the part it plays in the politics of any other country in the world. Bhakti in religion may be a road to the salvation of the soul. But in politics, Bhakti or hero-worship is  a sure road to degradation and to eventual dictatorship.” Institution building is thus a facet of constitutional morality. It envisages an institutional basis for political behaviour. It involves that the political parties and the political process address issues affecting the public at large. Constitutional morality reduces the gap between representation and  legitimacy. Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) held in  Manoj Narula v Union of India that: th Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 11 (25 November, 1949)  Ibid  Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution,  Oxford University Press (2016), at page 12 (2014) 9 SCC 1  14 “The democratic values survive and become successful where the people at large and the persons-in-charge of the institution are strictly guided by the constitutional parameters without paving the path of deviancy and reflecting in action the primary concern to maintain institutional integrity and the requisite constitutional restraints”. It is only when political conflicts are regulated through negotiations and accommodation that the enforcement of constitutional principles can be achieved. 15 Constitutional morality requires filling in constitutional silences to enhance and complete the spirit of the Constitution. A Constitution can establish a structure of government, but how these structures work rests upon the fulcrum of constitutional values. Constitutional morality purports to stop the past from tearing the soul of the nation apart by acting as a guiding basis to settle constitutional disputes: “Of necessity, constitutions are unfinished. What is explicit in the text rests on implicit understandings; what is stated rests  on what is unstated.” 16 Constitutional morality provides a principled understanding for unfolding the work of governance. It is a compass to hold in troubled waters. It specifies norms for institutions to survive and an expectation of behaviour that will meet Martin Loughlin, “The Silences of Constitutions”, International Journal of Constitutional Law (2019, In Press),  available at https://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/de/institute/rphil/freiburger_vortraege/silences-of-constitutions-m.- loughlin-manuskript.pdf 15 not just the text but the soul of the Constitution. Our expectations may be well ahead of reality. But a sense of constitutional morality, drawn from the values of that document, enables us to hold to account our institutions and those who preside over their destinies. Constitutional interpretation, therefore, must flow from constitutional morality. C Constitutional Interpretation 17 The primary task before the Court here, as in other constitutional cases, is to interpret the Constitution. This reflects a truism. For, while deciding what the Constitution means, we must understand what it says. First and foremost, in understanding the text of the Constitution, it must be borne in mind that the Constitution is not merely a legal document. The Constitution embodies a political vision of a plural democratic polity. This political vision combines with the values which the founding fathers infused to provide a just social compact in which individual aspirations for dignity and liberty would be achieved. Hence, any interpretation of the Constitution must be unabashed in accepting the importance of the Constitution as a political document which incorporates a blue print for democratic governance. The values which the Constitution as a political document incorporates, provide the foundation for understanding its text. It is in that sense that successive generations of judges have reminded themselves that it is, after all, a Constitution that we are expounding. The words of the Constitution cannot be construed merely by alluding to what a dictionary of the language would explain. While its language is of relevance to 16 the content of its words, the text of the Constitution needs to be understood in the context of the history of the movement for political freedom. Constitutional history embodies events which predate the adoption of the Constitution. Constitutional history also incorporates our experiences in the unfolding of the Constitution over the past sixty eight years while confronting complex social and political problems. Words in a constitutional text have linkages with the provisions in which they appear. It is well to remember that each provision is linked to other segments of the document. It is only when they are placed in the wide canvas of constitutional values that a true understanding of the text can emerge. The principle that the text has to be deduced from context reflects the limitations in understanding the Constitution only as a legal document. To perceive the Constitution as a purely legal document would be an injustice to the aspirations of those who adopted it and a disservice to the experience of our society in grappling with its intractable problems. Justice HR  Khanna in Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (“Kesavananda”) held thus: “A Constitution encompasses within itself the broad indications as to how the nation is to march forward in times to come. A Constitution cannot be regarded as a mere legal document... A Constitution must of necessity be the vehicle of the life of a nation. It has also to be borne in mind that a Constitution is not a gate but a road. Beneath the drafting of a Constitution is the awareness that things do not stand still but move on, that life of a progressive nation, as of an individual, is not static and stagnant but dynamic and dashful.” AIR (1973) SC 1461  17 18 The second value which must be borne in mind is that the Constitution recognises the aspirations of popular sovereignty. As its Preamble tells us, the document was adopted by “We the People of India”. The Preamble sets forth at the outset the creation of a “sovereign... democratic, republic”. It is through the expression of the sovereignty of the people and on the cornerstone of a democratic and republican form of government that the Constitution seeks to achieve justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. The width of our constitutional aspirations finds abundant reflection in the plurality and diversity of the elements which it comprehends within justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. Justice incorporates its social, economic, and political manifestations. Liberty incorporates freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. Equality is defined in its substantive sense to include equality of status and opportunity. Fraternity seeks to assure dignity to the individual while, at the same time, ensuring the unity and integrity of the nation. 19 There are four abiding principles which are essential to understanding the content of the Constitution. The first is that as a political document, the Constitution is an expression of the sovereignty of the people. The second is that the Constitution seeks to achieve its vision of a political and social ordering on the basis of democracy. A democratic form of government recognises that sovereignty resides within the people. Popular sovereignty can exist when democracy is meaningful. The third principle is that the Constitution adopts a republican form of government in which the powers of sovereignty are vested in the people and are exercised directly or through 18 their elected representatives. The fourth, which is not the least in importance, is the secular ideology of the Constitution. For, it is on the foundation of a secular order that freedom, liberty, dignity and equality to every citizen is achieved. 20 These principles, it is well to remind ourselves, are not just political exhortations. They constitute the essence and substance of the Constitution and provide the foundation for the fine print of governance. It is through the expression of popular sovereignty that the Constitution has provided an assurance for the enforcement of equality and of equal protection of the law. The four founding principles constitute the means of achieving accountability and amenability to the rule of law. The democratic method of governing the country is a value which is intrinsic to the Constitution. Democracy as a way of life is also instrumental in achieving fundamental freedoms which the Constitution assures to each individual. Each of the four principles has an inseparable connect. They provide the basis on which the Constitution has distributed legislative and executive power between the Union and the states. They provide the foundation for ensuring basic human freedoms in the realisation of dignity, liberty and autonomy. They embody the architecture for the governance of the nation. In many respects, the complexity of our Constitution is a reflection of the intricate cultural and social structures within Indian society. The Constitution has attempted to bring about an equilibrium in which a diversity of tradition, plurality of opinion and variations of culture can 19 co-exist in one nation. To ignore the infinite variety which underlies our constitutional culture is to risk its cohesion. The integrity of the nation is founded on accepting and valuing co-existence. Constitutional doctrine must be evolved keeping in mind these principles. 21 Unlike many other constitutional texts in the democratic world, the Indian Constitution has lived through a multitude of amendments. In  Puttaswamy , this Court had held: “The Constitution was drafted and adopted in a historical context. The vision of the founding fathers was enriched by the histories of suffering of those who suffered oppression and a violation of dignity both here and elsewhere. Yet, it would be difficult to dispute that many of the problems which contemporary societies face would not have been present to the minds of the most perspicacious draftsmen. No generation, including the present, can have a monopoly over solutions or the confidence in its ability to foresee the future.” The exercise of the amendatory power cannot be construed as a reflection of the deficiency of its original text, as much as it is a reflection of the felt need to create new institutions of governance, recognize new rights and to impose restraints upon the assertion of majoritarian power. Over time, the Constitution was amended to provide constitutional status to local self-governing bodies, such as the Panchayats in Part IX, the municipalities in Part IXA and co- operative societies in Part IXB. These structures of governance have been constitutionally entrenched to enhance participatory and representative democracy. In other amendments, new rights have been expressly recognized (2017) 10 SCC 1  20 such as the right to free and compulsory education for children between the ages of six and fourteen in Article 21A. As the nation gained sobering experiences about the excess of political power during the Emergency, the constituent power responded by introducing limitations (through the Forty Fourth Amendment) on the exercise of the emergency powers under Article 352 and by circumscribing the power to override elected governments in the states under Article 356. 22 The basic structure doctrine was evolved by judicial interpretation in Kesavananda to ensure that the fundamentals of constitutional governance are not effaced by the exercise of the constituent power to amend the Constitution. The postulate of the doctrine is that there are values which are so fundamental and intrinsic to the democratic way of life, a republican form of government and to the preservation of basic human freedoms, that these must lie outside the power of legislative majorities to override by the exercise of constituent powers. The doctrine was a warning to “a fledgling democracy of  the perils of brute majoritarianism” . The basic structure doctrine and the power of judicial review have ensured (in the course of the previous thirty four years) the preservation of basic constitutional safeguards and the continuance of constitutional institutions accountable to the sovereignty of the people. The basic structure doctrine imposes a restraint on the exercise of the constituent power. Equally, it is necessary to remember that the exercise of the Raju Ramchandran, “The Quest and the Questions”, Outlook (25 August, 2014), available at  https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/the-quest-and-the-questions/291655 21 constituent power may in certain cases be regarded as enhancing the basic structure. The constituent power enhances the basic structure when it recognizes new sets of human freedoms, sets up new structures of representative governance in the constitutional text or imposes restraints on the power of the state to override popularly elected institutions. Secularism, which is inherent in the entire constitutional framework and flows from fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III, is a part of the basic structure of the  Constitution. Secularism is based on the foundations of constitutional morality and reflects the idea of our democracy. The insertion of the word “Secular” into the Preamble of the Constitution, by the 42nd amendment, did not redefine the Constitution’s identity. The amendment formally recognized the bedrock of the constitutional scheme. The amendment solidified the basic structure of the Constitution. 23 Democracy has been held, by a Constitution Bench of this Court in  Kihoto Hollohan v Zachillhu , to be a part of the basic structure of our Constitution. The insertion of Article 239AA by the exercise of the constituent power is an instance of an amendment elevating a democratic form of governance to a constitutional status for the National Capital Territory. In interpreting such exercises of the constituent power which fortify the basic structure, the meaning of the constitutional text must be guided by the intent Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225; SR Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1  1992 SCC Supl. (2) 651  22 underlying such exercises of the constituent power. A nine-judge Bench of this  Court in I.R. Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu had held thus: “ The Constitution is a living document. The constitutional provisions have to be construed having regard to the march of time and the development of law. It is, therefore, necessary that while construing the doctrine of basic structure due regard be had to various decisions which led to expansion and development of the law. The principle of constitutionalism is now a legal principle which requires control over the exercise of Governmental power to ensure that it does not destroy the democratic principles upon which it is based. These democratic principles include the protection of fundamental rights. The principle of constitutionalism advocates a check and balance model of the separation of powers, it requires a diffusion of powers, necessitating different independent centers of decision making. The principle of constitutionalism advocates a check and balance model of the separation of powers, it requires a diffusion of powers, necessitating different independent centers of decision making.” (emphasis supplied) It is in this background that it would be necessary to turn to the provisions of Part VIII of the Constitution. D Part VIII of The Constitution: The Union Territories 24 Part VIII of the Indian Constitution, prior to 1956, dealt with Part C of the First Schedule. Part VIII was amended by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution in 1956. Simultaneously, the First Schedule was amended by the Seventh Amendment (together with Article 1). In place of the Part A, B and C States, the Constitution now provides a division of the territory of the nation between the States and the Union Territories. While clause 1 of Article 1 stipulates that India is a Union of States, clause 2 incorporates the States and (2007) 2 SCC 1  23 the Union Territories of the First Schedule. The territory of India, as Clause 3 of Article 1 provides, comprises of : (i) The territories of the States; (ii) The Union territories; and (iii) Territories which may be acquired. 25 Article 239 provides thus: “239. (1) Save as otherwise provided by Parliament by law, every Union territory shall be administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through an administrator to be appointed by him with such designation as he may specify. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Part VI, the President may appoint the Governor of a State as the administrator of an adjoining Union territory, and where a Governor is so appointed, he shall exercise his functions as such administrator independently of his Council of Ministers.” Clause 1 of Article 239 has several elements, which are significant to understanding its content: (i) Clause 1, as its opening words indicate, is subject to Parliament providing “otherwise… by law”; (ii) Every Union territory is administered by the President; (iii) Administration of a Union territory by the President is to such extent as the President “thinks fit”; (iv) Administration by the President is through the office of an Administrator; and (v) The Administrator is appointed by the President with a designation as he will specify. Article 239A, which was inserted by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution in 1962, provides as follows: 24 “239A. Creation of local Legislatures or Council of Ministers or both for certain Union territories.— (1) Parliament may by law create for the Union territory of Puducherry— (a) a body, whether elected or partly nominated and partly elected, to function as a Legislature for the Union territory, or (b) a Council of Ministers, or both with such constitution, powers and functions, in each case, as may be specified in the law. (2) Any such law as is referred to in clause (1) shall not be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution for the purposes of article 368 notwithstanding that it contains any provision which amends or has the effect of amending this Constitution.” Article 239A applies to the Union territory of Puducherry (Goa, Daman and Diu were excluded with effect from 1987 by the Goa, Daman and Diu Reorganisation Act, 1987). 26 Article 239A is enabling. It enables Parliament to enact a law for the Union territory so as to create a legislature or a Council of Ministers or both. In creating a legislature, Parliament is left free to determine whether the legislative body should be entirely elected or should consist of a certain number of nominated legislators. Parliament, in its legislative power, may decide either to create a legislature or a Council of Ministers. Whether to do so, in the first place, is left to its discretion. Whether one or both of such bodies should be created is also left to the legislative authority of Parliament. If it decides to enact a law, Parliament is empowered to specify the constitutional powers and functions of the legislature and of the Council of 25 Ministers. While the Constitution provides an enabling provision, the setting up of a legislature, the creation of a Council of Ministers and the ambit of their authority are to be governed by an ordinary law to be enacted by Parliament. Such a law, clause 2 clarifies, would not constitute an amendment of the Constitution under Article 368 even if it were to contain provisions which amend or have the effect of amending the Constitution. Creating democratic institutions for governing Union territories under Article 239A was left to the legislative will of Parliament. 27 In contrast to the provisions of Article 239A is the text which the Constitution has laid down to govern Delhi. The marginal note to Article 239AA provides that the Article makes “special provisions with respect to Delhi”. Article 239AA provides thus: “239AA. Special provisions with respect to Delhi.— (1) As from the date of commencement of the Constitution (Sixty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1991, the Union territory of Delhi shall be called the National Capital Territory of Delhi (hereafter in this Part referred to as the National Capital Territory) and the administrator thereof appointed under article 239 shall be designated as the Lieutenant Governor. (2) (a) There shall be a Legislative Assembly for the National Capital Territory and the seats in such Assembly shall be filled by members chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the National Capital Territory. (b) The total number of seats in the Legislative Assembly, the number of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes, the division of the National Capital Territory into territorial constituencies (including the basis for such division) and all other matters relating to the functioning of the Legislative Assembly shall be regulated by law made by Parliament. 26 (c) The provisions of articles 324 to 327 and 329 shall apply in relation to the National Capital Territory, the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory and the members thereof as they apply, in relation to a State, the Legislative Assembly of a State and the members thereof respectively; and any reference in articles 326 and 329 to “appropriate Legislature” shall be deemed to be a reference to Parliament. (3) (a) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislative Assembly shall have power to make laws for the whole or any part of the National Capital Territory with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or in the Concurrent List in so far as any such matter is applicable to Union territories except matters with respect to Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List and Entries 64, 65 and 66 of that List in so far as they relate to the said Entries 1, 2 and 18. (b) Nothing in sub-clause (a) shall derogate from the powers of Parliament under this Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union territory or any part thereof. (c) If any provision of a law made by the Legislative Assembly with respect to any matter is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament with respect to that matter, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislative Assembly, or of an earlier law, other than a law made by the Legislative Assembly, then, in either case, the law made by Parliament, or, as the case may be, such earlier law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislative Assembly shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void : Provided that if any such law made by the Legislative Assembly has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, such law shall prevail in the National Capital Territory : Provided further that nothing in this sub-clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislative Assembly. (4) There shall be a Council of Ministers consisting of not more than ten per cent. of the total number of members in the Legislative Assembly, with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Lieutenant Governor in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters with respect to which the Legislative Assembly has power to make 27 laws, except in so far as he is, by or under any law, required to act in his discretion : Provided that in the case of difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and his Ministers on any matter, the Lieutenant Governor shall refer it to the President for decision and act according to the decision given thereon by the President and pending such decision it shall be competent for the Lieutenant Governor in any case where the matter, in his opinion, is so urgent that it is necessary for him to take immediate action, to take such action or to give such direction in the matter as he deems necessary. (5) The Chief Minister shall be appointed by the President and other Ministers shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Chief Minister and the Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. (6) The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly. (7) (a) Parliament may, by law, make provisions for giving effect to, or supplementing the provisions contained in the foregoing clauses and for all matters incidental or consequential thereto. (b) Any such law as is referred to in sub-clause (a) shall not be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution for the purposes of article 368 notwithstanding that it contains any provision which amends or has the effect of amending, this Constitution. (8) The provisions of article 239B shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the National Capital Territory, the Lieutenant Governor and the Legislative Assembly, as they apply in relation to the Union territory of Puducherry, the administrator and its Legislature, respectively; and any reference in that article to “clause (1) of article 239A” shall be deemed to be a reference to this article or article 239AB, as the case may be.” Article 239AA is a product of the exercise of the constituent power, tracing its origins to the sixty ninth amendment which was brought into force on 1 February 1992. Under clause 1, with the commencement of the Constitution (Sixty Ninth Amendment) Act 1991, the Union Territory of Delhi is called the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Its Administrator, who is appointed under 28 Article 239, is designated as the Lieutenant Governor. The administrator appointed by the President under Article 239(1) is designated as the Lieutenant Governor for the National Capital Territory. The source of the power to appoint the Lieutenant Governor is traceable to Article 239(1). 28 Clause 2 of Article 239AA contains a constitutional mandate that there shall be a legislative assembly for the NCT. This is unlike Article 239A which left it to the discretion of Parliament to create a legislature by enacting a law for the Union territories governed by that provision. Article 239AA imprints the legislative assembly for the NCT with a constitutional status. Its representative character is reflected in the mandate that the members of the legislative assembly shall be “chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies” in the NCT. The necessity of direct election underlines the rule of participatory democracy and of the members of the legislative assembly being representatives of the people residing in the territorial constituencies comprised in the NCT. Parliament has been assigned the role of regulating through a law, the number of seats in the legislative assembly, reservation for the scheduled castes, defining the division of the NCT into territorial constituencies and of elucidating the functioning of the assembly in all matters. The importance which the Constitution ascribes to the status of the legislative assembly is evinced by the adoption of the provisions of Articles 324 to 327 and 329 in relation to the NCT as they apply in the case of the legislative assembly of a state. These articles (which are contained in Part XV 29 of the Constitution) ascribe constitutional status to the Election Commission of India and assign to it the task of superintending, directing and controlling the conduct of all elections. Article 325 is a guarantee against discrimination based on religion, race, caste or sex. Article 326 embodies the principle of adult suffrage. Article 327 empowers Parliament to enact a law in regard to the elections to the legislatures. Article 329 imposes a restraint on interference by courts in electoral matters. The Constitution has considered the institutional existence of a legislative assembly for Delhi to be a matter of such importance as to be elevated to a constitutional requirement in clause 2 of Article 239AA and to warrant the guarantee of free and fair elections which is enforced through the constitutionally entrenched position of the Election Commission of India. 29 Clause 3 of Article 239 AA defines the legislative powers of the legislative assembly for the NCT. Sub clause (a) empowers the legislative assembly for the NCT to enact law with respect to any of the matters contained in the State or Concurrent lists to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The ability of the legislative assembly is circumscribed “insofar as any such matter is applicable to Union territories”. The legislative assembly can hence enact legislation in regard to the entries in the State and Concurrent lists to the extent to which they apply to a Union territory. Of equal significance is the exception which has been carved out : Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List (and Entries 64, 65 and 66 insofar as they relate to Entries 30 1,2 and 18) lie outside the legislative powers of the legislative assembly of NCT. Entries 1, 2, and 18 of the State List are thus: “1.Public order (but not including the use of any naval, military or air force or any other armed force of the Union or of any other force subject to the control of the Union or of any contingent or unit thereof in aid of the civil power). 2. Police (including railway and village police) subject to the provisions of entry 2A of List I. 18.Land, this is to say, rights in o over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; and improvement and agricultural loans; colonization.” The subjects of public order, police and land do not lie within the domain of the legislative assembly. Entries 64, 65 and 66 provide thus : “64.Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this List. 65.Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List. 66.Fees in respect of any of the matters in this List, but not including fees taken in any court.” The legislative assembly is disabled from enacting laws governing the above entries (which deal with offences against laws referable to the State List, jurisdiction of courts and fees) insofar as they relate to public order, the police and land. This is a constitutional indication of the fact that the NCT has been considered to be of specific importance from the perspective of the nation to exclude three important areas which have a vital bearing on its status as a national Capital. Apart from the exclusions, the over-arching importance of the regulatory power of Parliament is underlined by the conferment upon Parliament of legislative power over State as well as Concurrent List subjects in the Seventh Schedule. Unlike state legislative assemblies which wield legislative power exclusively over the State List, under the provisions of Article 31 246(3), the legislative assembly for NCT does not possess exclusive legislative competence over State List subjects. By a constitutional fiction, as if it were, Parliament has legislative power over Concurrent as well as State List subjects in the Seventh Schedule. Sub clause (c) of clause 3 of Article 239AA contains a provision for repugnancy, similar to Article 254. A law enacted by the legislative assembly would be void to the extent of a repugnancy with a law enacted by Parliament unless it has received the assent of the President. Moreover, the assent of the President would not preclude Parliament from enacting legislation in future to override or modify the law enacted by the legislative assembly. Hence, the provisions of clause 2 and clause 3 of Article 239AA indicate that while conferring a constitutional status upon the legislative assembly of NCT, the Constitution has circumscribed the ambit of its legislative Powers firstly, by carving out certain subjects from its competence (vesting them in Parliament) and secondly, by enabling Parliament to enact law on matters falling both in the State and Concurrent lists. Moreover, in the subjects which have been assigned to it, the legislative authority of the Assembly is not exclusive and is subject to laws which are enacted by Parliament. E Cabinet Form of Government 30 Before deliberating upon the nature and extent of the executive power of the NCT, it is necessary to discuss the essential features of the cabinet form of government, which are of paramount importance in the current context. Collective Responsibility 32 31 Collective responsibility is a cornerstone of the Westminster model.  Initially developed as a constitutional convention in Britain between 1780 and  1832, it began to appear in text-books in the 1860s and 1870s. In 1867, Walter Bagehot, in his classic work titled “The English Constitution”, called the “House of Commons” as “a real choosing body”, which decides the path that the nation  would follow. The consequence of such a systemic expectation in the British Parliamentary system, Bagehot declared, was that the public can, “through Parliament, turn out an administration which is not doing as it likes, and can  put in an administration which will do as it likes” . The responsibility of Ministers was set as their liability “to have all their public acts discussed in  Parliament” . The Cabinet was defined as “a collective body bound together by  a common responsibility”. Later, Lord Salisbury formulated this common responsibility thus: “ [F]or all that passes in a Cabinet, each Member of it who does not resign is absolutely and irretrievably responsible, and that he has no right afterwards to say that he agreed in one case to a compromise, while in another he was persuaded by one of his Colleagues... It is only on the principle that absolute responsibility is undertaken by every Member of a Cabinet who, after a decision is arrived at, remains a Member of it, that the joint responsibility of Ministers to Parliament can be upheld, and one of the most essential conditions of Parliamentary responsibility  established.” (Emphasis supplied) AH Birch, Representative and Responsible Government, George Allen & Unwin Ltd (1964), at page 131  Ibid, at page 136  nd Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, 2 Edition (1873), at page 118, available at  https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/bagehot/constitution.pdf Ibid, at page 34  Edward A. Freeman, The Growth of the English Constitution (1872)  Ibid  HL Deb vol 239 cc 833-4, 8 April 1878  33 Ministers were liable to lose their offices, if they failed to retain the confidence of the House of Commons or the Parliament. In the 1880s, Dicey, “Law of the Constitution”, propounded that: “[It] is now well-established law that the Crown can act only through Ministers and according to certain prescribed forms which absolutely require the co-operation of some Minister, such as a Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor, who thereby becomes not only morally but legally responsible for the legality of the act in which he takes part. Hence, indirectly but surely, the action of every servant of the Crown, and therefore, in effect of the Crown itself, is brought under the supremacy of the land. Behind parliamentary responsibility lies legal liability, and the acts of Ministers no less than the acts of subordinate officials are made subject to the rule of law.”^  This fixed the responsibility of the Cabinet for the “general conduct of affairs” of the government. 32 In the twentieth century, Sir Ivor Jennings conceptualized collective responsibility of a Cabinet Government, thus: “A Government that cannot make up its mind on a fundamental issue ought not to be the Government and will be so regarded in the constituencies. Its fall may be regarded  as imminent.” The conduct of the cabinet determines the fate of the government. Ibid, at page 327  Ibid, at page 420  rd Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government, Cambridge University Press (1959), 3 Edition, at page 279  34 33 Collective responsibility of Ministers to the Parliament is comprehended in two aspects: (i) collective responsibility of Ministers for the policies of the government; and (ii) individual responsibility of Ministers for the work of their  governments. The idea behind this bifurcation, as explained by Birch, is to hold a government “continuously accountable for its actions, so that it always faces the possibility that a major mistake may result in a withdrawal of  Parliamentary support.” In the British system, collective responsibility work on basis of certain precepts which define and regulate the existence of government. Geoffrey Marshall (1989) identifies three strands within the  principle : i) The confidence principle : a government can only remain in office for so long as it retains the confidence of the House of Commons, a confidence which can be assumed unless and until proven otherwise by a confidence vote; ii) The unanimity principle : all members of the government speak and vote together in Parliament, save in situations where the Prime Minister and the Cabinet themselves make an exception such as a free vote or an ‘agreement to differ’; and iii) The confidentiality principle : unanimity, as a universally applicable situation, is a constitutional fiction, but one which must be maintained, and is said to allow frank ministerial discussion within the Cabinet and the Government. AH Birch (Supra note 35), at page 131  Ibid, at page 137  G Marshall, Ministerial responsibility, Oxford University Press (1989), at pages 2-4  35 34 A study conducted by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2007 examined the individual and collective performance of Ministers between 1945-1997. The findings of the study revealed that though the principle acted “as a form of protection for an individual Minister when policies pursued in his department are deemed to have failed”, it also induced a cost for being a member of the government. All the Ministers of the government, as a consequence of the principle of solidarity, were perceived as  jointly sharing the responsibility of policy failure. The doctrine of collective responsibility has evolved as one of the indispensable features of the parliamentary system of government and reflects the political engagement between government and Parliament. In a 1 parliamentary democracy, the nuances of the doctrine are political. To maintain the notion of “collegiality and coherence”, the ministers work as a team. In the Australian context, Wanna (2012) postulates that collective responsibility thereby acts as an under-flowing current necessary for the survival of a government: “To survive as a government, ministries must show they can maintain the confidence of the house, put up a credible front to their political opponents and the media, and as a working ministry find ways to deal with the business of state, much of which will involve making collective decisions and imposing  collegial executive authority.” Samuel Berlinski, Torun Dewan and Keith Dowding, “Individual and Collective Performance and the Tenure of  British Ministers 1945-1997”, London School of Economics & Political Science (February 2007), available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19281/1/Individual_and_Collective_Performance_and_the_Tenure_of_British_Ministers _1945-1997.pdf V Sudheesh Pai, “Is The River Rising Higher Than The Source? Nature Of Rules Business Directory Or 1  Mandatory?” Journal of Indian Law Institute (2011), at page 513 36 35 Granville Austin observes that the framers of India’s Constitution conceived that the democratic values of the Constitution would be achieved in  “the institutions of direct, responsible government” . The members of the Constituent Assembly borrowed the Parliamentary  Cabinet form of government from British constitutional theory and adopted it into our  Constitution. Though the Constituent Assembly did not adopt British constitutional conventions in the written form, collective responsibility of the  Cabinet was specifically incorporated into India’s constitutional framework. There is a direct relationship between the principle of collective responsibility and government accountability. This relationship is conceptualized in “The Oxford Companion to Politics in India”: “[A]ccountability can be defined in terms of outcomes rather than processes of government… It also includes the criterion of responsiveness to changes in circumstances that alter citizen needs and abilities… In other words, accountability refers to the extent to which actual policies and their implementation coincide with a normative ideal in terms of what they ought to be… In this broad sense, accountability amounts to evaluating the nature of governance itself, in outcome-oriented terms.”^ John Wanna, “Ministers as Ministries and the Logic of their Collective Action”, in Keith Dowding & Chris Lewis  (eds.), Ministerial Careers and Accountability in the Australian Commonwealth Government, ANU Press (2012), available at http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p191121/pdf/ch023.pdf Granville Austin (Supra note 3), at page 145  Ibid, at page 166  Ibid, at page 172  Dilip Mookherjee, “Government Accountability” in Niraja Gopal Jayal and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds.), The  Oxford Companion to Politics in India, Oxford University Press (2010), at page 477 37  The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (2016) adverts to several facets of collective responsibility: “Collective responsibility has several facets. First, ministers act as a common unit; cabinet decisions are binding on all ministers. Disagreements, if any, may be aired in private. Ministers, however, speak in one voice and stand by one another in Parliament and in public. Those that cannot reconcile themselves with particular government policies, or are unwilling to defend them in public, must resign. Conversely, decisions of particular ministers, unless overruled, are decisions of the government.” The principle has also been considered as a political component which  political parties in power invoke to maintain party discipline. Collective responsibility also exists in practice in situations where ministers have no knowledge of the actions taken by the subordinate officers of their respective departments: “Governing is a complex affair; hundreds of officials in dozens of departments make many decisions on a daily basis… These officials are also part of the executive, and ministers are responsible for those that serve in their departments… Ordinarily, ministers busy themselves with policy issues; matters of implementation are usually left to officials over whom ministers command little or no oversight. Yet, when they act, subordinates notionally do so on behalf of ministers. Ministers, therefore, cannot seek refuge in ignorance. Nor can they absolve themselves by pointing to their officers. Both inside and outside Parliament, they are accountable for their  departmental shortcomings.” 36 Collective responsibility, as a principle and practice, has been given effect authoritatively in several judgments of this Court. The Constitution Shubhankar Dam, “Executive” in Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds.), The Oxford  Handbook of the Indian Constitution, Oxford University Press (2016), at page 319 Ibid  Ibid, at page 320  38 Bench of this Court, in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v The State of  Punjab , examined the functions of the executive. The Court held that the President is “a formal or constitutional head of the executive” and that the “real executive powers” are vested in the Ministers or the Cabinet: “Our Constitution, though federal in its structure, is modelled on the British Parliamentary system where the executive is deemed to have the primary responsibility for the formulation of governmental policy and its transmission into law though the condition precedent to the exercise of this responsibility is its retaining the confidence of the legislative branch of the State… In the Indian Constitution, therefore, we have the same system of parliamentary executive as in England and the council of Ministers consisting, as it does, of the members of the legislature is, like the British Cabinet, “a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the legislative part of the State to the executive part”. The Cabinet enjoying, as it does, a majority in the legislature concentrates in itself the virtual control of both legislative and executive functions; and as the Ministers constituting the Cabinet are presumably agreed on fundamentals and act on the principle of collective responsibility, the most important questions of policy are all formulated by them.” (Emphasis supplied) The relationship between the responsibility of the Cabinet and individual Ministers was dealt with in a Constitution Bench decision in A Sanjeevi Naidu  v State of Madras : “The cabinet is responsible, to the legislature for every action taken in any of the ministries. That is the essence of joint responsibility. That does not mean that each and every decision must be taken by the cabinet. The political responsibility of the Council of Ministers does not and cannot predicate the personal responsibility of the Ministers to discharge all or any of the governmental functions. Similarly an individual Minister is responsible to the legislature for every action taken or omitted to be taken in his ministry. This (1955) 2 SCR 225  (1970) 1 SCC 443  39 again is a political responsibility and not personal responsibility.”  In Samsher Singh v State of Punjab , Chief Justice AN Ray (speaking for the majority) opined that Ministers must accept responsibility for every executive act: “In England, the sovereign never acts on his own responsibility. The power of the sovereign is conditioned by the practical rule that the Crown must find advisers to bear responsibility for his action. Those advisers must have the confidence of the House of Commons. This rule of English Constitutional law is incorporated in our Constitution. The Indian Constitution envisages a parliamentary and responsible form of Government at the Centre and in the States and not a Presidential form of Government. The powers of the Governor as the Constitutional head are not different.” A seven-judge Bench decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v Union of  India explained the substance of a government’s collective responsibility. All the Ministers are treated as one entity. A government could stay in office only so long as it commands the support and confidence of a majority of the Members of the Legislature. The government is politically responsible for the decisions and policies of each of the Ministers and of his department. The sanction against any government action was held to be embodied in the principle of collective responsibility, which is enforced by the “pressure of public opinion” and expressed specifically in terms of withdrawal of political support: (1974) 2 SCC 831  (1977) 4 SCC 608  40 “The object of collective responsibility is to make the whole body of persons holding Ministerial office collectively, or, if one may so put it, "vicariously" responsible for such acts of the others is are referable to their collective volition so that, even if an individual may not be personally responsible for it, yet, he will be deemed to share the responsibility with those who may have actually committed some wrong.”  The decision in Common Cause, A Registered Society v Union of India delivered by a three-judge Bench held that the concept of collective responsibility is essentially a “political concept” and that the country is governed by the party in power on the basis of the policies endorsed by its Cabinet. The Court held that the concept of collective responsibility has two meanings: “The first meaning which can legitimately be ascribed to it is that all members of a Govt. are unanimous in support of its policies and would exhibit that unanimity on public occasions although while formulating the policies, they might have expressed a different view in the meeting of the Cabinet. The other meaning is that Ministers, who had an opportunity to speak for or against the policies in the Cabinet are thereby personally and morally responsible for its success and failure.”  The decision in Subramanian Swamy v Manmohan Singh theorises that collective responsibility may be enforced only politically, thereby making its legal implications unclear. In this case, a Minister was charged with committing grave irregularities in the grant of telecom licenses. The appellant had provided documents to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) for the grant of (1999) 6 SCC 667  (2012) 3 SCC 64  41 sanction to prosecute under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This Court held: “In our view, the officers in the PMO and the Ministry of Law and Justice, were duty bound to apprise Respondent No. 1 [Prime Minister] about seriousness of allegations made by the Appellant… By the very nature of the office held by him, Respondent No. 1 is not expected to personally look into the minute details of each and every case placed before him and has to depend on his advisers and other officers. Unfortunately, those who were expected to give proper advice to Respondent No. 1 and place full facts and legal position before him failed to do so. We have no doubt that if Respondent No. 1 had been apprised of the true factual and legal position regarding the representation made by the Appellant, he would have surely taken appropriate decision and would not have allowed the matter to linger for a period of more than one year.” The decision implied that “individual ministerial decisions… do not always  generate collective legal responsibilities” . 37 Collective responsibility represents a seminal principle for modern  parliamentary democracies. Collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers ensures accountability to the legislature and to the electorate. Collective responsibility governs the democratic process, as it makes a government liable for every act it does. It envisages that a government works effectively to ensure and fulfil the interests of the public. It purports to ensure transparency in government decisions. Collective responsibility rests on the foundations of constitutional morality, which reflects constitutional ethics. The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Supra note 52), at page 320  See also Amarinder Singh v Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha, (2010) 6 SCC 113; Krishna Kumar  Singh v State of Bihar, (2017) 3 SCC 1; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Satpal Saini, 2017(2) SCALE 292 42 Aid and Advice 38 Collective responsibility under our Constitution is based on a “slightly  modified version” of the British cabinet system. There is a direct relationship between collective responsibility and the form of government envisaged by the Constitution. The President was designated as the titular head of government. The founding fathers and mothers of the Constitution adopted the convention which made the President generally bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers. This was explained by Dr B R Ambedkar, while introducing the Draft Constitution on 4th November 1948. “Under the Draft Constitution the President occupies the same position as the King under the English Constitution. He is the head of the State but not of the Executive. He represents the Nation but does not rule the Nation. He is the symbol of the nation. His place in the administration is that of a ceremonial device on a seal by which the nation's decisions are made known… The President of the Indian Union will be generally bound by the advice of his Ministers. He can do nothing contrary to their advice nor can he do anything without their advice. The President of the United States can dismiss any Secretary at any time. The President of the Indian Union has no power to do so long as his Ministers command a majority in Parliament… A democratic executive must satisfy two conditions - (1) It must be a stable executive and (2) it must be a responsible executive. Unfortunately it has not been possible so far to devise a system which can ensure both in equal degree… In England, where the Parliamentary system prevails, the assessment of responsibility of the Executive is both daily and periodic. The daily assessment is done by members of Parliament, through questions, Resolutions, No-confidence motions, Adjournment motions and Debates on Addresses… The daily assessment of responsibility which is not available under the American system is it is felt far more effective than the periodic assessment and far more necessary in a country Granville Austin (Supra note 3), at page 145  43 like India. The Draft Constitution in recommending the Parliamentary system of Executive has preferred more  responsibility to more stability. ” (Emphasis supplied) Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar agreed with Dr Ambedkar: “…that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People. If a President stands in the way of the Council of Ministers discharging that responsibility to the House he will be guilty of violation of the Constitution and he will be even liable to impeachment. Therefore it is merely a euphemistic way of saying that the President shall be guided by the advice of his Ministers in the exercise of his functions. This Council of Ministers will be collectively responsible to the House of the People, and the House of the People must meet all situations in regard to the budget, in regard to legislation, in regard to every matter connected with the administration of the country. Therefore, if the Council of Ministers is to discharge their responsibility, it will be the duty of the President to see that the Constitution is obeyed …”^ (Emphasis supplied) As the Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, Dr Rajendra Prasad expected the convention to be developed into a healthy practice in independent India: “We have had to reconcile the position of an elected President with an elected Legislature and, in doing so, we have adopted more or less the position of the British Monarch for the President… [H]is position is that of a Constitutional President. Then we come to the Ministers. They are of course responsible to the Legislature and tender advice to the President who is bound to act according to that advice. Although there are no specific provisions, so far as I know, in the Constitution itself making it binding on the President to accept the advice of his Ministers, it is hoped that the convention under which in England the King acts always on the advice of his Ministers will be established in this country also and, the President, not so much on account of the written word in the Constitution, but as the result th Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7 (4 November 1948)  Ibid  44 of this very healthy convention, will become a  Constitutional President in all matters. ” (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution makers envisaged and adopted a limited role for the President as the nominal head of the Indian State and imposed sanctions on his or her constitutional authority by making them bound by the decisions of the Council of Ministers generally. A similar role was adopted for the Governor in the States. 39 After the Constitution had come into force, this Court gave judicial  sanction to the convention. In U.N.R. Rao v Smt. Indira Gandhi , the Constitution Bench held: “It will be noticed that Article 74(1) is mandatory in form. We are unable to agree with the appellant that in the context the word "shall" should be read as “may”. Article 52 is mandatory. In other words there shall be a President of India.... The Constituent Assembly did not choose the Presidential system of Government. If we were to give effect to this contention of the appellant we would be changing the whole concept of the Executive. It would mean that the President need not have a Prime Minister and Ministers to aid and advise in the exercise of his functions. As there would be no 'Council of Ministers' nobody would be responsible to the House of the People. With the aid of advisers he would be able to rule the country at least till he is impeached under Article 61… Article 74(1) is mandatory and, therefore, the President cannot exercise the executive power without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. We must then harmonise the provisions of Article 75(3) with Article 74(1) and Article 75(2). Article 75(3) brings into existence what is usually called “Responsible Government”.” th Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 11 (26 November, 1949)  (1971) 2 SCC 63  45  In Samsher Singh v State of Punjab , while dealing with the question whether the Governor as the Constitutional or the formal head of the State can exercise powers and functions of appointment and removal of members of the subordinate judicial service personally, Chief Justice AN Ray delivered the majority judgment, holding that: “The President as well as the Governor is the constitutional or formal head. The President as well as the Governor exercises his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers, save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion. Wherever the Constitution requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for the exercise by the President or the Governor of any power or function, the satisfaction required by the Constitution is not the personal satisfaction of the President or Governor but the satisfaction of the President or Governor in the Constitutional sense in the Cabinet system of Government, that is, satisfaction of his Council of Ministers on whose aid and advice the President or the Governor generally exercise all his powers and functions. The decision of any Minister or officer under rules of business made under any of these two Articles 77(3) and 166(3) is the decision of the President or the Governor respectively. These articles did not provide for any delegation. Therefore, the decision of Minister or officer under the rules of business is the decision of the President or the Governor.” The Court summed up the position of law as follows: “[W]e hold that the President or the Governor acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head in the case of the Union and the Chief Minister at the head in the case of State in all matters which vests in the executive whether those functions are executive or legislative in character. Neither the President nor the Governor is to exercise the executive functions personally… Where the Governor has any discretion the Governor acts on his own judgment. The Governor exercises his discretion in harmony with his Council of Ministers.” (1974) 2 SCC 831  46 Justice Krishna Iyer, on behalf of himself and Justice PN Bhagwati, delivered a concurring opinion. 40 The convention that the President shall be bound by the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers was explicitly made a part of the Constitution by the forty-second constitutional amendment. By the amendment, Article 74(1) was amended to ensure that the President shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. Article 74(1) reads thus: “There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice.” The Forty-fourth Constitution Amendment added another proviso to Article 74 (1) so that the “President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration”. Therefore, the position which emerges is that where it has not been expressly provided, the executive head shall be bound by the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. This constitutional scheme, after the forty-second and forty-fourth amendments, has been judicially reaffirmed. Authoring the judgment of the  Constitution Bench in PU Myllai Hlychho v State of Mizoram , Justice KG Balakrishnan (as he then was) held that the “satisfaction” of the Governor (2005) 2 SCC 92  47 required by the Constitution for the exercise of any power or function is not the personal satisfaction of the Governor but a satisfaction in the constitutional sense under the Cabinet system of Government, i.e. on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Justice Madan B Lokur, while delivering the concurring opinion in the five- judge Constitution Bench decision in Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v  Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly , opined that the absence of the expression "his individual judgment" makes it apparent that the Governor would always be bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in matters where he/she is permitted under the Constitution to act "in his discretion". 41 Collective responsibility and aid and advice are mutually reinforcing principles. Each of them and both in conjunction affirm and enhance the democratic values on which the Cabinet form of government is founded. Collective responsibility ensures that government speaks as one political entity which owes allegiance to the elected representatives of the people. By ensuring that government is responsible in its decision making to the legislature, the principle of collective responsibility fosters a responsive and accountable government. Modern government, with its attendant complexities, comprises of several components and constituent elements. They include Ministers who are also elected as members of the legislature and unelected (2016) 8 SCC 1  48 public officials who work on issues of daily governance. Discussion and dialogue are accepting of dissent. In a system of constitutional governance, collective decision making must allow room for differences. A synthesis can emerge in government, when political maturity and administrative wisdom combine in arriving at acceptable solutions to the problems of governance. Collective responsibility allows for and acknowledges differences in perception and ideology. Yet, what the doctrine does is to place a decision taken by a constituent part of the government as a decision of the government. All Ministers are bound by a decision taken by one of them or their departments. In terms of its accountability to the legislature, government is treated as one decision making unit so that the politics of decision making and administrative divergences do not dilute from the responsibility which government owes as a political unit to the legislature. This is crucial to ensuring that government is responsive to the aspirations of the people in whom political sovereignty resides.  42 In Kihoto Hollohan v Zachillhu , Chief Justice Venkatachaliah speaking for this Court had held thus: “Parliamentary democracy envisages that matters involving implementation of policies of the Government should be discussed by the elected representatives of the people. Debate, discussion and persuasion are, therefore, the means and essence of the democratic process. During the debates the Members put forward different points of view. Members belonging to the same political party may also have, and may give expression to, differences of opinion on a matter. Not often the view expressed by the Members in the House have 1992 SCC Supp. (2) 651  49 resulted in substantial modification, and even the withdrawal, of the proposals under consideration. Debate and expression of different points of view, thus, serve an essential and healthy purpose in the functioning of Parliamentary democracy.” 43 The doctrine of aid and advice enhances the commitment to the same democratic values which form the basis of collective responsibility. The mandate that a titular head of government must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers ensures that the form of democratic governance (decision making in the name of a titular head) is subservient to its substance, which mandates that the real authority to take decisions must reside in the elected arm of the government. The doctrine of aid and advice enhances accountability and responsive government – besides representative government – by ensuring that the real authority to take decisions resides in the Council of Ministers, which owes ultimate responsibility to the people, through a legislature to whom the Council is responsible. Collective responsibility and the aid and advice doctrine must not be construed as disjunctive but together constitute integral parts of the discourse in ensuring the strength of and commitment to democracy. F The Nature of Executive Power 44 While the legislative power in relation to the NCT is defined in clauses 2 and 3, its executive power forms the subject matter of clause 4 of Article 50 239AA. Clause 4 institutionalises the position of the Council of Ministers with a Chief Minister as its head. The constitutional role which is ascribed to the Council of Ministers is to aid and advise the Lieutenant Governor “in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters with respect to which the legislative assembly has power to make laws”. There are three salient features of the executive power which is vested in the Council of Ministers. Firstly, the executive power is co-extensive with the legislative power of the legislative assembly. The executive power extends to all subjects upon which the assembly can legislate. The executive power of the Council of Ministers does not extend to matters on which the legislative assembly cannot legislate. What is beyond the legislative competence of the Assembly is ultra vires the executive powers of the Council of Ministers. Secondly, the delineation of the executive power in clause 4 defines, at the same time, the relationship between the Council of Ministers (headed by the Chief Minister) and the Lieutenant Governor. The Council of Ministers aids and advises the Lieutenant Governor; the corollary being that the Lieutenant Governor has to act on the basis of the aid and advise tendered by the Council. Thirdly, the exception to the aid and advice principle in the substantive part of clause 4 is in respect of those matters in which the Lieutenant Governor is required to act in its discretion “by or under any law”. In other words, save and except in regard to areas which are reserved for the exercise of his discretion, the Lieutenant Governor must act on the aid and advice tendered to him by the Council of Ministers. 51 45 The proviso to clause 4 forms the bone of contention. The proviso envisages a situation where the Lieutenant Governor has a difference of opinion with the Council of Ministers “on any matter”. In such a case, the proviso entails the course of action which the Lieutenant Governor must follow. The Lieutenant Governor is under a constitutional mandate to refer the difference of opinion to the President for decision. As a consequence, the Lieutenant Governor must necessarily act according to the decision “given thereon” by the President. Pending a decision by the President, the Lieutenant Governor is empowered to take action or to issue directions where the matter is of such an emergent nature as to require immediate action. The heart of the matter turns upon interpreting the expression “difference of opinion” and the words “on any matter”. Clause 4 does not specify what kind of a difference of opinion would warrant a reference to the President. Nor for that matter, does it explain the nature of the matter on which a difference of opinion is contemplated. Before we interpret the ambit of the proviso to clause 4, one facet is clear. Where a difference of opinion has arisen, warranting a reference to the President, the proviso leaves the course of action to be followed by the Lieutenant Governor beyond doubt. In a situation where the conditions under the proviso exist, the Lieutenant Governor has to refer the matter to the President and must abide by the decision of the President. Reading the substantive part of clause 4 and the proviso, it is thus evident that the Lieutenant Governor has two courses of action to follow. Primarily, under the substantive part of clause 4, the Lieutenant Governor is bound by the aid and 52 advice of the Council of Ministers (the only exception being where under a provision of law, he has to act according to his own discretion). However, the embargo upon the Lieutenant Governor acting otherwise than on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers is lifted only to enable him to refer a difference of opinion on any matter for a decision by the President. In other words, the Lieutenant Governor must either abide by the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers or, in the event of a difference of opinion, reserve it for a decision by the President and thereupon be bound to act in accordance with the decision which has been rendered by the President. Pending the decision by the President, the proviso enables the Lieutenant Governor to attend to a situation requiring immediate action. 46 Before elucidating the nature and ambit of the relationship between the (i) Council of Ministers and the Lieutenant Governor; and (ii) the Lieutenant Governor and the President, it would be necessary to advert to some of the other provisions of Article 239AA which have a bearing on those relationships. The Lieutenant Governor, as we have noted earlier, is appointed by the President under Article 239(1) read with Article 239AA(1). The Chief Minister is appointed by the President, while the other ministers are appointed by the President on the advice of the Chief Minister. They hold office during the pleasure of the President (clause 5). The concept of collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the legislative assembly is expressly embodied in clause 6. A comparative analysis of the provisions of the Constitution relating to the Council of Ministers in the Union and the States indicates that in the case of the NCT, Article 239AA has engrafted the fundamental precept of the 53 collective responsibility of an elected government in a cabinet form of government to the elected legislature. Creating an executive power in government which is co-extensive with the legislative power of the elected legislature and the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the legislature are intrinsic to the cabinet form of government. 47 Parliament has, by clause 7 of Article 239AA, been empowered to make provisions to implement and to supplement the other provisions of that Article. Any law enacted by Parliament to do so would not amount to a constitutional amendment within the meaning of Article 368 even if it amends or has the effect of amending any provision of the Constitution. 48 Article 239AB enunciates the course of action which the President is empowered to follow where there has been a failure of constitutional machinery in the NCT. Article 239AB provides as follows: “239AB. Provision in case of failure of constitutional machinery.