Preetha Krishnan vs. The United India Insurance Co.Ltd.

2025 INSC 1293
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.9753-56 /2025)

PREETHA KRISHNAN & ORS. … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE UNITED INDIA INSURANCE
CO. LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)



J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.

Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NAVEEN D
Date: 2025.11.07
17:05:03 IST
Reason:

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Leave granted.

2. These appeals are directed against the judgment and order
th
dated 28 June 2024, passed in MACA No.210 and 1219 of 2015;
and Judgment and order dated 27.11.24 in R.P.Nos.1165 and
1187 of 2024 by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, which,
nd
in turn, were preferred against the order dated 2 April 2014 in
O.P. (M.V.) No.1105/2012, passed by the Motor Accidents
1
Claims Tribunal, Pala .

rd
3. The brief facts giving rise to these appeals are that on 3
August 2012, the deceased, namely, T.I. Krishnan, aged 51 years,
was driving his car, bearing registration No.KL-5/M-1062
through the Pala-Thodupuzha Road. A bus bearing registration
No.KL-38/B-1833, driven in a rash and negligent manner,
collided with the car of the deceased. As a result of the incident,
the deceased sustained severe injuries and died on his way to the
hospital.



4. A claim petition was filed on behalf of the claimant-
appellants ( the wife and children of the deceased ) under Section
th
166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, before the Tribunal, on 11
December 2012 seeking compensation to the tune of
Rs.60,00,000/-, stating therein that the deceased used to earn

1
Hereinafter referred as ‘Tribunal’
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Rs.47,860/- per month, by working as an Assistant Engineer in
the Public Works Department.

nd
5. The Tribunal vide its order dated 2 April 2014, awarded
an amount of Rs.44,04,912/- to the claimant-appellants along
with an interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing the
claim petition. The Tribunal, considering the evidence on record,
determined the income of the deceased to be Rs.45,408/- per
month ( post deduction of Rs.2,453/- per month payable as taxes ).
Since the deceased was aged 51 years, future prospects of 15%
th
was applied to his income. A deduction of 1/4 of the income
was made towards living expenses and a multiplier of 9
( considering the facts that one of the petitioners is a government
employee and other is a doctor ) was applied. Further, the
Tribunal awarded Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of consortium;
Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses; Rs.40,000/- for loss of
love and affection; and Rs.5000/- for loss of estate.


6. Aggrieved by the compensation awarded by the Tribunal,
the insurer as well as the claimant-appellants filed MACA Nos.
210 of 2015 and 1219 of 2015 respectively, before the High
Court.

7. The High Court, vide the impugned judgment, partly
allowed the appeals and reduced the compensation under the
head of loss of dependency from Rs.42,29,712/- to
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Rs.35,10,144/-, by applying a split multiplier considering the
post-retirement reduction in the income of the deceased, thereby
deducting the excess amount of Rs.7,19,568/-. The Court further
enhanced the compensation under the heads - loss of consortium
and loss of love and affection to Rs.1,60,000/-. The amount
awarded towards funeral expenses was reduced to Rs.15,000/-,
while the amount under the head loss of estate was enhanced to
Rs.15,000/-. The High Court also directed the Tribunal to
disburse the amount to claimant-appellants Nos.1 to 4
( Appellants in MACA No. 1219 of 2015 ) in the ratio of

70:10:10:10.
{{{{{
7.
8. Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the High
Court, the claimant-appellants filed RP No.1165 of 2024 arising
from MACA No.210 of 2015 and RP No.1187 of 2024 arising
from MACA No.1219 of 2015. The High Court, however,
rejected these applications for review, stating that if reasons are
recorded, split multiplier would be possible.


th
9. Dissatisfied with the judgment dated 28 June 2024 and
final orders passed in RP Nos.1165 of 2024 and 1187 of 2024 by
the High Court, the claimant-appellants are now before us.

