Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3047 OF 2015
(Arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 6237/2014)
Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary … Appellant (s)
Versus
Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing
Federation Limited and others … Respondent (s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3048 OF 2015
(Arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 3799/2014)
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3049 OF 2015
(Arising from S.L.P. (C) No. 5270/2014)
J U D G M E N T
KURIAN, J.:
Leave granted.
2. Whether in the absence of a specific provision on removal by
no confidence in the Act, Rules or even Bye-laws of a Cooperative
Signature Not Verified
Society, the Chairperson/elected office bearer can be removed by a
Digitally signed by
Meenakshi Kohli
Date: 2015.03.19
12:19:19 IST
Reason:
motion of no confidence, is the short but complex question.
1
3. Appellant was removed from the office of the Chairperson of
the first respondent–cooperative society through a no confidence
motion. Aggrieved, appellant filed a writ petition which was
dismissed as per the impugned judgment and thus the appeal.
4. Shri Kapil Sibal, Shri H. Ahmedi and Shri Harin P. Raval,
learned Senior Counsel led the arguments on behalf of the appellant.
Shri Tushar Mehta, Additional Solicitor General, Dr. Rajeev Dhawan,
Shri Ashok Desai and Shri V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel, Shri Sanjay
R. Hegde and Shri B. S. Patel, learned Counsel, led the arguments on
behalf of the respondents.
5. International Cooperative Alliance Statement on the
Cooperative Identity was adopted in Manchester, United Kingdom on
23.09.1995. The ‘cooperative’ is defined as:
“A co-operative is an autonomous association of
persons united voluntarily to meet their common
economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations
through a jointly-owned and
democratically-controlled enterprise.”
(Emphasis supplied)
6. The Statement also provides for ‘values’ on which
cooperatives should model themselves, which reads as follows:
“Co-operatives are based on the values of self-help,
self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and
2
solidarity. In the tradition of their founders,
co-operative members believe in the ethical values
of honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring
for others.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. The Statement further provides for ‘seven cooperative
principles’ as guidelines by which the cooperatives put their values
into practice. Following are the principles:
“ 1st Principle: Voluntary and Open Membership
Co-operatives are voluntary organizations, open to
all persons able to use their services and willing to
accept the responsibilities of membership, without
gender, social, racial, political or religious
discrimination.
2nd Principle: Democratic Member Control
Co-operatives are democratic organizations
controlled by their members, who actively
participate in setting their policies and making
decisions. Men and women serving as elected
representatives are accountable to the membership.
In primary co-operatives members have equal voting
rights (one member, one vote) and co-operatives at
other levels are also organized in a democratic
manner.
3rd Principle: Member Economic Participation
Members contribute equitably to, and democratically
control, the capital of their co-operative. At least part
of that capital is usually the common property of the
co-operative. Members usually receive limited
compensation, if any, on capital subscribed as a
condition of membership. Members allocate
surpluses for any or all of the following purposes:
3
developing their co-operative, possibly by setting up
reserves, part of which at least would be indivisible;
benefiting members in proportion to their
transactions with the co-operative; and supporting
other activities approved by the membership.
4th Principle: Autonomy and Independence
Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help
organizations controlled by their members. If they
enter to agreements with other organizations,
including governments, or raise capital from external
sources, they do so on terms that ensure democratic
control by their members and maintain their
co-operative autonomy.
5th Principle: Education, Training and
Information
Co-operatives provide education and training for
their members, elected representatives, managers,
and employees so they can contribute effectively to
the development of their co-operatives. They inform
the general public – particularly young people and
opinion leaders – about the nature and benefits of
co-operation.
6th Principle: Co-operation among
Co-operatives
Co-operatives serve their members most effectively
and strengthen the co-operative movement by
working together through local, national, regional
and international structures.
7th Principle: Concern for Community
Co-operatives work for the sustainable development
of their communities through policies approved by
their members.”
(Emphasis supplied)
4
8. The cooperative movement in India started at the beginning
th
of the 20 century. Though the movements were also based on
some of the values and principles stated above, it appears that the
cooperatives in India did not have effective autonomy, democratic
functioning and professional management. The National Policy on
Cooperatives announced by the Department of Agriculture and
Cooperation, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India adopted in
March, 2002, is wholly based on the definition, values and principles
th
stated above. 97 Amendment to the Constitution of India, in fact,
gave a constitutional frame to this policy.