—If the President, on receipt of a report from the Lieutenant Governor or otherwise, is satisfied— (a) that a situation has arisen in which the administration of the National Capital Territory cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of article 239AA or of any law made in pursuance of that article; or (b) that for the proper administration of the National Capital Territory it is necessary or expedient so to do, the President may by order suspend the operation of any provision of article 239AA or of all or any of the provisions of any law made in pursuance of that article for such period and subject to such conditions as may be specified in such law and make such incidental and consequential provisions as may appear to him to be necessary or expedient for administering the National Capital Territory in accordance with the provisions of article 239 and article 239AA.” 54 Under Article 239AB, the President is empowered to suspend the operation of (i) any provision of Article 239AA; and of (ii) any provisions of law made in pursuance of that Article and to make provisions to administer the NCT, in accordance with Articles 239 and 239AA where, upon a report from the Lieutenant Governor, the President is satisfied that: (a) A situation has arisen where the administration of the NCT cannot be carried on in accordance with Article 239AA or a law made in pursuance of it; or (b) For the proper administration of the NCT. Article 239B as already noted confers power upon the administrator of Puducherry to promulgate ordinances during the recess of the legislature. This power is also conferred upon the Lieutenant Governor of the NCT by clause 8 of Article 239AA. Under Article 241, Parliament is empowered to constitute a High Court for a Union territory. 49 In understanding the nature of the executive power in relation to the NCT of Delhi and the relationship between the Council of Ministers and the Lieutenant Governor on one hand, and the Lieutenant Governor and the President on the other, it is necessary to draw a comparison with the provisions of the Constitution governing the Union and the States. Part V of the Constitution (consisting of Articles 52 to 151) deals with the Union; Part VI (comprising of Articles 152 to 237) deals with the States and Part VIII (comprising of Articles 239 to 241) deals with the Union territories. Parts V and VI contain similar elucidations with some important variations. Both Part V and 55 Part VI deal with the executive, the legislative power of the President, and the judiciary. Part V covers the Union judiciary, while Part VI cover the High Courts and the subordinate courts in the States. 50 Article 52 provides for the President. Article 53 stipulates that the executive power of the Union shall be vested in the President and shall be exercised by him directly or through subordinate officers in accordance with the Constitution. Under Article 73, the executive power of the Union extends (a) to matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws; and (b) to the exercise of rights, authority and jurisdiction exercisable by the Union government under a treaty or agreement. Article 73 provides thus: “73. Extent of executive power of the Union.— (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend— (a) to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws; and (b) to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any treaty or agreement: Provided that the executive power referred to in sub-clause (a) shall not, save as expressly provided in this Constitution or in any law made by Parliament, extend in any State to matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has also power to make laws. (2) Until otherwise provided by Parliament, a State and any officer or authority of a State may, notwithstanding anything in this article, continue to exercise in matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for that State such executive power or functions as the State or officer or authority thereof could exercise immediately before the commencement of this Constitution.” 56 The proviso to Article 73(1) stipulates that except as may be expressly provided by Constitution or in any law which has been enacted by Parliament, the executive power of the Union under sub clause (a) of clause 1 does not extend in a State to matters with respect to which the legislature of the State has also power to make laws. The effect of the proviso is that the executive power of the Union does not extend to matters in the Concurrent List, since these are matters on which State legislatures also have the power to make laws. Article 74(1) provides for a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the head. The function of the Council of Ministers is “to aid and advice the President”. The President is, in the exercise of his functions, under a mandate to “act in accordance with such advice”. Article 74 provides as follows: “74. Council of Ministers to aid and advise President.— (1) There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President who shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice: Provided that the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration. (2) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the President shall not be inquired into in any court.” Article 77 provides for the conduct of the business of the Union government: “77. Conduct of business of the Government of India.— (1) All executive action of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President. 57 (2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the President shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the President, and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the President. (3) The President shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business.” By and under Article 77(1) the executive action of the Union government is expressed to be taken in the name of the President. Under clause 2, orders and instruments made and executed in the name of the President are to be authenticated in such a manner as may be specified in the rules made by the President. Clause 3 enables the President to make rules for the transaction of the business of the government and for the allocation of governmental business among ministers. Article 78 embodies the basic duty of the head of the elected government in a Cabinet form of government to communicate with and to furnish information to the President. Article 78 provides as follows : “78. Duties of Prime Minister as respects the furnishing of information to the President, etc.— It shall be the duty of the Prime Minister— (a) to communicate to the President all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to the administration of the affairs of the Union and proposals for legislation; (b) to furnish such information relating to the administration of the affairs of the Union and proposals for legislation as the President may call for; and (c) if the President so requires, to submit for the consideration of the Council of Ministers any matter on which a decision has been taken by a Minister but which has not been considered by the Council.” 58 These provisions of the Constitution institutionalise the relationship between the President and the Union Cabinet and re-affirm the position of the President as the titular head of state. The President must act on the aid and advise tendered by the Union Cabinet. The executive power of the Union is co-extensive with the legislative power of Parliament. In a cabinet form of government, it is the Council of Ministers which owes collective responsibility to the House of the People. Collective responsibility, as a constitutional doctrine, ensures accountability to the sovereign will of the people who elect the members of the legislature. Though all executive action is expressed to be taken in the name of the President and orders and instruments made and executed in the name of the President are authenticated in the manner prescribed by rules, the constitutional position of the President is of a titular head. The use of the expression “in the exercise of his functions” in Article 74(1) is formalistic in nature since the substance of executive power is vested in and conferred upon the government constituted through the Council of Ministers which owes collective responsibility to Parliament. The proviso to Article 74(1) stipulates that while the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider his advice, once that has been done, the President is bound to act on the advice tendered after reconsideration. 51 The position of the President as a titular head of State is evidenced in the constitutional provisions which define the relationship between the President and Parliament. Under Article 111, a Bill is presented to the 59 President for assent upon being passed by the Houses of Parliament. Under the proviso to Article 111, the President is empowered to return a Bill for reconsideration (if it is not a Money Bill). Upon being reconsidered, if the Bill is passed again by the Houses of Parliament (with or without amendment) the President shall, thereafter, not withhold assent. 52 In Part VI of the Constitution, the provisions which define the role of the Governor in relation to the states indicate that the Governor is also a titular head of government in each state. The executive power of the State is vested in the Governor under Article 154. The Governor is appointed by the President under Article 155 and holds office during the pleasure of the President under Article 156. The executive power of the state is co-extensive with the legislative power, by virtue of Article 162. However, in relation to matters on which both the legislature of a State and Parliament can enact law, the executive power of the state is subject to and limited by the conferment of executive power upon the Union by the Constitution or by a law enacted by Parliament. In the States, Article 163 postulates a Council of Ministers with the Chief Ministers as its head to aid and advice the Governor in the exercise of his functions, except where the Governor is under the Constitution required to exercise any of the functions in his own discretion. Where a question arises as to whether the Governor is required to act in his discretion, Article 163(2) makes the decision of the Governor final. While the Chief Minister is appointed by the Governor under Article 164, other ministers are appointed by the 60 Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister and hold office during the pleasure of the Governor. Article 164(2) incorporates the principle of collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the legislative assembly of the State. Article 166 contains a provision dealing with the conduct of the business of the government of the State which is pari materia with Article 77. Similarly, Article 167 incorporates the duty of the Chief Minister to communicate with and to furnish information on the affairs of the state to the Governor, in terms similar to Article 78. 53 While assessing the status of the National Capital Territory under Article 239AA, certain significant aspects need to be borne in mind: (i) Article 239AA is a result of the exercise of the constituent power under Article 368 of the Constitution. By and as a result of Article 239AA, special provisions have been made for the National Capital Territory of Delhi. These provisions are not an emanation of an act of ordinary legislation; (ii) For the NCT of Delhi, the exercise of the constituent power has resulted in a constitutionally entrenched status both for the legislature and for the Council of Ministers. The legislative assembly is elected by the process of direct election. The legislative assembly has the power to enact law in respect of matters in the State List of the Seventh Schedule (save for the excepted matters in Entries 1, 2 and 18 and Entries 64, 65 and 66 insofar as they relate to entries 1, 2 and 18). Yet, while the legislative 61 powers which have been conferred on the legislative assembly extend to the State List (save for the excepted entries) and the Concurrent List, Parliament has been empowered to legislate both on matters falling within the State and the Concurrent lists. Parliament possesses overriding legislative powers over matters falling in both the State and Concurrent lists for the NCT; and (iii) Article 239AA(4) provides constitutional status to the Council of Ministers and embodies the entrenched principle in a cabinet form of government that a titular head of state acts on the aid and advice tendered by his ministers, who owe collective responsibility to the legislature. In setting up a structure of governance in which there is a legislature elected through the process of direct election and an executive arm which is collectively responsible to the legislature and which, in the discharge of its functions, tenders aid and advise to Lieutenant Governor on matters which are co-extensive with legislative power, the Constitution has incorporated the basic principles of the cabinet form of government. The adoption of these special features of the cabinet form of government in relation to the NCT must weigh while interpreting Article 239AA. 54 At the same time, the constitutional scheme indicates several features in relation to the NCT which have resulted in the conferment of a constitutional status which falls short of the trappings of full statehood. They include the following : 62 (a) The position of the National Capital Territory is subsumed under Part VIII which applies to Union territories. Delhi is and continues to be a Union territory governed by Part VIII; (b) Every Union territory is, under Article 239(1), administered by the President acting through an Administrator. The Administrator appointed under Article 239(1) is designated as the Lieutenant Governor for the NCT under Article 239AA(1). Article 239 is the source of the constitutional power to appoint the Lieutenant Governor for the NCT; (c) The position that the application of Article 239 is not excluded in relation to the NCT is made evident by Article 239AB. In a situation in which the President is empowered to suspend the provisions of Article 239AA, where the administration of the NCT cannot be carried on in accordance with Article 239AA, or of any law made in pursuance of that Article, the President is empowered to make consequential provisions for administering the territory in accordance with Article 239 as well as Article 239AA. Hence, the provisions of Article 239AA cannot be read disjunctive from Article 239(1); (d) The administration of a Union territory by the President acting through an Administrator is firstly subject to Parliamentary law and secondly, to such extent as he thinks fit. Hence the nature of 63 the administration of a Union territory, including NCT is subject to these two provisions; (e) The position of the NCT as distinguished with the constitutional position of a State finds expression in the contrast between Article 239AB and Article 356 on the other. Upon the exercise of the power under Article 356, the President “can assume to himself” the functions of the government of the State and declare that the powers of the legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament. In contrast, Section 239AB empowers the President to suspend the operation of Article 239AA or of any provision of law made under it and to thereupon make consequential provisions for the administration of the NCT in accordance with Articles 239 and 239AA; and (f) While emphasising the binding character of the aid and advise tendered to the President, or as the case may be, the Governor, the constitutional position in relation to the Lieutenant Governor contains a distinct variation. Article 74(1) embodies, in relation to the President of India, the binding character of the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers by specifying that the President shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice. Upon the President requiring the Council of Ministers to reconsider their advice, the President is bound to act upon the advice which is tendered after reconsideration. Similarly, 64 in the case of Governors in the states, Article 163(1) provides for a Council of Ministers “to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions”, except where the Governor is required by the Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion. Article 239AA(4) incorporates in its substantive segment the constitutional principle of aid and advice which the Council of Ministers tenders to the Lieutenant Governor in the exercise of his functions. But, in relation to the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers, the proviso to Article 239AA(4) has engrafted a special provision which does not have a corollary in Article 163. While under Article 163(1), the Governor is required to act upon the aid and advice tendered (save in matters which the Constitution entrusts to the discretion of the Governor), the proviso to Article 239AA(4) contemplates an area where the binding character of the aid and advice tendered to the Lieutenant Governor is lifted in the event of a “difference of opinion.. on any matter”. 55 In resolving the area within which the Lieutenant Governor can refer the difference of opinion with the Council of Ministers of the NCT to the President, it would be necessary to balance on the one hand the constitutional principles of the cabinet form of government adopted in Article 239AA, while on the other hand leaving open the latitude, which has been created by the proviso to clause 4 considering the special status of the NCT. The former consideration 65 would need the court to pursue a line of interpretation which does not detract from the fundamental principles of representative government. An elected government reflects in a democracy, the aspirations of the people who vote to elect their representatives. The elected representatives carry the responsibility of giving expression to the political will of the electorate. In a democratic form of government, real power must subsist in the elected arms of the State. Ministers of government are elected representatives of the people. They are accountable to the people through their collective responsibility to the legislature. As a collective entity, the Council of Ministers owes responsibility to the legislature. The relationship between the Council of Ministers and the titular head of State is governed by the over-arching consideration that real power and substantive accountability is vested in the elected representatives of the people. The principle of aid and advice is in a constitutional sense intended to strengthen the constitutional value of representative government and of governance which is accountable and responsive to the electorate. While bearing these fundamental constitutional principles of a democracy in mind, a balance has to be struck with the second of the above elements which recognises the special status of the NCT. The NCT represents the aspirations of the residents of its territory. But it embodies, in its character as a capital city the political symbolism underlying national governance. The circumstances pertaining to the governance of the NCT may have a direct and immediate impact upon the collective welfare of the nation. This is the rationale for the exclusion of the subjects of public order, police and land from 66 the legislative power and necessarily from the executive power of the NCT. These considerations would necessarily require a careful balance between the two principles. Each of the two principles must be given adequate weight in producing a result which promotes the basic constitutional values of participatory democracy, while at the same time preserving fundamental concerns in the secure governance of the nation. G Constitutional History of the NCT 56 Mr Gopal Subramanium, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the NCT, has submitted that the NCT occupies a unique position in our constitutional jurisprudence. It has been contended by Mr Subramanium that the NCT, though it remains a Union Territory, has come to acquire various th characteristics that were, prior to the 69 constitutional amendment, considered under the Constitution to be characteristics solely of States. As a consequence, the learned Senior Counsel has further contended, NCT has become a constitutional hybrid with powers that were formerly only found in full-fledged States of the Union and therefore enjoys far more powers than the government of any other Union Territory. On the contrary, Mr Maninder Singh, the learned Additional Solicitor General has submitted that the NCT finds its place as a Union Territory in Part II of Schedule I of the Constitution. It has been contended on his behalf that the NCT has historically remained a centrally administered territory with the status of a Union Territory in the Constitution and that it continues to remain a Union Territory even after the th 69 constitutional amendment. 67 57 In order to interpret the constitutional scheme envisaged for the NCT, this Court must analyze the constitutional history and the evolution of the structure of governance for the NCT as brought into existence, by various enactments, from time to time. The Government of Part C States Act, 1951 58 The first Schedule to the Constitution originally contained Part A, Part B and Part C States. After the adoption of the Constitution, The Government of Part C States Act, 1951 was enacted. Section 2(c) defined the expression Delhi thus: “Section 2(c) “Delhi”, except where it occurs in the expression “State of Delhi”, means such area in the State of Delhi as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify.” Section 3 provided for the constitution of a legislative assembly for each state governed by the law. It provided for the establishment of legislative assemblies for the states of Ajmer, Bhopal, Coorg, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh and Vindhya Pradesh. The Chief Commissioner was entrusted with the power, under Section 8(2), to prorogue and dissolve the assembly. Section 12 conferred upon the Chief Commissioner the right to address and send messages to the assembly. Section 21 of the Act defined the extent of legislative power: “Section 21- Extent of legislative power 68 “(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Legislative Assembly of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or in the Concurrent List: Provided that the Legislative Assembly of the State of Delhi shall not have power to make laws with respect to any of the following matters, namely:- (a) Public order; (b) Police including railway police; (c) The constitution and powers of municipal corporations and other local authorities, of improvement trusts and of water supply, drainage, electricity, transport and other public utility authorities in Delhi or in New Delhi; (d) Lands and buildings vested in or in the possession of the Union which are situated in Delhi or in New Delhi including all rights in or over such lands and buildings, the collection of rents therefrom and the transfer and alienation thereof; (e) Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters mentioned in the foregoing clauses; (f) Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, with respect to any of the said matters; and (g) Fees in respect of any of the said matters other than fees taken in any court.” However, sub Section 2 of Section 21 provided that sub section 1 will not derogate from the power conferred upon Parliament by the Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for a state. The sanction of the Chief Commissioner was required under Section 23 for certain legislative proposals, these being: “(a) Constitution and organisation of the court of the Judicial Commissioner; (b)Jurisdiction and powers of the court of the Judicial Commissioner with respect to any of the matters in the State List or in the Concurrent List; 69 (c) State Public Service Commission.” 59 A Bill passed by the legislative assembly was, under Section 26, required to be presented to the Chief Commissioner. The Chief Commissioner in turn was obligated to reserve the Bill for consideration of the President. If the President directed the Chief Commissioner to submit the Bill to the Assembly for reconsideration, the Assembly was required to consider the suggestions and, if the Bill was passed, it had to be presented again to the President for reconsideration. 60 Section 36 provided for a Council of Ministers: “Council of Ministers (1) There shall be a Council of Ministers in each State with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Chief Commissioner in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters, with respect to which the Legislative Assembly of the State has power to make law except in so far as he is required by any law to exercise any judicial or quasi- judicial functions: Provided that, in case of difference of opinion between the Chief Commissioner and his Ministers on any matter, the Chief Commissioner shall refer it to the President for decision and act according to the decision given thereon by the President, and pending such decision it shall be competent for the Chief Commissioner in any case where the matter is in his opinion so urgent that it is necessary for him to take immediate action, to take such action or to give such direction in the matter as he deems necessary: Provided further that in the State of Delhi every decision taken by a Minister or by the Council in relation to any matter concerning New Delhi shall be subject to the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner, and nothing in this sub-section shall be construed as preventing the Chief Commissioner in case of any difference of opinion 70 between him and his Ministers from taking such action in respect of the administration of New Delhi as he in his discretion considers necessary. (2) The Chief Commissioner shall, when he is present, preside at meetings of the Council of Ministers, and, when the Chief Commissioner is not present, the Chief Minister or, if he is also not present, such other Minister as may be determined by the rules made under sub-section (1) of section 38 shall preside over meetings of the Council. (3) If any question arises as to whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Chief Commissioner is required by any law to exercise-any judicial or quasi- judicial functions, the decision of the Chief Commissioner thereon shall be final. (4) If in the State of Delhi any question arises as to whether any matter is or is not a matter concerning New Delhi, the decision of the Chief Commissioner thereon shall be final: Provided that in case of any difference of opinion between the Chief Commissioner and his Ministers on such question, it shall be referred for the decision of the President and his decision shall be final. (5) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the Chief Commissioner shall not be inquired into in any court.” Section 36(1) incorporated the aid and advice principle. But where there was a difference of opinion between the Chief Commissioner and his ministers “on any matter”, the Chief Commissioner was required to refer it to the President and to act in accordance with the decision of the President. Insofar as the State of Delhi was concerned, under the second proviso every decision of a Minister or the Council of Ministers in relation to New Delhi was subject to the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner. In the event there was a difference of opinion, the Chief Commissioner had the authority to take such action for the administration of New Delhi “as he in his discretion considers necessary”. The 71 Chief Commissioner would also preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers. If a question arose as to whether any matter concerned New Delhi, the decision of the Chief Commissioner was to be final and if there was a difference of opinion, it was to be referred to the President for his decision. 61 Section 36 assumes significance in the context of the present controversy, because its provisions must be distinguished from the position which was adopted when the sixty ninth amendment was introduced in Article 239AA into the Constitution. Four features of Section 36 stand out : first, the requirement of the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner to every decision concerning New Delhi; second, empowerment of the Chief Commissioner, in the event of a difference of opinion to act in his discretion for the administration of New Delhi; third, the mandate of the Chief Commissioner being required to preside over meetings of the Council of Ministers; and fourth, the requirement of referring any difference of opinion on whether a matter concerned New Delhi to the President whose decision would be final. Article 239AA has made a departure in critical matters from the position as it obtained under Section 36. First, (unlike the second proviso to Section 36(1)), Article 239AA(4) does not mandate that every decision of the Council of Ministers should be subject to the concurrence of the Lieutenant Governor; second, the provision (in the second proviso to Section 36(1)) empowering the Chief Commissioner to act in his discretion on the administration of New Delhi is absent in Article 239AA(4) except where the Lieutenant Governor on a 72 reference of a difference of opinion to the President has to deal with an emergent situation; and third, neither in Article 239AA nor in the GNCTD Act (and for that matter in the Transaction of Business Rules) has it been provided that the Lieutenant Governor would preside over meetings of the Council of Ministers. Section 36 of the erstwhile Act of 1951 created a hierarchical structure which placed the Chief Commissioner as an authority superior to the Council of Ministers in the exercise of its executive power. Every decision of the Council of Ministers concerning New Delhi was subject to the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner. The absence of such a provision in Article 239AA cannot be regarded as a matter of no constitutional significance. Historically the constituent body had before it a model which was created by the parliamentary enactment of 1951 but advisedly did not choose to engraft it into the provisions of Article 239AA when the sixty ninth amendment was adopted. 62 The provisions of the Constitution relating to Part A, Part B and Part C  States were abrogated with the adoption of the seventh amendment in 1956. Section 130 of the States Reorganization Act 1956 repealed the 1951 Act. The result has been explained in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the 1956 Act. “… The main features of the reorganization proposed are the abolition of the existing constitutional distinction between Part A, Part B and Part C States, the establishment of two categories for the component units of the Union to be called the States and the abolition of the institution of the Raj The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956  73 Pramukh consequent on the disappearance of the Part B States…”. Consequent upon the seventh amendment to the Constitution, the expression “the Union territories specified in the First Schedule” was inserted into the Constitution. Delhi came to be described as a Union territory upon being included as an entry in the First Schedule. By virtue of Section 12 of the 1956 Act, as from the appointed day, in the First Schedule to the Constitution for Part A, Part B and Part C States, the parts which followed were substituted. Delhi was described in serial number 1 of Part C as “the territory which immediately before commencement of the Constitution was comprised in the Chief Commissioner’s Province of Delhi”. Delhi became a Union Territory governed by the Union government through an Administrator who was appointed by the President.  63 Article 239A was introduced by the fourteenth amendment in 1962, as a result of which Parliament was authorized to create, for certain Union territories, local legislatures and/ or a Council of Ministers. The Government of Union Territories Act, 1963 The Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act 1962  74 64 On 10 May 1963, the Government of Union Territories Act 1963 was enacted. The Act of 1963 defined the expression Administrator in Section 2(a) as : “(a) "Administrator" means the administrator of the Union territory appointed by the President under article 239;” Section 3 provided for a legislative assembly. Section 18 provided for the extent of legislative power in the following terms: “18. Extent of legislative power. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Legislative Assembly of the Union territory may make laws for the whole or any part of the Union territory with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution in so far as any such matter is applicable in relation to Union territories. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall derogate from the powers conferred on Parliament by the Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for the Union territory or any part thereof.” Sub Section 1 of Section 18 was similar in language to Article 239AA(3)(a), without the exclusion of matters relating to Entries 1, 2 and 18 and Entries 64, 65 and 66. Sub Section 2 was similar in language to Article 239AA(3)(b). Section 21 provided that if there was any inconsistency between a law made by Parliament and a law made by the legislative assembly, the law made by Parliament would prevail to the extent of repugnancy (this provision is similar in nature to Article 239AA(3)(c). Section 44 contained the following provision for the Council of Ministers: “44. Council of Ministers. 75 (1) There shall be a Council of Ministers in each Union territory with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Administrator in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters with respect to which the Legislative Assembly of the Union territory has power to make laws except in so far as he is required by or under this Act to act in his discretion or by or under any law to exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial functions: Provided that, in case of difference of opinion between the Administrator and his Ministers on any matter, the Administrator shall refer it to the President for decision and act according to the decision given thereon by the President, and pending such decision it shall be competent for the Administrator in any case where the matter is in his opinion so urgent that it is necessary for him to take immediate action, to take such action or to give such direction in the matter as he deems necessary: … (3) If and in so far as any special responsibility of the Administrator is involved under this Act, he shall, in the exercise of his functions, act in his discretion.” Section 44 (1) and Article 239AA are pari materia (with the difference that clause 4 of Article 239AA pegs the strength of the Council of Ministers to not more than ten per cent of the total number of members of the legislative assembly). At the same time, it must also be noted that sub section 3 of Section 44 recognised the power of the Administrator, to act in his discretion where “any special responsibility” of the Administrator was involved under the Act. This provision in sub section 3 of Section 44 was in addition to the reservation made in Section 44(1) in respect of those matters where the administrator was under the Act, required to act in his discretion or was to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions under any law. The “special 76 responsibility” provision of sub-section 3 of Section 44 does not find a parallel in Article 239AA. The Delhi Administration Act, 1966 65 On 2 June 1966, Parliament enacted the Delhi Administration Act 1966, “to provide for the administration of the Union territory of Delhi”. The Act, in Section 3, constituted a Metropolitan Council, consisting of 56 persons to be directly elected. However, the Central government was empowered to nominate five persons to the Metropolitan Council. The tenure of the Metropolitan Council, unless it was sooner dissolved, was to be five years. Under Section 22 the Metropolitan Council could make recommendations, on certain matters, insofar as they related to Delhi. Section 22 provided as follows: “(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Metropolitan Council shall have the right to discuss, and make recommendations with respect to, the following matters in so far as they relate to Delhi, namely: - (a) proposals for undertaking legislation with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution in so far as any such matter is applicable in relation to Union territories (hereafter referred to as the State List and the Concurrent List); (b) proposals for extension to Delhi of any enactment in force in a State relatable to any matter enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List; (c) proposals for legislation referred to it by the Administrator with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List; 77 (d) the estimated receipts and expenditure pertaining to Delhi to be credited to and to be made from, the Consolidated Fund of India; and notwithstanding anything contained in the Delhi Development Act, 1957, the estimated receipts and expenditure of the Delhi Development Authority; (e) matters of administration involving general policy and schemes of development in so far as they relate to matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List; (f) any other matter referred to it by the Administrator. (2) The recommendations of the Metropolitan Council, after having been duly considered by the Executive Council, shall, wherever necessary, be forwarded by the Administrator to the Central Government with the views, if any, expressed thereon by the Executive Council.” The recommendations of the Metropolitan Council after they were considered by the Executive Council were to be forwarded to the Central government. The function of the Executive Council was to “assist and advise” the Administrator in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters in the State List or Concurrent List. Conscious as Parliament was of the use of the expression “aid and advise” in Articles 74 and 163 of the Constitution; and in Section 36(1) of the Government of Part C States Act 1951; Section 44 of the Government of Union Territories Act 1963, carefully adopted the expression “assist and advise” in Section 27. Section 27 was in the following terms: “(1) There shall be an Executive Council, consisting of not more than four members one of whom shall be designated as the Chief Executive Councilor and others as the Executive Councilors, to assist and advise the Administrator in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List, except in so far as he is required by or under this Act to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion or by or under any law to exercise any judicial or quasi- judicial functions: 78 Provided that, in case of difference of opinion between the Administrator and the members of the Executive Council on any matter, other than a matter in respect of which he is required by or under this Act to act in his discretion, the Administrator shall refer it to the President for decision and act according to the decision given thereon by the President, and pending such decision, it shall be competent for the Administrator in any case where the matter is in his opinion so urgent that it is necessary for him to take immediate action, to take such action or to give such direction in the matter as he deems necessary: Provided further that every decision taken by a member of the Executive Council or by the Executive Council in relation to any matter concerning New Delhi shall be subject to the concurrence of the Administrator, and nothing in this sub-section shall be construed as preventing the Administrator in case of any difference of opinion between him and the members of the Executive Council from taking any action in respect of the administration of New Delhi as he, in his discretion, considers necessary. (2) The Administrator shall preside at every meeting of the Executive Council, but if he is obliged to absent himself from any meeting of the Council owing to illness or any other cause, the Chief Executive Councilor shall preside at the meeting of the Council. (3) The functions of the Administrator with respect to law and order in Delhi including the organization and discipline of police force, and with respect to such other matters as the President may it from time to time specify in this behalf, shall be exercised by him in his discretion. (4) If any question arises as to whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Administrator is by or under this Act required to act in his discretion, the decision of the Administrator thereon shall be final. (5) If any question arises as, to whether any matter is or is not a matter as respects which the Administrator is required by or under any law to exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial functions, the decision of the Administrator thereon shall be final. (6) If any question arises as to whether any matter is or is not a matter concerning New Delhi, the decision of the Administrator thereon shall be final. 79 (7) The question whether any, and if so, what advice was tendered by any member of the Executive Council to the Administrator shall not be enquired into in any court.” Every decision of the Executive Council in relation to any matter concerning New Delhi was subject to the concurrence of the Administrator. A provision similar to the second proviso to Section 27(1) does not find a reference in Article 239AA. Moreover, under sub section 2 of Section 27, the Administrator was to preside at every meeting of the Executive Council. The members of the Executive Council were, under Section 28, appointed by the President and held office during the pleasure of the President. A member of the Executive Council could not hold office beyond a period of six months if he was not a member of Metropolitan Council. 66 The Act of 1966 continued to apply to the Union Territory of Delhi until the adoption of the sixty ninth amendment to the Constitution and the GNCTD Act 1991. The Balakrishnan Committee 67 On 14 December 1989 the Committee constituted by the Ministry of Home Affairs for making recommendations on the reorganization of the structure for the governance of Delhi submitted its report. The report of the Committee, which was chaired by Mr S Balakrishnan (Adviser, Ministry of Home Affairs) observed that there is a conflict of interest between the need to 80 develop the national capital for the nation as a whole and the desires of the local population for a greater autonomy in the conduct of their own affairs. This conflict was described in the report thus: “..The main difficulty lies in reconciling the two conflicting requirements, namely, the requirement of satisfying the democratic aspirations over the citizens of the capital to govern themselves in consonance with the spirit of their national Constitution and the requirement that the national Government should have sufficient control over the capital city and its administration for discharging its national and international responsibilities and commitments.” The Committee considered the following five options: “(1) The existing structure under the Delhi Administration Act, 1966 may be retained with such modifications as may be found necessary. (2) The administration of Delhi may be the direct responsibility of the Central Government except for municipal functions to be left with the Municipal Corporation or other municipal bodies; there is no need for any Legislative Assembly or Council of Ministers. (3) Delhi may be made a full-fledged State of the Union. (4) Delhi may be made a Union territory with a Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers. (5) Delhi may be given a special status and dispensation under the Constitution itself.” The Committee indicated the reasons which had weighed with it in rejecting the claim for full statehood to Delhi. Firstly, the Committee noted that the conferment of full statehood would result in a constitutional division of 81 legislative power between the Union and the State and to that extent, the Union Executive would be denuded of executive powers in relation to matters governed by the State list. In the view of the Committee: “..This constitutional prohibition on the exercise of powers and functions will make it virtually impossible for the Union to discharge its special responsibilities in relation to the national capital as well as to the nation itself. We have already indicated in an earlier chapter the special features of the national capital and the need for keeping it under the control of the Union Government. Such control is vital in the national interests irrespective of whether the subject matter is in the State field or Union field. If the administration of the national capital is divided into rigid compartments of State field and Union field, conflicts are likely to arise in several vital matters, particularly if the two Governments are run by different political parties. Such conflicts may, at times, prejudice the national interest. We have given careful thought to the matter and we are of the considered opinion that any arrangement for Delhi that involves constitutional division of powers, functions and responsibilities between the Union and the government of the national capital will be against the national interest and should not be made.” The Committee opined that “ the national capital belongs to the nation as a whole ” and hence a demand for full statehood could not be entertained. Consistent with its view, the Committee opined that Delhi should have a Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers, while continuing to be a Union territory for the purposes of the Constitution. The legislative powers conferred upon the Legislative Assembly were to exclude certain specific subjects, having due regard to the special responsibility of the Union in respect of Delhi. The Committee recommended that the subjects of public order and police should be excluded from the purview of the Legislative Assembly. The report of the Committee recommended that the Administrator 82 for the Union Territory should be expressly required to perform his functions on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The expression “aid and advice”, the Committee noted, is a term of art based on the cabinet form of government adopted by the Constitution. However, the principle of aid and advice would be subject to three modifications: (i) it would not apply in respect of those matters where the Administrator exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (ii) the Administrator would act on aid and advice in respect of matters where the legislative Assembly has the power to make laws; and (iii) a special provision would be made to resolve differences between the Administrator and his Council of Ministers on any matter concerning the administration of Delhi. The Committee was of the following view: “..by virtue of article 239 of the Constitution, the ultimate responsibility for good administration of Delhi is vested in the President acting through the Administrator. Because of this, the Administrator has to take a somewhat more active part in the administration than the Governor of a State. It is, therefore, necessary to reconcile between the need to retain the responsibility of the Administrator to the Centre in this regard and the need for enforce the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the Legislature. The best way of doing this is to provide that in case of difference of opinion which cannot be resolved between the Administrator and his Council of Ministers, he should refer the question to the President and the decision of the President thereon will be final..” The Committee considered whether the administration of Delhi should be provided for under a law enacted by Parliament, as was the case earlier. The Committee recommended a constitutional amendment in preference to a 83 statute governing the administration of the national capital as a measure of stability and permanence : “..any arrangement providing for the structure of government for the national capital is of great importance and significance to the nation and, as such, it is desirable that any such arrangement should ensure a measure of stability and permanence: The fluid situation which existed at the time when the Constitution came into force and which was the ground relied upon at that time for making a flexible arrangement no longer exists. We, therefore, consider that the time has come for making specific constitutional provisions for the structure of government for the national capital at least in regard to the core features thereof. If the provisions are incorporated in the Constitution an amendment can be made only by a two-thirds majority in parliament which may not always be available. To that extent a scheme incorporated in the Constitution would be more permanent than one in a law of parliament. We have no doubt that this will go a long way in assuring the people of Delhi that the governmental structure will be stable and will not suffer by the play of political forces.” The Committee thus recommended a constitutional amendment, with the above core features, with parliamentary legislation supplementing them in details. 68 The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the sixty ninth amendment to the Constitution explains its rationale in the following terms : “After such detailed inquiry and examination, it recommended that Delhi should continue to be a Union Territory and provided with a Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers responsible to such Assembly with appropriate powers to deal with matters of concern to the common man. The Committee also recommended that with a view to ensure stability and permanence, the arrangements should be incorporated in the Constitution to give the National Capital a special status among the Union Territories .” (Emphasis supplied) 84 The avowed object of the sixty ninth amendment was to ensure that while Delhi would continue to be a Union territory, it would have a legislative assembly and a Council of Ministers responsible to it. This was to vest “appropriate powers” to deal with the matters of concern to the common man. The object of the constitutional amendment was to attribute “stability and permanence” to the arrangements to govern the Union territory and to confer “a special status among the Union territories” to the national Capital. In other words, while the status of the NCT would be of a Union territory, it nonetheless had a special status within the class of Union Territories. 69 Having regard to this history and background, it would be fundamentally inappropriate to assign to the NCT a status similar to other Union territories. Article 239AA(4) is a special provision which was adopted to establish a special constitutional arrangement for the governance of the NCT, albeit within the rubric of Union territories. In interpreting the provisions of Article 239AA, this Court cannot adopt a blinkered view, which ignores legislative and constitutional history. While adopting some of the provisions of the Acts of 1963 and 1966, Parliament in its constituent capacity omitted some of the other provisions of the legislative enactments which preceded the sixty ninth amendment. The relationship between the Council of Ministers and the Administrator of the Union territory evolved as Delhi progressed from a Part C State (before the Seventh Amendment) to a Union Territory governed by 85 legislation. As a Union territory, the position of Delhi has evolved from being administered by an Administrator under Article 239A following the fourteenth amendment and from governance under the earlier enactments of Parliament to its present-day status as a national capital territory governed by a specific constitutional provision: Article 239AA. We have noticed how, when Delhi was within the purview of the Part C States Act, every decision of the Council of Ministers on any matter concerning New Delhi was subject to the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner and any difference of opinion was to be resolved by the Chief Commissioner himself acting in his discretion to administer New Delhi. Under the Act of 1963, besides matters which the Administrator was required to act in his discretion or where he was to exercise judicial or quasi- judicial functions under law there were matters vested in the Administrator in his “special responsibility” where he could act in his discretion. Under the Act of 1966, the Executive Council was to “assist and advice” the Administrator and each one of its decisions in relation to any matter concerning New Delhi was subject to the concurrence of the Administrator. The absence of similar provisions in Article 239AA cannot be ignored while defining the nature of the relationship between the Council of Ministers and the Lieutenant Governor and the authority of the Lieutenant Governor. H NCT : A Special Class among Union Territories? 86 70 All Union territories are grouped together in Part VIII of the Constitution. While bringing them under the rubric of one constitutional pairing, there is an unmistakable distinction created between them by the Constitution. Such a distinction originates in Article 239(1) itself. While setting out the basic premise that “every Union territory shall be administered by the President”, Article 239(1) conditions it upon two important qualifications. The first is provided by the language with which Article 239(1) opens, which is: “save as otherwise provided by Parliament by law”. The second qualification is that the President may exercise the power of administering each Union territory “to such extent as he thinks fit” through an Administrator. The opening words essentially leave it to Parliament to determine the nature and extent to which the administration of a Union territory would be exercised through the President. The President may exercise that power through the office of an Administrator to such extent as he thinks fit. The expression “to such extent as he thinks fit” enunciates a constitutional discretion by which the limits of the exercise by the President of the power of administration through an Administrator are to be set. Both these qualifications have significant constitutional implications because they leave open the nature and extent of the administration of the Union territory by the President, through the auspices of an Administrator, to the determination by Parliamentary legislation. 71 The provisions of Article 239 result in significant consequences for the position of Union territories. Article 239 does not elucidate the nature or extent 87 of administrative or regulatory control over the Union territory. Article 239A (which presently applies to Puducherry), Article 239AA (which has special provisions for Delhi) and Article 240 leave no manner of doubt that the relationship of the Union government with every Union and the extent of Presidential control over the administration is not intended to be uniform. These three Articles indicate that a distinction has been made between the status of Union territories at least in terms of the exercise of legislative powers in relation to executive functions. 72 This distinction would emerge from a close reading of the provisions of Article 240 which governs : (i) The Andaman and Nicobar Islands; (ii) Lakshadweep; (iii) Daman and Diu; (iv) Dadar and Nagar Haveli; and (v) Puducherry. Clause 1 of Article 240 enables the President to make regulations for “the peace, progress and good government” of the Union territories mentioned above. Article 239A as we have noticed earlier, empowers Parliament to create a local legislature or a Council of Ministers (or both) for Puducherry. Once Parliament enacts legislation under clause 1 of Article 239A, it would be incongruous to have a duality of governance with the President making regulations for peace, progress and good government as well. Hence, the proviso to Article 240(1) states that the President shall not make any such regulation after the legislature for the Union territory of Puducherry has first 88 convened, when a Parliamentary legislation under Article 239A creates a body to function as a legislature. However, when the legislature is dissolved or its functioning is eclipsed pursuant to a Parliamentary legislation, the Presidential power to make regulations for peace, progress and good government is revived. Puducherry was therefore grouped together with the other Union territories under Article 240(1) but in contemplation of a law made by Parliament under Article 239A, a specific constitutional mandate allows for the entrustment of legislative and executive functions to the extent that they are transferred under the law to the local legislature or, as the case may be, to the Council of Ministers. If Parliament were to enact no law at all, the President would continue to retain the power to frame regulations. Moreover, even upon the enactment of Parliamentary legislation, the Presidential power to frame regulations for Puducherry is revived where the legislature stands dissolved or its functioning is suspended. 73 Delhi presents a special constitutional status under Article 239AA. This is fortified when those provisions are read in contrast with Articles 239A and 240. Article 239AA does not incorporate the language or scheme of Article 240(1), which enables the President to frame regulations for peace, progress and good government of the Union territories referred to in Article 240(1). This proviso to Article 240(1) indicates that once a Parliamentary law has been framed, the President shall not frame regulations for Puducherry. In the case of Delhi, Article 239AA does not leave the constitution of a legislature or the Council of Ministers to a law to be framed by Parliament in future. Article 89 239AA mandates that there shall be a legislative assembly for the NCT and there shall be a Council of Ministers, with the function of tendering aid and advice to the Lieutenant Governor. The “there shall be” formulation is indicative of a constitutional mandate. Bringing into being a legislative assembly and a Council of Ministers for the NCT was not relegated by Parliament (in its constituent power) to its legislative wisdom at a future date upon the enactment of enabling legislation. Clause 7(a) of Article 239AA enables Parliament by law to make provisions to give effect to or to supplement the provisions contained in that Article. Parliament’s power is to enforce, implement and fortify Article 239AA and its defining norms. 74 The above analysis would indicate that while Part VIII brings together a common grouping of all Union territories, the Constitution evidently did not intend to use the same brush to paint the details of their position, the institutions of governance (legislative or executive), the nature of democratic participation or the extent of accountability of those entrusted with governance to their elected representatives. Hence, in defining the ambit of the constitutional powers entrusted to the Council of Ministers for the NCT and their relationship with Lieutenant Governor as a delegate of the President, the Court cannot be unmindful of the constitutional importance which has to be assigned to representative government. Representative government is a hallmark of a Constitution which is wedded to democracy for it is through a democratic form of governance that the aspirations of those who elect their 90 representatives are met. Undoubtedly, governance of the NCT involves national imperatives. They must also weigh in the balance. The proviso to clause 4 of Article 239AA is constitutional indicator of the national concerns which were borne in mind when the constituent power was exercised to establish the NCT as a political arm of governance by a special constitutional provision. Those national imperatives have led to the carving out of the areas of police, public order and land from the sphere of legislative authority of the legislative assembly and their entrustment to Parliament. Again, it is the sense of a national imperative which led to the constituent power being so modulated in relation to the NCT as to allow Parliamentary legislative authority over all entries in the State list, in addition to the Concurrent list. Parliament does not exercise legislative authority in relation to State list entries as regards the states in India unless a matter falls within the ambit of Articles 252 or 253. Parliamentary legislative control over Union territories has been broadened precisely as a manifestation of national imperatives or concerns. The executive power of the Council of Ministers being co-extensive with legislative power, this aspect has to be borne in mind. The true challenge is to maintain that delicate balance in a federating Union, such as ours, which ensures that national concerns are preserved in the interest of the unity and integrity of the nation, while at the same time local aspirations exercised through the democratic functioning of elected governments find expression in our polity. 91 75 The constitutional principle which emerges is that while Delhi presents a special case, quite unlike the other Union territories, the constitutional provisions governing it are an amalgam between national concerns (reflected in control by the Union) and representative democracy (expressed through the mandate of a Council of Ministers which owes collective responsibility to a directly elected legislature). There is no gainsaying the fact that the control by the Union, is also control of the President acting on the aid and advice of the Union Council of Ministers which in turn owes collective responsibility to Parliament. Constitutional statesmanship between the two levels of governance, the Centre and the Union territory, ought to ensure that practical issues are resolved with a sense of political maturity and administrative experience. This Court has to step in only because skirmishes between the two have raised constitutional issues of the proper distribution of executive control over the National Capital Territory. I The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991 76 Parliament enacted the Government of National Capital Territory of  Delhi Act 1991 “to supplement the provisions of the Constitution relating to the legislative assembly and a Council of Ministers for the National Capital Territory of Delhi”. The legislation has been enacted in pursuance of the provisions of clause 7(a) of Article 239AA. Act 1 of 1992 (Referred hereinafter as the “GNCTD Act”)  92 77 Some of the salient features of the law merit reference. The law mandates direct election from territorial constituencies to the legislative   assembly . The duration of the assembly is fixed at five years . The Lieutenant Governor has the right to address and to communicate messages to the   assembly . The law provides special provisions for financial bills . A recommendation of the Lieutenant Governor, prior to the introduction of a Bill or amendment in the legislative assembly is mandatory, where it incorporates a provision for any of the following : “(a) the imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax ; (b) the amendment of the law with respect to any financial obligations undertaken or to be undertaken by the Government of the Capital; (c) the appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of the Capital; (d) the declaring of any expenditure to be expenditure charged on the Consolidated fund of the Capital or the  increasing of the amount of any such expenditure;” Similarly, if a Bill, when enacted into law, would involve an expenditure from the consolidated fund of the Capital, it requires the prior recommendation of the Lieutenant Governor before being passed by the legislative assembly. Assent of the Lieutenant Governor to Bills passed by the legislative assembly is mandated in the following terms: Section 3, GNCTD Act  Section 5, GNCTD Act  Section 9, GNCTD Act  Section 22, GNCTD Act  Section 22(1), GNCTD Act  93 “Section 24. Assent to Bills : - When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly, it shall be presented to the Lieutenant Governor and the Lieutenant Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President : Provided that the Lieutenant Governor may, as soon as possible after the presentation of the Bill to him for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill together with a message requesting that the Assembly will consider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof, and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is so returned, the Assembly will reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again with or without amendment and presented to the Lieutenant Governor for assent, the Lieutenant Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President: Provided further that the Lieutenant Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which, - (a) in the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that court is, by the Constitution, designed to fill; or (b) the President may, by order, direct to be reserved for his consideration; or (c) relates to matters referred to in sub-section (5) of section 7 or section 19 or section 34 or sub-section (3) of section 43. Explanation :- For the purposes of this section and section 25, a Bill shall be deemed to be a Money Bill if it contains only provisions dealing with all or any of the matters specified in sub-section (1) of section 22 or any matter incidental to any of those matters and, in either case, there is endorsed thereon the certificate of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly signed by him that it is a Money Bill.” As the above provisions indicate, the Lieutenant Governor can assent to a Bill, withhold assent or reserve the Bill for consideration of the President. Where 94 the Bill is not a Money Bill, the Lieutenant Governor is permitted to return it for reconsideration to the Assembly. Thereafter, if the Bill is passed again by the Assembly, the Lieutenant Governor can either assent to the Bill or reserve it for consideration of the President. The second proviso sets out three categories of Bills which the Lieutenant Governor must reserve for the consideration of the President. Where the Bill has been reserved for the consideration of the President, Section 25 stipulates that the President may either assent or withhold assent to the Bill. The President may, if it is not a Money Bill, direct the Lieutenant Governor to return the Bill to the assembly for reconsideration and if it is again passed, the Bill has to be presented again to the President for consideration. 78 The power of the Lieutenant Governor is wider than the power of the Governor of a State under Article 200 of the Constitution. Article 200 provides as follows: “Article 200. When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, has been passed by both Houses of the Legislature of the State, it shall be presented to the Governor and the Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President: Provided that the Governor may, as soon as possible after the presentation to him of the Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill together with a message requesting that the House or Houses will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, Assent to Bills. When a Bill is so returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again by the House or 95 Houses with or without amendment and presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom: Provided further that the Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that Court is by this Constitution designed to fill.” Under Article 200, where the Governor has returned a Bill (not being a Money Bill) to the legislative assembly of the State for reconsideration and the Bill is passed by the legislature, the Governor is precluded from withholding assent. In contrast, Section 24 confers authority upon the Lieutenant Governor, even if a Bill has been reconsidered and passed by the legislative assembly of the NCT, to either assent to it or reserve it for consideration of the President. Moreover, the second proviso to Section 24 widens the categories of Bills which the Lieutenant Governor must necessarily reserve for the consideration of the President. Clause (a) of the second proviso corresponds to the second proviso to Article 200. In addition, clause (b) of the second proviso to Section 24 empowers the President to direct the Lieutenant Governor to reserve a Bill for his consideration. Similarly, under clause (c), Bills relating to salaries payable to the Speaker, Deputy Speaker and the members of the legislative assembly of NCT, the official language of the Capital and of the legislative assembly and the salaries and the allowances of the Ministers, are matters upon which the Lieutenant Governor has to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President. These provisions indicate a greater degree of interface between the President and the Lieutenant Governor. 96 79 Section 27 provides for the laying of an annual financial statement by the Lieutenant Governor before the legislative assembly with the previous sanction of the President, containing the estimated receipts and expenditure of the Capital for that year. Section 29 makes a provision for appropriation Bills. Section 30 provides for supplementary, additional or excess grants. Here again, a provision has been made for the previous sanction of the President. Section 33 empowers the legislative assembly to make rules for regulating, subject to the Act, its procedure and conduct of business. The Lieutenant Governor upon consulting the Speaker of legislative assembly and with the approval of the President may make rules for the timely completion of financial business; for regulating the procedure of and the conduct of business in the legislative assembly in relation to financial matters of Bills; for the appropriation of moneys within the consolidated fund of the Capital; and for prohibiting any discussion on matters where the Lieutenant Governor is to act in his discretion. Under Section 34, the President has been empowered to direct that the official language of the Union shall be adopted for such of the official purposes of the Capital as may be specified, and that any other language shall also be adopted. 80 Part IV of the GNCTD Act has inter alia made provisions for matters which lie in the discretion of the Lieutenant Governor, the conduct of business, 97 and the duty of the Chief Minister to communicate with and share information with the Lieutenant Governor. Section 41 provides thus:

81 The Lieutenant Governor acts in his discretion in two classes of matters. The first consists of those which are outside the powers conferred upon the legislative assembly but in respect of which the President has delegated powers and functions to the Lieutenant Governor. The second category consists of those matters where the Lieutenant Governor is required to act in his discretion by or under any law or under which he exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Matters falling within the ambit of Section 41 lie outside the realm of the aid and advice mandate. Where a subject or matter lies outside the purview of the legislative assembly, it necessarily lies outside 98 the executive powers of the government of the NCT. Such matters stand excepted from the ambit of the aid and advice which is tendered by the Council of Ministers to the Lieutenant Governor. 82 Section 44 stipulates that the President may make rules for the conduct of business: “Section 44. Conduct of business: (1) The President shall make rules - (a) for the allocation of business to the Ministers in so far as it is business with respect to which the Lieutenant Governor is required to act on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers; and (b) for the more convenient transaction of business with the Ministers, including the procedure to be adopted in the case of a difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and the Council of Ministers or a Minister. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all executive action of the Lieutenant Governor whether taken on the advice of his Ministers or otherwise shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Lieutenant Governor. (3) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Lieutenant Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Lieutenant Governor and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or instrument made or executed by the Lieutenant Governor.” Under Section 44, the allocation of business amongst ministers in the government on matters where the Lieutenant Governor is to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers has to be prescribed by the rules framed by the President. Similarly, rules for the convenient transaction of business with Ministers and for the modalities to be followed where there is a difference 99 between the Lieutenant Governor and the Council of Ministers or a Minister are framed by the President. All executive action is under sub-section 2 expressed in the name of the Lieutenant Governor. Sub-Section 3 provides for the authentication of orders and instruments made and executed in the name of the Lieutenant Governor. 83 Section 44 may be distinguished from the provisions of the Constitution in relation to the conduct of business of the Union government (under Article 77) and the conduct of business of the States (under Article 166). Article 77 inter alia stipulates that all executive action of the Union government shall be expressed in the name of the President and that orders or instruments in the name of the President shall be authenticated in accordance with the rules framed by the President. The President is empowered to make rules for the convenient transaction of business and for allocation of that business among ministers. Article 166 is pari materia (with the substitution of the Governor, for the President in relation to a State). Unlike in the case of a State, where rules of business are prescribed by the Governor, Section 44 requires that the rules in relation to the conduct of business in the NCT be framed by the President. Moreover, there is no provision analogous to the proviso to Article 239AA(4) in relation to the affairs of a State under the Constitution. Article 167 does not contain a provision for the procedure to be adopted where there is a difference of opinion between the Governor and the Council of Ministers. 100 84 Section 45 provides for the duty of the Chief Minister to communicate with and share information with the Lieutenant Governor: “Section 45. Duties of Chief Minister as respects the furnishing of information to the Lieutenant Governor, etc,- It shall be the duty of the Chief Minister – (a) to communicate to the Lieutenant Governor all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to the administration of the affairs of the Capital and proposals for legislation; (b) to furnish such information relating to the administration of the affairs of the Capital and proposals for legislation as Lieutenant Governor may call for; and (c) If the Lieutenant Governor so requires, to submit for the consideration of the Council of Ministers any matter on which a decision has been taken by a Minister but which has not been considered by the Council.” Section 45 is similar in terms to Article 78 (in relation to the Prime Minister) and Article 167 (in relation to a Chief Minister of a State). Articles 78 and 167 embody the fundamental duty of the elected head of government in a cabinet form of government to communicate with the titular head of state and to furnish information in regard to the affairs of the state. The duty to keep the head of State informed in relation to the affairs of State arises because real decision making vests in the elected executive. Since decisions are taken by the executive, the head of State is kept apprised in reference to his constitutional position as titular head. 85 Section 46 provides for the Consolidated Fund of the Capital. Section 47 provides for contingency funds. Section 47(A) provides that the executive power of the Union extends to borrowing upon the security of the 101 Consolidated Fund of the Capital within the limits determined by Parliamentary legislation. 86 Section 49 establishes the principle of the “general control” of the President over the Lieutenant Governor and the Council of Ministers. “Section 49. Relation of Lieutenant Governor and his Ministers to President – Notwithstanding anything in this Act, the Lieutenant Governor and his Council of Ministers shall be under the general control of, and comply with such particular directions, if any, as may from time to time be given by the President.” As an incident of control, the Lieutenant Governor and Council of Ministers must comply with the particular directions issued by the President. Such directions are obviously issued on the aid and advise of the Union Council of Ministers. Section 52 stipulates that all contracts relating to the administration of the Capital are made in exercise of the executive power of the Union and suits and proceedings in connection with the administration can be instituted by or against the Union government. 87 This survey of the provisions of the GNCTD Act 1991 indicates that there is a significant interface between the President and the Lieutenant Governor in matters relating to the administration of the Capital. The 102 Lieutenant Governor has been conferred with certain specific powers by the provisions of the Act including, among them, requirements of seeking the prior recommendation of the President to the introduction of financial Bills. As we have seen, the Lieutenant Governor has been subjected to a wider obligation to reserve Bills for the consideration of the President and in regard to withholding of his assent to a Bill which has been passed by the legislative assembly in comparison with the duties of a Governor of a State. Matters such as the presentation of the annual financial statement or supplementary, additional or excess grants require previous sanction of the President. The President has been conferred with the power to issue directions in regard to the official language of the National Capital Territory. The Lieutenant Governor has been vested with the power to act in his own discretion in matters which fall outside the ambit and power of the legislative assembly and which have been delegated to him by the President as well as in regard to those matters where he is required under law to exercise his own discretion or to act in exercise of judicial or quasi judicial functions. Rules for the conduct of business are framed by the President in relation to the National Capital Territory, including for the allocation of business. They would include the procedure to be followed where there is a difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and the Council of Ministers. Section 49, which has a non-obstante provision, subjects the Lieutenant Governor and the Council of Ministers to the general control of the President and to such directions as may be issued from time to time. 103 J The Transaction of Business Rules, 1993 88 The Transaction of Business of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Rules, 1993 (“Transaction of Business Rules”) have been formulated by the President in exercise of powers conferred by Section 44 of the GNCTD Act 1991. Rule 4(1) embodies the principle of collective responsibility. According to the Rule 4(1): “4. (1) The Council shall be collectively responsible for all the execution orders issued by any Department in the name of the Lieutenant Governor and contracts made in the name of the President in connection with the administration of the Capital whether such orders or contracts are authorised by an individual Minister in respect of a matter pertaining to the Department under his charge or as a result or discussions at a meeting of the Council.” 89 Rule 7 stipulates that all proposals which are referred to in the Schedule must be placed before the Council of Ministers in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter 3. All such proposals after consideration by the Minister-in-charge have to be submitted to the Chief Minister. Rule 8 envisages orders of the Chief Minister either for circulation of a proposal under Rule 9 or for placing it for consideration of the Ministers. Rule 9 empowers the Chief Minister to circulate proposals to the Ministers for opinion instead of placing them before the Council of Ministers. A proposal can be passed by circulation only if there is unanimity of opinion among the Ministers. 104 90 The Transaction of Business Rules contain elaborate provisions for the Lieutenant Governor to be kept informed right from the stage of a proposal. Rule 9(2), stipulates that where a proposal is circulated, a memorandum explaining the proposal has to be prepared for circulation among the Ministers and simultaneously a copy has to be forwarded to the Lieutenant Governor. According to the Rule 9(2): “If it is decided to circulate any proposal, the Department to which it belongs, shall prepare a memorandum setting out in brief the facts of the proposal, the points for decision and the recommendations of the Minister in charge and forward copies thereof to the Secretary to the Council who shall arrange to circulate the same among the Ministers and simultaneously send a copy thereof to the Lieutenant Governor.” Under Rule 10(4), if the Chief Minister accepts the recommendations, he is to return the proposal with his orders to the Secretary to the Council of Ministers. Thereupon, Rule 10(5) stipulates that : “On receipt of the proposal, the Secretary to the Council shall communicate the decision to the Lieutenant Governor and pass on the proposal to the Secretary concerned who shall thereafter take necessary steps to issue the orders unless a reference to the Central Government is required in pursuance of the provisions of Chapter V.” Rule 10(5) requires that on receipt of a proposal, the Secretary to the Council is to communicate the decision to the Lieutenant Governor and to share the proposal with the Secretary of the concerned department. The Secretary of the department concerned would proceed to issue orders, unless a reference to the Central government is required under Chapter V. Chapter V, as we shall 105 note hereafter, deals with a situation where there has been a difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and the Council of Ministers. 91 Proposals which are required to be placed before the Council of Ministers are dealt with in Rule 11, which provides thus : “When it has been decided to place a proposal before the Council, the Department to which it belongs, shall, unless the Chief Minister otherwise directs, prepare a memorandum indicating precisely the salient facts of the proposal and the points for decision. Copies of the memorandum and such other documents, as are necessary to enable the proposal to be disposed of shall be forwarded to the Secretary to the Council who shall arrange to circulate the memorandum to the Ministers and simultaneously send a copy thereof to the Lieutenant Governor.” A memorandum explaining the proposal is placed by the department to which the proposal belongs before the Secretary to the Council. The latter circulates the memorandum to the Ministers and simultaneously sends a copy to the Lieutenant Governor. Rule 13(3) requires that the agenda, upon being approved by the Chief Minister, must be forwarded by the Secretary to the Council to the Lieutenant Governor, the Chief Minister and other Ministers. A record of the decisions taken in the meetings of the Council is prepared and, under Rule 13(7), the Secretary to the Council is required to forward a copy to the Ministers and to the Lieutenant Governor. Rule 14 provides thus: “(1) The decision of the Council relating to each proposal shall be separately recorded and after approval by the Chief Minister, or the Minister presiding , shall be placed with the records of the proposal. After approval by the Chief Minister or the Minister presiding , the decision of 106 the Council as approved, shall be forwarded by the Secretary to the Council to the Lieutenant Governor. (2) Where a proposal has been approved by the Council and the approved record of the decision has been communicated to the Lieutenant Governor, the Minister concerned shall take necessary action to give effect to the decision.” After a decision has been taken by the Council on a proposal and upon the approval by the Chief Minister, the decision is forwarded to the Lieutenant Governor. After the decision has been communicated to the Lieutenant Governor, the Minister concerned is empowered to give effect to the decision. 92 Rule 15 empowers the Minister in charge of a department to dispose of proposals or matters in the department in accordance with the Standing Orders. Copies of the Standing Orders have to be forwarded to the Lieutenant Governor and to the Chief Minister. Under Rule 16, the Minister can provide, by means of Standing Orders, for matters to be brought to his personal notice. Copies of the Standing Orders have to be forwarded to the Lieutenant Governor and the Chief Minister. Rule 17 requires a weekly submission of statements containing particulars of important proposals or matters disposed of in the department both to the Lieutenant Governor and the Chief Minister. 107 93 Rule 19(5) confers authority upon the Lieutenant Governor to call for papers of a proposal or matter from any department. Rule 19(5) is in the following terms: “The Lieutenant Governor may call for papers relating to any proposal or matter in any Department and such requisition shall be complied with by the Secretary to the Department concerned, he shall simultaneously inform the Minister-in- charge of the department of the action taken by him.” Rule 22 provides for a class of matters which shall be brought to the attention of the Lieutenant Governor and the Chief Minister: “Any matter which is likely to bring the Government of the Capital into controversy with the Central Government or with any State Government, shall, as soon as possible, be brought to the notice of the Lieutenant Governor and the Chief Minister.” Rule 23 provides for classes of proposals or matters which must be submitted to the Lieutenant Governor before orders are issued. Rule 23 is in the following terms: “The following classes of proposals or matters shall essentially be submitted to the Lieutenant Governor through the Chief Secretary and the Chief Minister before issuing any orders thereon, namely: (i) matters which affect or are likely to affect the peace and tranquillity of the capital; (ii) matters which affect or are likely to affect the interest of any minority community, Scheduled Castes and backward classes; (iii) matters which affect the relations of the Government with any State Government , the Supreme Court of India or the High Court of Delhi; (iv) proposals or matters required to be referred to the Central Government under the Act or under Chapter V; 108 (v) matters pertaining to the Lieutenant Governor's Secretariat and personnel establishment and other matters relating to his office; (vi) matters on which Lieutenant Governor is required to make order under any law or instrument in force; (vii) petitions for mercy from persons under sentence for death and other important cases in which it is proposed to recommend any revision of a judicial sentence; (viii) matters relating to summoning, prorogation and dissolution of the Legislative Assembly, removal of disqualification of voters at elections to the Legislative Assembly, Local Self Government Institutions and other matters connected with those; and (ix) any other proposals or matters of administrative importance which the Chief Minister may consider necessary.” Rule 24 provides thus: “Where the Lieutenant Governor is of the opinion that any further action should be taken or that action should be taken otherwise than in accordance with the orders passed by the Minister in-charge, he may require the proposal or matter to be placed before the Council for consideration: Provided that the notes, minutes or comments of the Lieutenant Governor in any such case shall not be brought on the Secretariat record unless the Lieutenant Governor so directs.” Rule 25 casts a duty on the Chief Minister to furnish to the Lieutenant Governor information on certain matters pertaining to the administration of the Capital. According to Rule 25: “The Chief Minister shall: (a) cause to be furnished to the Lieutenant Governor such information relating to the administration of the Capital and proposals for legislation as the Lieutenant Governor may call for; and (b) if the Lieutenant Governor so requires, submit for the consideration of the Council any matter on which a decision has been taken by a Minister but which has not been considered by the Council.” 109 Rule 45 of the Transaction of Business Rules deals with the disposal of business relating to the executive functions of the Lieutenant Governor. Under Rule 45: “The Lieutenant Governor, may by standing orders in writing, regulate the transaction and disposal of the business relating to his executive functions: Provided that the standing orders shall be consistent with the provisions of this Chapter, Chapter V and the instructions issued by the Central Government for time to time. Provided further that the Lieutenant Governor shall in respect of matters connected with 'public order', 'police' and 'land' exercise his executive functions to the extent delegated to him by the President in consultation with the Chief Minister, if it is so provided under any order issued by the President under article 239 of the Constitution. Provided further that 'standing orders' shall not be inconsistent with the rules concerning transaction of business.” The second proviso deals with the class of subjects (public order, police and law) which stand carved out of the legislative powers of the Assembly and hence lie outside the executive powers of the NCT government. On such matters, to the extent to which functions are delegated to the Lieutenant Governor by the President, the Lieutenant Governor will consult the Chief Minister if the President has so provided in an order under Article 239. Rule 46 makes provisions in regard to persons serving in connection with the administration of the National Capital Territory: “(1) With respect to persons serving in connection with the administration of the National Capital Territory, the Lieutenant Governor shall, exercise such powers and perform such functions as may be entrusted to him under the provisions of the rules and orders regulating the conditions of service of such persons or by any other 110 order of the President in consultation with the Chief Minister, if it is so provided under any order issued by the President under article 239 of the Constitution. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) the Lieutenant Governor shall consult the Union Public Service Commission on all matters on which the Commission is required to be consulted under clause(3) of article 320 of the Constitution; and in every such case he shall not make any order otherwise than in accordance with the advice of the Union Public Services Commission unless authorised to do so by the Central Government. (3) All correspondence with Union Public Service Commission and the Central Government regarding recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the administration of National Capital Territory shall be conducted by the Chief Secretary or Secretary of the Department concerned under the direction of the Lieutenant Governor.” Under Rule 47, the Lieutenant Governor has to consult the Union government before exercising his powers or discharging his functions in respect of any matter for which no specific provision is contained in the Rules. 94 Chapter V of the Transaction of Business Rules sets out the procedure to be followed by the Lieutenant Governor in making a reference to the Central government in the event of a difference of opinion with the Council of Ministers. Rules 49, 50 and 51 provide as follows: “49. In case of difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and a Minister in regard to any matter, the Lieutenant Governor shall endeavour by discussion on the matter to settle any point on which such difference of opinion has arisen. Should the difference of opinion persist, the Lieutenant Governor may direct that the matter be referred to the Council.” “50. In case of difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and the Council with regard to any matter, the 111 Lieutenant Governor shall refer it to the Central Government for the decision of the President and shall act according to the decision of the President.” “51. Where a case is referred to the Central Government in pursuance of rule 50, it shall be competent for the Lieutenant Governor to direct that action shall be suspended pending the decision of the President on such case or in any case where the matter, in his opinion, is such that it is necessary that immediate action should be taken to give such direction or take such action in the matter as he deems necessary.” Where a direction has been issued by the Lieutenant Governor under Rule 51, the Minister concerned must take action to give effect to the direction. 95 Under Rule 53, an annual plan for each financial year is to be prepared under the directions of the Lieutenant Governor which has to be referred to the Central government for approval. The form of the annual financial statement and the procedure for obtaining the approval of the President have to be prescribed by the Central government under Rule 54. 96 Rule 55(1) provides for certain categories of legislative proposals which must be referred to the Central government by the Lieutenant Governor. Rule 55(2) enunciates those matters upon which the Lieutenant Governor shall make a prior reference to the Union government in the Ministry of Home Affairs or through the appropriate ministry. According to Rule 55: “(1) The Lieutenant Governor shall refer to the Central Government every legislative proposal, which 112 (a) if introduced in a Bill form and enacted by the Legislative Assembly, is required to be reserved for the consideration of the President under the proviso to subclause (c) of clause (3) of article 239 AA or, as the case may be, under the second proviso to section 24 of the Act; (b) attracts provisions of articles 286, 287, 288 and 304 of the Constitution as applicable to the Capital; (c) relates to any matter which may ultimately necessitate additional financial assistance from the Central Government through substantive expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of the Capital or abandonment of revenue or lowering of rate of any tax. (2) Subject to any instructions which may from time to time be issued by the Central Government, the Lieutenant Governor shall make a prior reference to the Central Government in the Ministry of Home Affairs or to the appropriate Ministry with a copy to the Ministry of Home Affairs in respect of the following matters:- (a) proposals affecting the relations of the Central Government with any State Government, the Supreme Court of India or any other High Court; (b) proposals for the appointment of Chief Secretary and Commissioner of Police, Secretary (Home) and Secretary (Lands); (c) important cases which affect or are likely to affect the peace and tranquillity of the National Capital Territory; and (d) cases which affect or are likely to affect the interests of any minority community, Scheduled Castes or the backward classes.” Rule 56 stipulates that where a matter has been referred by the Lieutenant Governor to the Central government under the Rules, further action shall not be taken except in accordance with the decision of the Central government. 97 Analysing the Transaction of Business Rules, it becomes evident that the Lieutenant Governor is required to be kept informed of governmental 113 business. The duty of the Council of Ministers, with the Chief Minister at its head, to do so begins at the stage of a proposal. When a proposal is circulated under the directions of the Chief Minister to the Council of Ministers, a copy of the explanatory memorandum has to be forwarded to the Lieutenant Governor. After the proposal has been approved, the decision is communicated to the Lieutenant Governor. The decision is forwarded to the Secretary of the department concerned for issuing orders unless a reference to the Central government is warranted under Chapter V. Where a proposal is placed before the Council of Ministers, an explanatory memorandum has to be forwarded to the Lieutenant Governor. Copies of the agenda, upon approval of the Chief Minister, are required to be submitted to the Lieutenant Governor. A record of the decisions of the Council of Ministers is forwarded to the Lieutenant Governor. After the decisions of the Council have been approved by the Chief Minister, they are forwarded by the Secretary to the Council to the Lieutenant Governor. Rule 14(2) stipulates that after a proposal has been approved by the Council of Ministers and the approved record of the decision has been communicated to the Lieutenant Governor, the minister concerned “shall take necessary action to give effect to the decision”. Communication of the approved record of the decision to the Lieutenant Governor is mandatory and it is only thereafter that the decision can be implemented. The Lieutenant Governor is empowered to call for papers relating to any proposal or matter in any department under Rule 19(5). The power conferred upon the Lieutenant Governor to do so is independent of and does not detract from the duty of the 114 Council of Ministers to keep him informed at every stage. Matters which are likely to bring the government of the NCT into controversy with the Central government or with any state government must be bought to the notice of the Lieutenant Governor. As distinguished from Rule 14, Rule 23 sets out those classes of proposals or matters which have to be submitted to the Lieutenant Governor before orders are issued thereon. Rule 14(2), as noted earlier, stipulates that upon being approved by the Council, the record of the decision is communicated to the Lieutenant Governor upon which the minister will take necessary action to give effect to the decision. However, Rule 23 elucidates specified situations where proposals or matters must be essentially submitted to the Lieutenant Governor before issuing orders thereon. These matters are considered to be important enough to warrant a mandatory prior submission to the Chief Minister as well as to the Lieutenant Governor before orders are issued. These provisions in the Transaction of Business Rules ensure that the Lieutenant Governor is kept informed of the affairs and administration of the National Capital Territory at every stage. The rules leave no element of discretion in the Council of Ministers to not comply with the obligation. The obligation to keep the Lieutenant Governor informed at every stage brooks no exceptions. 98 The Transaction of Business Rules set out a careful defined procedure to enable the Lieutenant Governor to counsel the Ministers. This is to facilitate a further reflection or reconsideration in certain situations. Rule 24 deals with 115 one such situation where the Lieutenant Governor is of the opinion “that any further action should be taken or that action should be taken otherwise than in accordance with the orders passed by the minister in charge”. The Lieutenant Governor may in either case require that the proposal or matter be placed before the Council of Ministers for consideration. The duty of keeping the Lieutenant Governor abreast of the administration of the affairs of the National Capital Territory is amplified by Rule 25. Under the Rule, a duty has been cast on the Chief Minister to furnish to the Lieutenant Governor information on the administration of the Capital and proposals for legislation as the latter may summon. The Lieutenant Governor may also require the submission to the Council of a matter on which the Minister has taken a decision but it has not been placed before the Council. 99 Chapter IV enables the Lieutenant Governor to formulate standing orders regulating the transaction and disposal of business relating to his executive functions. The second proviso to Rule 45 specifically deals with matters connected with public order, police and land. These are subjects which lie outside the ambit of legislative powers of the legislative assembly, since they fall under Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List. Since there is an absence of legislative power in relation to these subjects, they lie outside the realm of matters covered by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. On these excepted subjects, the Lieutenant Governor has to exercise his executive function to the extent to which there is a delegation by the 116 President. The Lieutenant Governor has to consult the Chief Minister if it is so provided in an order of the President under Article 239. Clearly, therefore, in regard to the excepted matters, the exercise of the executive functions by the Lieutenant Governor must be in accord with the delegation, if any, by the President. The Lieutenant Governor can exercise only such executive functions, to the extent to which a delegation has been made. The requirement of consulting the Chief Minister would be subject to the contents of an order issued by the President under Article 239. 100 As regards persons who are in the service connected to the administration of the NCT, the Lieutenant Governor has been assigned under Rule 46 such powers and functions as are entrusted to him by the Rules and orders regulating the conditions of service of such persons or an order of the President made under Article 239. The Lieutenant Governor is mandated to consult the Union Public Service Commission on matters on which it is required to be consulted under Article 320(3). The Lieutenant Governor has to act in accordance with the advice of the Commission unless authorized by the Central government. 101 The Transaction of Business Rules elaborately define the modalities which the Lieutenant Governor must follow in the event of a difference of opinion with the Council of Ministers. The proviso to Article 239AA(4), Section 117 44(1)(b) of the GNCTD Act and Chapter V of the Transaction of Business Rules provide a composite and holistic perspective. They elucidate the modalities which must be followed when there is a difference of opinion. Chapter V supplements and gives effect to the proviso to Article 239AA(4). If a difference of opinion arises between the Lieutenant Governor and a Minister on any matter, the first and primary endeavour must be to resolve it by discussion. Before the matter escalates to the next stage all efforts have to be devoted to a mutual resolution with the Minister. If the difference of opinion continues to persist, the Lieutenant Governor is empowered to direct that the matter in difference be referred to the Council of Ministers. It is when a difference persists between the Lieutenant Governor and the Council of Ministers that a reference is contemplated by Rule 50 to the Central government for a decision of the President. These provisions provide a road map for the exercise of constitutional statesmanship. The differences between the Lieutenant Governor and a Minister or the Council of Ministers must in good faith be attempted to be resolved. Differences constitute the heart of democracy. Reason and dialogue are the essence of a democratic government. The affairs of government do admit of variations in perspective and opinion. The problems of governance are complex. The institutional process of decision making must be mature and tolerant. The theatrics which accompany the rough and tumble of politics ought not to disrupt the necessity for institutional governance which is marked by constitutional sobriety and administrative wisdom. 118 102 Settlement of a difference between a Minister and the Lieutenant Governor by discussion obviates a reference to the President and provides a flexible and expeditious solution where there is a difference of opinion. The first stage at which a resolution is attempted is between the Lieutenant Governor and the Minister in question. If that does not result in a satisfactory solution, the second stage involves the Council of Ministers as a collective entity. It is when the dispute has failed to meet a satisfactory resolution with the Council of Ministers that the Lieutenant Governor is empowered to make a reference to the Central government. The power of the Lieutenant Governor under Rule 55(2) stands independent of the area of difference of opinion covered by Rules 49, 50 and 51. Rule 55(2) brings into focus certain specified areas where certain matters have to be referred to the Union government either in the Union Ministry of the Home Affairs or in the appropriate ministry. The matters covered by Rule 55(2) are considered to be important enough to warrant a prior reference to the Central government. 103 The feature which stands out from the Transaction of Business Rules is that an obligation and duty has been cast upon the elected government and its officers to duly keep the Lieutenant Governor informed of proposals relating to governmental business. The duty to keep the Lieutenant Governor informed is a necessary element of the process and essential for the exercise of the 119 constitutional authority which has been vested in the Lieutenant Governor. It is only when the Lieutenant Governor is kept duly apprised of matters relating to the administration of the National Capital Territory that a decision can be taken on whether a reference should be made to the Union government under Chapter V. If the Lieutenant Governor were to be kept in the dark, it would not be possible for him as a constitutional authority to determine as to whether the matter is of such a nature as would warrant a reference to the Central government. Sharing of information and the process of communication ensures a dialogue which promotes harmony in administration. The Rules are founded upon the need to maintain constitutional comity rather than strife. 104 A significant aspect of the Rules is that on matters which fall within the ambit of the executive functions of the government of NCT, decision making is by the government comprised of the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at its head. The role of the Lieutenant Governor is evinced by the duty which is cast upon the government to keep him duly apprised on matters relating to the administration of the Union territory. On matters of executive business which lie within the constitutional functions assigned to the executive government of the NCT, such a role is elaborated in the functions assigned to the Lieutenant Governor under Rule 24. Rule 24 deals with an eventuality when the Lieutenant Governor may be of the opinion that any further action should be taken or that action should be taken otherwise than in accordance with an order which has been passed by a Minister. In such a case, the 120 Lieutenant Governor does not take his own decision. He has to refer the proposal or matter to the Council of Minister for consideration. Under Rule 25, Lieutenant Governor may require the Council to consider a matter on which a decision has been taken by a Minister but which has not been considered by the Council. Rule 23 enunciates matters which have to be submitted to the Lieutenant Governor before issuing any orders thereon. If the Lieutenant Governor disagrees with a decision or proposal, recourse has to be taken to the procedure which has been enunciated in Rules 49, 50 and 51. If there is a difference of opinion, the Lieutenant Governor must refer it to the Union government after following the procedure which has been laid down. After the decision of the President has been communicated, the Lieutenant Governor must follow that decision and implement it. In other words, the Lieutenant Governor has not been conferred with the authority to take a decision independent of and at variance with the aid and advice which is tendered to him by the Council of Ministers. If he differs with the aid and advice, the Lieutenant Governor must refer the matter to the Union government (after attempts at resolution with the Minister or Council of Ministers have not yielded a solution). After a decision of the President on a matter in difference is communicated, the Lieutenant Governor must abide by that decision. This principle governs those areas which properly lie within the ambit and purview of the executive functions assigned to the government of the National Capital Territory. Matters under Section 41 which fall under the discretion of the Lieutenant Governor stand at a different footing. The Lieutenant Governor 121 may be required to act in his discretion where a matter falls outside the powers conferred on the legislative assembly but in respect of which powers or functions have been delegated to him by the President. The Lieutenant Governor may also be required to act in his discretion under a specific provision of law or where he exercises judicial or quasi judicial functions. Matters pertaining to public order, police and land lie outside the ambit of the legislative powers of the Assembly and hence are outside the executive functions of the government of NCT. These are matters where the Lieutenant Governor would act in the exercise of his functions at his discretion if and to the extent to which there has been a delegation or entrustment by the President to him under Article 239 of the Constitution. Hence, a distinction exists between matters which lie within the domain of the legislative powers of the Assembly and of the executive powers of the NCT government, and those which lie outside. On the former, the Lieutenant Governor must abide by the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers and, in the event of a difference of opinion, refer the matter to the President for decision. In matters which lie outside the legislative powers of the legislative assembly, the Lieutenant Governor has to act in accordance with the entrustment or delegation that has been made to him by the President under Article 239. 105 Section 49 of the GNCTD Act confers an overriding power of control upon the President and the power to issue directions. Upon the exercise of 122 Presidential powers under Section 49, the Lieutenant Governor would have to abide by the directions of the President. K Precedents Literal Interpretation 106 The Learned Additional Solicitor General has relied on certain decisions of this Court to support his submission that while interpreting the Constitution, the Court must read its words in a strictly textual manner. It is his contention that the provisions of Article 239AA, the GNCTD Act and Transaction of Business Rules must be given plain and literal interpretation. 107 The first case relied by the Learned ASG is the decision in Keshavan  Madhava Menon v State of Bombay (“Keshavan Madhava Menon”) . A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court had held that assuming that the provisions of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 were inconsistent with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, proceedings which had been commenced and were pending at the date of the commencement of the Constitution were not affected even if the Act was inconsistent with the fundamental rights and had become void under Article 13(1). The appeal against the judgment of the High Court was adjudicated by a seven-Judge (1951) 2 SCR 228  123 Constitution Bench of this Court. Justice S R Das, speaking for a majority of this Court held that: “An argument founded on what is claimed to be the spirit of the Constitution is always attractive, for it has a powerful appeal to sentiment and emotion; but a court of law has to gather the spirit of the Constitution from the language of the Constitution. What one may believe or think to be spirit of the Constitution cannot prevail if the language of the Constitution does not support that view. Article 372(2) gives power to the President to adapt and modify existing laws by way of repeal or amendment. There is nothing to prevent the President, in exercise of the powers conferred on him by that article, from repealing, say the whole or any part of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. If the President does so, then such repeal will at once attract Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. In such a situation all prosecutions under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, which were pending at the date of its repeal by the President would be saved and must be proceeded with notwithstanding the repeal of that Act unless an express provision was otherwise made in the repealing Act. It is therefore clear that the idea of the preservation of past inchoate rights or liabilities and pending proceedings to enforce the same is not foreign or abhorrent to the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention about the spirit of the Constitution as invoked by the learned counsel in aid of his plea that pending proceedings under a law which has become void cannot be proceeded with. Further, if it is against the spirit of the Constitution to continue the pending prosecutions under such a void law, surely it should be equally repugnant to that spirit that men who have already been convicted under such repressive law before the Constitution of India came into force should continue to rot in jail. It is, therefore, quite clear that the court should construe the language of Article 13(1) according to the established rules of interpretation and arrive at its true meaning uninfluenced by any assumed spirit of the Constitution.” Applying the standard, the majority held that Article 13 of the Constitution “is entirely prospective in operation and rendered inconsistent existing laws ineffectual on and after the date of the commencement of the Constitution”. The view of the majority was that there is no fundamental right that a person 124 shall not be prosecuted and punished for an offence committed before the Constitution came into force. Justice Fazal Ali in his dissenting judgment, however, held that: “..Evidently, the framers of the Constitution did not approve of the laws which are in conflict with the fundamental rights, and, in my judgment, it would not be giving full effect to their intention to hold that even after the Constitution has come into force, the laws which are inconsistent with the fundamental rights will continue to be treated as good and effectual laws in regard to certain matters, as if the Constitution had never been passed. How such a meaning can be read into the words used in Article 13(1), it is difficult for me to understand. There can be no doubt that Article 13(1) will have no retrospective operation, and transactions which are past and closed, and rights which have already vested, will remain untouched. But with regard to inchoate matters which were still not determined when the Constitution came into force, and as regards proceedings whether not yet begun, or pending at the time of enforcement of the Constitution and not yet prosecuted to a final judgment, the very serious question arises as to whether a law which has been declared by the Constitution to be completely ineffectual can yet be applied. On principle and on good authority, the answer to this question would appear to me to be that the law having ceased to be effectual can no longer be applied.” 108 The next judgment on which reliance has been placed by the ASG is in  Tej Kiran Jain v N Sanjiva Reddy . A Bench of six judges of this Court was considering an appeal from the judgment of a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court rejecting a plaint claiming a decree for damages for statements made on the floor of the Lok Sabha during a Calling Attention Motion. Such an action was clearly barred under Article 105(2) of the Constitution. This Court rejected the contention that the immunity granted by Article 105(2) in respect of anything said or any vote given in Parliament would apply only to words (1970) 2 SCC 272  125 relevant to the business of Parliament and not to something which was irrelevant. In that context, the Court held that: “In our judgment it is not possible to read the provisions of the article in the way suggested. The article means what it says in language which could not be plainer. The article confers immunity inter alia in respect of “anything said …. In Parliament”. The word ‘anything’ is of the widest import and is equivalent to ‘everything’. The only limitation arises from the words ‘in Parliament’ which means during the sitting of Parliament and in the course of the business of Parliament. We are concerned only with speeches in Lok Sabha. Once it was proved that Parliament was sitting and its business was transacted, anything said during the course of that business was immune from proceedings in any Court. This immunity is not only complete but is as it should be…” 109 The third decision is of a Constitution Bench in G Narayanaswami v G  Pannerselvam (“Narayanaswami”) . In that case, Article 171 of the Constitution came up for interpretation and the submission which was urged was that in order to be qualified to stand for election to a graduate constituency of the Legislative Council of a State, a person must also possess the qualification of being a graduate. Repelling the contention, this Court held that it was not open to the Court to add to the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution: “..The concept of such representation does not carry with it, as a necessary consequence, the further notion that the representative must also possess the very qualifications of those he represents… the view contained in the Judgment under appeal, necessarily results in writing some words into or adding them to the relevant statutory provisions to the effect that the candidates from graduates’ constituencies of Legislative Councils must also possess the qualification of having graduated. This contravenes the rule of “plain (1972) 3 SCC 717  126 meaning” or “literal” construction which must ordinarily prevail.” 110 In support of the above contention, reliance has also been placed on two other Constitution Bench decisions of this Court in Kuldip Nayar v Union   of India (“Kuldip Nayar”) and Manoj Narula v Union of India (“Manoj Narula”) . In Kuldip Nayar , an amendment made in the Representation of People Act, 1951 was challenged. By the said amendment, the requirement of “domicile” in the State concerned for getting elected to the Council of States was deleted. It was contended by the petitioner that removing the said requirement violated the principle of federalism, a basic feature of the Constitution. The Court rejected the contention of the petitioner. While endorsing and reiterating the view taken in the judgment in Narayanaswami , the Court held: “It may be desirable to give a broad and generous construction to the Constitutional provisions, but while doing so the rule of "plain meaning" or "literal" interpretation, which remains "the primary rule", has also to be kept in mind. In fact the rule of "literal construction" is the safe rule unless the language used is contradictory, ambiguous, or leads really to absurd results… The "representative" of the State is the person chosen by the electors who can be any person who, in the opinion of the electors, is fit to represent them. There is absolutely no basis for the contention that a person who is an elector in the State concerned is more "representative" in character than one who is not. We do not find any contradiction, ambiguity, or absurdity in the provisions of the law as a result of the impugned amendment. Even while construing the provisions of the Constitution and the RP Acts in the broadest or most generous manner, the rule of "plain meaning" or "literal" interpretation compels us not to accept the contentions of the petitioners.” (2006) 7 SCC 1  (2014) 9 SCC 1  127 In Manoj Narula , a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution assailed the appointment of some of the original Respondents as Ministers to the Council of Ministers of Union of India despite their involvement in serious and heinous crimes. The question before the Court was whether a categorical prohibition can be read to the words contained in Article 75(1) of the Constitution so that the Prime Minister is constitutionally prohibited to give advice to the President in respect of a person for becoming a Minister who is facing a criminal trial for a heinous and serious offence and charges have been framed against him by the trial Judge. The Constitution Bench held that it cannot re-write a constitutional provision: “Reading such an implied limitation as a prohibition would tantamount to adding a disqualification at a particular stage of the trial in relation of a person. This is neither expressly stated nor is impliedly discernible from the provision.” 111 These judgments do not advance the proposition which is sought to be urged on behalf of the Union of India that anything but the literal meaning of the words used is irrelevant to the interpretation of the Constitution. The judgment in Keshavan Madhava Menon held that the Court has to gather the spirit of the Constitution from its language and that the language of Article 13 had to be interpreted in accordance with the established rules of interpretation “uninfluenced by any assumed spirit of the Constitution”. These observations of the seven-judge Bench are not intended to adopt a principle of interpretation which requires the Court to ignore the basic values which the Constitution seeks to enhance, while interpreting the words used in the text. 128 The words contained in the text of the Constitution have to be attributed a purposive interpretation which advances fundamental constitutional values. In Keshavan Madhava Menon , the Court found the ‘spirit of the Constitution’ to be perhaps too vague or amorphous (though it was not articulated specifically thus). After the evolution of the basic structure doctrine post Kesavananda , the interpretation of the Constitution must be guided by those fundamental tenets which constitute the foundation and basic features of the document. Where a provision of the Constitution is intended to facilitate participatory governance, the interpretation which the Court places must enhance the values of democracy and of republican form of government which are part of the basic features. 112 The judgment in Tej Kiran Jain rejects the attempt to dilute the immunity conferred by Article 105 in respect of statements made on the floor of the House. The judgment in Narayanaswami rejected the attempt to read a qualification for being elected to the Legislative Council which was not found in the text of Article 171. The Court in Manoj Narula refused to read a disqualification into the words of Article 75 for being appointed as a Minister of the Union Cabinet. The Constitution of India is an embodiment of multiple values. The Constitution preserves national unity. Yet it also nurtures regional autonomy and decentralization. As discussed in the beginning of this judgment, the approach of a constitutional court must be to interpret the Constitution so as “to arbitrate between contesting interpretations of the many 129  core values on which our polity is believed to be based.” Each provision of the Constitution must therefore be studied “as an expression of values” and has to  be interpreted “against the background of an overarching constitutional order”. Representative democracy underlines the essence of our Constitution. Collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers is the most essential component of the Cabinet form of government as envisaged under the Constitution. The trust reposed in the Council of Ministers of the NCT is based on its constitutional status. These moral values of the Constitution must therefore be upheld. 113 In Kuldip Nayar ’s case, the Court had held that in order to interpret the intention behind the enactment of a provision, “one needs to look into the historical legislative developments”. Placing the structure of governance in the NCT to a constitutional pedestal (while making divergences from previous statutory schemes, as discussed earlier in this judgment) provided a special status to the NCT, which this Court cannot ignore. This Court must interpret the Constitution on the basis of the principles elucidated in the beginning of this judgment. Relationship between Centre and Union Territories Rajiv Bhagava (ed.), Politics and Ethics of the Indian Constitution, Oxford University Press (2008), at page 9  Martin Loughlin, “The Silences of Constitutions”, International Journal of Constitutional Law (2019, In Press)  https://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/de/institute/rphil/freiburger_vortraege/silences-of-constitutions-m.-loughlin- manuskript.pdf 130 114 The relationship between the Union government and a Union territory has in varying contexts been the subject matter of decided cases. In Satya  Dev Bushahri v Padam Dev (“Satya Dev Bushahri”) , the election of the first respondent was questioned, among other grounds, for the reason that he was interested in contracts with the government and was disqualified for being chosen to the legislative assembly of Himachal Pradesh. The Election Tribunal rejected the contention holding that Representation of the People Act, 1951 was not applicable to elections in Part C States. The appellant contended that the contracts in which the elected candidate had interest were in fact contracts with the Central government, which disqualified him from becoming a member of the legislative assembly. It was urged that since the executive action of the Central government is vested in the President, the President was also the executive head of Part C States and a contract entered into with the then state of Himachal Pradesh was in law a contract with the Central government. Dealing with the submission, Justice T L Venkatarama Ayyar speaking for a Bench of three judges of this Court held thus :