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10. The point of challenge taken is that the High Court erred
in applying split multiplier without considering the possibility of
the deceased continuing to earn even after retirement. It is further
contended that the Courts failed to appreciate the educational
qualification and professional experience of the deceased, which
could have secured him a placement in the construction sector,
even after his retirement.


11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

12. The main grievance of the claimant-appellants is the
application of split multiplier by the High Court, causing a
significant reduction in the total compensation, as awarded by the
Tribunal, vis-à-vis , the High Court. We find force in this point of
challenge. The reasoning adopted by the High Court in applying
a split multiplier is that the deceased would have shortly
superannuated from service. Thereafter, there would have been a
50% (approx. reduction) in his monthly take-home pay.


13. We find that there are divergent views of the High Courts
regarding the use of split multiplier. Some judgments support its
application while others explicitly reject the same. Below is a
tabular representation, illustrative in nature, of certain judgments
accepting the use of split multiplier, while others passed by the
same Court rejecting it. The common factor to be noted, in all
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these judgments is that the person involved in the accident or the
person who passed away as a result of the accident, were
employed in jobs that had a definite retirement age.

SJ: Single Judge
DB: Division Bench

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14. As can be seen from the above table, there is diverging
opinion on the application of split multiplier. While certain High
Courts have differences intra-court, there also exists inter-court
difference. What is more concerning to us, is the former. Given
that there was no uniformity of opinion within a single Court, the
Tribunal below is left bereft of guidance leading to differences in
compensation awarded for no justifiable reason. This also creates
a concerning situation for judicial discipline. We have found
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instances where a division bench has applied the concept, but a
learned single Judge has refused to do so, subsequently. Further,
when there are differences of opinion in benches of equal
strength, it is incumbent upon the Court to seek to resolve by
referring the issue to a bench of larger composition.

15. There can be no gainsaying that the judgment of this Court
2
in Sarla Verma v. DTC represented the coming of a much more
structured, uniform method of calculation of compensation in
motor accident cases insofar as the multiplier to be applied is
concerned. In this judgment itself, it was observed that the
practice of applying multiplier which is equivalent to the number
of years the deceased or the injured person had left in service, is
the confusion that has to be avoided.
“41. ... Some tribunals, as in this case, apply the
multiplier of 22 by taking the balance years of service
with reference to the retiring age. It is necessary to avoid
this kind of inconsistency. We are concerned with cases
falling under Section 166 and not under Section 163-A
of the MV Act. In cases falling under Section 166 of the
MV Act, Davies method [Davies v. Powell Duffryn
Associated Collieries Ltd., 1942 AC 601 : (1942) 1 All
ER 657 (HL)] is applicable.

42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used
should be as mentioned in Column (4) of the table above
(prepared by applying Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2 SCC
176 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 335] , Trilok Chandra [(1996) 4
SCC 362] and Charlie [(2005) 10 SCC 720 : 2005 SCC
(Cri) 1657] ), which starts with an operative multiplier

2
(2009) 6 SCC 121
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of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years),
reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for
26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to
40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50
years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that
is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7
for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”

16. It has been held time and again by this Court that a split
multiplier is not to be adopted, as a matter of course, and is only
to be used in the exceptional circumstances, with such
circumstances being recorded. [See Sarla Verma and Ors. vs.
3
DTC and Ors . ] Reference may be made to N. Jayasree & Ors.
4
v. Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd. , this Court
held that the application of a split multiplier in a case involving
a 52-year-old Assistant Professor of Mathematics was not
justified. It was observed in reference to National Insurance Co.
5
Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi that the Rule of Thumb of adding 15% of
the salary as future prospects in cases where the deceased was
between the age of 50 and 60 was not to be deviated from.