9. Apart from providing for the right to form cooperative
societies to be a fundamental right under Article 19 of the
Constitution of India and insertion of Article 43B under the Directive
Principles of State Policy on promotion of cooperative societies, the
amendment also introduced a new Part IXB on Cooperative
Societies. Reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
amendment would give a clear picture as to the need to strengthen
the democratic basis and provide for a constitutional status to the
cooperative societies. Thus, one has to see the constitutional
th
aspirations on the concept of cooperative societies after the 97
Amendment in the Constitution of India which came into effect on
12.01.2012.
5
“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
The co-operative sector, over the years, has
made significant contribution to various sectors of
national economy and has achieved voluminous
growth. However, it has shown weaknesses in
safeguarding the interests of the members and
fulfilment of objects for which these institutions were
organised. There have been instances where
elections have been postponed indefinitely and
nominated office bearers or administrators remaining
in-charge of these institutions for a long time. This
reduces the accountability of the management of
co-operative societies to their members. Inadequate
professionalism in management in many of the
co-operative institutions has led to poor services and
low productivity. Co-operatives need to run on well
established democratic principles and elections held
on time and in a free and fair manner. Therefore,
there is a need to initiate fundamental reforms to
revitalize these institutions in order to ensure their
contribution in the economic development of the
country and to serve the interests of members and
public at large and also to ensure their autonomy,
democratic functioning and professional
management.
2. The "co-operative societies" is a subject
enumerated in Entry 32 of the State List of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and the State
Legislatures have accordingly enacted legislations on
co-operative societies. Within the framework of State
Acts, growth of co-operatives on large scale was
envisaged as part of the efforts for securing social
and economic justice and equitable distribution of
the fruits of development. It has, however, been
experienced that in spite of considerable expansion
of co-operatives, their performance in qualitative
terms has not been up to the desired level.
Considering the need for reforms in the Co-operative
Societies Acts of the States, consultations with the
State Governments have been held at several
occasions and in the conferences of State
Co-operative Ministers. A strong need has been felt
for amending the Constitution so as to keep the
6
co-operatives free from unnecessary outside
interferences and also to ensure their autonomous
organisational set up and their democratic
functioning.
3. The Central Government is committed to
ensure that the co-operative societies in the country
function in a democratic, professional, autonomous
and economically sound manner. With a view to
bring the necessary reforms, it is proposed to
incorporate a new Part in the Constitution so as to
provide for certain provisions covering the vital
aspects of working of co-operative societies like
democratic, autonomous and professional
functioning. A new article is also proposed to be
inserted in Part IV of the Constitution (Directive
Principles of State Policy) for the States to endeavour
to promote voluntary formation, autonomous
functioning, democratic control and professional
management of cooperative societies. The proposed
new Part in the Constitution, inter alia , seeks to
empower the Parliament in respect of multi-State
co-operative societies and the State Legislatures in
case of other co-operative societies to make
appropriate law, laying down the following matters,
namely:—
( a ) provisions for incorporation, regulation
and winding up of co-operative societies based
on the principles of democratic
member-control, member-economic
participation and autonomous functioning;
( b ) specifying the maximum number of
directors of a co-operative society to be not
exceeding twenty-one members;
( c ) providing for a fixed term of five years
from the date of election in respect of the
elected members of the board and its office
bearers;
( d ) providing for a maximum time limit of
six months during which a board of directors of
co-operative society could be kept under
supersession or suspension;
( e ) providing for independent professional
audit;
( f ) providing for right of information to the
7
members of the co-operative societies;
( g ) empowering the State Governments to
obtain periodic reports of activities and
accounts of co-operative societies;
( h ) providing for the reservation of one
seat for the Scheduled Castes or the
Scheduled Tribes and two seats for women on
the board of every co-operative society, which
have individuals as members from such
categories;
( i ) providing for offences relating to
co-operative societies and penalties in respect
of such offences.
