Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 6219-6220 of 2004
PETITIONER:
Kishori Lal & Anr.
RESPONDENT:
Madan Gopal (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/09/2004
BENCH:
P. VENKATARAMA REDDI & P.P. NAOLEKAR
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
@
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.14675-14676 OF 2002
P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.
Leave granted.
The appellants were the defendants in the two suits
filed by Madan Gopal, who is no more and is now
represented by his legal representatives who are
respondents herein. The first suit was filed to restrain the
first defendant (appellant herein) from making any
construction on the spot marked ’CB’ in the sketch annexed
to the plaint or in any other part of the land and also to
restore the original position of the land at point ’CB’ and to
restore the entry gate to the suit property. The second suit
was filed seeking permanent injunction restraining the
defendants from changing the nature of the suit land or
raising any construction or transferring the same to the
detriment of the plaintiff. The plaintiff also prayed for a
permanent injunction restraining defendants No.1 and 5
from installing and working the sawing machine at point ’A’
as shown in the sketch plan.
The original plaintiff’s father and defendants’ fathers
were brothers being the sons of one Kanshi Ram. The
plaintiffs claimed that Khasra Nos. 119 & 120 were Abadideh
inam land belonging to the said common ancestor and the
defendants have no exclusive rights over the said land. In
other words, the plaintiff claimed to be co-owner along with
the defendants 1 to 4. The plaintiff further claimed that
there was an entrance and passage at point ’CB’ (shown in
the plan attached to plaint) leading to K.No.119 and it has
been annexed by the defendant No.1 who was proposing to
raise shops thereon. The 5th defendant is a tenant of
defendant No.1 and he had installed a saw machine on the
portion of the land let out to him by 1st defendant.
Both the suits were tried together and they were
dismissed. On appeal filed by the plaintiffs, the first
appellate Court held that the suit property is the joint and
undivided property of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4 and
in the absence of proof of ouster, the defendants cannot
claim to be in exclusive possession and raise constructions
thereon. It was further held that a passage existed at point
’CB’ and the first defendant had no legal right to block or
raise any construction over the passage (leading to the land
in K.No. 119). It was also held that the Saw Machine was
installed by the 5th defendant without the consent of the co-
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sharers. The first appellate Court therefore restrained
construction at point marked ’CB’ or any other part of the
suit land and further directed defendant No.1 to restore the
entrance gate and passage to the suit land at point ’CB’. A
mandatory injunction was also granted directing defendant
No.5 to remove the structure raised and the Saw Machine
installed therein.
On second appeal, the High Court confirmed the
permanent injunction granted by the appellate Court
restraining from raising constructions over suit property. The
mandatory injunction directing the first defendant to restore
the entrance gate and passage at point ’CB’ was upheld.
However, the injunction directing the removal of structure
and the saw machine installed by the 5th defendant was set
aside. The second appeal was thus allowed partly.
We notice that the High Court did not frame substantial
question of law arising in the second appeal. However, the
High Court did consider the matter elaborately. We also
notice that the High Court did not consider the question
whether the suit property, not to speak of the passage at
’CB’, is the joint undivided property of the plaintiff and
defendants 1 to 4, as held by the first appellate Court or it is
the exclusive property of the appellants herein. Both
before the trial Court and the first appellate Court, there was
a debate and finding on the question whether the
appellants-defendants could get the exclusive right of
ownership by virtue of Section 11 of J&K Common Lands
(Regulation) Act, 1956.
It is the contention of the appellants that the land in
question being abadi land, held by them at the
commencement of the Act, had vested in them. This
contention, though upheld by the trial Court, was negatived
by the appellate Court on the ground that the appellants
could not establish that the suit land was ’under the house’
owned by them (defendants 1 to 4) or that they fell within
the category of non-proprietors/non-tenants. In the
memorandum of second appeal, the following question has
been raised.
"As to whether the provisions of Section
11 (wrongly mentioned as Section 17) of
the Common Land (Regulation) Act
could be claimed by a person who had
let out the land in question in abadi deh
for purposes of commercial use and
construction in particular and what is the
meaning of the word ’house’ as
appearing in the said Section?"
It is the contention of the learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants that the finding of the first
appellate Court in regard to the applicability of Section 11 is
unsustainable. It is submitted that even according to the
document (copy of field book) filed along with the counter
affidavit of the first respondent in the SLP, there was a
house in Khasra No. 119. Both the learned counsel are not
clear whether this document was adduced in evidence by
any of the parties at any stage. The High Court did not
address itself to the question of law whether on the facts
proved or admitted, the appellants-defendants are entitled
to the benefit of Section 11 of the Act. If they are so
entitled, the finding of appellate Court that the suit land is
joint property, cannot prima facie stand. The High Court
only focused its attention to the question of existence of the
passage at point ’CB’ and whether the first defendant or his
tenant could raise any constructions thereon. At the same
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time, the High Court upheld the permanent injunction
granted by the appellate Court restraining the first
defendant from making any construction on the point
marked ’CB’ or any other part of the suit land (emphasis
supplied). The suit land undisputably includes K.No.119.
Perhaps, if substantial question of law had been framed, this
omission on a crucial point would not have occurred. We
must, however, clarify that we have not gone into the merits
of this contention. We should not be understood to have
expressed any view with reference to the finding of the
appellate Court in regard to the applicability of Section 11 of
the Common Laws (Regulation) Act relied upon by the
appellants’ counsel.
Coming to the next point as regards the passage at
point ’CB’, the first appellate Court recorded the finding that
the passage and the entrance gate at point ’CB’ did exist
and that the same should not have been meddled or
interfered with by the appellants. This finding based on the
appreciation of evidence was affirmed by the High Court.
However, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the
appellants that the alleged passage was undisputedly
located in Khasra No. 118 which is not the suit property and
therefore no injunction should have been granted in respect
of the alleged passage outside the suit land, i.e. the land
situate in K.Nos. 119 & 120. It is also submitted by the
learned counsel for the appellants that no easementary right
of way to the disputed suit lands through the point ’CB’ is
pleaded nor any evidence adduced on this aspect. According
to the learned counsel, the finding was given by the
appellate Court on the footing that it was also part of the
joint property which is legally incorrect. Ground No.vi in the
memorandum of second appeal covers this point. Without
going into the merits of this controversy, we take note of the
fact that the High Court did not consider the issue in regard
to passage from this perspective whether or not such
contention could be allowed to be raised by the appellants
and whether it merits acceptance are matters for
determination by the High Court. While expressing no view
on this aspect either, we would only like to observe that the
High Court should have dealt with the contention adverted
to above while dealing with this aspect.
In the light of the above discussion, we remit the
second appeal to the High Court for fresh consideration after
framing appropriate substantial questions of law in regard to
the two points referred to above and render its decision
afresh as expeditiously as possible. The judgment of the
High Court is set aside and the appeals are allowed to the
extent indicated above. No costs.