(1955) 1 SCR 549  131 The Court consequently rejected the contention that a contract with a Part C State should be construed as a contract with the Central government. This decision was subject to a review. In the application for review, reliance was sought to be placed on the provisions of Section 3(8)(b)(2) of the General Clauses Act which define the expression “Central Government” as follows :

On this basis, it was urged that a contract with the Chief Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh must be treated as a contract with the Central government and in consequence the elected candidate was disqualified under the relevant legislation. On the other hand, the elected candidate relied upon the provisions of Section 3(60)(b) which read as follows:

This Court, in the course of the judgment in review, held that in view of the provisions of Section 3(8), a contract with the Chief Commissioner in a Part C State is a contract with the Central government, which would be a disqualification for election to the legislative assembly under Section 17 of 132 Government of Part C States Act 1951 read with Section 7(d) of Representation of the People Act, 1951. In the view of the Court:

115 The subsequent decision in Devji Vallabhbhai Tandel v Administrator  of Goa, Daman & Diu (“Tandel”) involved an order of detention issued under  the COFEPOSA by the Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu. One of the grounds of challenge before the Bench of three Judges of this Court was that an order of detention could be made only by the Chief Minister in the name of the Administrator, and not by the Administrator. Section 2(f) defined the expression “state government”, in relation to a Union territory, to mean the Administrator. An order of detention could be issued under Section 3(1) by the Central government or the state government or officers of a certain rank who (1982) 2 SCC 222  The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act 1974  133 were duly empowered. Justice Baharul Islam speaking for this Court noted that comparing the provisions of Articles 74 and 163, on the one hand and Section 44 of the Government of Union Territories Act 1963, there was a manifest difference between the position of the President or Governor and the Administrator of a Union territory. In the view of the Court:

The Court adverted to the fact that when the Administrator makes a reference to the President on a difference of opinion arising with the Council of Ministers, he may “during the interregnum...completely override the advice of the Council of Ministers and act according to his light”. This Court observed that neither the Governor nor the President enjoys such a power: 134

116 The learned Additional Solicitor General has placed reliance on the above observations to submit that since the proviso to Section 44 was “bodily lifted” (as he describes it) and placed in Article 239AA(4), the construction placed by the Bench of three Judges in Tandel on the ambit of the powers of the Administrator will govern the construction of the proviso to Article 239AA. On the other hand, Mr Gopal Subramanium urged that the above interpretation of the proviso to Section 44(1) of the 1963 Act will not apply proprio vigore to Article 239AA. In his submission, the constitutional amendment resulting in the introduction of Article 239AA is a significant expression of people’s sovereignty and the intention underlying it must receive a purposive interpretation. While not detracting from the importance of the NCT, Mr Subramanium submitted that the area of control with the Administrator which is “an exceptional residual power” must not set at naught a democratically elected Cabinet form of government in the Union territory. We will return to the proper construction to be placed upon the proviso. However, at this stage we find it difficult to subscribe to the view that the content of the constitutional provision engrafted in Article 239AA must be read on the same pedestal as the content of the statutory provision in Section 44 of the 1963 135 Act. The fact that the proviso to Article 239AA(4) is similar in terms to the proviso to Section 44(1) of the 1963 Act may be one aspect of relevance to the construction of the former. Yet, to our mind, in construing a constitutional provision, the considerations which weigh with the Court would not be constricted by the principles underlying the interpretation of the provisions of a statute. Ordinarily while construing a statute, the Court would be guided by the plain and grammatical meaning of the words used. The literal or golden rule of interpretation gives way where its consequence would lead to an absurdity or perpetuate an evil which the legislature had intended to avoid. The Court, even while interpreting a statute, may adopt a purposive interpretation. An interpretation is purposive because it facilitates the object which the legislature intended to achieve by enacting the law. Even a purposive interpretation seeks to fulfil the aim and object of the legislature which enacted the law. While construing the provisions of the Constitution, the Court cannot be oblivious either to the nature of the document which it construes or to its task as an institution created by the Constitution to interpret its provisions. Ordinary law is susceptible to alteration by legislative majorities. Legislative amendments to statutory provisions are often a response to the predicaments of the moment. The object of elevating rights, duties and modes of governance into the protective terrain of a constitutional document is to precisely elevate them to a status of stability and permanence which we attribute to a constitutional provision. Constitutional provisions are also subject to the amendatory process under Article 368 so long as the basic features of 136 the Constitution are not abridged. The restraints on the constituent power in the form of the special majorities required for the passage of an amendment, the requirement in certain cases of ratification by the state legislatures and the substantive limits imposed by the basic structure doctrine make the distinction between ordinary legislation and a constitutional amendment evident. Interpretation of a constitutional text is therefore governed by the precept that the Court is embarking upon the task of construing an organic document which defines the basic compact for society. It is in that sense that the Court will bear in mind that it is the Constitution which the Court is expounding. These considerations must apply with significant force when an amendment to the Constitution has (as in the present case) strengthened the basic structure by entrenching the principle of democratic governance. Consequently, the line of thought which requires us to read the proviso to Article 239AA(4) in terms of the proviso to Section 44(1), and to follow the line of interpretation of the latter in Tandel’s case is to place words above the heart and soul of the Constitution. Tandel’s case did not have to go into the issues which arise before us in relation to the exercise of constitutional powers. Tandel does not explain what is the nature of the difference of opinion which will warrant a reference to the President. The COFEPOSA, as we have noticed, defined the expression “state government” in relation to a Union territory to mean ‘the Administrator thereof’. The Court did not have to consider the effect of the proviso, in any event not in the context of a constitutional provision. There are more fundamental issues which the Court must resolve while interpreting the 137 text of the Constitution which lie beyond the mere question of whether the Administrator of Goa (as in that case) was authorised to issue an order of detention. While construing the text of Article 239AA, the endeavour of the Court must be to facilitate the strengthening of democratic institutions. Constitutional liberties survive and democracies remain vibrant when the institutions of governance created by the Constitution are capable of withstanding the challenges of the times. As an expounder of constitutional principle, it is the foremost duty of the Court to adopt an interpretation which gives expression to democratic values. Truth, justice and freedom are cardinal values in the democratic quest of achieving the dignity of citizens. The ability of citizens to participate in the formation of governments and to expect accountable and responsive government constitutes the backbone of a free society. In interpreting constitutional text, history should remind us how fragile liberty and democracy can be, unless citizens fiercely protect their foundations. We can ignore them only at our peril. 117 Another decision of this Court which must be adverted to is in Goa Sampling Employees’ Association v General Superintendence Co. of  India Pvt. Ltd. (“Goa Sampling”) . A reference was made by the Central government of an industrial dispute for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. It was sought to be urged that in relation to a Union Territory, the Central government is the appropriate government. The Tribunal (1985) 1 SCC 206  138 held that the workmen were dock workers governed by an Act of Parliament and since they were working in a major port, it was the Central government which was the appropriate government. The Tribunal also held that even if the state government is the appropriate government, since Goa was then a Union territory and its administration was carried on by an Administrator appointed by the President under Article 239, the Central government was the appropriate government. The High Court held that the industrial dispute in which the workmen were involved did not concern a major port and hence the Central government was not the appropriate government. Moreover, the High Court also held that the Central government is not the state government for the Union territory of Goa under the Act but it was the Administrator appointed under Article 239 who is the state government. The Administrator being the appropriate government, the High Court held that the Central government had no jurisdiction to make the reference. It was the second limb of the finding of the High Court which was considered by this Court in the course of its judgment. In order to appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to consider the expressions “Central government” as defined in Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as follows: “(8) ‘Central Government’ shall— (a) * (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include, (i)-(ii) * (iii) in relation to the administration of a Union Territory, the Administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Article 239 of the Constitution.” 139 The expression “state government” is defined in Section 3(60), insofar as is material thus:

“Union territory” is defined in Section 3(62) to mean the Union territories specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and to include any other territory comprised within the territory of India but not specified in that Schedule. Dealing with the provisions of Section 44(1) of the 1963 Act, this Court observed thus:

The Court noticed that the provisions of Part VI of the Constitution which deal with the States clearly indicate that a Union territory administration is not a state government. The Court observed that the Constitution makes a distinction between a State and its government (called the state government) 140 on one hand and the Union territory and its administration on the other hand. This distinction, the Court observed, was carried in the definition contained in the General Clauses Act:

The view of the High Court that the Administrator is the state government insofar as the Union territory is concerned under Section 3(60) was held to be in error. The decisions in Satya Dev Bushahari and in The State of Madhya  Pradesh v Shri Moula Bux were distinguished since they were rendered prior to the amendment of Part VIII of the Constitution in 1956 and before the insertion of Articles 239A and 239B. The position in law was set out as follows: (1962) 2 SCR 794  141