4. It is expected that these provisions will not
only ensure the autonomous and democratic
functioning of co-operatives, but also ensure the
accountability of management to the members and
other stakeholders and shall provide for deterrence
for violation of the provisions of the law.
5. The Bill seeks to achieve the above
objectives.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Article 43B of the Constitution of India provides for
promotion of cooperative societies:
“43B. The State shall endeavour to promote
voluntary formation, autonomous functioning,
democratic control and professional management
of co-operative societies.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Part IXB of the Constitution of India is titled as “The
Cooperative Societies”. A few provisions would be relevant for our
consideration.
8
Article 243ZH(b) defines “board”:
•
“243ZH( b ) “board” means the board of
directors or the governing body of a co-operative
society, by whatever name called, to which the
direction and control of the management of the
affairs of a society is entrusted to;”
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 243ZH(c) defines “cooperative society”:
•
“243ZH( c ) “co-operative society” means a
society registered or deemed to be registered under
any law relating to co-operative societies for the
time being in force in any State;”
• “Office bearer” is under Article 243ZH(e):
“243ZH( e ) “office bearer” means a President,
Vice-President, Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson,
Secretary or Treasurer of a co-operative society and
includes any other person to be elected by the board
of any co-operative society;”
• Article 243ZJ provides for the number and term of
members of the board and its office bearers:
“243ZJ. (1) The board shall consist of such
number of directors as may be provided by the
Legislature of a State, by law:
Provided that the maximum number of directors
of a co-operative society shall not exceed
twenty-one:
Provided further that the Legislature of a State
shall, by law, provide for the reservation of one seat
9
for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes and
two seats for women on board of every co-operative
society consisting of individuals as members and
having members from such class or category of
persons.
(2) The term of office of elected members of the
board and its office bearers shall be five years from
the date of election and the term of office bearers
shall be coterminous with the term of the board:
Provided that the board may fill a casual
vacancy on the board by nomination out of the same
class of members in respect of which the casual
vacancy has arisen, if the term of office of the board
is less than half of its original term.
(3) The Legislature of a State shall, by law,
make provisions for co-option of persons to be
members of the board having experience in the field
of banking, management, finance or specialization in
any other field relating to the objects and activities
undertaken by the co-operative society as members
of the board of such society:
Provided that the number of such co-opted
members shall not exceed two in addition to
twenty-one directors specified in the proviso to
clause (1):
Provided further that such co-opted members
shall not have the right to vote in any election of the
co-operative society in their capacity as such
member or to be eligible to be elected as office
bearers of the board:
Provided also that the functional directors of a
co-operative society shall also be the members of
the board and such members shall be excluded for
the purpose of counting the total number of directors
specified in first proviso of clause (1).”
(Emphasis supplied)
10
Article 243ZT provides for continuance of the existing
•
laws:
“243ZT. Notwithstanding anything in this Part,
any provision of any law relating to co-operative
societies in force in a State immediately before the
commencement of the Constitution (Ninety Seventh
Amendment) Act, 2011, which is inconsistent with
the provisions of this Part, shall continue to be in
force until amended or repealed by a competent
Legislature or other competent authority or until the
expiration of one year from such commencement,
whichever is less.’.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Thus, by 12.01.2013, all laws on cooperative societies were
bound to be restructured in consonance with the Ninety Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution of India and, in any case, any
provision in the Act or Rules or Bye-laws otherwise inconsistent with
the Constitution will be inoperative thereafter. Articles 43B and
243ZT are mandates to all the States and the competent authorities
to structure cooperative societies as conceived in the Constitution of
India, if not already there. Therefore, we have to see whether the
Act, Rules or Bye-laws contain any provision for democratic
functioning.
13. The first legislation on cooperative movement in India was
the Cooperative Credit Societies Act, 1904 and, thereafter, the
11
cooperative societies emerged in India as State sponsored/promoted
institutions. The main objective was only credit intended to relieve
the poor agriculturists from the clutches of moneylenders. The first
urban cooperative credit society under the Act of 1904 was
1
registered in Kanjivaram in erstwhile Madras province . The traits of
democracy were present in the very first legislation through the
principle “one man, one vote”. Since the first legislation was limited
to the credit societies, a new legislation was introduced 8 years later
as “Cooperative Societies Act, 1912”. The restriction regarding
registration limited to credit societies was taken away and any
society established with the object of promoting the economic
interests of its members in accordance with the cooperative
principles, or a society established with the object of facilitating the
2
operations of such a society, could be registered .