17. Superannuation from service hardly qualifies as such an
exceptional circumstance, which would justify the use of split
multiplier. It is only a natural progression that a person who
enters service must also exit at some point in time. The same

3
(2009) 6 SCC 121
4
(2022) 14 SCC 712
5
(2017) 16 SCC 680
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cannot be taken as a negative circumstance against the deceased
person or a person injured severely, leading to incapacitation or
permanent disability. The position, in our considered view, is
evidently clear from what stood observed by this Court in
6
Sumathi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. , as under :

‘....it is clear that in normal course, the compensation is to
be calculated by applying the multiplier, as per the
2
judgment of this Court Sarla Verma . Split multiplier
cannot be applied unless specific reasons are recorded. The
finding of the High Court that the deceased was having
leftover service of only four years, cannot be construed as
a special reason, for applying the split multiplier for the
purpose of assessing the compensation. In normal course,
compensation is to be assessed by applying multiplier as
2
indicated by this Court in the judgment in Sarla Verma . As
no other special reason is recorded for applying the split
1
multiplier, judgment of the High Court is fit to be set aside
by restoring the award of the Tribunal.’

(Emphasis supplied)

18. The judgment referred to by the learned Single Judge in
the impugned judgment, i.e., K.R. Madhusudhan v.
7
Administrative Officer and Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy
8
& Ors. , in our considered view, does not support the use of a
split multiplier. In both these judgments, this Court has held that
there have to be cogent reasons recorded for its use. As already
observed above, retirement from service is not ‘ out of the

6
2021 SCC Online SC 3697
7
(2011) 4 SCC 689
8
(2013) 15 SCC 45
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ordinary ’, ‘ exceptional ’ and ‘ cogent ’ for the same to qualify. It
is also, a matter of considerable difficulty to conceive what such
cogent or exceptional circumstances may be. In any event, the
Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi (supra) had, in para 59.7
observed that the age of the deceased is the criterion to be utilized
for multiplier. It does not provide for any other possibilities.
This, in our considered view, does not even leave open the
possibility of employment of split multiplier, whatsoever. As
such, when dealing with a beneficial legislation which relies on
just compensation as its bedrock, it is most prudent to tread the
path of certainty, insofar as practicable. This is more so important
in the context of age which is the primary basis for computation
of compensation. In other words, split multiplier is a concept
foreign to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and is not to be used by
the Tribunal and/or Courts in calculation of the compensation.

19. Concluding the issue of income, we hold that the income
as on the date of death is to be taken to calculate the
compensation. We further notice that the High Court failed to
comply with the directives issued in Pranay Sethi (supra) i.e.,
granting 10% enhancement, every three years under the
conventional heads. In accordance with the above discussion, the
compensation now payable to the claimant-appellant is as under:


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CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION

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Thus, the difference in compensation is as under:

20. The Civil Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. The
nd
impugned Award dated 2 April 2014 passed in O.P.(MV) No.
1105 of 2012 by the Tribunal, as modified by the High Court of
th
Kerala, vide the impugned judgment dated 28 June 2024, passed
in MACA Nos.210 of 2015 and 1219 of 2015; and judgement and
order dated 27.11.24 in R.P.Nos.1165 and 1187 of 2024 shall
stand modified accordingly. Interest on the amount is to be paid
as awarded by the Tribunal. In the end, we may only record our
surprise regarding the approach adopted by the High Court
despite clear observations in Sumathi (supra).

21. The amount be directly remitted into the bank account of
the claimant-appellants as directed by the High Court. The
particulars of the bank accounts are to be immediately supplied
by the learned counsel for the appellant to the learned counsel for
th
the respondent. The amount be remitted positively before 30
November, 2025.


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22. We clarify that the directions issued by this order shall
apply prospectively and the conclusions arrived at regarding the
split multiplier, shall not affect the judgments of the High Courts
noticed by us above. That was done only for the purpose of
demonstrating the difference of opinion prevalent on this issue as
also shedding light on the situation which comprises judicial
propriety. A copy of this order is directed to be circulated by the
Registrar (Judicial) of this Court to the learned Registrars
General of all the High Courts for necessary information and
compliance. It is requested that an e-copy of the order be also
circulated to the Tribunals forthwith.


23.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.




…………….......................………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)


…….......................………….……J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
New Delhi;
November 6, 2025
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