The decision of the two judge Bench in Goa Sampling explains that under the General Clauses Act 1897, the expression “Central government” will include the Administrator of a Union territory acting within the scope of his authority under Article 239, in relation to the administration of the Union territory. Similarly, the expression “state government” means in relation to the Union territory, the Central government. The Central government was held to be the appropriate government to make a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The judgment in Goa Sampling dealt with the limited scope as to which is the appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act. 118 The issue as to whether the Lieutenant Governor of the NCT is competent to accord sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure was considered by a two  judge Bench of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu (“Navjot Sandhu”) . In that case, sanctions under both the statutes were accorded “by (2005) 11 SCC 600  142 order and in the name of the Lieutenant Governor”. The sanction under Section 50 of the POTA was urged to be a nullity on the ground that in relation to the Union Territory only the Central government was competent to accord it. Section 2(1)(h) of POTA defined the expression “State” in relation to a Union territory, to mean the Administrator thereof. Rejecting the challenge, this Court held that under Article 239AA, the Administrator appointed under Article 239 does not lose his status as such and it is only his designation which is merged into the new designation of Lieutenant Governor “in keeping with the upgraded status of this particular Union territory”. The Lieutenant Governor, who continues to be an Administrator, was held to derive authority to grant sanction under Section 50 by reason of the legislative fiction under Section 2(1)(h), the Administrator being deemed to be the state government for the purpose of Section 50. Hence : “..by virtue of specific statutory delegation in favour of the Administrator who is constitutionally designated as the Lieutenant Governor as well, the sanction accorded by the said authority is a valid sanction under Section 50 of POTA..” The decision in Navjot Sandhu turned upon a specific statutory delegation in favour of the Administrator to grant sanction. It is hence of no assistance to the present constitutional context. Decision in NDMC 143 119 A nine-judge Bench of this Court in New Delhi Municipal Council v  State of Punjab (“NDMC”) dealt with the issue as to whether properties owned and occupied by various states in the NCT are exempt from the levy of local taxes under Article 289(1) of the Constitution. Allied to this was the question as to whether the states are entitled to exemption from the levy of taxes imposed by Parliamentary legislation under Article 246(4) upon their properties situated within the Union territories. Article 246(4) provides thus: “Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included [in a State] notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.” Justice B P Jeevan Reddy spoke for the majority of five judges. The minority view of four judges was rendered by Chief Justice Ahmadi. 120 The judgment of the majority notes that the States, put together, do not exhaust the territory of India. Parliament has the power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of territory of India not included in a State. Since the Union territories are not included in the territory of any State, Parliament was the only law making body. Dealing with the provisions of Article 239 AA, the Court held : “..In the year 1991, the Constitution did provide for a legislature for the Union Territory of Delhi [National Capital Territory of Delhi] by the Sixty-Ninth (Amendment) Act (Article 239-AA) but even here the legislature so created was not a full-fledged legislature nor did it have the effect of – assuming that it could – lift the National Capital Territory of Delhi from Union Territory category to the category of States within the (1997) 7 SCC 339  144 meaning of Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution. All this necessarily means that so far as the Union Territories are concerned, there is no such thing as List I, List II or List III. The only legislative body is Parliament – or a legislative body created by it. Parliament can make any law in respect of the said territories – subject, of course, to constitutional limitations other than those specified in Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution. Above all, the Union Territories are not “States” as contemplated by Chapter I of Part XI; they are the territories of the Union falling outside the territories of the States. Once the Union Territory is a part of the Union and not part of any State, it follows that any tax levied by its legislative body is Union taxation. Admittedly, it cannot be called “State taxation” – and under the constitutional scheme, there is no third kind of taxation. Either it is Union taxation or State taxation..” 121 The judgment of the majority also holds that all Union territories are not situated alike. The first category consists of Union territories which have no legislature at all. The second category has legislatures created by a law enacted by Parliament under the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963. The third category is Delhi which has “special features” under Article 239 AA. Though the Union territory of Delhi “is in a class by itself ”, it “ is certainly not a State within the meaning of Article 246 or part VI of the Constitution ”. Various Union territories- the Court observed - are in different stages of evolution. However, the position remains that these Union territories, including the NCT are yet Union territories and not a State. General Clauses Act 122 Article 367 (1) of the Constitution provides that: “367(1) Unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under article 372, apply for interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the 145 interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India.” 123 As we have noticed, the inclusive definition of the expression ‘State’ in Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that as respects any period after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, the expression State shall mean the States specified in the First Schedule to the Constitution and shall include a Union territory. If this inclusive definition was made applicable for the purpose of construing Article 246(4), an anomaly would arise because Parliament would have no power to legislate in respect of the Union territories with respect to matters governed by the State list. Until a legislature which is empowered to legislate on matters in the State list is created under Article 239A for the Union territories, there would be no legislature with competence to legislate on those matters. The consequences which would result from reading the provisions of Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act while interpreting Article 246(4) were noticed in a judgment of a Constitution Bench in TM Kanniyan v Income Tax Officer,  Pondicherry (“Kanniyan”) . The Constitution Bench held that such a construction would be repugnant to the context of Article 246 and hence, Parliament would have under Article 246(4) plenary powers to make laws for all Union Territories in respect of all matters. The decision in Kanniyan was followed in the judgment of the majority in the nine-judge bench decision in NDMC . Even the judgment of the minority noted that while certain Union territories have legislative assemblies of their own, “they are very much under (1968) 2 SCR 103  146 the supervision of the Union Government and cannot be said to have an independent status”. Notably, the minority view also accepted the principle that the definition of the expression “State” in Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act is inapplicable to Article 246(4). 124 A Constitution Bench of this Court in Management of Advance  Insurance Co. Ltd. v Shri Gurudasmal (“Advance Insurance”) while construing Entry 80 of the Union list held that the definitions contained in the General Clauses Act may not always apply in relation to the expression “State” in the Constitution and much would depend upon the context. Entry 80 of the Union list provides as follows: “80. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any State to any area outside that State, but not so as to enable the police of one State to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area outside that State without the consent of the Government of the State in which such area is situated; extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any State to railway areas outside that State” In that case, on a complaint by an Income Tax Officer of the commission of offences by the appellant under Sections 409, 477A and 120B of the Penal Code, a case was registered by the Superintendent of Police in the Special Police Establishment, New Delhi. The appellant filed a writ petition challenging the right of the Special Police Establishment to investigate the case in the State of Maharashtra but it was dismissed by the High Court. In appeal before this Court, it was urged that the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted (1970) 1 SCC 633  147 under the Act XV of 1946 was not constitutional and had no jurisdiction to investigate cases in other states. The submission was that Entry 80 speaks of a police force belonging to any state and not of a police force belonging to a Union territory. Chief Justice Hidayatullah speaking for a Constitution Bench held that Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act (which defines State in respect of any period after the commencement of the seventh constitution amendment to include a Union territory) “furnishes a complete answer to the difficulty which is raised since Entry 80 must be read so as to include Union territory”. Hence, the members of a police force belonging to a Union territory could have their powers and jurisdiction extended to another state with the consent of that State. The Constitution Bench held that the definitions in the General Clauses Act “cannot always be read” in interpreting the constitutional text and “the definitions apply unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context”. The Constitution Bench held that: “After the Seventh Amendment India is a Union of States (Article 1) and the territories thereof are specified in the First Schedule. Then there are Union Territories which are mentioned separately. There is thus a distinction between “States” and “Union Territories” which cannot be lost sight of. When the definition cannot be made applicable owing to the context or the subject, the word “State” refers to States in the First Schedule only. Such an occasion arose in I.M Kanniyan v Income-Tax Officer, Pondicherry and Another, and Bachawat, J., explained Article 246 by holding that the definition of “State” in two parts in the adapted Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act was repugnant to the subject and context of Article 246. There is nothing in the subject or context of Entry 80 of the Union List which can be said to exclude the application of the definition in Section 3(58). Indeed the Part C States were expressly mentioned in Entry No. 39 of the Federal List of the Government of India Act, 148 1935 (after its amendment in 1947) and thus before the Seventh Amendment the definition of State (subject to the subject or context) included Part C States. Therefore, the definition of “State” in Section 3(58) in the General Clauses Act after the adaptation in 1956 applies and includes Union Territories in Entry 80 of the Union List” The Constitution Bench in Advance Insurance did not find anything repugnant in the subject or context of Entry 80 of the Union list. Hence, Entry 80 was held to include Union territories.  125 In Union of India v Prem Kumar Jain , a Bench of four judges of this Court dealt with an appeal from a decision of the Delhi High Court which had quashed a notification of the Union government and a scheme for the formation of a joint cadre of the Indian Administrative Service. The High Court had held the formation of a Delhi – Himachal Cadre of service to be ultra vires . The creation of a joint cadre for all Union territories on 1 January 1968 under Rule 3(1) of the IAS (Cadre) Rules 1954 was challenged as being contrary to Article 312 and the All India Services Act 1951, as it was not common to the Union and a State, a Union territory not being a State. The High Court held that Union territories not being States, the action was ultra vires . In appeal, this Court observed that it was not necessary for Parliament to make a law providing for the creation of a service common to the Union and the States under Article 312(1), in view of clause 2, which provided as follows : “312 (2) The services known at the commencement of this Constitution as the Indian Administrative Service and the (1976) 3 SCC 743  149 Indian Police Service shall be deemed to be services created by Parliament under this article”. Section 3(1) of the All India Services Act had a provision for making rules for the regulation of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service “after consultation with the governments of the States concerned”. The issue was whether Union territories could be States for the purpose of such consultation. This Court held that the expression “State” having been defined in Section 3(58), from the commencement of the seventh amendment to the Constitution in 1956, and the President having substituted a new clause 58 in Section 3, there was nothing repugnant to the subject or context to make that definition inapplicable. The High Court was held to have been in error in holding that Union territories were not States for that purpose. 126 Whether the expression “State” in the Constitution would cover a Union territory is a matter to be deduced from the context. The Constitution in the First Schedule makes a clear distinction between States and Union territories. Hence, the inclusive definition of the expression “State” in Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act cannot apply to the First Schedule. Similarly, in Article 246(4), which enables Parliament to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State, the definition in Section 3(58) would have no application, having due regard to the context. This was explained in the decision in Kanniyan . When there is something repugnant in 150 the subject or context, the definition in Section 3(58) would have no application. “Insofar as any such matter is applicable to Union territories” 127 In the State list and the Concurrent list of the Seventh Schedule, there are numerous entries which use the expression “State”. These entries are illustratively catalogued below: “ List II 12. Libraries, museums and other similar institutions controlled or financed by the State . 26. Trade and commerce within the State subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III. 37. Elections to the Legislature of the State subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament. 38. Salaries and allowances of members of the Legislature of the State , of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and, if there is a Legislative Council, of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman thereof. 39. Powers, privileges and immunities of the Legislative Assembly and of the members and the committees thereof, and, if there is a Legislative Council, of that Council and of the members and the committees thereof; enforcement of attendance of persons for giving evidence or producing documents before committees of the Legislature of the State . 40. Salaries and allowances of Ministers for the State . 41. State public services; State Public Service Commission. 42. State pensions, that is to say, pensions payable by the State or out of the Consolidated Fund of the State . 43. Public debt of the State . LIST III 3. Preventive detention for reasons connected with the security of a State 4. Removal from one State to another State of prisoners, accused persons and persons subjected to preventive detention for reasons specified in entry 3 of this List. 43. Recovery in a State of claims in respect of taxes and other public demands, including arrears of land-revenue and sums recoverable as such arrears, arising outside that State .” (Emphasis supplied) 151 128 Article 239AA(3)(a) permits the legislative assembly of the NCT to legislate on matters in the State list, except for Entries 1, 2 and 18 (and Entries 64, 65 and 66 insofar as they relate to the earlier entries) and on the Concurrent list, “ insofar as any such matter is applicable to Union territories ”. In forming an understanding of these words of Article 239AA(3) (a), it has to be noticed that since the decision in Kanniyan right through to the nine-judge Bench decision in NDMC , it has been held that the expression “ State ” in Article 246 does not include a Union territory. The expression “insofar as any such matter is applicable to Union territories” cannot be construed to mean that the legislative assembly of NCT would have no power to legislate on any subject in the State or Concurrent lists, merely by the use of the expression “State” in that particular entry. This is not a correct reading of the above words of Article 239AA(3)(a). As we see below, that is not how Parliament has construed them as well. 129 Section 7(5) of the GNCTD Act provides that salaries of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the legislative assembly may be fixed by the legislative assembly by law. Section 19 provides that the members of the legislative assembly shall receive salaries and allowances as determined by the legislative assembly by law. Section 43(3) similarly provides that the salaries and allowances of ministers shall be determined by the legislative assembly. However, Section 24 provides that a Bill for the purpose has to be reserved for 152 the consideration of the President. Parliament would not have enacted the above provisions unless legislative competence resided in the States on the above subject. The subjects pertaining to the salaries and allowances of members of the legislature of the state (including the Speaker and Deputy Speaker) and of the Ministers for the state are governed by Entry 38 and Entry 40 of the State list. The GNCTD Act recognises the legislative competence of the legislative assembly of NCT to enact legislation on these subjects. The use of the expression ‘State’ in these entries does not divest the jurisdiction of the legislative assembly. Nor are the words of Article 239AA(3)(a) exclusionary or disabling in nature. 130 The purpose of the above narration is to indicate that the expression ‘State’ is by itself not conclusive of whether a particular provision of the Constitution would apply to Union territories. Similarly, it can also be stated that the definition of the expression state in Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act (which includes a Union territory) will not necessarily govern all references to ‘State’ in the Constitution. If there is something which is repugnant in the subject or context, the inclusive definition in Section 3(58) will not apply. This is made clear in the precedent emanating from this Court. In certain contexts, it has been held that the expression ‘State’ will not include Union territories while in other contexts the definition in Section 3(58) has been applied. 153 Hence, the expression “insofar as any such matter is applicable to Union territories” is not one of exclusion nor can it be considered to be so irrespective of subject or context. L Construction of the proviso to Article 239AA(4) 131 The vexed issue of interpretation relates to the proviso to Article 239AA(4). Undoubtedly, the National Capital Territory continues to be a Union territory. The Union government has a special interest in the administration of its affairs. This is exemplified by the provisions of Article 239 and Section 49 of the GNCTD Act. The proviso to Article 239AA(4) must be given an interpretation which is marked with a sense of fine constitutional balance. The balance which is drawn must preserve the vital interest of the Union government in the governance of the national capital while supporting the legitimacy, and constitutional status of the Council of Ministers which owes collective responsibility to the legislative assembly and which, in its capacity of the executive arm of government tenders aid and advice to the Lieutenant Governor under a cabinet form of governance. 132 Broadly speaking, three lines of reasoning emerge before the Court. The Court need not be constrained by having to choose one among them. It 154 would be possible to draw from each, in arriving at a conclusion. The first line of interpretation would have the Court interpret the expression “difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and his Council of Ministers on any of the matter” without reservation or qualification. This line of interpretation follows a purely literal or textual construction. Any difference of opinion would fulfil the proviso to clause 4. ‘Any matter’ would mean any matter without restriction. The Lieutenant Governor would be free to refer to the President just about any difference of opinion of any matter, where it has arisen with the Council of Ministers. This approach cautions the court against confining the proviso to specified categories or confining the areas where differences can arise. 133 The second line of interpretation is that the expression should be read and confined to specified categories. To test the validity of this approach, four categories may be delineated. The Lieutenant Governor may invoke the power under the proviso where: (i) Executive decisions or acts of the Government of NCT will impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union government; (ii) The requirement of complying with laws enacted by Parliament or of the provisions of the Constitution arises; 155 (iii) The executive authority of the government of NCT is sought to be exercised in an area where it has no legislative competence (the ultra vires doctrine); and (iv) A matter is located within Rule 23 of the Transaction of Business Rules. 134 There is a third line of interpretation, which has two facets. The first facet postulates at what stage, a reference to the President may be made in terms of the proviso. According to it, a reference can be made to the President only after the Lieutenant Governor has made an effort to resolve a difference with a Minister or with the Council of Ministers by seeking a resolution through dialogue and discussion. The Lieutenant Governor has to follow the provisions contained in the Transaction of Business Rules, which mandate that an attempt should be made to resolve differences within the institutional level of the NCT government before escalating matters to the President. The second facet relates to the substantive meaning of the expression ‘any matter’. ‘Any matter’ in this line of interpretation would not mean ‘every matter’ or every trifling matter but only those rare and exceptional matters where the difference is so fundamental to the governance of the Union territory that it deserves to be escalated to the President. The third approach to interpretation proposes that both a procedural and substantive nuance must be adopted while interpreting the proviso, failing which the salutary constitutional purpose underlying Article 239AA will be defeated. 156 135 A close analysis of the three lines of interpretation would indicate that there is a kernel of substance in each of them, but there are pitfalls which must be guarded against. The functioning of institutions must establish a constitutional balance which facilitates cooperative governance. Governance in cooperation is both a hallmark and a necessity of our constitutional structure. Our Constitution distributes legislative and executive powers between political entities. Distribution of power between institutions which are the creation of the Constitution is a significant effort to ensure that the values of participation and representation which constitute the foundation of democracy permeate to all levels of governance. The federal structure for governance which is a part of the basic structure recognizes the importance of fulfilling regional aspirations as a means of strengthening unity. The Constitution has adopted some but may be not all elements of a federal polity and the Union government has an important role in the affairs of the nation. For the purpose of the present discourse, it is necessary to emphasise the value which the Constitution places on cooperative governance, within the  federal structure. An illustration is to be found in Chapter II of Part XI which deals with the administrative relations between the Union and the States. Under Article 256, an obligation has been cast upon every state to ensure that its executive power is exercised to secure compliance with laws enacted by Parliament. The executive power of the Union extends to issuing directions to Granville Austin (Supra note 3), at page 232  157 a State as are necessary, for that purpose. Article 257 contains a mandate that in exercising its executive power, a State shall not impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union. The constitutional vision of cooperative governance is enhanced by the provision made in Article 258 under which the President may, with the consent of a State, entrust to it or to its officers, functions in relation to any matter to which the power of the Union extends. Similarly, even on matters on which a State legislature has no power to make laws, Parliament may confer powers and impose duties on the officers of the State. Article 261 provides that full faith and credit must be given throughout the territory of India to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union and of every State. Without determining (it being unnecessary for the present discussion) the extent to which these provisions apply to a Union territory, the purpose of emphasising the principles which emerge from the chapter on administrative relations is to highlight the necessity for cooperative governance between different levels of government, in a Constitution, such as ours, which contains an elaborate distribution of power between political entities and institutions. The construction which the Court places on the proviso to Article 239AA(4) must facilitate mutual cooperation so that the affairs of state are carried out without dislocations occasioned by differences of perception. Differences between political arms of the state are natural to a democratic way of life. The strength inherent in differences is that the Constitution provides a platform for the robust expression of views, accommodates differences of ideology and 158 acknowledges that the resilience, and not the weakness of the nation lies in the plurality of her cultures and the diversity of her opinions. The working of a democratic Constitution depends as much on the wisdom and statesmanship of those in charge of governing the affairs of the nation as much as it relies on the language of the Constitution defining their powers and duties. 136 The proviso to Article 239AA(4) must be operated and applied in a manner which facilitates and does not obstruct the governance of the NCT. If the expression ‘any matter’ were to be construed as ‘every matter’ or every trifling matter that would result in bringing to a standstill the administration of the affairs of the NCT. Every conceivable difference would be referred to the President. The elected representatives would be reduced to a cipher. The Union government would govern the day to day affairs. The forms of the Constitution would remain but the substance would be lost. Article 239AA has been introduced as a result of the exercise of the constituent power. The purpose of the exercise is to confer a special status on the National Capital Territory. The arrangements for administering the affairs of Delhi are constitutionally entrenched as a result of the Sixty-Ninth amendment. Whether there should be a Council of Ministers or a Legislature (or both) was not left to determination in an Act of Parliament. The Constitution mandates that both must exist in the NCT. The Constitution mandates direct elections to the Legislature. It obligates the existence of a Council of Ministers which owes collective responsibility to the Legislature. It demarcates the area of legislative 159 and executive power. The Lieutenant Governor, as the substantive part of Article 239AA(4) stipulates, is to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. In adopting these provisions, the Constitution incorporates the essentials of the cabinet form of government. Was this to have no meaning? A constitutional court must be averse to accepting an interpretation which will reduce these aspirations of governance to a mere form, without the accompanying substance. The Court must take into consideration constitutional morality, which is a guiding spirit for all stakeholders in a democracy. 137 In discharging his constitutional role, the Lieutenant Governor has to be conscious of the fact that the Council of Ministers which tenders aid and advice is elected to serve the people and represents both the aspirations and responsibilities of democracy. Neither the Constitution nor the enabling legislation, which we have noticed earlier, contemplate that every decision of the executive government must receive the prior concurrence of the Lieutenant Governor before it can be implemented. 138 The interpretation of the proviso must be cognizant of the constitutional position that though Delhi has a special status, it continues to be a Union territory governed by Part VIII. There are take-aways from the first line of interpretation which have significance. Within the rubric of Union territories, as the nine-judge Bench decision in NDMC noticed, different Union territories are 160 in varying stages of evolution. Some of the erstwhile Union territories such as Goa attained full statehood and ceased to be Union territories. Some may not have a legislature. Some may have a Legislature under an enactment of Parliament. Delhi has a special position in that both its Legislature as well as Council of Ministers have a constitutionally recognized status. The conferment of this status by a constitutional amendment enhances the position of its arms of governance within Union territories without conferring statehood. Delhi is administered by the President under Article 239 acting through an Administrator who is designated as a Lieutenant Governor under Article 239AA(1). The language of the opening words of Article 239(1) must be read in harmony with Article 239AA. In terms of the reach of its legislative powers, the legislative assembly for the NCT does not exercise exclusive jurisdiction over State List subjects. Parliament has legislative authority (in addition to the Union List), both in regard to the State and Concurrent Lists for NCT. Hence legislation by the legislative assembly, even on matters which fall within its legislative domain is subject to the overriding power of Parliament. The principle of repugnancy which Article 254 recognises between Union and State legislation on matters in the Concurrent List is extended by Article 239AA [3(b) and 3 (c)], both with reference to State and Concurrent List subjects for NCT. Moreover, certain subjects have been expressly carved out from the ambit of the legislative authority of the legislative assembly and vested exclusively in Parliament. Executive powers of the Government of NCT being co-extensive with legislative powers, the aid and advice which is 161 tendered to the Lieutenant Governor by the Council of Ministers is confined to those areas which do not lie outside the purview of legislative powers. These provisions demonstrate that while adopting the institutions of a cabinet form of government, the Constitution has, for NCT, curtailed the ambit of the legislative and executive power, consistent with its status as a Union territory. 139 The exercise of the constituent power to introduce Article 239AA was cognizant of the necessity to protect national interests inherent in the governance of a national capital. A sense of permanence and stability was sought to be attributed to the arrangements made for governing Delhi by bringing in a constitutional amendment. Both in terms of the reach of the legislative power, as well as in relation to the exercise of executive power, the special constitutional arrangements for Delhi recognise that the governance of Delhi implicates a sense of national interest. When matters of national interest arise, they would predicate a predominant role for institutions of national governance. 140 Consistent with the need to preserve national interest, it would not be appropriate to restrict the ambit of the proviso to Article 239AA(4) to situations where the action of the government is ultra vires the limits of its executive powers. This becomes evident on a construction of the provisions of Section 41(1)(i) and Section 44(1)(a) of the GNCTD Act. Sub-clause(i) of Section 41(1) enables the Lieutenant Governor to act in his discretion on a matter 162 which falls outside the purview of the powers conferred on the legislative assembly but in respect of which powers or functions are entrusted or delegated to him by the President. Under Section 44(1)(a), Rules of Business are made on matters on which the Lieutenant Governor is required to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Section 44(1)(a) covers business which is not a part of Section 41(1)(i). This is because matters which fall within Section 44(1)(i) are not governed by the principle of aid and advice. 141 There is much to be said for not laying down an exhaustive catalogue of situations to which the proviso applies. Governance involves complexities. In the very nature of things, it would not be possible for a Court delivering judgment in the context of the problems of the day to anticipate situations which may arise in future. It would be unsafe to confine a constitutional provision to stated categories which may affect the resilience of the Constitution to deal with unforeseen situations. Some of the illustrations which may warrant the exercise of the power under the proviso may shed light on the purpose of the proviso and the object which it seeks to achieve. 142 There are two constitutional perspectives: first, the operation of the proviso should preserve the national concerns underlying the conferment of such a power, and second, the exercise of the power under the proviso must not destroy the essential democratic values recognised in Article 239AA. Thus, it is necessary to lay down the steps which need to be adopted before recourse is taken to the proviso. The Transaction of Business Rules indicate 163 in sufficiently elaborate terms that when there is a difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and a Minister, primarily, an effort should be made to resolve it by mutual discussion. If this process does not yield a satisfactory result, the matter can be referred to the Council of Ministers with whom an attempt is made to seek a satisfactory solution. It is when these two stages are crossed and a difference still persists that the proviso can be taken recourse to by referring the matter to the President. These stages which are enunciated in the Transaction of Business Rules must be read in conjunction with the authority conferred by Section 44 of the GNCTD Act which was enacted in pursuance of Article 239AA(7). Hence the proviso must be read in conjunction with the law enacted by Parliament and the Transaction of Business Rules made by the President, to give clarity to the operating procedure for invoking the proviso. Moreover, once a reference is made to the President, the Lieutenant Governor is bound by the decision of the President. The Lieutenant Governor has the authority to take action which is warranted by emergent circumstances until the President has taken a decision. But before recourse is taken to the proviso, the Lieutenant Governor must make every effort with the Minister or, as the case may be, the Council of Ministers to resolve a matter of difference. The nature of the differences which may warrant a reference to the President cannot be exhaustively catalogued. But it would be appropriate to construe the proviso as a protector of national concerns in regard to governance of the NCT. The Lieutenant Governor is a watchdog to protect them. The Lieutenant Governor may, for instance, be 164 justified in seeking recourse to the proviso where the executive act of the government of the NCT is likely to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union government. The Lieutenant Governor may similarly consider it necessary to invoke the proviso to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or a law enacted by Parliament. There may well be significant issues of policy which have a bearing on the position of the National Capital Territory as a national capital. Financial concerns of the Union government may be implicated in such a manner that it becomes necessary for the Lieutenant Governor to invoke the proviso where a difference of opinion remains unresolved. A situation of the nature indicated in Rule 23 of the Transaction of Business Rules may well justify recourse to the proviso. The touchstone for recourse to the proviso is that the difference of opinion is not a contrived difference. The matter on which a difference has arisen must be substantial and not trifling. In deciding whether to make a reference, the Lieutenant Governor must always bear in mind the latitude which a representative government possesses to take decisions in areas falling within its executive authority. The Lieutenant Governor must bear in mind that it is not he, but the Council of Ministers which takes substantive decisions and even when he invokes the proviso, the Lieutenant Governor has to abide by the decision of the President. The Lieutenant Governor must also be conscious of the fact that unrestrained recourse to the proviso would virtually transfer the administration of the affairs of the NCT from its government to the Centre. If the expression ‘any matter’ were to be read so broadly as to 165 comprehend ‘every matter’, the operation of the proviso would transfer decision making away from the government of the NCT to the Centre. If the proviso were to be so read, it would result in a situation where the President would deal with a reference on every matter, leaving nothing but the husk to the administration of the Union territory. Article 239AB makes a provision where there is a failure of the constitutional machinery in the Union territory. The proviso to Article 239AA(4) does not deal with that situation. Hence, in the application of the proviso it would be necessary to bear in mind that the Council of Ministers for the NCT has a constitutionally recognised function, as does the legislative assembly to whom the Council is collectively responsible. The role of the Lieutenant Governor is not to supplant this constitutional structure but to make it workable in order to ensure that concerns of a national character which have an innate bearing on the status of Delhi as a national capital are not bypassed. If these fundamental precepts are borne in mind, the operation of the proviso should pose no difficulty and the intervention of the President could be invoked in appropriate cases where a matter fundamental to the governance to the Union territory is involved. M Conclusions 143 After analysing the constitutional and statutory provisions and the precedents on this point, this Court reaches the following conclusions: 166 (1) The introduction of Article 239AA into the Constitution was the result of the th exercise of the constituent power. The 69 amendment to the Constitution has important consequences for the special status of Delhi as the National Capital Territory, albeit under the rubric of a Union territory governed by Part VIII of the Constitution; (2) The content of such a constitutional amendment cannot be confined or constrained by the content of legislations which governed Delhi in the past. The constitutional amendments sought to bring stability and permanence to the democratic governance of the NCT. An amendment which enhances the basic features of the Constitution must bear an interpretation which will fulfil its true character; (3) The Administrator appointed by the President under Article 239(1) is designated, with reference to the NCT as its Lieutenant Governor. The substantive source of power to appoint the Lieutenant Governor arises from Article 239 of the Constitution; (4) While Article 239(1) indicates that the administration of a Union territory is by the President, the opening words of the provision (“Save as otherwise provided by Parliament by law”) indicate that the nature and extent of the administration by the President is as indicated in the law framed by Parliament. Moreover, the subsequent words of the provision (“to such extent as he thinks fit”) support the same position; 167 (5) By adopting Article 239AA, Parliament as a constituent body, provided Delhi with a special status by creating constitutionally entrenched institutions of governance. Article 239AA mandates the existence of a legislative assembly and Council of Ministers to govern the affairs of the National Capital; (6) The provisions of Article 239AA represent a clear mandate of the Constitution to provide institutional governance founded on participatory, representative and responsive government. These features emerge from the provisions of Article 239AA which: (i) require direct election to the legislative assembly from territorial constituencies; (ii) engage the constitutional functions of the Election Commission of India under Articles 324, 327 and 329; (iii) confer law making authority on the legislative assembly in respect of matters governed by the State List (save for excepted matters) and the Concurrent List; (iv) mandate the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the legislative assembly; and 168 (v) provide (in the substantive part of Article 239AA(4)) that the Lieutenant Governor shall act on the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. In adopting these provisions through an amendment, the Constitution has recognized the importance of the cabinet form of government to govern the affairs of Delhi; (7) The distribution of legislative power in Article 239AA is indicative of the predominant role assigned to Parliament as a legislative body. This emerges from: (i) the position that Parliament is empowered to legislate on subjects falling in the State List as well as the Concurrent List; and (ii) the carving out of the three subjects of public order, police and land (Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List) and of offences, jurisdiction of Courts and fees (Entries 64, 65 and 66 in so far as they relate to the previous entries), all of which are within the exclusive legislative domain of Parliament. Principles of repugnancy govern any inconsistency between laws enacted by the legislative assembly and those by Parliament and the laws of Parliament are to prevail unless a Presidential assent has been received. (8) The executive power of the government of NCT is co-extensive with the legislative power. The principle of aid and advice under clause 4 of Article 169 239AA extends to areas where the Lieutenant Governor exercises functions in relation to matters where the legislative assembly has the power to make laws. In consequence, those matters on which the legislative assembly does not have the power to enact legislation are not governed by the principle of aid and advice. Similarly, the Lieutenant Governor is not subject to aid and advice on matters where he is required to exercise his own discretion by or under any law; (9) The GNCTD Act, 1991 has been enacted by Parliament in pursuance of the legislative authority conferred upon it by clause 7(a) of Article 239AA. The President has made the Transaction of Business Rules for the NCT as contemplated in the GNCTD Act, 1991; (10) Section 41 of the GNCTD Act indicates that: (i) in matters which lie outside the legislative powers entrusted to the legislative assembly and where there has been an entrustment or delegation of functions by the President to the Lieutenant Governor under Article 239; and (ii) on matters where the Lieutenant Governor exercises his own discretion by or under any law, he is not subject to the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers; 170 (11) Section 44 of the GNCTD Act indicates that aid and advice governs areas other than those specified in Section 44(1)(i); (12) Under the Transaction of Business Rules, the Lieutenant Governor must be kept duly apprised on all matters pertaining to the administration of the affairs of the NCT. The Rules indicate the duty of the Council of Ministers to inform the Lieutenant Governor right from the stage of a proposal before it. The duty to keep the Lieutenant Governor duly informed and apprised of the affairs of the NCT facilitates the discharge of the constitutional responsibilities entrusted to him and the fulfilment of his duties under the GNCTD Act, 1991 and the Transaction of Business Rules; (13) While the provisions contained in the Transaction of Business Rules require a scrupulous observance of the duty imposed on the Council of Ministers to inform the Lieutenant Governor on all matters relating to the administration of the NCT, neither the provisions of Article 239AA nor the provisions of the Act and Rules require the concurrence of the Lieutenant Governor to a decision which has been taken by the Council of Ministers. Rule 14 of the Transaction of Business Rules in fact indicates that the duty is to inform and not seek the prior concurrence of the Lieutenant Governor. However, in specified areas which fall under Rule 23; it has 171 been mandated that the Lieutenant Governor has to be apprised even before a decision is implemented; (14) As a result of the provisions of Article 367, the General Clauses Act, 1897 applies, subject to adaptations and modifications made under Article 372, to the interpretation of the Constitution. The definitions of the expressions ‘state’ (Section 3(58)) and ‘state government’ (Section 3(60)) and ‘union territory’ (Section 3(62A)) apply to the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context of a particular provision of the Constitution; (15) Since the decision of this Court in Kanniyan (supra) and right through to the nine-judge Bench decision in NDMC (supra), it is a settled principle that the expression ‘state’ in Article 246(4) will not include a Union territory and that the definition contained in the General Clauses Act will not apply having regard to the subject and context of the provision. Decisions of this Court have applied the subject and context test to determine whether the expression ‘state’ in other provisions of the Constitution and in statutory provisions would include a Union territory; (16) The use of the expression “State” in a particular provision is not dispositive of whether or not its application would stand excluded in 172 relation to a Union territory. The outcome is essentially based on the subject and context in which the word has been used; (17) While giving meaning and content to the proviso to Article 239AA (4), it is necessary to harmonise two significant precepts: (i) The Constitution has adopted a cabinet form of government for the Union territory of Delhi by creating institutions for the exercise of legislative power and an executive arm represented by the Council of Ministers; and (ii) Vital national interests are implicated in the governance of the National Capital Territory. The doctrines of aid and advice and of collective responsibility give effect to (i) above while the empowerment of the Lieutenant Governor to refer any matter on which there is a difference of opinion to the President is a reflection of (ii) above. (18) While it may not be possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of those differences which may be referred to the President by the Lieutenant Governor, it must be emphasised that a difference within the meaning of the proviso cannot be a contrived difference. If the expression ‘any matter’ were to be read as ‘every matter’, it would lead to the President assuming administration of every aspect of the affairs of the Union 173 territory, thereby resulting in the negation of the constitutional structure adopted for the governance of Delhi; (19) Before the Lieutenant Governor decides to make a reference to the President under the proviso to Article 239AA(4), the course of action mandated in the Transaction of Business Rules must be followed. The Lieutenant Governor must, by a process of dialogue and discussion, seek to resolve any difference of opinion with a Minister and if it is not possible to have it so resolved to attempt it through the Council of Ministers. A reference to the President is contemplated by the Rules only when the above modalities fail to yield a solution, when the matter may be escalated to the President; (20) In a cabinet form of government, the substantive power of decision making vests in the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as its head. The aid and advice provision contained in the substantive part of Article 239AA(4) recognises this principle. When the Lieutenant Governor acts on the basis of the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers, this recognises that real decision-making authority in a democratic form of government vests in the executive. Even when the Lieutenant Governor makes a reference to the President under the terms of the proviso, he has to abide by the decision which is arrived at by the President. The Lieutenant Governor has, however, been 174 authorised to take immediate action in the meantime where emergent circumstances so require. The provisions of Article 239AA(4) indicate that the Lieutenant Governor must either act on the basis of aid and advice or, where he has reason to refer the matter to the President, abide by the decision communicated by the President. There is no independent authority vested in Lieutenant Governor to take decisions (save and except on matters where he exercises his discretion as a judicial or quasi-judicial authority under any law or has been entrusted with powers by the President under Article 239 on matters which lie outside the competence of the Government of NCT); and (21) The proviso to Article 239AA is in the nature of a protector to safeguard the interests of the Union on matters of national interest in relation to the affairs of the National Capital Territory. Every trivial difference does not fall under the proviso. The proviso will, among other things, encompass substantial issues of finance and policy which impact upon the status of the national capital or implicate vital interests of the Union. Given the complexities of administration, and the unforeseen situations which may occur in future, it would not be possible for the court in the exercise of judicial review to exhaustively indicate the circumstances warranting recourse to the proviso. In deciding as to whether the proviso should be invoked the Lieutenant Governor shall abide by the principles which have been indicated in the body of this judgment. 175 144 After the circulation of my judgment to my learned colleagues, I have had the benefit of receiving the judgments of the learned Chief Justice and brother Justice Ashok Bhushan. I believe that there is a broad coalescence of our views. 145 The reference shall stand answered in the above terms and the proceedings shall now be placed before the learned Chief Justice of India for appropriate directions in regard to the constitution of the Bench to decide the matters. …..…..........................................J [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD] New Delhi; July 04, 2018. 176 1 REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2357 OF 2017 GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI       … APPELLANT(S) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA           … RESPONDENT(S) WITH Civil   Appeal   No.2358   of   2017,   Civil   Appeal   No.2359   of 2017, Civil Appeal No.2360 of 2017, Civil Appeal No.2361 of   2017,   Civil   Appeal   No.2362   of   2017,   Civil   Appeal No.2363 of 2017, Civil Appeal No.2364 of 2017, Criminal Appeal   NO.277   of   2017   and   Contempt   Petition   (C) No.175/2016 in W.P.(Crl.) No.539/1986. J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. These   appeals   have   been   filed   questioning   the Division   Bench   judgment   of   Delhi   High   Court   dated 2 04.08.2016   deciding   nine   writ   petitions   by   a   common judgment, out of nine writ petitions, two writ petitions were   filed   by   the   Government   of   National   Capital Territory of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “GNCTD”) being Writ Petition (C) No.5888 of 2015 (GNCTD vs. UOI) impugning:  "Notifications   dated   21.05.2015   and 23.07.2014   issued   by   the   Govt.   of   India, Ministry of Home Affairs empowering the Lt. Governor to exercise the powers in respect of matters   connected   with   “Services”   and directing the ACB Police Station not to take cognizance of offences against officials of Central Government.”  and Writ Petition (Crl.) No.2099 of 2015 (GNCTD vs. Nitin Manawat) impugning: "Order   passed   by   the   Lt.   Governor,   NCT   of Delhi under Section 24 of Cr. P.C. appointing a   Special   Public   Prosecutor   to   conduct   the trial in FIR No.21/2012 in the Special Court under PC Act.” One   writ   petition   filed   by   Union   of   India   being   Writ Petition   (C)   No.8867   of   2015   (UOI   vs.   GNCTD   &   Anr.) impugning: "Notification dated 11.08.2015 issued by the Directorate   of   Vigilance,   GNCTD   under   the Commissions   of   Inquiry   Act,   1952   without 3 placing   before   the   Lieutenant   Governor   for his views/concurrence.” 2. Other six writ petitions were filed by individuals challenging various notifications issued by GNCTD.   The petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No.7887 of 2015 and Writ Petition   (C)   No.8382   of   2015   had   challenged   the notification dated 11.08.2015 issued by the Directorate of Vigilance, GNCTD under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. In Writ Petition (C) No.7934 of 2015 (Naresh Kumar vs. GNCTD & Ors.) impugned action was: "Notification dated 04.08.2015 issued by the Revenue   Department,   GNCTD   revising   minimum rates   of   agricultural   land   (circle   rules) under   the   provisions   of   Indian   Stamp   Act, 1899   and   Delhi   Stamp   (Prevention   of Undervaluation   of   Instrument)Rules   without placing   before   the   Lieutenant   Governor   for his views/concurrence.” Writ   Petition(C)   No.8190   of   2015   (Sandeep   Tiwari   vs. GNCTD & Ors.) was filed questioning: "Order   passed   by   the   Department   of   Power, GNCTD  under  Delhi  Electricity  Reforms  Act, 2000   read   with   Delhi   Electricity   Reforms (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001 appointing the Nominee   Directors   on   Board   of   Electricity Distribution   Companies   without   placing before   the   Lieutenant   Governor   for   his views/concurrence.” 4 3. The   petitioner   in   Writ   Petition   (C)No.348   of   2016 (Ramakant   Kumar   vs.   GNCTD)   had   also   challenged notification dated 22.12.2015 issued by the Directorate of Vigilance, GNCTD under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 constituting the Commission of Inquiry.  4. The   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   after considering   the   arguments   of   the   parties   recorded   its conclusion   in   paragraph   304   of   the   judgment   and   its outcome   in   paragraph   305.   Paragraphs   304   and   305   are extracted below: “304. The   conclusions   in   this   batch   of petitions may be summarized as under:­ (i) On a reading of Article 239 and Article 239AA of the Constitution together with the   provisions   of   the   Government   of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991 and the Transaction of Business of the   Government   of   NCT   of   Delhi   Rules, 1993,   it   becomes   manifest   that   Delhi continues to be a Union Territory even th after   the   Constitution   (69   Amendment) Act, 1991 inserting Article 239AA making special   provisions   with   respect   to Delhi. Article 239 of the Constitution continues (ii) to   be   applicable   to   NCT   of   Delhi   and insertion   of   Article   239AA   has   not diluted the application of Article 239 in any manner. 5 (iii) The  contention  of  the  Government of   NCT   of   Delhi   that   the     Lt. Governor of NCT of Delhi is bound to act only   on   the   aid   and   advice   of   the Council of Ministers in relation to the matters in respect of which the power to make   laws   has   been   conferred   on   the Legislative   Assembly   of   NCT   of   Delhi under  clause  (3)(a)  of  Article 239AA of the Constitution is without substance and cannot be accepted. (iv) It   is   mandatory   under   the constitutional   scheme   to   communicate the   decision   of   the   Council   of Ministers to the Lt. Governor even in relation to the matters in respect of which   power   to   make   laws   has   been conferred   on   the   Legislative   Assembly of NCT of Delhi  under clause (3)(a) of Article   239AA   of   the   Constitution   and an   order   thereon   can   be   issued   only where the Lt. Governor does not take a different view and no reference to the Central Government is required in terms of the proviso to clause (4) of Article 239AA   of   the   Constitution   read   with Chapter   V   of   the   Transaction   of Business of   the Government of NCT of Delhi Rules, 1993. (v) The   matters   connected   with   'Services' fall   outside   the   purview   of   the Legislative   Assembly   of   NCT   of   Delhi. Therefore,   the   direction   in     the impugned Notification S.O.1368(E) dated 21.05.2015   that   the Lt. Governor of the   NCT   of   Delhi   shall   in   respect   of matters   connected   with   'Services' exercise   the   powers   and   discharge   the functions of the Central Government to the extent delegated to him from time 6 to   time   by   the   President   is   neither illegal nor unconstitutional. (vi) The   direction   in   the   impugned Notification   S.O.1896(E)   dated 23.07.2014   as   reiterated   in   the Notification   S.O.1368(E)   dated 21.05.2015   that   the   Anti­Corruption Branch Police Station shall not take any cognizance of offences against officers, employees   and   functionaries   of   the Central Government is in accordance with the   constitutional   scheme   and   warrants no   interference   since   the   power   is traceable to Entry 2 (Police) of List II of   the   Seventh   Schedule   to   the Constitution   in   respect   of   which   the Legislative   Assembly   of   NCTD   has   no power to make laws. (vii) Notification No.F.5/DUV/Tpt./4/7/ 2015/ 9386­9393 dated 11.08.2015 issued by the Directorate of Vigilance, Government of NCT   of   Delhi   under   Section   3   of   the Commission   of   Inquiry   Act,   1952 appointing the Commission of Inquiry for inquiring into all aspects of the award of work related to grant of CNG Fitness Certificates   in   the   Transport Department, Government  of  NCT  of  Delhi is   illegal   since   the   same   was   issued without seeking the views/concurrence of the Lt. Governor as provided under Rule 10 and Rule 23 read with Chapter V of Transaction of Business Rules, 1993. For   the   same   reasons,   the (viii) Notification No. F.01/66/2015/DOV/15274­ 15281   dated   22.12.2015   issued   by   the Directorate of Vigilance, Government of NCT   of   Delhi   under   Section   3   of   the 7 Commission   of   Inquiry   Act,   1952 appointing the Commission of Inquiry to inquire   into   the   allegations   regarding irregularities   in   the   functioning   of Delhi   and   District   Cricket   Association is also declared as illegal. (ix) The appointment of Nominee Directors of Government of NCT of Delhi on Board of BSES   Rajdhani   Power   Limited,   BSES Yamuna   Power   Limited   and   Tata   Power Delhi Distribution Limited by the Delhi Power Company Limited on the basis of the   recommendations   of   the   Chief Minister of Delhi without communicating the decision of the Chief Minister to the   Lt.   Governor   of   NCT   of   Delhi   for his views is illegal. (x) The proceedings of the Government of NCT of   Delhi,   Department   of   Power No.F.11(58)   /2010/Power/1856   dated 12.06.2015 issuing  policy directions to the   Delhi   Electricity   Regulatory Commission   regarding   disruption   in electricity   supply   to   consumers   and compensation payable in respect thereof are   illegal   and   unconstitutional   since such policy directions cannot be issued without     communicating     to     the     Lt. Governor of NCT of Delhi for his views. (xi) The   Notification   No.F.1(1953)/Regn.Br./ Div.Com/HQ/2014/191   dated   04.08.2015 issued   by   the   Government   of   NCT   of Delhi, Revenue Department in exercise of the   powers   conferred   by   sub­section(3) of Section 27 the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (2   of   1899)   and   Rule   4   of   the   Delhi Stamp  (Prevention  of  Under  ­  Valuation of Instruments) Rules, 2007 revising the 8 minimum   rates   for   the   purpose   of chargeability   of   stamp   duty   on   the instruments related to sale/transfer of agriculture   land   is   illegal   since   the said   notification   was   issued   without seeking the views/concurrence of the Lt. Governor   of   NCT   of   Delhi   as   required under the constitutional scheme. Though the Lt. Governor of NCT (xii) of   Delhi   is   competent   to   appoint   the Special Public Prosecutor under Section 24(8) of Cr.P.C., such power has to be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in terms of Clause (4)   of   Article   239AA   of   the Constitution. 305.   In   result,   W.P.(C)   No.5888/2015   is dismissed, W.P.(C) Nos.7887/2015, 7934/2015, 8190/2015,   8382/2015,   8867/2015,   9164/2015 and   348/2016   are   allowed   and   W.P.(Crl.) No.2099/2015 is disposed of with directions.” 5. The Government of NCTD aggrieved by the judgment has filed appeals. The GNCTD in its appeals has prayed for setting aside the judgment of the High Court. 6. Union   of   India   has   filed   two   appeals,   namely, C.A.No.2364 of 2017 questioning the judgment of Division Bench in Writ Petition(C) No.7934 of 2015 and Criminal Appeal No.277 of 2017 questioning the judgment in Writ 9 Petition(Crl.) No.2099 of 2015. 7. These   appeals   raise   important   questions   of   law   in respect   of   the   powers   exercisable   by   democratically elected Government of NCT in juxtaposition to the power of   Lt.   Governor   of   NCTD   (hereinafter   referred   to   as “LG”). 8. During the hearing of the appeals, a two Judge Bench of   this   Court   opined   that   the   appeals   involve substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of Article 239AA of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench passed the following order for placing the matter before   Chief   Justice   for   constituting   a   Constitution Bench: "During the hearing of these appeals our attention   is   drawn   to   the   provisions   of Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India. Having   gone   through   the   matters   and   the aforesaid provisions, we are of the opinion that   these   appeals   need   to   be   heard   by   a Constitution Bench as these matters involve substantial   questions   of   law   as   to   the interpretation   of   Article   239AA   of   the Constitution.  The Registry shall accordingly place the 10 papers   before   Hon'ble   the   Chief   Justice   of India   for   constituting   an   appropriate Constitution Bench.”  9. These   appeals,   thus,   have   been   placed   before   this Constitution Bench. At the outset, it was agreed between the   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   that   this Constitution Bench may only answer the     constitutional questions and the individual appeals thereafter will be decided by appropriate regular Benches.  10. We have been benefited by erudite submissions made by   learned   senior   counsel,   Shri   P.   Chidambaram,   Shri Gopal Subramanium, Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, Smt. Indira Jaising and Shri Shekhar Naphade. On behalf of Union of India, submissions have been advanced by Shri Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General for India. We have also   heard   other   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the parties   as   well   as   learned   counsel   appearing   for intervenor   for   whom   Dr.   A.M.   Singhvi   and   Shri   Arvind Datar,   learned   senior   counsel   have   appeared.   Shri Siddharth Luthra, learned senior counsel has appeared for respondent in C.A. NO.2360 of 2017. 11 11. A common written submission has been filed on behalf of   Government   of   National   Capital   Territory   of   Delhi. Shri Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General has also filed the written submission on behalf of Union of India and Lt. Governor of NCTD. The submissions 12. Learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for   GNCTD   has emphasised   and   highlighted   various   aspects   of   the different   constitutional   issues   which   have   arisen   for consideration   in   these   appeals.   Their   submissions   are referred   hereafter   as   common   submissions   on   behalf   of GNCTD.   It   is   submitted   that   NCTD   occupies   a   unique position   in   constitutional   jurisprudence   by   virtue   of insertion   of   Articles   239AA   and   239AB   vide   the Constitution   (Sixty   Ninth   Amendment)   Act,   1991.   Though still a Union Territory, the NCTD has come to acquire th various   characteristics   that   were,   prior   to   the   69 Amendment   and   the   Government   of   the   National   Capital Territory   Act,   1991   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “1991 Act”),   considered   under   the   Constitution   to   be 12 characteristics solely of States. As a consequence, the GNCTD also enjoys far more powers than the Government of any other Union Territory. The History of constitutional provisions and Parliamentary enactments with respect to th the NCTD clearly establishes that 69  Amendment and 1991 Act were passed aiming for giving the residents of the NCTD   proper   participation   an   ever   larger   say   in   the governance of NCTD, truer and  deeper form of democracy. Article   239AA   intended   to   completely   eradicate   any hierarchical   structure   which   functionally   placed Lieutenant Governor of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “LG”) in a position superior to that of the Council of Ministers,   especially   with   respect   to   the   exercise   of executive   power.   Pursuant   to   Article   239AA,   a   cabinet system   of   Government   on   the   Westminster   style   was introduced in Delhi and the LG was made a titular head alone   in   respect   of   matters   that   were   assigned   to Legislative Assembly and the Council of Ministers. By way of   the   express   and   deliberate   exclusion   of   language similar to that of the 1963 Act and 1966 Act from the words of Article 239AA, and the replacement of “assist 13 and advise” with the term of art “aid and advice”, the th 69   Constitutional   Amendment   consciously   obviated   a requirement   for   the   LG's   concurrence   and   allowed   the Council   of   Ministers   created   thereunder   to   govern   the NCTD. The provisions of Article 239AA must be interpreted as furthering the basic structure of the Constitution, a purposive interpretation has always been adopted by this Court. Learned counsel have also relied on “doctrine of constitutional silence and convention”. 13. It   is   contended   that   federalism   being   the   basic structure of the Constitution. The interpretation of the constitutional   provisions   has   to   be   done   in   a   manner which   may   strengthen   the   federal   structure   as contemplated   by   the   Constitution.   The   arguments   of respondent   that   provisions   of   Article   239AA   should   be read in a strictly textual manner is not correct. Our constitutional   jurisprudence   has   moved   away   by   several decisions of this Court from a textual to more purposive and organic method of constitutional interpretation. 14 th 14. The   69   Constitutional   Amendment   installed   a Westminster   style   of   Government   for   NCTD.   The constitutional   head   would   be   bound   by   the   “aid   and advice”   of   their   Council   of   Ministers,   this   is irrespective of who is the constitutional head, whether President, State Governor or by logical end the LG. In the   case   of   NCTD,   the   principle   of   collective responsibility to a democratic legislative body requires that the “aid and advice” of the Council of Ministers be binding on the LG in order to give due respect to the th stated   intention   of   the   69   Constitutional   Amendment, i.e.,   the   introduction   of   constitutionally   mandated democratic governance in Delhi. 15. It is the petitioner's case that the extent of the executive powers of the GNCTD can be understood by way of a combined reading of the provisions of Article 239AA(3) read with Article 239AA(4). The GNCTD possesses exclusive executive powers in relation to matters that fall within the   purview   of   the   Assembly's   Legislative   competence. Neither the President nor the Central Government has any 15 executive powers in Delhi with respect to these matters and the LG as the President's delegate has no role or power in this regard. Article 239AA(3) gives the Delhi Legislative   Assembly   legislative   powers   over   all   but Entries 1, 2, 18 and Entries 64, 65 and 66 in so far as they relate to Entry 1, 2 and 18 of the State List, and all the subjects in the Concurrent List. The Council of Ministers' executive domain under Article 239AA(4) is the same.   Moreover, Article 239AA reserves primacy of the Union   Parliament   and   the   Central   Government   only   in limited   area.   This   is   clear   from   the   provisions   of Article   239AA(3)(b).   The   primacy   of   the   legislative powers of Parliament is reserved by this provision but there is no corresponding provision in the Constitution which   preserves   the   executive   power   of   the   Central Government   vis­a­vis   the Delhi Government in respect of the NCT. Thus, Article 239AA(3)(b) consciously preserves Parliament's   Legislative   powers   for   Delhi,   as   they obtained   for   all   Union   Territories   under   Article   246. Also   it   consciously   omits   from   giving   the   Centre coterminous executive powers, and Article 73 will only 16 operate to give the Centre executive power in relation to the three reserved subjects of State List. 16. Dwelling on the interpretation of proviso to Article 239AA(4), it is submitted that proviso is not meant for the LG to have a different view on the merits of the aid and   advice   that   has   been   tendered   by   the   Council   of Ministers and is only meant to deal with situations where the   aid   and   advice   of   the   Council   of   Ministers   is transgressing   beyond   the   areas   constitutionally prescribed to them. It is submitted that the said proviso operates in the following areas, where the decision of the Council of Ministers of the NCTD:­ a. is outside the bounds of executive power under  Article 239AA(4); b. impedes or prejudices the lawful exercise of the executive power of the Union; c. is contrary to the laws of the Parliament. d. falls   within   Rule   23   of   the   Transaction   of   Business   of   Government   of   National   Capital   Territory of Delhi Rules, 1993 matters such as­ 17 i. matters which affect the peace and tranquillity of the Capital; ii. Interests of any minority community; iii. Relationship with the higher judiciary; iv. any other matters of administrative  importance which the Chief Minister may consider necessary. 17. A   holistic   reading   of   Article   239AA(4)   and   the proviso reveals that the proviso exists because the norm is for the LG to be bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers of the NCTD. This norm can only be departed from in the circumstances laid out above for the applicability of the proviso. 18. It is submitted that 1991 Act as well as the Rules themselves cannot be used to interpret the constitutional provisions   rather   they   are   reflecting   the   scheme   of governance.   The   “services”   lies   within   the   Legislative and Executive domains of the Delhi Assembly and the GNCTD respectively. 18 19. Shri   Maninder   Singh,   learned   Additional   Solicitor General for India replying to the submissions of learned counsel   for   the   appellant   contends   that   while interpreting   the   Constitution   the   Courts   should   give effect to plain and literal meaning of the constitutional provisions.   There   is   neither   any   ambiguity   nor   any absurdity arising from the plain/literal interpretation of the provisions of 239AA. The constitutional provisions concerning the GNCTD have been inserted keeping in view the   carefully   envisaged   scheme   of   governance   for   NCTD under the Constitution of India. The Constitution makers have   deliberately   used   the   widest   possible   words   “any matter” in order to retain the powers of the Union in both the legislative and executive spheres in relation to all matters, keeping in view the unique features as well as special responsibilities of the Union, in each subject in   relation   to   the   National   Capital.   Any   contention seeking   a   restrictive   interpretation   of   the   said provisions are impermissible in view of the law laid down by   this   Court.   Any   such   contention   would   not   only   be 19 contrary to the constitutional scheme envisaged for Delhi but   would   also   be   contrary   to   the   intention   of   the Constitution makers in using the widest possible language for emphasising the responsibility and supremacy of the Union in the administration of the National Capital. 20. The   contention   on   the   basis   of   principles   of constitutional   silence   or   constitutional   implication which run contrary to the constitutional scheme envisaged by   express   provisions   has   to   be   rejected.   The Balakrishnan   Committee   Report   which   was   foundation   for th 69   Constitutional   Amendment   throws   light   on   the intention of the Constitution makers. 21. Article 239 is an integral/inseparable part of the constitutional scheme envisaged for all Union Territories as provided for under Part VIII of the Constitution, and is   to   be   read   with   Article   239AA   for   NCT   of   Delhi. Article 239 applies to all Union Territories including NCT of Delhi when read with Article 239AA, the way it applies to Pondicherry when read with the provision of 20 Article 239A. 22. Shri   Maninder   Singh   during   his   submission   has referred to various paragraphs of Balakrishnan Committee Report to bring home his point of view. 23. It is submitted that even when Article 239AA(3)(a) stipulates that Legislative Assembly of Delhi shall have the   power   to   legislate   in   respect   of   subject   matters th provided in List II and List III of the VII  Schedule of Constitution   of   India,   it   specifically   restricts   the legislative powers of Legislative Assembly of Delhi to those   subject   matters   which   are   “applicable   to   Union Territories”. The Constitution envisages that List II and th List   III   of   the   VII   Schedule   of   the   Constitution   of India   contain   certain   subject   matters   which   are   not applicable   to   Union   Territories.   The   intention   of   the Constitution makers is that even when the subject matters th contained in List II and List III of the VII   Schedule become available to the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi, the subject matters in the said Lists which are 21 not   applicable   to   Union   Territories   would   not   become available to the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi and would be beyond its legislative powers. 24. Article   246(4)   provides   that   in   relation   to   all Union Territories including Delhi and any other territory which is not a State, Parliament has power to make laws on     i.e. all subject matters contained in all any matter th three   Lists   of   the   VII   Schedule.   This   independent separate   provision   once   again   recognises   the ultimate/eventual responsibility of the Union in relation to the Union Territories on all subject matters. 25. Since the executive power of the Union under Article 73(1)(a), and which is vested in the President of India under Article 53 extends to all subject matters on which Parliament has power to make laws – in a Union Territory, the executive power of the Union extends to   any matter i.e. all subject matters contained in all three Lists of th the   VII   Schedule   and   remains   vested   in   the   President under Article 239 of the Constitution for administering 22 Union   Territories,   including   Union   Territory   of   NCT Delhi. 26. It is submitted that the proviso to Article 239AA(4) re­enforces   and   recognises   the   ultimate/eventual responsibility   and   continuing   control   of   the   Union   in relation to the administration of the Union Territory of Delhi. The Constitution makers have envisaged that owing to its responsibilities in relation to every subject, it may become necessary for the Union Government to take any decision with regard to any matter in relation to the administration   of   the   National   Capital   Territory   of Delhi. Such a need may also be arising in relation to day­to­day functioning of the National Capital. 27. It is further submitted that the Constitution makers have deliberately used the widest possible phrase of “ any matter”   in   the   proviso   to   Article   239AA(4).   The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of  Tej Kiran Jain and Others Vs. N. Sanjiva Reddy and Others, (1970) 2 SCC 272     has clearly held that the word “any” used in 23 relation   to   “anything”   in   the   Constitution   –   would necessarily mean “everything”. The said principle would make   it   abundantly   clear   that   the   phrase   “any   matter” used   in   Article   239AA   would   necessarily   and unexceptionally mean “every matter”. Further, only such an interpretation would ensure the intended objective and the necessity that if the need arises, the Union is not prevented   from   discharging   its   responsibilities   in relation   to   the   National   Capital   in   relation   to   any matter. 28. It   is   further   respectfully   submitted   that   the proviso   to   Article   239AA(4)   would   not   deserve   to   be interpreted as an “exception”. It is not an exception but the   reiteration   of   a   constitutional   mandate.   The constitutional   mandate   is   that   the   Union   would   have overarching control in relation to all matters for the National Capital. There is no vestige of any exclusive Executive Power in the Council of Ministers of NCT of Delhi. The vestige of the Executive Power continues to remain in the President. The proviso is controlling the 24 provision   of   Article   239AA(4),   reiterating   the overarching   control   of   the   Union,   and   is   not   an exception.   The   proviso   indicates   the   constitutional mandate   of   supremacy   of   the   Union.   In   the   humble submission   of   the   respondents,   no   restrictive interpretation of the proviso ought to be permitted and the clear Constitutional mandate contained in the proviso to   Article   239AA(4)   would   deserve   to   be   followed, especially in the case of the National Capital. 29. It is most respectfully reiterated that the unitary scheme   of   governance   for   Union   Territories,   especially for National Capital of Delhi, has been envisaged keeping in   view   the   fact   that   the   administration   of   Union Territories specially National Capital of Delhi is the responsibility   of   the   President/Union.   The   Union Government is the responsible Government, accountable to the   Parliament   for   the   administration   of   the   Union Territories. The National Capital belongs to people of the entire nation.  Learned Additional Solicitor General has also referred to and relied on various provisions of 25 1991   Act   and   Transaction   of   Business   Rules,   1993   with regard to administration of GNCTD. 30. Learned   Additional   Solicitor   General   in   its submission   also   contended   that   there   are   very   few instances in which LG has made reference to President and in actual working LG neither withhold the files nor there is any other hindrance in decisions taken by GNCTD. He submits   that   on   various   occasions   without   even communicating   the   decisions   taken   by   the   Council   of Ministers/Ministers   to   the   LG,   the   GNCTD   starts implementing the decision which is not in accordance with the scheme of governance as delineated by Article 239AA. 1991 Act and Transaction of Business Rules, 1993. 31. Learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective submissions have placed reliance on a large number   of   judgments   of   this   Court   and   Foreign   Courts. Relevant decisions of this Court and other Courts shall be   referred   to   while   considering   the   respective submissions.  26 Importance of a National Capital 32. The   word   “Capital”   is   derived   from   Latin   word “ caput ” meaning head and denotes a certain primacy status associated with the very idea of a Capital. Delhi is the National Capital of the country. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to notice the early history of Delhi. During the British period Calcutta was a seat of both the Provincial Government of Bengal as well as the Central   Government.   The   conflicts   of   authorities   and jurisdiction between the Governor of Bengal and Governor­ General was brought into the notice of the Secretary of the State in London. Lord Hardinge in his dispatch of 25.08.1911   emphasised   “that   the   Capital   of   a   great Central   Government   should   be   separate   and   independent, and effect has been given to this principle in the United States of America, Canada and Australia”. A decision was taken to transfer Capital from Calcutta to Delhi which was   announced   on   12.12.1911.   A   Government   Notification No.911   dated   17.09.1912   was   issued   under   which   the Governor­General­in­Council took under his authority the 27 Territories comprising the Tehsil of Delhi and the Police Station of Mehrauli which were formerly included in the province   of   Punjab.   The   Notification   provided   for   the administration of areas as a separate province under a Chief   Commissioner.   The   Delhi   Laws   Act,   1911   and   the Delhi Laws Act, 1915 made provisions for the continuance of the Laws in force in the Territories comprising the Chief   Commissioner's   province   of   Delhi   and   for   the extension of other enactments in force in any part of British India to Delhi by Governor­General­in­Council. In 1915,   trans­Yamuna   areas   comprising   65   villages   were separated   from   United   Provinces   of   Agra   and   Oudh   and added to the Chief Commissioner's  of Delhi. Administration   of   Delhi   after   Enforcement   of   the Constitution of India. 33. The Government of India Act, 1935 did not affect any material changes in the administrative set­up for Delhi and it continued as before to be a Chief Commissioner's Province   directly   administered   by   the   Governor­General “acting to such extent as he thinks fit through a Chief Commissioner”.   On   31.07.1947,   a   Committee   under   the 28 Chairmanship   of   Dr.   B.Pattabhi   Sitaramayya   was established   to   study   and   report   on   the   constitutional changes   required   in   the   administrative   structure obtaining   in   the   Chief   Commissioner's   Provinces, including   Delhi.   The   Committee   recommended   that   Delhi, Ajmer,   Bhopal,   Bilaspur,   Coorg,   Himachal   Pradesh including   Kutch,   Manipur,   Tripura   and   such   other provinces   may   be   so   designated   as   shall   be   the   Lt. Governor's   Province .   The   report   was   debated   in Constituent   Assembly   when   draft   Articles   212   and   213 (which   was   adopted   as   239­240)   was   debated.   When   the th Constitution   was   enforced   from   26   January,   1950   the scheme of the Constitution of India including Articles 1 to 4, Territory of India was divided into four categories Part 'A', Part 'B', Part 'C' and Part 'D' States. With regard to Part 'A' and Part 'B' States, the Constitution envisaged a vertical division of power between the Union and States wherein Part 'C' and 'D' States, Constitution had   provided   structure   under   which   Union   Government retained the power in both the executive and legislative sphere. Part 'C' States had also been termed as centrally 29 administered   areas   which   included   Delhi.   Parliament enacted the Government of Part C States Act, 1951, under which   provision   was   made   to   aid   and   advice   to   Chief Commissioner. The States Re­organisation Commission was set   up   on   29.12.1953   which   also   took   up   subject   of functioning of Part 'C' States. The State Re­organisation Commission   made   the   following   Report   with   regard   to Delhi: "584. It is hardly necessary to discuss in any detail the reasons why Delhi, if it is to continue as the Union Capital, cannot be made part   of   a   full­fledged   constituent   unit   of the Indian Union. Even under a unitary system of   government,   the   normal   practice   is   to place   national   capitals   under   a   special dispensation. In France, for example, there is a greater degree of central control over Paris   than   over   other   municipalities.   In England,   the   police   administration   of   the metropolitan   area   is   directly   under   the control of the Home Secretary, who does not exercise similar powers in respect of other municipal areas. Apart from reasons which are peculiar to each country or city, there are some   general   considerations   necessitating special arrangements in respect of national capitals. Capital cities possess, or come to possess, some degree of political and social predominance.   They   are   seats   of   national governments,   with   considerable   property belonging   to   these   governments.   Foreign diplomatic   missions   and   international agencies are located in these capitals. They also become centres of national culture and 30 art.   So   far   as   federal   capitals   are concerned,   there   is   also   an   additional consideration. Any constitutional division of powers,   if   it   is   applicable   to   units functioning   in   the   seats   of   national governments,   is   bound   to   give   rise   to embarrassing   situations.   Practice   in   other countries,   administrative   necessity   and   the desirability   of   avoiding   conflicting jurisdictions,   all   point   to   the   need   for effective   control   by   national   governments over federal capitals.” 34. On the basis of the recommendation of the State Re­ th organisation   Commission,   7   Amendment   Act,   1956   was passed, under the Amendment Part 'C' States were renamed as Union Territory. Delhi a Part 'C' State became Union Territory   and   the   Legislative   Assembly   and   Council   of Ministers ceased to act w.e.f. 01.11.1956. Subsequent to th 7   Amendment,   different   schemes   were   enforced   for administration of Delhi, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 was passed by the Parliament providing for direct election of Councillors from all the constituencies to be th elected   by   residents   of   Delhi.     By   Constitution   14 Amendment Act, 1962, Article 239A was inserted which was enabling   provision   for   the   Parliament   to   make   law   to create a Legislature or Council of Ministers or both for 31 the   Union   Territories   specified   therein.   The   Union Territory of Delhi was not included in the list of Union Territories  in Article 239A. The Parliament enacted the Government   of   Union   Territories   Act,   1963.   The   Delhi Administration Act, 1966 was passed by the Parliament to provide   for   an   elected   body   of   Delhi   Metropolitan Council. A Committee was appointed by the Government of India to go into the various issues connected with the administration   of   Union   Territory   of   Delhi.   The Committee,   after,   studying   for   two   years   about   all aspects   of   the   matters   had   submitted   its   Report   on 14.12.1989   to   the   Home   Minister.   The   Report   of   the Committee   is   commonly   known   as   Balakrishnan   Committee Report.   While   submitting   the   Report   S.Balakrishnan,   in nutshell,   in   his   letter   dated   14.12.1989   addressed   to Home Minister has outlined task given to the Committee in following words: “The   task   of   designing   a   proper structure   of   Government   for   the   national capital   particularly   for   a   country   with   a federal set up like ours, has always proved difficult   because   of   two   conflicting requirements.   On   the   one   hand,   effective administration of the national capital is of vital importance to the national Government 32 not   only   for   ensuring   a   high   degree   of security and a high level of administrative efficiency but also for enabling the Central Government   to   discharge   its   national   and international   responsibilities;   to   ensure this, it must necessarily have a complete and comprehensive control over the affairs of the capital.   On   the   other   hand,   the   legitimate demand of the large population of the capital city   for   the   democratic   right   of participation in the government at the city level is too important to be ignored. We have endeavoured   to   design   a   governmental structure   for   Delhi   which   we   hope,   would reconcile these two requirements.”  35. Balakrishnan   Committee   Report   studied   different aspects connected with the administration of Delhi, the Capital of this country. While studying “National Capital Administration   in   some   countries”,   in   Chapter   V,   the Committee examined various models including United States of   America,   Canada,   Japan   and   United   Kingdom.   After noticing   the   different   aspects   in   paragraph   5.7.3 following has been observed: “5.7.3 It will be clear from the above that it has been recognised in many countries of the world that the national government should have the ultimate control and authority over the affairs of the national capital. At the same   time,   there   is   a   noticeable   trend   in those   countries   to   accept   the   principle   of associating   the   people   in   the   capital   with sectors of administration affecting them, by 33 means   of   a   representative   body.   Because   of the difficulty in securing a balance between these   two   considerations,   the   problem   of evolving   an   appropriate   governmental structure for the national capital has proved difficult   in   many   countries   particularly those with a federal type of government.“ 36. Before   the   Committee,   the   arguments   for   giving Statehood   to   Delhi   as   well   as   arguments   against   the Statehood   was   noticed.   The   Committee   after   considering the   rival   arguments   concluded   following   in   paragraph 6.5.9 and 6.5.10: “6.5.9  We are also impressed with the argument that Delhi as the national capital belongs   to   the   nation   as   a   whole   and   any constituent   ‘State   of   the   Union   of   which Delhi   will   become   a   part   would   sooner   or later   acquire   a   predominant   position   in relation   to   other   States.     Sufficient constitutional   authority   for   Union intervention in day­to­day matters, however, vital   some   of   them   may   be,   will   not   be available to the Union, thereby prejudicing the   discharge   of   its   national   duties   and responsibilities. 6.5.10 In   the   light   of   the   foregoing discussion our conclusion is that it will not be   in   the   national   interests   and   in   the interests of Delhi itself, to restructure the set­up in Delhi as a full­fledged constituent State   of   the   Union,   this   will   have   to   be ruled out. We recommend accordingly.” 34 37. While   discussing   “salient   features   of   proposed structure” following was stated in paragraphs 6.7.1 and 6.7.2: “6.7.1 As   a   consequence   of   our recommendation   in   the   preceding   paragraph that   Delhi   should   be   provided   with   a Legislative   Assembly   and   a   Council   of Ministers the further issues to be considered are: (i) the   extent   of   the   powers   and responsibilities to be conferred on or entrusted to these bodies, the special safeguards to ensure that the Union is not hampered in discharging its duties and   responsibilities   and   the   other salient features of the structure; and (ii) the   manner   in   which   the   proposed changes   in   the   structure   should   be brought about, that is, whether they should   be   by   amendments   to   the Constitution,   or   by   a   Parliamentary law or by a combination of both. We will now take up the issue in item (i) above   in   the   succeeding   paragraphs.   Item (ii) will be discussed in Chapter VII. 6.7.2 As we have already stated, any governmental set­up for Delhi should ensure that the Union is not fettered or hampered in any way in the discharge of its own special responsibilities   in   relation   to   the administration of the national capital, by a constitutional division of powers, functions and   responsibilities   between   the   Union   and the   Delhi   Administration.   The   only   way   of ensuring this arrangement is to keep Delhi as 35 a   Union   Territory   for   the   purposes   of   the Constitution.   Thereby,   the   provision   in Article   246(4)   of   the   Constitution   will automatically   ensure   that   Parliament   has concurrent and overriding powers to make laws for   Delhi   on   all   matters,   including   those relateable   to   the   State   List. Correspondingly,   the   Union,   Executive   can exercise executive powers in respect of all such matters subject to the provisions of any Central   law   governing   the   matter.   We, therefore,   recommend   that   even   after   the creation   of   a   Legislative   Assembly   and Council   of   Ministers   for   Delhi   it   should continue   to   be   a   Union   Territory   for   the purposes of the Constitution.” 38. Various   other   recommendations   were   made   by th Balakrishnan   Committee   which   led   to   Constitution   69 th Amendment.   Statement   and   Objects   of   Constitution   69 Amendment   notices   the   object   and   purpose   of constitutional   amendment   which   are   to   the   following effect: “STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS The   question   of   re­organisation   of   the Administrative set­up in the Union territory of Delhi has been under the consideration of the Government for some time. The Government of India appointed on 24­12­1987 a Committee to go into the various issues connected with the administration of Delhi and to recommend measures inter alia for the streamlining of 36 the administrative set­up. The Committee went into   the   matter   in   great   detail   and considered   the   issues   after   holding discussions   with   various   individuals, associations,   political   parties   and   other experts   and   taking   into   account   the arrangements   in   the   national   Capitals   of other   countries   with   a   federal   set­up   and also the debates in the Constituent Assembly as also the reports by earlier Committees and Commissions. After such detailed inquiry and examination, it recommended that Delhi should continue to be a Union territory and provided with a Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers   responsible   to   such   Assembly   with appropriate   powers   to   deal   with   matters   of concern to the common man. The Committee also recommended   that   with   a   view   to   ensure stability   and   permanence   the   arrangements should be incorporated in the Constitution to give   the   National   Capital   a   special   status among the Union territories. 2. The Bill seeks to give effect to the above  proposals.” th 39. By   69   Amendment   Act,   Article   239AA   and   Article 239AB   were   added   in   Part   VIII   of   the   Constitution. Article 239AA and 239AB which Articles are taken up for consideration in these appeals are as follows: “Article   239AA   {Special   provisions   with respect to Delhi} 37 1. As   from   the   date   of   commencement   of   the Constitution   (Sixty   ninth   Amendment)   Act, 1991,   the   Union   territory   of   Delhi   shall   be called the National Capital Territory of Delhi (hereafter   in   this   Part   referred   to   as   the National   Capital   Territory)   and   the administrator thereof appointed under article 239   shall   be   designated   as   the   Lieutenant Governor. 2(a) There shall be a Legislative Assembly for the National Capital Territory and the seats in   such   Assembly   shall   be   filled   by   members chosen   by   direct   election   from   territorial constituencies   in   the   National   Capital Territory. (b) The   total   number   of   seats   in   the Legislative   Assembly,   the   number   of   seats reserved for Scheduled Castes, the division of the   National   Capital   Territory   into territorial   constituencies   (including   the basis for such division) and all other matters relating to the functioning of the Legislative Assembly   shall   be   regulated   by   law   made   by Parliament. (c) The provisions of articles 324 to 327 and 329   shall   apply   in   relation   to   the   National Capital Territory, the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory and the members thereof as they apply, in relation to a State, the   Legislative   Assembly   of   a   State   and   the members   thereof   respectively;   and   any reference   in   articles   326   and   329   to "appropriate   Legislature"   shall   be   deemed   to be a reference to Parliament. 3(a) Subject   to   the   provisions   of   this Constitution,   the   Legislative   Assembly   shall have power to make laws for the whole or any part   of   the   National   Capital   Territory   with 38 respect   to   any   of   the   matters   enumerated   in the State List or in the Concurrent List in so far as any such matter is applicable to Union territories   except   matters   with   respect   to Entries   1,   2   and   18   of   the   State   List   and Entries 64, 65 and 66 of that List in so far as they relate to the said Entries 1, 2 and 18. (b) Nothing   in   sub­clause   (a)   shall   derogate from   the   powers   of   Parliament   under   this Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter   for   a   Union   territory   or   any   part thereof. (c) If   any   provision   of   a   law   made   by   the Legislative   Assembly   with   respect   to   any matter is repugnant to any provision of a law made   by   Parliament   with   respect   to   that matter, whether passed before or after the law made   by   the   Legislative   Assembly,   or   of   an earlier   law,   other   than   a   law   made   by   the Legislative   Assembly,   then,   in   either   case, the law made by Parliament, or, as the case may   be,   such   earlier   law,   shall   prevail   and the   law   made   by   the   Legislative   Assembly shall,   to   the   extent   of   the   repugnancy,   be void: Provided that if any such law made by the Legislative Assembly has been reserved for the   consideration   of   the   President   and   has received his assent, such law shall prevail in the   National   Capital   Territory:   Provided further that nothing in this sub­clause shall prevent Parliament form enacting at any time any   law   with   respect   to   the   same   matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or   repealing   the   law   so   made   by   the Legislative Assembly. 4. There   shall   be   a   Council   of   Ministers consisting of not more than ten per cent of the total number of members in the Legislative 39 Assembly, with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Lieutenant Governor in the exercise of his functions in relation to matters with respect to which the Legislative Assembly has power to make laws, except in so far as he is, by or under any law, required to act   in   his   discretion:   Provided   that   in   the case   of   difference   of   opinion   between   the Lieutenant Governor and his Ministers on any matter, the Lieutenant Governor shall refer it to the President and pending such decision it shall be competent for the Lieutenant Governor in any case where the matter, in his opinion, is so urgent that it is necessary for him to take immediate action, to take such action or to   give   such   direction   in   the   matter   as   he deems necessary. 5. The Chief Minister shall be appointed by the President   and   the   other   Ministers   shall   be appointed   by   the   President   on   the   advice   of the   Chief   Minister   and   the   Ministers   shall hold   office   during   the   pleasure   of   the President. 6. The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly. 7(a) Parliament   may,   by   law,   make   provisions for   giving   effect   to,   or   supplement   the provisions contained in the foregoing clauses and   for   all   matters   incidental   or consequential thereto. (b) Any such law as is referred to in sub­clause (a) shall not be deemed to be an amendment of this constitution for the purposes of article 368   notwithstanding   that   it   contains   any provision   which   amends   or   has   the   effect   of amending this constitution. 8. The provisions of article 239B shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the National 40

The Principles of Constitutional Interpretation 41 40. Before we proceed to examine the scheme delineated by Article 239AA, it is necessary to have an overview on the   principles   which   have   been   accepted   for interpretation of a Constitution. Before we notice the accepted   principles   for   constitutional   interpretation, we want to notice prophetic words of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar where Dr. Ambedkar in closing debate on 25.11.1949 in the Constituent   Assembly   on   the   draft   Constitution   made following  statement: “...Because   I   feel,   however   good   a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work it, happen   to   be   a   bad   lot.   However,   bad   a Constitution may be, it may turn out to be good   if   those   who   are   called   to   work   it, happen   to   be   a   good   lot.   The   working   of   a Constitution does not depend wholly upon the nature of the Constitution. The Constitution can provide only the organs of State such as the   Legislature,   the   executive   and   the Judiciary. The factors on which the working of those organs of the State depend are the people   and   the   political   parties   they   will set   up   as   their   instruments   to   carry   out their wishes and their politics.”    41. After   noticing   the   universal   truth   stated   by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as above, we now proceed to notice the principles of Constitutional interpretation.  The general 42 rule   for   interpreting   a   Constitution   are   the   same   as those for interpreting a general Statute.  Article 367 of the   Constitution   provides   that   Unless   the   context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made   therein   under   Article   372,   apply   for   the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation   of   an   Act   of   the   Legislature   of   the Dominion of India.  This Court in  Keshavan Madhava Menon Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 128 : (1951) SCR 228 held that court of law has to gather the spirit of the Constitution from the language of the Constitution. True meaning   of   the   Constitution   has   to   be   arrived   at uninfluenced   by   any   assumed   interpretation   of   the Constitution.  In Para 13 of the judgment, following was held :­ “ 13.  An argument founded on what is claimed to be   the   spirit   of   the   Constitution   is   always attractive,   for   it   has   a   powerful   appeal   to sentiment and emotion; but a court of law has to gather the spirit of the Constitution from the language of the Constitution. What one may believe or think to be the spirit of the Con­ stitution   cannot   prevail   if   the   language   of the Constitution does not support that view. Article 372(2) gives power to the President to 43 adapt and modify existing laws by way of re­ peal or amendment. There is nothing to prevent the President, in exercise of the powers con­ ferred on him by that article, from repealing, say the whole or any part of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. If the President does so, then such repeal will at once attract Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. In such a situation all prosecutions under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, which were pending at the date of its repeal by the Pres­ ident   would   be   saved   and   must   be   proceeded with   notwithstanding   the   repeal   of   that   Act unless an express provision was otherwise made in   the   repealing   Act.   It   is   therefore   clear that the idea of the preservation of past in­ choate rights or liabilities and pending pro­ ceedings to enforce the same is not foreign or abhorrent   to   the   Constitution   of   India.   We are,   therefore,   unable   to   accept   the   con­ tention about the spirit of the Constitution as invoked by the learned counsel in aid of his plea that pending proceedings under a law which   has   become   void   cannot   be   proceeded with. Further, if it is against the spirit of the Constitution to continue the pending pros­ ecutions   under   such   a   void   law,   surely   it should   be   equally   repugnant   to   that   spirit that men who have already been convicted under such repressive law before the Constitution of India came into force should continue to rot in   jail.   It   is,   therefore,   quite   clear   that the court should construe the language of Ar­ ticle 13(1) according to the established rules of interpretation and arrive at its true mean­ ing uninfluenced by any assumed spirit of the Constitution.” 42. This   Court   in   subsequent   judgments   have   also   pro­ pounded the doctrine of literal interpretation and doc­ 44 trine of purposive interpretation.  There cannot be  de­ nial to the fact that the Court has to respect the lan­ guage   used   in   the   Constitution   wherever   possible,   the language be such interpreted as may best serve the pur­ pose   of   the   Constitution.     A   Constitutional   document should be construed with less rigidity and more generos­ ity than other acts. This Court in   S.R. Chaudhuri Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 126   held that we must remember that a Constitution is not just a document in solemn form, but a living framework for the Government of the people exhibiting a sufficient degree of cohesion and its successful working depends upon the Democratic spirit   underlying   it   being   respected   in   letter   and   in spirit. 43. Before   a   Constitution   Bench   of   this   Court   in   G. Narayanaswami Vs. G. Paneerselvam and Others, (1972) 3 SCC 717 , provisions of Article 171 came up for interpre­ tation, in the above case, in Paragraph 4 of the judg­ ment, following principle was reiterated:­ “4.   Authorities   are   certainly   not   wanting which indicate that courts should interpret in a broad and generous spirit the document which 45 contains   the   fundamental   law   of   the   land   or the basic principles of its Government. Never­ theless, the rule of “plain meaning” or “lit­ eral”   interpretation,   described   in   Maxwell’s Interpretation   of   Statutes   as   “the   primary rule”, could not be altogether abandoned today in interpreting any document. Indeed, we find Lord Evershed, M.R., saying: “The length and detail of modern legislation, has undoubtedly reinforced   the   claim   of   literal   construction as the only safe rule”. (See: Maxwell on In­ terpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., p. 28.) It may be that the great mass of modern legis­ lation,   a   large   part   of   which   consists   of statutory rules, makes some departure from the literal   rule   of   interpretation   more   easily justifiable   today   than   it   was   in   the   past. But, the object of interpretation and of “con­ struction” (which may be broader than “inter­ pretation”)   is   to   discover   the   intention   of the law­makers in every case (See: Crawford on Statutory   Construction,   1940   Edn.,   para   157, pp.   240­42).   This   object   can,   obviously,   be best achieved by first looking at the language used in the relevant provisions. Other methods of extracting the meaning can be resorted to only   if   the   language   used   is   contradictory, ambiguous, or leads really to absurd results. This is an elementary and basic rule of inter­ pretation as well as of construction processes which,   from   the   point   of   view   of   principles applied,   coalesce   and   converge   towards   the common purpose of both which is to get at the real sense and meaning, so far as it may be reasonably   possible   to   do   this,   of   what   is found laid down. The provisions whose meaning is under consideration have, therefore to be examined   before   applying   any   method   of   con­ struction at all………………….” 46 44.  In  B.R. Kapur Vs. State of T.N. and Another, (2001) 7   SCC   231   Justice   Pattanaik,   delivering   a   concurring judgment, laid down following in Paragraph 72:­ “72.   …………………………………A   documentary   constitution reflects the beliefs and political aspirations of those who had framed it. One of the princi­ ples of constitutionalism is what it had de­ veloped in the democratic traditions. A pri­ mary function that is assigned to the written constitution is that of controlling the organs of the Government. Constitutional law presup­ poses   the   existence   of   a   State   and   includes those   laws   which   regulate   the   structure   and function of the principal organs of the gov­ ernment and their relationship to each other and to the citizens. Where there is a written constitution, emphasis is placed on the rules which it contains and on the way in which they have   been   interpreted   by   the   highest   court with constitutional jurisdiction. Where there is a written constitution the legal structure of the Government may assume a wide variety of forms.   Within   a   federal   constitution,   the tasks of the Government are divided into two classes, those entrusted to the federal organs of the Government, and those entrusted to the various   States,   regions   or   provinces   which make up the federation. But the constitutional limits bind both the federal and State organs of the Government, which limits are enforce­ able as a matter of law………………….” 45. Another Constitution Bench in   Kuldip Nayar and Oth­ ers Vs. Union of India and Others, (2006) 7 SCC 1  after 47 the   above   quoted   passage   of   G.   Narayanaswami   (supra) stated following in Para 201:­ “ 201.          Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx We endorse and reiterate the view taken in the   abovequoted   paragraph   of   the   judgment. It may be desirable to give a broad and gen­ erous   construction   to   the   constitutional provisions, but while doing so the rule of “plain meaning” or “literal” interpretation, which remains “the primary rule”, has also to   be   kept   in   mind.   In   fact   the   rule   of “literal construction” is the safe rule un­ less the language used is contradictory, am­ biguous, or leads really to absurd results.” 46. We may also notice the Constitution Bench Judgment in  I.R. Coelho Vs. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1,  it laid down   the   principles   of   construction   in   Paragraph   42, which is to the following effect:­ “42.  The controversy with regard to the dis­ tinction between ordinary law and constitu­ tional amendments is really irrelevant. The distinction is valid and the decisions from Indira Gandhi case (1975 Supp. SCC 1) up to Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India [(2006) 7 SCC 1] case  represents the correct law. It has no application in testing the constitutional amendment   placing   the   Acts   in   the   Ninth Schedule. There is no manner of doubt that: A)   In   Kesavananda   Bharati   [(1973)   4 SCC   225]   case   Sikri,   C.J.   [para 475(h)], Shelat & Grover, JJ. [paras 607, 608(7)], Hegde & Mukherjea, JJ. 48 [paras   742,   744(8)]   and   Jaganmohan Reddy,   J.   [paras   1211,   1212(4)]   all clearly held that the Acts placed in the Ninth Schedule and the provisions thereof have to be subjected to the basic structure test. (B)   Chandrachud,   C.J.   in   Waman   Rao case [(1980) 3 SCC 587], followed the path laid down by 6 Judges in Kesa­ vananda Bharati without quoting from their   conclusions   and   without   at­ tempting   to   reconcile   their   views with   the   subsequent   development   in the law regarding the distinction be­ tween ordinary legislations and con­ stitutional amendments.” 47. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that Fed­ eralism being one of the basic structure of the Constitu­ tion, this Court may put such interpretation on Article 239AA, which strengthens the federal structure.   It is further   contended   that   Parliamentary   democracy   having been adopted by our Constitution, this Court may inter­ pret Article 239AA so that Constitutional design and Con­ stitutional   objectives   be   fulfilled.     It   is   submitted that judgments of this Court in   Rustom Cavasjee Cooper Vs. Union of India, (1970)1 SCC 248: AIR 1970 SC 564  and judgment of this Court in  Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of In­ dia and Another, (1978)1 SCC 248: AIR 1978 SC 597  reflect 49 that principles of less textual and more purposive method of Constitutional interpretation which  has been adopted in these cases.  Judgment of this Court in  K.C. Vasanth Kumar and Another Vs. State of Karnataka, 1985 Supp. SCC 714  has been relied, wherein this Court laid down follow­ ing:­ “……………………….It   is   not   enough   to   exhibit   a Marshallian awareness that we are expounding a Constitution; we must also remember that we are expounding a Constitution born in the mid­twentieth century, but of an anti­impe­ rialist   struggle,   influenced   by   constitu­ tional   instruments,   events   and   revolutions elsewhere, in search of a better world, and wedded to the idea of justice, economic, so­ cial and political to all. Such a Constitu­ tion must be given a generous interpretation so as to give all its citizens the full mea­ sure of justice promised by it. The exposi­ tors   of   the   Constitution   are   to   concern themselves less with mere words and arrange­ ment of words than with the philosophy and the pervading “spirit and sense” of the Con­ stitution,   so   elaborately   exposed   for   our guidance   in   the   Directive   Principles   of State   Policy   and   other   provisions   of   the Constitution…………………………….”  48. Shri H.M. Seervai, in his “A Critical Commentary” on Constitutional   Law   of   India,   on   interpretation   of   the Constitution, states following in Paragraph 2.1 and 2.2:­ 50 “2.1 A Court of Law must gather the spirit of the Constitution from the language used, and what one may believe to be the spirit of the Constitution cannot prevail if not sup­ ported by the language, which therefore must be   construed   according   to   well­established rules   of   interpretation   uninfluenced   by   an assumed   spirit   of   the   Constitution.   Where the Constitution has not limited, either in terms or by necessary implication, the gen­ eral powers conferred upon the Legislature, the Court cannot limit them upon any notion of the spirit of the Constitution.  2.2 Well established rules of interpretation require   that   the   meaning   and   intention   of the framers of a Constitution – be it a Par­ liament or a Constituent Assembly – must be ascertained  from   the  language  of  that  Con­ stitution itself; with the motives of those who   framed   it,   the   Court   has   no   concern. But, as Higgins J. observed – “in words that have   not   withered   or   grown   sterile   with years”­: “although   we   are   to   interpret   the words of the constitution on the same principles of interpretation as we ap­ ply   to   any   ordinary   law,   these   very principles of interpretation compel us to   take   into   account   the   nature   and scope of the Act we are interpreting, to remember that it is a Constitution, a mechanism under which laws are to be made,   and   not   a   mere   Act   which   de­ clares what the law is to be.”   49. Justice G.P. Singh  in “Principles of Statutory In­ th terpretation”, 14  Edition, while discussing interpreta­ tion of Constitution stated following:­ 51 “The Constitution is a living organic thing and   must   be   applied   to   meet   the   current needs and requirements, and is not bound to be interpreted by reference to the original understanding  of   the  constitutional  econom­ ics as debated in Parliament.   Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the content and meaning of Article 149, which provides the duties and powers of the CAG, will vary from age to age and, given that spectrum is an important   natural   resource,   CAG   has   the power   to   examine   the   accounts   of   telecom service providers under Article 149. It cannot, however, be said that the rule of literal construction or the golden rule of construction has no application to interpre­ tation   of   the   Constitution.     So   when   the language is plain and specific and the lit­ eral construction produces no difficulty to the constitutional scheme, the same has to be resorted to. Similarly, where the Consti­ tution has prescribed a method for doing a thing and has left no ‘abeyance’ or gap, if the   court   by   a   strained   construction   pre­ scribes another method for doing that thing, the decision will become open to serious ob­ jection and criticism.”   50. Aharon Barak (Former President, Supreme Court of Is­ rael) while dealing with Purposive Constitutional Inter­ pretation   expounded   the   modern   concept   in   following words:­   “The purpose of the constitutional text is to provide a solid foundation for national existence. It is to embody the basic aspira­ tions of the people. It is to guide future 52 generations by its basic choices. It is to control   majorities   and   protect   individual dignity and liberty. All these purposes can­ not be fulfilled if the only guide to inter­ pretation is the subjective purposes of the framers of the constitutional text. The con­ stitution will not achieve its purposes if its vision is restricted to the horizons of its founding fathers. Even if we assume the broadest  generalizations   of  subjective  pur­ pose, this may not suffice. It may not pro­ vide a solid foundation for modern national existence.   It   may   be   foreign   to   the   basic aspirations of modern people. It may not be consistent with the dignity and liberty of the modern human being. A constitution must be wiser than its creators”. 51. Almost same views have been expressed by Aharon Barak in “Foreword: A Judge on Judging The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy”, which are as under:­ “The original intent of the framers at the time of drafting is important.   One cannot understand the present without understanding the past.  The framers’ intent lends histor­ ical   depth   to   understanding   the   text   in   a way that honors the past.  The intent of the constitutional   authors,   however,   exists alongside   the   fundamental   views   and   values of modern society at the time of interpreta­ tion.  The constitution is intended to solve the problems of the contemporary person, to protect his or her freedom.  It must contend with his or her needs.  Therefore, in deter­ mining   the   constitution’s   purpose   through interpretation, one must also take into ac­ count the values and principles that prevail at the time of interpretation, seeking syn­ 53 thesis   and   harmony   between   past   intention and present principle.” 52. In this context, we may also profitably notice views of  David Feldman  expressed in “The Nature and Signifi­ cance   of   Constitutional   Legislation”   published   in 2013(129) L.Q.R. 343­358.   Few principles to guide the interpretation   of   Constitution   instruments   were   noted, which are as follows:­ “Despite   differences   between   constitutions, and between types of provision within each constitution,   diverse   jurisdictions   have shown considerable consistency in their se­ lection of principles to guide the interpre­ tation of constitutional instruments. First, constitutions are to be interpreted with the aid   of   their   preambles,   which   are   usually treated   as   forming   an   integral   part   of them.63 Secondly, a democratic constitution must be interpreted to “foster, develop and enrich”,   rather   than   undermine,   democratic institutions.64   In   particular,   interpreters should   give  scope  for  a  self­governing  en­ tity   to   make   its   own   decisions,   including decisions   about   the   terms   on   which   demo­ cratic institutions operate, subject to lim­ its imposed by the constitution.65 Thirdly, constitutions are not to be interpreted with mechanical   literalness.   Interpreters   must take   account   of   the   context,   ultimate   ob­ ject, and textual setting of a provision, 66 bearing   in   mind   that   “the   question   is   not what may be supposed to have been intended [by the framers], but what has been said”. 67   Fourthly,   according   to   at   least   some 54 judges,  constitutions  are  not  to  be  inter­ preted as permitting institutions, including legislatures, to act in a way which “offends what I may call the social conscience of a sovereign democratic republic”, because law must be regarded by ordinary people as “rea­ sonable, just and fair” Nevertheless, these principles must be qual­ ified by the recognition of differences be­ tween constitutions.” 53. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on the   principles   of   Constitutional   silence   and   Constitu­ tional implications.  It is submitted that Constitutional silence and Constitutional implications have also to be given due effect while interpreting Constitutional provi­ sions.  Reliance has been placed on Constitutional Bench Judgment of this Court in   Manoj Narula Vs. Union of In­ dia, (2014) 9 SCC 1 .   Constitution Bench in the above case while considering principles of Constitutional si­ lence or abeyance laid down following in Paras 65­66:­ “65.   The next principle that can be thought of is constitutional silence or silence of the Constitution or constitutional abeyance. The said principle is a progressive one and is applied as a recognised advanced consti­ tutional practice. It has been recognised by the Court to fill up the gaps in respect of certain areas in the interest of justice and larger   public   interest.   Liberalisation   of 55 the concept of locus standi for the purpose of development of public interest litigation to establish the rights of the have­nots or to   prevent   damages   and   protect   environment is one such feature. Similarly, laying down guidelines   as   procedural   safeguards   in   the matter   of   adoption   of   Indian   children   by foreigners in Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India   [(1987)   1   SCC   66]   or   issuance   of guidelines pertaining to arrest in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) 1 SCC 416] or di­ rections issued in Vishaka v. State of Ra­ jasthan [(1997) 6 SCC 241] are some of the instances. 66.  In this context, it is profitable to re­ fer to the authority in Bhanumati v. State of U.P. [(2010) 12 SCC 1] wherein this Court was dealing with the constitutional validity of the U.P. Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Act, 2007. One of the grounds for challenge was that   there   is   no   concept   of   no­confidence motion in the detailed constitutional provi­ sion under Part IX of the Constitution and, therefore,   the   incorporation   of   the   said provision   in   the   statute   militates   against the   principles   of   Panchayati   Raj   institu­ tions. That apart, reduction of one year in place of two years in Sections 15 and 28 of the   Amendment   Act   was   sought   to   be   struck down as the said provision diluted the prin­ ciple of stability and continuity which is the main purpose behind the object and rea­ son of the constitutional amendment in Part IX of the Constitution. The Court, after re­ ferring   to   Articles   243­A,   243­C(1),   (5), 243­D(4), 243­D(6), 243­F(1), 243­G, 243­H, 243­I(2),   243­J,   243­K(2)   and   (4)   of   the Constitution and further taking note of the amendment, came to hold that the statutory provision   of   no­confidence   is   contrary   to Part   IX   of   the   Constitution.   In   that   con­ 56 text, it has been held as follows: (Bhanu­ mati case, SCC p. 17, paras 49­50) “49.   Apart   from   the   aforesaid   rea­ sons, the arguments by the appellants cannot be accepted in view of a very well­known   constitutional   doctrine, namely,   the   constitutional   doctrine of   silence.   Michael   Foley   in   his treatise on The Silence of Constitu­ tions   (Routledge,   London   and   New York) has argued that in a Constitu­ tion ‘abeyances are valuable, there­ fore, not in spite of their obscurity but because of it. They are signifi­ cant for the attitudes and approaches to the Constitution that they evoke, rather than the content or substance of their strictures’. (p. 10) 50.   The   learned   author   elaborated this concept further by saying, “De­ spite the absence of any documentary or material form, these abeyances are real and are an integral part of any Constitution.   What   remains   unwritten and indeterminate can be just as much responsible for the operational char­ acter   and   restraining   quality   of   a Constitution as its more tangible and codified components.’ (p. 82)” 54. It is further relevant to notice that although above well   known   Constitutional   doctrine   was   noticed   but   the Court held that express Constitutional provisions cannot be   ignored   while   considering   such   doctrine   and   princi­ 57 ples.  After what has been stated above about above prin­ ciples in Paras 65 and 66, following was held in Para 67:­ “ 67.   The question that is to be posed here is whether taking recourse to this doctrine for the purpose of advancing constitutional culture, can a court read a disqualification to   the   already   expressed   disqualifications provided under the Constitution and the 1951 Act. The answer has to be in the inevitable negative,   for   there   are   express   provisions stating the disqualifications and second, it would tantamount to crossing the boundaries of judicial review.” 55. Doctrine of Constitutional implications was also no­ ticed by Constitution Bench in Para 68 to the following effect:­  “ 68.   The   next   principle   that   we   intend   to discuss   is   the   principle   of   constitutional implication. We are obliged to discuss this principle as Mr Dwivedi, learned Amicus Cu­ riae, has put immense emphasis on the words “on the advice of the Prime Minister” occur­ ring in Article 75(1) of the Constitution. It is his submission that these words are of immense   significance   and   apposite   meaning from   the   said   words  is   required  to   be   de­ duced to the effect that the Prime Minister is   not   constitutionally   allowed   to   advise the President to make a person against whom charge has been framed for heinous or seri­ ous offences or offences pertaining to cor­ ruption as Minister in the Council of Minis­ ters, regard being had to the sacrosanctity 58 of the office and the oath prescribed under the Constitution. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that on many an occasion, this Court has expanded the horizon inherent in various articles by applying the doctrine of implication   based   on   the   constitutional scheme   and   the   language   employed   in   other provisions of the Constitution.” 56. There cannot be any dispute with regard to doctrine of silence and doctrine of implications as noticed above. But while applying above said doctrines in interpreting a Constitutional   provision,   express   provision   cannot   be given a go­bye.  The purpose and intent of Constitutional provisions especially the express language used which re­ flect a particular scheme has to give full effect to and express   Constitutional   scheme   cannot   be   disregarded   on any such principles.   57. From the above discussions, it is apparent that Con­ stitutional   interpretation   has   to   be   purposive   taking into   consideration   the   need   of   time   and   Constitutional principles.   The intent of Constitution framers and ob­ ject and purpose of Constitutional amendment always throw light on the Constitutional provisions but for interpret­ ing a particular Constitutional provision, the Constitu­ 59 tional Scheme and the express language employed cannot be given a go­bye.  The purpose and intent of the Constitu­ tional provisions have to be found from the very Consti­ tutional provisions which are up for interpretation.  We, thus, while interpreting Article 239AA have to keep in mind the purpose and object for which Sixty Ninth Consti­ tution (Amendment) Act, 1991 was brought into force.  Af­ ter noticing the above principles, we now proceed further to examine the nature and content of the Constitutional provisions.  CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME OF ARTICLE 239AA 58. To find out the Constitutional Scheme as delineated by   Article   239AA,   apart   from   looking   into   the   express language of Article 239AA, we have also to look into the object and purpose of Constitutional provision, on which sufficient light is thrown by the object and reasons as contained in Sixty Ninth Constitutional Amendment as well as   Balakrishnan's   Report   which   was   the   basis   of   Sixty Ninth Constitutional Amendment. We have already referred to   some   relevant   parts   of   Balakrishnan's   report   in 60 preceding paragraph of this judgment.  59. The   task   before   Balakrishnan   Report   in   words   of Balakrishnan himself was to synchronise the two competing claims i.e. “On the one hand, effective administration of the   National   Capital   is   of   vital   importance   to   the National Government not only for ensuring a high degree of security and a high level of administrative efficiency but also for enabling the Central Government to discharge its   national   and   international   responsibilities”.     To ensure   this,   it   must   necessarily   have   a   complete   and comprehensive control over the affairs of the capital. On the other hand, legitimate demand of the large population of   the   capital   city   for   the   democratic   right   of participation in the Government at the city level is too important to be ignored.  We have endeavoured to design a Governmental   structure   for   Delhi   which   we   hope,   would reconcile these two requirements”. 60. For administration of Delhi, there has been earlier a   Parliamentary   Legislation.   Legislative   Assembly functioned   in   Delhi   after   the   enforcement   of   the 61 Constitution   till   01.11.1956.     Article   239A   which   was inserted by Constitutional Fourteenth Amendment Act, 1962 had   already   contemplated   that   Parliament   may   by   law provide for Legislative Assembly for a Union territory. While considering the salient features of the proposed structure,   following   was   stated   in   Para   6.7.2   of   the Report: “6.7.2 As   we   have   already   stated,   any governmental   set­up   for   Delhi   should ensure that the Union is not fettered or hampered in any way in the discharge of its   own   special   responsibilities   in relation   to   the   administration   of   the national   capital   by   a   constitutional division   of   powers,   functions   and responsibilities between the union and the Delhi   Administration.     The   only   way   of ensuring this arrangement is to keep Delhi as a Union territory for the purposes of the Constitution.  Thereby, the provision in article 246(4) of the Constitution will automatically   ensure   that   Parliament   has concurrent and overriding powers to make laws for Delhi on all matters, including those   relateable   to   the   State   List. Correspondingly,   the   Union   Executive   can exercise   executive   powers   in   respect   of all such matters subject to the provisions of any Central law governing the matter. We, therefore, recommend that even after the creation of a Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers for Delhi it should continue to be a Union territory for the purposes of the Constitution.”  62 61. The Report also highlighted the necessity of certain subjects being kept out of jurisdiction of Legislative Assembly   of   Delhi   which   were   to   be   dealt   with   by   the Union.  62. At this juncture, it is also relevant to note the issue   pertaining   to   admissibility   of   the   Balakrishnan Report.   The   issue   regarding   admissibility   of Parliamentary   Committee's   Report   in   proceeding   under Article 32/Article 136 of the Constitution of India was engaging attention of the Constitution Bench when hearing in these matters were going on. The  Constitution Bench has delivered its judgment in Writ Petition (C) No.558 of 2012   Kalpana   Mehta   and   others   Vs.   Union   of   India   and others   on   09.05.2018.   The   Constitution   Bench   had   held that Parliamentary Committee Reports can be looked into and   referred   to   by   this   Court   in   exercise   of   its jurisdiction   under   Article   32/136.   The   Chief   Justice delivering   his   opinion   (for   himself   and   on   behalf   of Justice A.M. Khanwilkar) in the conclusions recorded in Paragraph 149 in sub paragraph (iv) and (vii), has laid 63 down: “ (iv)   In   a   litigation   before   this   Court either under Article 32 or Article 136 of the   Constitution   of   India   can   take   on record   the   report   of   the   Parliamentary Standing   Committee.   However,   the   Court while   taking   the   report   on   record   as   a material can take aid of as long as there is   no   contest   or   the   dispute   on   the content   because   such   a   contest   would invite   the   court   to   render   a   verdict either accepting the report in toto or in part or rejecting it in entirety. (vii)   In   a   public   interest   litigation where the adversarial position is absent, the Court can take aid of the said report in   larger   interest   of   the   society   to subserve the cause of welfare State and in any   furtherance   to   rights   provided   under the   Constitution   or   any   statutory provision.“ 63. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud   (one of us) answering the reference has held at Page 86: " (i)  As a matter of principle, there is no reason why reliance upon the report of a Parliamentary Standing Committee cannot be placed in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution; (ii)   Once   the   report   of   a   Parliamentary Committee has been published, reference to it in the course of judicial proceedings will   not   constitute   a   breach   of parliamentary   privilege.   The   validity   of the report is not called into question in 64 the   court.   No   Member   of   Parliament   or person   can   be   made   liable   for   what   is stated   in   the   course   of   the   proceedings before a Parliamentary Committee or for a vote tendered or given; and (iii)   However,   when   a   matter   before   the court   assumes   a   contentious   character,   a finding   of   fact   by   the   court   must   be premised   on   the   evidence   adduced   in   the judicial proceeding.” 64. Myself     delivering   my (Justice   Ashok   Bhushan) concurring   opinion   has   also   laid   down   following   in Paragraph 151(ii,vii): “ (ii)   The publication of the reports not being only permitted, but also are being encouraged by the Parliament. The general public   are   keenly   interested   in   knowing about   the   parliamentary   proceedings including parliamentary reports which are steps   towards   the   governance   of   the country.   The   right   to   know   about   the reports   only   arises   when   they   have   been published   for   use   of   the   public   in general. (vii)   Both the parties have not disputed that Parliamentary Reports can be used for the purposes of legislative history of a Statute   as   well   as   for   considering   the statement made by a minister. When there is no breach of privilege in considering the Parliamentary materials and reports of the committee by the Court for the above two   purposes,   we   fail   to   see   any   valid reason for not accepting the submission of 65 the   petitioner   that   Courts   are   not debarred from accepting the Parliamentary materials   and   reports,   on   record,   before it, provided the Court does not proceed to permit the parties to question and impeach the reports.” 65.   Thus,   it   is   now   well   settled   that   Parliamentary Committee   Report   can   be   looked   into   to   find   out   the intent and purpose of legislation, in the present case, Sixty Ninth Constitutional Amendment.  66. The   statement   of   object   &   reasons   of   Sixty   Ninth Amendment   Act   has   also   referred   to   the   Balakrishnan's Report.   While referring to the Balakrishnan's Report, following has been noted:  “The   Committee   went   into   the   matter   in great detail and considered the issues after holding discussions with various individuals, associations,   political   parties   and   other experts   and   taking   into   account   the arrangements in the National Capitals of other countries with a federal set­up and also the debates   in   the   Constituent   Assembly   as   also the   reports   by   earlier   Committees   and Commissions.  After such detailed inquiry and examination, it recommended that Delhi should continue to be a Union territory and provided with a Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers   responsible   to   such   Assembly   with appropriate   powers   to   deal   with   matters   of concern to the common man.  The Committee also recommended   that   with   a   view   to   ensure 66 stability   and   permanence   the   arrangements should be incorporated in the Constitution to give   the   National   Capital   a   special   status among the Union territories.”  67. The   recommendation   of   the   Committee   that   Delhi should continue to be Union territory providing with a Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers responsible to such Assembly was thus accepted and to give effect the same   Article   239AA   was   inserted   in   the   Constitution. There   is   no   denying   that   one   of   the   purposes   for insertion of Article 239AA is to permit a democratic and republican form of Government.  The principle of cabinet responsibility was the Constitutional intent which has to be   kept   in   mind   while   interpreting   the   Constitutional provisions.  68. There are many facets of Article 239AA which need elaborate   consideration.   Different   facets   shall   be separately dealt under following heads: A LEGISLATIVE POWER OF PARLIAMENT AND THAT OF GNCTD B EXECUTIVE POWER OF UNINON (PRESIDENT/ LG) AND THAT  OF  GNCTD 67 C PROVISO TO ARTICLE 239AA (i) AID AND ADVICE (ii) IN MATTER D WHETHER   CONCURRENCE   OF   LG   REQUIRED   FOR   EXCLUSIVE   DECISION OF GNCTD E COMMUNICATION OF DECISION OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS /  MINISTER AND LG, ITS PURPOSE AND OBJECT F ADMINISTARTIVE   FUNCTION   OF   THE   GNCTD   AND   LG   AS   DELINEATED  BY 1991 ACT AND THE TRANSACTIONS OF   BUSINESS RULEs, 1993.  A. LEGISLATIVE POWER OF PARLIAMENT AND THAT OF GNCTD 69. Clause   (3)   of   the   239AA   deals   with   power   to   make laws for the whole or any part of the National Territory of   Delhi   by   the   Legislative   Assembly   as   well   as   by Parliament. Clause (3) of Article 239 is extracted for ready reference:  "(3) (a) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution,   the   Legislative   Assembly shall   have   power   to   make   laws   for   the whole or any part of the National Capital Territory   with   respect   to   any   of   the matters enumerated in the State of List or in the Concurrent List in so far as any such   matter   is   applicable   to   Union territories except matters with respect to Entries 1, 2, and 18 of the State List and Entries 64, 65 and 66 of that List in so far as they relate to the said Entries 1, 2,and 18. 68 (b)   Nothing   in   sub­clause   (a)   shall derogate   from   the   powers   of   Parliament under this Constitution to make laws with respect   to   any   matter   for   a   Union territory or any part thereof. (c) If any provision of a law made by the Legislative Assembly with respect to any matter is repugnant to any provision of a law   made   by   Parliament   with   respect   to that   matter,   whether   passed   before   or after   the   law   made   by   the   Legislative Assembly, or of an earlier law, other than a   law   made   by   the   Legislative   Assembly, then,   in   either   case,   the   law   made   by Parliament, or, as the case may be, such earlier   law,   shall   prevail   and   the   law made by the Legislative Assembly shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void; Provided that if any such law made by the Legislative Assembly has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent such law shall prevail in National Capital Territory : Provided   further   that   nothing   in   this sub­clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to,   amending,   varying   or   repealing   the law so made by the Legislative Assembly.” 70. The above provision makes it clear that Legislative Assembly shall have power to make laws in respect of any of the matters enumerated in the State List or in the 69 Concurrent   List   in   so   far   as   any   such   matter   is applicable   to   Union   territories   except   matters   with respect to Entries  1, 2 and 18  of the State List and Entries 64, 65 and 66 of the List.   71. The   provision   is   very   clear   which   empowers   the Legislative Assembly to make laws with respect to any of the   matters   enumerated   in   the   State   List   or   in   the Concurrent List except the excluded entries.  One of the issue is  that power to  make laws in State List or in Concurrent List is hedged by phrase “in so far as any such matter is applicable to Union territories”. 72. A   look   of   the   Entries   in   List   II   and   List   III indicates that there is no mention of Union Territory. A perusal of the List II and III indicates that although in various entries there is specific mention of word “State” but there is no express reference of “Union Territory” in any of the entries. For example, in List II Entry 12, 26, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43, there is specific mention of word “State”. Similarly, in List III Entry 3, 4 and 43 there is mention of word “State”.  The above phrase “in 70 so   far   as   any   such   matter   is   applicable   to   Union Territory” is inconsequential.  The reasons are two fold. On   the   commencement   of   the   Constitution,   there   was   no concept of Union Territories and there were only Part A, B,   C   and   D   States.     After   Seventh   Constitutional Amendment, where First Schedule as well as Article 2 of the Constitution were amended which included mention of Union Territory both in Article 1 as well as in First Schedule. Thus, the above phrase was used to facilitate the automatic conferment of powers to make laws for Delhi on   all   matters   including   those   relatable   to   the   State List and Concurrent List except where an entry indicates that its applicability to the Union Territory is excluded by implication or any express Constitutional provision.  73. Thus,   there   is   no   difficulty   in   comprehending   the Legislative power of the NCTD as expressly spelled out in Article 239AA. Now, we turn to find out Legislative power of the Parliament. Sub­clause (b) of Clause (3) of the Article 239AA mentions “nothing in sub clause (a)  shall derogate   from   the   powers   of   Parliament   under   this Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for 71 a Union Territory or any part thereof. 74. It is relevant to note that sub clause (3) begins with   the   word   “subject   to   the   provisions   of   this st Constitution”.   Article   246   thus,   by   Chapter   1   of   the Part X1 of the Constitution dealing with the Legislative relations has to be looked into and to be read alongwith Article   239AA   clause   (3).   Article   246   provides   as follows:  “246.   Subject­matter   of   laws   made   by Parliament   and   by   the   Legislatures   of States.­ (1)   Notwithstanding   anything   in   clauses (2)   and   (3),   Parliament   has   exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh   Schedule   (in   this   Constitution referred to as the “Union List”). (2)   Notwithstanding   anything   in   clause (3),   Parliament   and,   subject   to   clause (1),   the   Legislature   of   any   State   also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in   the   Seventh   Schedule   (in   this Constitution   referred   to   as   the “Concurrent List”). 72 (3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature   of   any   State   has   exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters   enumerated   in   List   II   in   the Seventh   Schedule   (in   this   Constitution referred to as the “State List”). (4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory   of   India   not   included   (in   a State) notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.” 75. Article   246   clause   (4)   expressly   provides   that Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter   for   any   part   of   the   territory   of   India   not included in a State; notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.  76. The Union Territories are part of the India which are not included in any State.   Thus, Parliament will have power to make laws for any matter with regard to Union   territories.   In     clause   (4)   of   Article   246   by Seventh Constitutional Amendment, in place of words “in 73 Part A or Part B of the First Schedule” the words “in State” have been substituted. Thus, overriding power of the Parliament was provided with regard to Part C and D States   on   enforcement   of   the   Constitution   which Constitutional Scheme is continued after amendment made by Seventh Constitutional Amendment. 77. The issue regarding constitutional scheme envisaged for   Delhi   consequent   to   insertion   of   Article   239AA   of Sixty Ninth Constitution Amendment came for consideration before a Nine Judge Bench of this Court in  NDMC Vs. State of Punjab (1997) 7 SCC 339.    The issue in the NDMC case was   whether   the   property   tax   levied   by   NDMC   On   the immovable properties of States situated within the Union Territory   of   Delhi   would   be   covered   by   the   exemption provided   in   Article   289   of   the   Constitution   of   India. Delhi   High   Court   had   been   pleased   to   hold   that   the exemption   under   Article   289   would   apply   and   the assessment and demand notices of NDMC were quashed.  The appeal came to be decided by a Nine Judge Bench of this Court.   74 78. The   majority   opinion   was   delivery   by   Justice   B.P. Jeevan Reddy.   The majority held that States and Union territories are different entities, which is clear from the scheme of Articles 245 and 246.  Following was laid down in Paragraphs 152, 155 and 160:­ ……………152.  On   a   consideration   of   rival contentions,   we   are   inclined   to   agree with   the   respondents­States.   The   States put together do not exhaust the territory of India. There are certain territories which do not form part of any State and yet   are   the   territories   of   the   Union. That the States and the Union Territories are different entities, is evident from clause (2) of Article 1 — indeed from the entire   scheme   of   the   Constitution. Article 245(1) says that while Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of   the   territory   of   India,   the legislature of a State may make laws for the   whole   or   any   part   of   the   State. Article   1(2)   read   with   Article   245(1) shows   that   so   far   as   the   Union Territories are concerned, the only law­ making   body   is   Parliament.   The legislature  of   a   State   cannot   make   any law for a Union Territory; it can make laws   only   for   that   State.   Clauses   (1), (2)   and   (3)   of   Article   246   speak   of division   of   legislative   powers   between Parliament   and   State   legislatures.   This division is only between Parliament and the State legislatures, i.e., between the Union   and   the   States.   There   is   no division   of   legislative   powers   between the   Union   and   Union   Territories. 75 Similarly, there is no division of powers between States and Union Territories. So far   as   the   Union   Territories   are concerned,   it   is   clause  (4)  of   Article 246   that   is   relevant.   It   says   that Parliament   has   the   power   to   make   laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. Now, the Union Territory is not included in   the   territory   of   any   State.   If   so, Parliament   is   the   only   law­making   body available for such Union Territories.  It is equally relevant to mention that the Constitution, as originally enacted, did not provide for a legislature for any of the Part ‘C’ States (or, for that matter, Part ‘D’ States). It is only by virtue of the  Government   of   Part   ‘C’   States   Act, 1951 that some Part ‘C’ States including Delhi got a legislature. This was put an end to by the States Reorganisation Act, 1956.   In   1962,   the   Constitution Fourteenth   (Amendment)   Act   did   provide for creation/constitution of legislatures for   Union   Territories   (excluding,   of course,   Delhi)   but   even   here   the Constitution did not itself provide for legislatures for those Part ‘C’ States; it merely empowered Parliament to provide for the same by making a law.  In the year 1991, the Constitution did provide for a legislature   for   the   Union   Territory   of Delhi   [National   Capital   Territory   of Delhi] by the Sixty­Ninth (Amendment) Act (Article   239­AA)   but   even   here   the legislature  so   created   was   not   a   full­ fledged legislature nor did it have the effect of — assuming that it could — lift the National Capital Territory of Delhi from   Union   Territory   category   to   the 76 category of States within the meaning of Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution. All this necessarily means that so far as the   Union   Territories   are   concerned, there is no such thing as List I, List II or List III. The only legislative body is Parliament   —   or   a   legislative   body created  by   it.   Parliament   can   make   any law in respect of the said territories — subject,   of   course,   to   constitutional   limitations   other than     those specified in Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution. Above all, the Union Territories are not “States” as contemplated by Chapter I of Part XI; they are the territories of the Union falling outside the territories of the States. Once the Union Territory is a part   of  the  Union   and   not   part   of   any State, it follows that any tax levied by its legislative body is Union taxation. Admittedly,   it   cannot   be   called   “State taxation” — and under the constitutional scheme,   there   is   no   third   kind   of taxation. Either it is Union taxation or State taxation ……………… ………………  155.  In   this   connection,   it   is necessary to remember that all the Union Territories are not situated alike. There are   certain   Union   Territories   (i.e., Andaman   and   Nicobar   Islands   and Chandigarh)   for   which   there   can   be   no legislature at all — as on today. There is a second category of Union Territories covered by Article 239­A (which applied to   Himachal   Pradesh,   Manipur,   Tripura, Goa, Daman and Diu and Pondicherry — now, of course, only Pondicherry survives in this category, the rest having acquired Statehood)   which   have   legislatures   by courtesy   of   Parliament.   Parliament   can, by   law,   provide   for   constitution   of 77 legislatures for these States and confer upon these legislatures such powers, as it may think appropriate. Parliament had created   legislatures   for   these   Union Territories under the “the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963”, empowering them to make laws with respect to matters in List II and List III, but subject to its overriding power. The third category is   Delhi.   It   had   no   legislature   with effect from 1­11­1956 until one has been created   under   and   by   virtue   of   the Constitution Sixty­Ninth (Amendment) Act, 1991 which introduced Article 239­AA. We have   already   dealt   with   the   special features of Article 239­AA and need not repeat it. Indeed, a reference to Article 239­B   read   with   clause   (8)   of   Article 239­AA shows how the Union Territory of Delhi   is   in   a   class   by   itself   but   is certainly not a State within the meaning of   Article   246   or   Part   VI   of   the Constitution.   In   sum,   it   is   also   a territory   governed   by   clause   (4)   of Article   246.   As   pointed   out   by   the learned   Attorney   General,   various   Union Territories   are   in   different   stages   of evolution.   Some   have   already   acquired Statehood and some may be on the way to it. The fact, however, remains that those surviving   as   Union   Territories   are governed   by   Article   246(4) notwithstanding the differences in their respective   set­ups   —   and   Delhi,   now called the “National Capital Territory of Delhi”, is yet a Union Territory ……………” ……………160.  It   is   then   argued   for   the appellants   that   if   the   above   view   is taken, it would lead to an inconsistency. The reasoning in this behalf runs thus: a law made by the legislature of a Union 78 Territory   levying   taxes   on   lands   and buildings would be “State taxation”, but if the same tax is levied by a law made by Parliament, it is being characterised as   “Union   taxation”;   this   is   indeed   a curious   and   inconsistent   position,   say the learned counsel for the appellants. In our opinion, however, the very premise upon   which   this   argument   is   urged   is incorrect.  A tax levied under a law made by   a   legislature   of   a   Union   Territory cannot be called “State taxation” for the simple reason that Union Territory is not a “State” within the meaning of Article 246   (or   for   that   matter,   Chapter   I   of Part XI) or Part VI or Articles 285 to 289 ……………”   79. After examining the Constitutional Scheme delineated by   Article   239AA,   another   constitutional   principle   had been   laid   down   by   the   Constitution   Bench   that   Union territories   are   governed   by   Article   246(4) notwithstanding their differences in respective set­ups and Delhi, now called the “National Capital Territory of Delhi” is yet a Union Territory.  The Constitution Bench had also recognised that the Union territory of Delhi is in a class by itself, certainly not a State.  Legislative power   of   the   Parliament   was   held   to   cover   Union Territories including Delhi. 79 80. The   above   clearly   indicates   that   Parliament   has power to make laws for NCTD with respect to any of the matter enumerated in State List or Concurrent List. The Legislative Assembly of NCT has legislative power    with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List   or   in   the   Concurrent   List   excluding   the   excepted entries of State List.  B. EXECUTIVE   POWERS   OF   THE   UNION(PRESIDENT   /LG)   AND     THAT OF    THE GNCTD 81. Although   there   is   no   express   provision   in   the Constitutional Scheme conferring executive power to LG of the Union territory of Delhi, as has been conferred on the Union under Article 73 and conferred on the State under   Article   154.     Under   the   Constitutional   Scheme executive   power   is   co­extensive   with   the   Legislative power. The Executive power is given to give effect to Legislative   enactments.   Policy   of   legislation   can   be given   effect   to   only   by   executive   machinery.     The executive   power   has   to   be   conceded   to   fulfill   the constitutionally conferred democratic mandate. Clause (4) 80 of   Article   239AA   deals   with   the   exercise   of   executive power by the Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head to aid and advice the LG in exercise of the above functions. The submission of the respondent is that executive power in relation to all matters contained in List II and List III is vested in the President.  82. The Union and States can exercise Executive power on the subjects on which they have power to legislate.  This Court in  Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur and Others Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549   while considering the extent of the Executive power in Paragraph 7 held following:­ “ 7.   Article 73 of the Constitution relates to the executive powers of the Union, while the corresponding provision in regard to the executive powers of a State is contained in Article  162.   The  provisions  of   these   arti­ cles   are   analogous   to   those   of   Sections   8 and 49(2) respectively of the Government of India   Act,   1935   and   lay   down   the   rule   of distribution of executive powers between the Union   and   the   States,   following,   the   same analogy as is provided in regard to the dis­ tribution   of   legislative   powers   between them.   Article   162,   with   which   we   are   di­ rectly concerned in this case, lays down: “Subject to the provisions of this Con­ stitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect 81 to which the legislature of the State has power to make laws: Provided that in any matter with respect to which the legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive   power   of   the   State   shall   be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Consti­ tution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof.” Thus under this article the executive au­ thority of the State is exclusive in respect to matters enumerated in List II of Seventh Schedule. The authority also extends to the Concurrent   List   except   as   provided   in   the Constitution itself or in any law passed by Parliament.   Similarly,   Article   73   provides that the executive powers of the Union shall extend to matters with respect to which Par­ liament has power to make laws and to the exercise  of  such  rights,   authority   and  ju­ risdiction as are exercisable by the Govern­ ment of India by virtue of any treaty or any agreement.   The   proviso   engrafted   on   clause (1) further lays down that although with re­ gard to the matters in the Concurrent List the executive authority shall be ordinarily left to the State it would be open to Par­ liament to provide that in exceptional cases the executive power of the Union shall ex­ tend to these matters also. Neither of these articles contain any definition as to what the  executive  function   is  and  what  activi­ ties   would   legitimately   come   within   its scope. They are concerned primarily with the distribution of the executive power between the Union on the one hand and the States on the other. They do not mean, as Mr Pathak seems to suggest, that it is only when Par­ liament or the State Legislature has legis­ 82 lated on certain items appertaining to their respective   lists,   that   the   Union   or   the State   executive,   as   the   case   may   be,   can proceed to function in respect to them. On the other hand, the language of Article 172 clearly   indicates   that   the   powers   of   the State   executive   do   extend   to   matters   upon which the State Legislature is competent to legislate   and   are   not   confined   to   matters over  which  legislation   has  been  passed  al­ ready. The same principle underlies Article 73 of the Constitution. These provisions of the Constitution therefore do not lend any support to Mr Pathak’s contention.” 83. The Constitution Bench has also in above case laid down that in our Constitution; we have adopted the same system of Parliamentary democracy as in England.  In this regard, following was held in Para Nos. 13 and 14:­ “ 13.   The limits within which the executive Government   can   function   under   the   Indian Constitution can be ascertained without much difficulty by reference to the form of the executive which our Constitution has set up. Our   Constitution,   though   federal   in   its structure,   is  modelled   on  the  British  par­ liamentary   system   where   the   executive   is deemed   to   have   the   primary   responsibility for   the   formulation   of   governmental   policy and   its   transmission   into   law   though   the condition precedent to the exercise of this responsibility   is   its   retaining   the   confi­ dence   of   the   legislative   branch   of   the State. The executive function comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying   it   into   execution.   This   evidently includes the initiation of legislation, the maintenance  of  order,  the  promotion  of  so­ 83 cial and economic welfare, the direction of foreign policy, in fact the carrying on or supervision of the general administration of the State. 14.   In India, as in England, the executive has   to   act   subject   to   the   control   of   the legislature; but in what way is this control exercised by the legislature? Under Article 53(1)   of   our   Constitution,   the   executive power of the Union is vested in the Presi­ dent but under Article 75 there is to be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. The Presi­ dent has thus been made a formal or consti­ tutional head of the executive and the real executive powers are vested in the Ministers or the Cabinet. The same provisions obtain in regard to the Government of States; the Governor or the Rajpramukh, as the case may be, occupies the position of the head of the executive in the State but it is virtually the Council of Ministers in each State that carries on the executive Government. In the Indian Constitution, therefore, we have the same system of parliamentary executive as in England   and   the   Council   of   Ministers   con­ sisting, as it does, of the members of the legislature is, like the British Cabinet, “a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the legislative part of the State to the ex­ ecutive part”. The Cabinet enjoying, as it does, a majority in the legislature concen­ trates in itself the virtual control of both legislative and executive functions; and as the   Ministers   constituting   the   Cabinet   are presumably agreed on fundamentals and act on the principle of collective responsibility, the most important questions of policy are all formulated by them.” 84 84. The appellant relying on Article 73 of the Constitu­ tion had submitted that Article 73 lays down the princi­ ple   that   while   there   may   exist   under   the   Constitution concurrent   legislative   powers   on   two   different   federal units, there can never be any concurrent executive pow­ ers.   It was further submitted that the above principle equally applies to matters listed in List II and List III of the Constitution of India for NCTD.  Referring to the Article 239AA(3)(b), it is contended that the said provi­ sion confers power on Parliament to enact legislations in matters in both state list and concurrent lists.   Such power is also available under Article 246.   However, it does not follow from the above that the said provision also confers executive powers in relation to matters in the state list and concurrent list.   It is further sub­ mitted that Parliament may by law confer executive powers in   relation   to   matters   in   the   concurrent   list   on   the Union Government for States, it may also do so in rela­ tion to the NCTD. But, if such thing is not done, Union Government   will,   as   a   general   rule,   have   no   executive powers in respect of matters under List II (except the 85 excluded Entries) and it is the GNCTD, which shall enjoy exclusive executive powers.  We are of the view that the above interpretation as put up by the appellant on Con­ stitutional provisions cannot be accepted.  The principle is well established that Executive powers co­exist with the Legislative powers.  Reference to Article 73 has been made in this context, which need to be noted.  Article 73 provides as follows:­ “ 73.   (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution,   the   executive   power   of   the Union shall extend—  (a)   to   the   matters   with   respect   to   which Parliament has power to make laws; and  (b) to the exercise of such rights, author­ ity and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the   Government   of   India   by   virtue   of   any treaty or agreement:  Provided   that   the   executive   power   referred to in subclause (a) shall not, save as ex­ pressly provided in this Constitution or in any   law   made   by   Parliament,   extend   in   any State to matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has also power to make laws.  (2) Until otherwise provided by Parliament, a State and any officer or authority of a State may, notwithstanding anything in this article,   continue   to   exercise   in   matters with respect to which Parliament has power 86 to make laws for that State such executive power or functions as the State or officer or authority thereof could exercise immedi­ ately  before   the  commencement  of  this  Con­ stitution.” 85. The proviso to Article 73(1) provides that the execu­ tive power referred to in subclause (a) shall not, save as expressly provided in this Constitution or in any law made by Parliament, extend in any State  to matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has also power to make laws.  Obviously, the proviso refers to the Concurrent List where both Parliament and State has power to make laws.  Executive power in reference to Concurrent List has been deliberately excluded to avoid any dupli­ cacy in exercise of power by two authorities.  The Arti­ cle 73 as it stood prior to Constitution Seventh Amend­ ment Act, 1956 contained the expression after the word State “specified in Part A or Part B of the First Sched­ ule”.     Thus,   the   executive   power   was   excluded   of   the Union only with regard to Part A and Part B States alone. Thus, when the Constitution was enforced, executive power of Union in reference to Part C States was not excluded with regard to Concurrent List also.  Part C States hav­ 87 ing been substituted as now by Union Territories by Con­ stitution Seventh Amendment Act. the word “State” in Pro­ viso to Article 73 cannot be read to include Union Terri­ tory.   Reading the word Union Territory within the word “State” in proviso to Article 73(1) shall not be in ac­ cordance with Scheme of Part VIII (Union Territories) of the Constitution.  Union Territories are administered by the President.  Exercise of executive power of the Union through President is an accepted principle with regard to Union Territories.  The above interpretation is also re­ inforced due to another reason.   Under Article 239AA(4) proviso, the Lieutenant Governor, in case of difference of opinion, can make a reference to the President for de­ cision   and   has   to   act   according   to   the   decision   given thereon. The President, thus, with regard to a particular executive action, which has been referred, has exclusive jurisdiction to take a decision, which both Council of Ministers as well as Lieutenant Governor has to follow. The provision does not indicate that power of the Presi­ dent is confined only to executive actions which are men­ tioned in List II.  When the President as provided by the 88 Constitutional Scheme, is entitled to take executive de­ cision  on   any   matter  irrespective   of   the   fact   whether such executive decision taken by the Council of Ministers or Ministers related to matters covered by List II and List III, the executive power to Union through President cannot be confined to List II. Overriding power to the Union even on the executive matters has to be conceded to be   there   as   per   Constitutional   scheme.     It   is   another matter that for exercise of executive powers by the Union through President and by Council of Ministers, headed by Chief Minister of NCTD, the Constitution itself indicates a scheme which advances the constitutional objectives and provide   a   mechanism   for   exercise   of   executive   powers, which aspect shall be, however, further elaborated while considering   sub­clause(4)   of   Article   239AA.   Legislative power   of   the   Union   is   co­extensive   with   its   executive power in relation to NCT is further indicated by the pro­ visions of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991. The insertion of Article 239AA by the th Constitution 69  Amendment has been followed by enactment of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi 89 Act, 1991 which Act was enacted by the Parliament in ex­ ercise of power under Article 239AA(7)(a) of the  Consti­ tution. Section 49 of the Act, 1991 provides as follows: " 49.   Relation   of   Lieutenant   Governor   and his   Ministers   to   President.­   Notwithstand­ ing   anything   in   this   Act,   the   Lieutenant Governor and his Council of Ministers shall be under the general control of, and comply with such particular   directions, if  any, as may from time to time be given by the President.” 86. Legislative power of the Union is exercised by the President as per the constitutional scheme and Section 49 itself indicates that Parliament clearly envisaged Coun­ cil of Ministers and the Lieutenant Governor shall be un­ der the general control of, and comply with such particu­ lar directions issued by the President from time to time. The power of the President to issue direction is not lim­ ited in any manner so as to put any restriction on the executive power of the Union. 87. The President further is empowered under Section 44 of Act, 1991 to make rules for the allocation of business to the Ministers in so far as it is business with respect 90 to which the Lieutenant Governor is required to act on the aid and advice of his  Council of Ministers. As per Article   239AA   sub­clause   (4)   read   with   business   rules, the manner and procedure of conduct of business including executive functions of GNCTD has to be administered. Al­ though the Union ordinarily does not interfere with or meddle with the day to day functions of the GNCTD which is  in tune with the constitutional scheme as delineated by Article 239AA and to give meaning and purpose to the Cabinet form of Government brought in place in the Na­ tional Capital of Territory. But as the overriding leg­ islative power of the Parliament is conceded in the con­ stitutional scheme, overriding executive power has also to be conceded even though such power is not exercised by the Union in the day to day functioning of the GNCTD. We thus conclude that executive power of the Union is co­ex­ tensive on all subjects referable to List I and List II on which Council of Ministers and the NCTD has also exec­ utive powers.  88. Learned counsel for the appellants have also referred to Article 239AB.   One of the submissions raised by the 91 appellants is that the executive power  can be exercised by Union or the Lieutenant Governor only in the circum­ stances as mentioned in Article 239AB i.e. only when con­ stitutional machinery in National Capital Territory has failed and National Capital Territory is unable to carry out the administration in accordance with the provisions of Article 239AB.   Article 239AB was also added by Con­ stitution   Sixty   Ninth   Amendment   Act,   which   is   as   fol­ lows:­ " 239AB.   Provision   in   case   of   failure   of ­   If   the   President, constitutional   machinery. on   receipt   of   a   report   from   the   Lieutenant Governor or otherwise, is satisfied— (a) that a situation has arisen in which the administration   of   the   National   Capital Territory   cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of Article 239AA  or of any law made in pursuance of that article; or (b) that for the proper administration of the National Capital  Territory   it   is   necessary or expedient so to do, the President may by or­ der suspend the operation of any provision of Article 239AA or of all or any of the provi­ sions of any law made in pursuance of that ar­ ticle for such period and subject to such con­ ditions   as   may   be   specified   in   such   law   and make   such   incidental   and   consequential   provi­ sions as may appear to him to be necessary or expedient for administering the National Capi­ tal Territory in accordance with the provisions of Article 239 and Article 239AA. "        92 89. The provision of the Article 239AB is a special pro­ vision where President may suspend the provision of Arti­ cle 239AA or any of the provision of any law made in pur­ suance of that article.   The above provision is akin to Article 356, the subject of both the provisions, i.e., Article 239AB and Article 356 is same, i.e., “provision in   case   of   failure   of   constitutional   machinery”.     The power under Article 356/239AA is conferred on Union in larger interest of State.  The submission that executive power   can   be   exercised   by   the   Union   through   President only when power under Article 239AB is exercised, cannot be accepted.   The provision of Article 239AB is for en­ tirely different purpose, and is not a provision regard­ ing exercise of general executive power by the Union. Article 239AA(4) Proviso 90. The interpretation of the proviso to sub­clause(4) is the main   bane   of contention between the parties.   There are two broad aspects which need detailed consideration. The first issue is the concept of the words “aid and ad­ 93 vice” as contained in sub­clause (4) of Article 239AA. The appellants case is that the content and meaning of aid and advice is same as has been used in Article 74 and Article   163   of   the   Constitution.   Article   163   Sub­ clause(1) is extracted for ready reference:­ 163.Council of Ministers to aid and ad­ 1) vise   Governor:­    (     There   shall   be   a council of Ministers with the Chief Min­ ister as the head to aid and advise the Governor   in   the   exercise   of   his   func­ tions, except in so far as he is by or under this constitution required to exer­ cise his functions or any of them in his discretion. 91. The appellant’s have placed reliance on Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in  Shamsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another, (1974) 2 SCC 831.    The Constitu­ tion Bench of this Court in the above case had occasion to examine the phrase “aid and advice” as used in Article 163 of the Constitution.  This Court found that our Con­ stitution embodies generally the Parliamentary system of the Government of British model both for Union and the States.   Both President and Governor have to act on the basis of aid and advice received from the Council of the Ministers except when they have to exercise their func­ 94 tion in their discretion.  Paras 27, 28, 30, 32 and 33, which are relevant are quoted as follows:­ “ 27.  Our Constitution embodies generally the Parliamentary   or   Cabinet   system   of   Govern­ ment of the British model both for the Union and the States. Under this system the Presi­ dent is the constitutional or formal head of the   Union   and   he   exercises   his   powers   and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution   on   the   aid   and   advice   of   his Council of Ministers. Article 103 is an ex­ ception to the aid and advice of the Council of   Ministers   because   it   specifically   pro­ vides that the President acts only according to the opinion of the Election Commission. This   is   when   any   question   arises   as   to whether a Member of either House of Parlia­ ment has become subject to any of the dis­ qualifications   mentioned   in   clause   (1)   of Article 102. 28.   Under the Cabinet system of Government as embodied in our Constitution the Governor is the constitutional or formal head of the State   and   he   exercises   all   his   powers   and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution   on   the   aid   and   advice   of   his Council of Ministers save in spheres where the   Governor   is   required   by   or   under   the Constitution   to   exercise   his   functions   in his discretion. 30.   In all cases in which the President or the   Governor   exercises   his   functions   con­ ferred on him by or under the Constitution with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers   he   does   so   by   making   rules   for convenient   transaction   of   the   business   of the Government of India or the Government of 95 the   State   respectively   or   by   allocation among his Ministers of the said business, in accordance   with   Articles   77(3)   and   166(3) respectively.  Wherever  the   Constitution  re­ quires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for the exercise of any power or function by the President or the Gover­ nor, as the case may be, as for example in Articles 123, 213, 311(2) proviso (c), 317, 352(1),   356   and   360   the   satisfaction   re­ quired by the Constitution is not the per­ sonal   satisfaction   of   the   President   or   of the Governor but is the satisfaction of the President or of the Governor in the consti­ tutional sense under the Cabinet system of Government. The reasons are these. It is the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers on whose   aid   and   advice   the   President   or   the Governor generally exercises all his powers and functions. Neither Article 77(3) nor Ar­ ticle 166(3) provides for any delegation of power.   Both  Articles  77(3)  and   166(3)  pro­ vide that the President under Article 77(3) and the Governor under Article 166(3) shall make rules for the more convenient transac­ tion of the business of the Government and the allocation of business among the Minis­ ters   of   the   said   business.   The   Rules   of Business and the allocation among the Minis­ ters of the said business all indicate that the decision of any Minister or officer un­ der the Rules of Business made under these two articles viz. Article 77(3) in the case of the President and Article 166(3) in the case of the Governor of the State is the de­ cision of the President or the Governor re­ spectively. 32.  It is a fundamental principle of English Constitutional   law   that   Ministers   must   ac­ cept responsibility for every executive act. In England the Sovereign never acts on his 96 own responsibility. The power of the Sover­ eign   is   conditioned   by   the   practical   rule that   the   Crown   must   find   advisers   to   bear responsibility for his action. Those advis­ ers must have the confidence of the House of Commons. This rule of English Constitutional law is incorporated in our Constitution. The Indian   Constitution   envisages   a   Parliamen­ tary and responsible form of Government at the Centre and in the States and not a Pres­ idential form of Government. The powers of the Governor as the constitutional head are not different. 33.   This   Court   has   consistently   taken   the view   that   the   powers   of   the   President   and the   powers   of   the   Governor   are   similar   to the   powers   of   the   Crown   under   the   British Parliamentary system. (See Ram Jawaya Kapur v.   State   of   Punjab,   A.   Sanjeevi   Naidu   v. State   of   Madras4,   U.N.R.   Rao   v.   Indira Gandhi5).  In   Ram  Jawaya  Kapur  case  Mukher­ jea, C.J. speaking for the Court stated the legal position as follows. The Executive has the primary responsibility for the formula­ tion  of  governmental  policy  and  its  trans­ mission into law. The condition precedent to the exercise of this responsibility is that the Executive retains the confidence of the legislative branch of the State. The initia­ tion of legislation, the maintenance of or­ der,   the   promotion   of   social   and   economic welfare,   the   direction   of   foreign   policy, the  carrying   on  of  the   general  administra­ tion   of   the   State   are   all   executive   func­ tions.   The   Executive   is   to   act   subject   to the  control  of   the  Legislature.  The  execu­ tive   power   of   the   Union   is   vested   in   the President.   The   President   is   the   formal   or constitutional   head   of   the   Executive.   The real executive powers are vested in the Min­ isters of the Cabinet. There is a Council of 97 Ministers   with   the   Prime   Minister   as   the head to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions.” 92. It is well settled that the Governor is to act on aid and   advice   of   the   Council   of   Ministers   and   as   contem­ plated under Article 163, according to the Constitutional scheme, Governor is not free to disregard the aid and ad­ vice of the Council of Ministers except when he is re­ quired to exercise his function in his discretion.  There cannot be any dispute to the proposition as laid down by this Court in   and followed there­ Shamsher Singh (supra) after in number of cases. Whether the “aid and advice” as used in Article 239AA(4) has to be given the same meaning as   is   contained   in   Article   163   and   Article   74   is   the question to be answered.    The appellant’s case is that Constitution scheme as delineated in Article 239AA itself having   accepted   Westminster   model   of   Governing   system, “aid and advice” of the Council of Ministers is binding on the LG and he cannot act contrary to the aid and ad­ vice and is bound to follow the aid and advice.   It is submitted   that   any   other   interpretation   shall   run   con­ trary   to   the   very   concept   of   Parliamentary   democracy, 98 which is basic feature of the Constitution.  There could have   been   no   second   opinion   had   the   proviso   to   sub­ clause(4) of Article 239AA was not there.   The aid and advice as given by Council of Ministers as referred to in sub­clause(4) has to be followed by the Lieutenant Gover­ nor unless he decides to exercise his power given in pro­ viso of sub­clause(4) of Article 239AA.   The proviso is an exception to the power as given in sub­clause(4).   A case when falls within the proviso, the “aid and advice” of the Council of Ministers as contemplated under sub­ clause (4) is not to be adhered to and a reference can be made by Lieutenant Governor.  This is an express Consti­ tution   scheme,   which   is   delineated   by   sub­clause(4)   of Article 239AA proviso.   It is relevant to note that the scheme   which   is   reflected   by   sub­clause(4)   of   Article 239AA proviso is the same scheme which is contained under Section 44 of the Government of Union Territories Act, 1963.  Section 44 of the Act is quoted below:­ “There   shall   be   a   Council   of   Ministers   in each Union Territory with the Chief Minister at   the   head   to   aid   and   advise   the Administrator   in   the   exercise   of   his functions   in   relation   to   matters   with respect to which the Legislative Assembly of 99 the Union Territory has power to make laws except   in   so   far   as   he   is   required   by   or under this Act to act in his discretion or by or under any law to exercise any judicial or quasi­judicial functions.  Provided   that   in   case   of   difference   of opinion   between   the   Administrator   and   his Ministers   on   any   matter,   the   Administrator shall refer it to the President for decision and   act   according   to   the   decision   given thereon by the President, and pending such decision,   it   shall   be   competent   for   the Administrator in any case where the matter in   his   opinion   is   so   urgent   that   it   is necessary for him to take immediate action, to   take   such   action   or   to   give   such direction   in   the   matter   as   it   deems necessary”.   93. Thus, with regard to Union Territories, the exception as carved out in proviso was very much there since be­ fore.  Thus, the scheme as contained in proviso was well known   scheme   applicable   in   the   Union   Territories.   When there   is   an   express   exception   when   the   aid   and   advice given by the Council of Ministers is not binding on the Lieutenant Governor and he can refer it to the President and pending such decision in case of urgency take his own decision, we are not persuaded to accept that aid and ad­ vice is binding on the Governor under Article 163.   The Legislative Assembly of the NCTD being representing the 100 views of elected members their opinion and decision has to be respected and in all cases, except where Lieutenant Governor decides to make a reference.    94. Another issue which needs consideration is the mean­ ing of the word “any matter” as occurring in first sen­ tence   of   the   proviso   to   sub­clause(4).     Another   issue which needs to be considered in this context is as to whether the operation of the proviso to sub­clause(4) is confined to only few categories of cases as contended by appellant or the proviso can be relied by Lieutenant Gov­ ernor in all executive decisions taken by Council of Min­ isters.  According to appellants, the proviso operates in the following areas, when the decision of the Council of Ministers of the NCTD:­   a. is outside the bounds of executive power under Article 239AA(4); b. impedes or prejudices the lawful exercise of the executive power of the Union; c. is contrary to the laws of the Parliament; d. falls within Rule 23 matters such as ­ 101 i. matters which  affect  the  peace  and  tranquil­ lity of the Capital; ii. interests of any minority community; iii. relationship with the higher judiciary; iv. any other matters of administrative importance which  the  Chief Minister  may  consider  neces­ sary. 95. Thus, appellants contended that apart from above cat­ egories   mentioned   above,   proviso   has   no   application   in any other matter.  We are not able to read any such re­ striction in the proviso as contended by the appellants. The   proviso   uses   the   phrase   “any   matter”   in   the   first sentence, i.e., “provided that in the case of difference of opinion between the Lieutenant Governor and his Minis­ ters on any matter……….”  The word “any matter” are words of wide import and the language of Article 239AA(4) does not admit any kind of restriction in operation of pro­ viso.   There is nothing in the provision of sub­clause (4) to read any restriction or limitation on the phrase “any matter” occurring in proviso.  The word “any matter” 102 has also been used in Article 239AA(3) while providing for power to make laws.  Sub­clause(3)(a) reads “subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislative Assembly shall have power to make laws for the whole or any part of the National Capital Territory with respect to any of the matters stated in the State List or in the Concurrent List in so far as any such matter is applica­ ble   to   Union   Territories……………”.   Further,   sub­clause(b) provides   “Nothing   in   sub­clause(a)   shall   derogate   from the powers of Parliament under the Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union Territory or any part thereof”.  The use of word “any matter” in above two clauses clearly indicate that it is not used in any limited or restricted manner rather use of word “any mat­ ter” is used referring to the entire extent of legisla­ tion.  When the same phrase has been used in proviso to sub­clause(4), we are of the view that similar interpre­ tation has to be given to the same word used in earlier part of the same Article.    103 96. In this context, we refer to  Tej Kiran Jain and Oth­ ers Vs. N. Sanjiva Reddy and Others, (1970) 2 SCC 272 . In the above case, this Court had occasion to consider the word “any thing” as used in Article 105(2) of the Constitution of India.   This Court stated following in Paragraph 8:­ “8.   In our judgment it is not possible to read   the   provisions   of   the   article   in   the way   suggested.   The   article   means   what   it says in language which could not be plainer. The article confers immunity inter alia in respect   of   “anything   said   ...   in   Parlia­ ment”. The word “anything” is of the widest import   and   is   equivalent   to   “everything”. The   only   limitation   arises   from   the   words “in Parliament” which means during the sit­ ting of Parliament and in the course of the business   of   Parliament.   We   are   concerned only with speeches in Lok Sabha. Once it was proved that Parliament was sitting and its business was being transacted, anything said during the course of that business was im­ mune from proceedings in any Court this im­ munity   is   not   only   complete   but   is   as   it should be……………………….”  97. From the above discussions, it is thus clear that aid and advice of the Council of Ministers is binding on the Lieutenant   Governor   except   when   he   decides   to   exercise his power given in proviso of sub­clause(4) of Article 239AA. In the matters, where power under Proviso has not 104 been exercised, aid and advice of the Council of Minis­ ters is binding on the Lieutenant Governor.   We are of the view that proviso to sub­clause(4) of Article 239AA cannot be given any other interpretation relying on any principle   of   Parliamentary   democracy   or   any   system   of Government or any principle of Constitutional silence or implications.    98. The submission of the appellants that proviso to sub­ clause(4) of Article 239AA envisages an extreme and un­ usual situation and is not meant to be a norm, is sub­ stantially correct. The exercise of power under Proviso cannot be a routine affair and it is only in cases where Lieutenant Governor on due consideration of a particular decision of the Council of Ministers/Ministers, decides to make a reference so that the decision be not imple­ mented.  The overall exercise of administration of Union Territory is conferred on President, which is clear from the provisions contained in Part VIII of the Constitu­ tion.   Although, it was contended by the appellant that Article 239 is not applicable with regard to NCTD after Article   239AA   has   been   inserted   in   the   Constitution. 105 The above submission cannot be accepted on account   of the express provisions which are mentioned under Article 239AA   and   Article   239AB   itself.     Article   239AA   sub­ clause(1)   itself   contemplates   that   administrator   ap­ pointed   under   Article   239   shall   be   designated   as   the Lieutenant   Governor.     Thus   the   administrator   appointed under Article 239 is designated as LG.  Article 239AB is also applicable to NCTD.  Article 239AB in turn refers to Article 239. The provisions contained in Part VIII of the Constitution   have   to   be   looked   into   in   its   entirety. Thus, all the provisions of Part VIII has to be cumula­ tively read while finding out the intention of the Con­ stitution makers, which makes it clear that Article 239 is also applicable to the NCTD.              Whether concurrence of Lieutenant Governor is required on executive decision of GNCTD. 99.   The constitutional provision of Article 239AA does not indicate that the executive decisions of GNCTD have to be taken with the concurrence of LG. The constitutional th provisions inserted by 69  Constitution Amendment are with the object to ensure stability and permanence by providing 106 Legislative   Assembly   and   Council   of   Ministers   by   the constitutional provisions itself. With regard to executive decision  taken  by  the  Council  of  Ministers/Ministers  of GNCTD proviso gives adequate safeguard empowering the LG to make a reference to the President in the event there is difference of opinion between executive decisions of the GNCTD and the LG, but the scheme does not suggest that the decisions   by   Council   of   Ministers/Ministers   have   to   be taken with the concurrence of the LG. The above conclusion is re­enforced by looking into the 1991 Act as well as Rules  framed   by  the  President  under  Section  44  of  1991 Act, namely, the Transaction of Business of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Rules, 1993. The provisions of 1991 Act although provide for communication of   proposal,   agenda   and   decisions   of   the   Council   of Ministers/Ministers to LG but there is no indication in any   of   the   provisions   that   the   concurrence   of   LG   is required with regard to the aforesaid decisions.   100.   Earlier   enactments   governing   the   Delhi administration did provide the word concurrence of LG for 107 implementing decisions taken by GNCTD but the said scheme having been given a go­bye in the 1991 Act, there is no requirement   of   any   concurrence   of   LG   to   the   executive decisions taken by the GNCTD. Communication to the LG, its purpose and object 101.  The scheme of 1991 Act clearly delineates that LG has   to   be   informed   of   all   proposals,   agendas   and decisions   taken   by   the   Council   of   Minister/Ministers. Section 44 deals with the conduct of business which is to the following effect:

108

102.   Under   Section   45,   Chief   Minister   is   to   furnish information to the LG about all decisions of the Council of   Ministers   relating   to   the   administration   of   the affairs of the Capital and the proposals for legislation and to furnish such information as may be called for by the LG. Section 45 is as follows:

109

103. Rules have been framed under Section 44 of 1991 Act, namely, 1993 Rules, which throw considerable light over the actual functioning of GNCTD and LG. Rule 9 sub­rule (2)   provides   that   if   it   is   decided   to   circulate   any proposal,   the   Department   to   which   it   belongs,   shall prepare a memorandum setting out in brief the facts of the   proposal,   the   points   for   decision   and   the recommendations of the Minister in charge and when the same   is   circulated   to   the   Ministers,   simultaneously   a copy   thereof   is   to   be   sent   to   the   LG.   Rule   10   is   as follows: “ 10.  (1) While directing that a proposal shall be circulated, the Chief Minister may also   direct,   if   the   matter   be   of   urgent 110 nature, that the Ministers shall communicate their opinion to the Secretary to the Council by   a   particular   date,   which   shall   be specified   in   the   memorandum   referred   to   in rule 9.   (2) If any Minister fails to communicate his opinion to the Secretary to the Council by the date so specified in the memorandum, it shall be assumed that he has accepted the recommendations contained therein.  (3)   If   the   Minister   has   accepted   the recommendations   contained   in   the   memorandum or   the   date   by   which   he   was   required   to communicate   his   opinion   has   expired,   the Secretary   to   the   Council   shall   submit   the proposal to the Chief Minister. (4)   If   the   Chief   Minister   accepts   the recommendations and if he has no observation to   make,   he   shall   return   the   proposal   with his   orders   thereon   to   the   Secretary   to   the Council. (5)   On   receipt   of   the   proposal,   the Secretary   to   the   Council   shall   communicate the decision to the Lieutenant Governor and pass   on   the   proposal   to   the   Secretary concerned who shall thereafter take necessary steps to issue the orders unless a reference to   the   Central   Government   is   required   in pursuance of the provisions of Chapter V.” 104.   The   above   provision   also   indicates   that   after proposal   is   accepted   by   the   Chief   Minister,   the   same shall   be   communicated   to   the   LG   and   only   thereafter 111 necessary   step   to   issue   the   orders   is   to   be   taken provided no reference is made to the Central Government by the LG under Chapter V of the Rules. 105. Rule 13 sub­rule (3) provides that an agenda showing the proposals to be discussed in a meeting of the Council has been approved by the Chief Minister shall be sent to the LG. The agenda approved by the Chief Minister shall be sent by the Secretary to the Council, to the LG. Rule 13 sub­rule (3) is as follows: “ Rule   13(3)   After   an   agenda   showing   the proposals to be discussed in a meeting of the Council   has   been   approved   by   the   Chief Minister,   copies   thereof,   together   with copies   of   such   memoranda   as   have   not   been circulated   under   rule   11,   shall   be   sent   by the   Secretary   to   the   Council,   to   the Lieutenant   Governor,   the   Chief   Minister   and other Ministers, so as to reach them at least two days before the date of 7 such meeting. The Chief Minister may, in case of urgency, curtail the said period of two days.” 106. Rule 14 again provides that decisions taken by the Council on each proposal shall be communicated to the LG. Standing orders issued by the Minister­in­charge for the disposal of proposals or matters in his Department are 112 also required to be communicated to LG, as required by Rules 15 and 16. 107.   Rule 19 sub­rule (5) empowers the LG to call for papers   relating   to   any   proposal   or   matter   in   any Department and such requisition shall be complied with by the Secretary to the Department concerned.  108. Rule 23 enumerates certain matters which are to be submitted to LG before issuing any orders thereon. Rule 23 is as follows: “23.   The   following   classes   of   proposals   or matters shall essentially be submitted to the Lieutenant   Governor   through   the   Chief Secretary   and   the   Chief   Minister   before issuing any orders thereon, namely:  (i) matters which affect or are likely to affect   the   peace   and   tranquility   of   the capital; (ii) matters which affect or are likely to   affect   the   interest   of   any   minority community,   Scheduled   Castes   and   backward classes; (iii) matters which affect the relations of the Government with any State Government, the Supreme Court of India or the High Court of Delhi; 113 (iv) proposals or matters required to be referred to the Central Government under the Act or under Chapter V; (v) matters pertaining to the Lieutenant Governor's   Secretariat   and   personnel establishment   and   other   matters   relating   to his office; (va) matters on which Lieutenant Governor is required to make order under any law or instrument in force;  (vi)   petitions   for   mercy   from   persons under sentence for death and other important cases   in   which   it   is   proposed   to   recommend any revision of a judicial sentence; (vii)   matters   relating   to   summoning, prorogation   and   dissolution   of   the Legislative   Assembly,   removal   of disqualification   of   voters   at   elections   to the   Legislative   Assembly,   Local   Self Government   Institutions   and   other   matters connected with those; and (viii) any other proposals or matters of administrative   importance   which   the   Chief Minister may consider necessary. 109.  Under Rule 24, the LG is empowered to require any order   passed   by   the   Minister­in­charge   to   be   placed before the Council for consideration.  110.   Rule 25 obliges the Chief Minister to furnish to the LG such information relating to the administration of 114 the Capital and proposals for legislation as the LG may call for.  111.     Rule   49   deals   with   the   difference   of   opinion between   the   LG   and   Minister   in   regard   to   any   matter, whereas Rule 50 deals with difference of opinion between the LG and the Council with regard to any matter. Rules 49 and 50 are as follows: “49.  In case of difference of opinion between   the   Lieutenant   Governor   and   a Minister   in   regard   to   any   matter,   the Lieutenant   Governor   shall   endeavour   by discussion on the matter to settle any point on   which   such   difference   of   opinion   has arisen.   Should   the   difference   of   opinion persist,   the   Lieutenant   Governor   may   direct that the matter be referred to the Council 50.  In   case   of   difference   of   opinion between   the   Lieutenant   Governor   and   the Council   with   regard   to   any   matter,   the Lieutenant   Governor   shall   refer   it   to   the Central   Government   for   the   decision   of   the President   and   shall   act   according   to   the decision of the President.” 112.   Rule   49   enable   and   oblige   the   LG   to   discuss   the matter when there is some difference with decision of a Minister.   The discussion to sort out difference and to arrive   at   an   acceptable   course   of   action   is   always welcome and is a measure employed in all organisational 115 functioning.   113.  The scheme as delineated by 1991 Act and Rules 1993 clearly indicates that LG has to be kept informed of all proposals, agendas of meeting and decisions taken. The purpose of communication of all decisions is to keep him posted   with   the   administration   of   Delhi.   The communication of all decisions is necessary to enable him to go through the proposals and decisions so as to enable him to exercise powers as conceded to him under 1991 Act and Rules 1993. Further, the power given under proviso to 239AA(4) can be exercised only when LG is informed and communicated   of   all   decisions   taken   by   GNCTD.   The communication of all decisions is necessary to enable the LG   to   perform   duties   and   obligations   to   oversee   the administration   of   GNCTD   and   where   he   is   of   different opinion   he   can   make   a   reference   to   the   President.   As observed   above   the   purpose   of   communication   is   not   to obtain his concurrence of the decision but purpose is to post him with the administration so as to enable him to exercise   his   powers   conceded   to   him   under   proviso   to 116 Article 239AA sub­clause (4). We have already observed that the powers given in proviso to sub­clause (4) is not to be exercised in a routine manner rather it is to be exercised by the LG on appropriate reasons to safeguard the interest of the Union Territory.  114. Learned Additional Solicitor General has submitted before us that in the last few years there have been very few   references   by   the   LG   in   exercise   of   powers   under proviso to sub­clause (4) of Article 239AA. Rule 14 sub­ rule (2) of 1993 Rules empowers the Minister concerned to take necessary action to give effect to the decision of the Council after decision has been communicated to the LG. The purpose of communication is to enable the LG to discharge   obligation   to   oversee   and   scrutinise   the decision. Although, there is no indication in the 1993 Rules as to after communication of the decisions of the Council   as   to   what   stage   the   decisions   are   to   be implemented. As observed no concurrence is required on the decisions and communication is only for the purpose of enabling the LG to formulate opinion as to whether 117 there is any such difference which may require reference. Only   a   reasonable   time   gap   is   to   elapse,   which   is sufficient to the LG to scrutinise the decision. It is for the LG and the Council of Ministers to formulate an appropriate   procedure   for   smooth   running   of   the administration   decisions   which   can   very   well   be implemented by the GNCTD immediately after the decisions are communicated to LG and are “seen” by the LG. When LG has   seen   a   decision   and   does   not   decide   to   make   a reference,   the   decision   has   to   be   implemented   by   all means. We are, thus, of the view that the 1991 Act and 1993 Rules cover the entire gamut, manner and procedure of   executive   decisions   taken   by   the   Council   of Ministers/Minister   their   communication,   and implementation and the entire administration is to be run accordingly.  115. The 1993 Rules provide that Chief Secretary and the Secretary   of   the   Department   concerned   are   severally responsible for the careful observance of these Rules and when either of them considers that there has been any 118 material departure, he shall bring it to the notice of the Minister­in­charge, Chief Minister and the LG. Rule 57 is as follows: “ 57.   The   Chief   Secretary   and   the Secretary   of   the   Department   concerned   are severally   responsible   for   the   careful observance of these rules and when either of them   considers   that   there   has   been   any   20 material departure from these rules, he shall personally   bring   it   to   the   notice   of     the Minister­in­charge,   Chief   Minister   and   the Lieutenant Governor.” 116.   The   duty   of   observance   of   1993   Rules   and   other statutory provisions lay both on Council of Ministers, Chief Minister and LG. All have to act in a manner so that the administration may run smoothly without there being   any   bottleneck.   The   object   and   purpose   of   all constitutional   provisions,   Parliamentary   enactments   and the   Rules   framed   by   the   President   is   to   carry   the administration in accordance with the provisions in the interest of public in general so that rights guaranteed by   the   Constitution   to   each   and   every   person   are realised.  When the duty is entrusted on persons holding high   office,   it   is   expected   that   they   shall   conduct themselves,   in   faithful,   discharge   of   their   duties   to 119 ensure smooth running of administration and protection of rights of all concerned.  117. I have perused the elaborate opinion of My Lord, the Chief   Justice   with   which   I   substantially   agree,   but looking to the importance of the issues, I have penned my own views giving reasons for my conclusions.  118.   I have also gone through the well researched and well   considered   opinion   of   Brother   Justice   D.Y. Chandrachud.   The   view   expressed   by   Justice   Chandrachud are substantially the same as have been expressed by me in this judgment.  119.   In view of the foregoing discussions we arrive on the   following   conclusions   on   the   issues   which   have arisen before us:  CONCLUSIONS I. The   interpretation   of   the   Constitution   has   to   be purposive taking into consideration the need of time and Constitutional principles. The intent of the Constitution 120 framers,   the   object   and   reasons   of   a   Constitutional Amendment   always   throw   light   on   the   Constitutional provisions. For adopting the purposive interpretation of a   particular   provision   the   express   language   employed cannot be given a complete go­bye. II. The Parliament has power to make laws for NCTD in respect of any of the matters enumerated in State List and Concurrent List. The Legislative Assembly of NCTD has also legislative power with respect to matters enumerated in the State List (except excepted entries) and in the Concurrent List. III. Executive power is co­extensive with the legislative power.   Legislative   power   is   given   to   give   effect   to legislative enactments. The Policy of legislation can be given effect to only by executive machinery. IV. When the Constitution was enforced, executive power of Union in reference to Part C States with regard to Concurrent List was not excluded. Part C States having th been  substituted  by 7   Constitution  Amendment as  Union 121 Territories. The word 'State' as occurring in proviso to th Article 73 after 7  Constitution Amendment cannot be read as   including   Union   Territory.   Reading   the   word   'Union Territory' within the word 'State' in proviso to Article 73 shall not be in consonance with scheme of Part VIII (Union Territories) of the Constitution. V. Executive power of the Union is co­extensive on all subjects   referable   to   List   II   and   III   on   which Legislative Assembly of NCTD has also legislative powers. VI. The “aid and advice” given by Council of Ministers as   referred   to   in   sub­clause   (4)   of   Article   239AA   is binding   on     the   LG   unless   he   decides   to   exercise   his power   given   in   proviso   to   sub­clause   (4)   of   Article 239AA. VII. The Legislative Assembly of NCTD being representing the views of elected representatives, their opinion and decisions have to be respected in all cases except where LG decides to make a reference to the President. 122 VIII.  The power given in proviso to sub­clause (4) to LG is not to be exercised in a routine manner rather it is to   be   exercised   by   the   LG   on   valid   reasons   after   due consideration, when it becomes necessary to safeguard the interest of the Union Territory. IX. For the Executive decisions taken by the Council of Ministers/Ministers of GNCTD, proviso to sub­clause (4) gives   adequate   safeguard   empowering   the   LG   to   make   a reference   to   the   President   in   the   event   there   is difference of opinion between decisions of the Ministers and   the   LG,   but   the   Constitutional   Scheme   does   not suggest   that   the   decisions   by   the   Council   of Ministers/Ministers require any concurrence of the LG. X. The scheme as delineated by 1991 Act and 1993 Rules clearly indicates that LG has to be kept informed of all proposals,   agendas   and   decisions   taken.   The   purpose   of communication of all decisions is to keep him posted with the   administration   of   Delhi.   The   communication   of   all decisions is necessary to enable him to go through so as 123 to enable him to exercise the powers as conceded to him under proviso to sub­clause (4) as well as under 1991 Act and 1993 Rules. The purpose of communication is not to obtain concurrence of LG. XI. From   persons   holding   high   office,   it   is   expected that they shall conduct themselves in faithful discharge of   their   duties   so   as   to   ensure   smooth   running   of administration so that rights of all can be protected. 120.  We having answered the constitutional issues raised before us in the above manner let these matters be now placed   before   the   appropriate   Bench   for   hearing   after obtaining orders from Hon'ble the Chief Justice. ..........................J. NEW DELHI,     ( ASHOK BHUSHAN ) JULY 04, 2018.