14. Under the Government of India Act of 1919 (Montague
Chelmsford Reforms), cooperation became a provincial subject
which gave a further impetus to the movement. This gave birth to
several cooperative land mortgage banks. The first of its kind was
registered in Punjab. Close to independence and thereafter, we see a
1
“Brief History of Urban Cooperatives” adapted from a paper by O.P. Sharma
published on Reserve Bank of India website –
www.rbi.org.in/scripts/briefhistory.aspx.
2
The Co-operative Movement in India by Eleanor M. Hough, Fourth Edition,
1959
12
radical change and increased growth in the cooperative movement.
Activities were spread to all spheres of human endeavour, and thus
in 2002, National Policy on Cooperatives was announced.
15. The cooperative societies having been conferred a
constitutional status by the Ninety Seventh Amendment, the whole
concept of cooperatives has undergone a major change. In 1993, the
local self-governments, viz., panchayats and municipalities were also
given constitutional status under Parts IX and IXA of the Constitution
rd th
of India by the 73 and 74 Amendments. The Statement of Objects
and Reasons would show that the Constitution wanted the local
bodies to function as vibrant democratic units of self-government.
After two decades, cooperative societies were given the
constitutional status by including them under Part IXB. The main
object for the said amendment was also to ensure “their autonomy,
democratic functioning and professional management”.
16. The National Policy on Cooperatives announced in March
2002 has recognized democracy, equality, equity and solidarity as
values of cooperatives. Cooperative society has been declared as a
democratic institution. Democratic principles have all through been
recognized as one of the cooperative principles though the
constitutional affirmation of those principles came only in 2012.
13
17. The principle of representative democracy is the election of
representatives by the people otherwise eligible to caste their vote
and the people thus elected, constituting the body for the
management of an institution. Thus, in the case of cooperative
societies, after the amendment in the Constitution, there has to be a
Board of elected representatives, which may be called Board of
Directors or Governing Body or a Managing Committee, etc., to
which the members entrust the direction and control of the
management of the affairs of the society. That representative body
selects one among the elected representatives as its Chairman or
any other office bearer, as the case may be. Selection is the act of
carefully choosing someone as the most suitable to be the leader or
office bearer. Thus, there is a lot of difference between election of
delegates/representatives to constitute a body and selection of a
person by the body from amongst the elected members to be the
leader. It is to be borne in mind that the management and control of
the society is entrusted to the representative body, viz., the Board of
Directors and that the Chairperson elected by the Board of Directors
is the Chairperson of the society and not of the Board of directors.
18. In Bhanumati and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh
3
through its Principal Secretary and others , the cooperative
3
(2010) 12 SCC 1
14
principles governing democratic institutions have been discussed in
detail; no doubt while dealing with the Panchayati Raj institutions.
However, the basic democratic principles governing both the
institutions, enjoying the constitutional status, are the same and,
therefore, it would be profitable to refer to the discussion on the
principles. To quote:
“58. These institutions must run on democratic
principles. In democracy all persons heading public
bodies can continue provided they enjoy the
confidence of the persons who comprise such bodies.
This is the essence of democratic republicanism. This
explains why this provision of no-confidence motion
was there in the Act of 1961 even prior to the
Seventy-third Constitution Amendment and has been
continued even thereafter. Similar provisions are
there in different States in India.
66. Democracy demands accountability and
transparency in the activities of the Chairperson
especially in view of the important functions
entrusted with the Chairperson in the running of
Panchayati Raj institutions. Such duties can be
discharged by the Chairperson only if he/she enjoys
the continuous confidence of the majority members
in the panchayat. So any statutory provision to
demonstrate that the Chairperson has lost the
confidence of the majority is conducive to public
interest and adds strength to
such bodies of
self-governance. Such a statutory provision cannot
be called either unreasonable or ultra vires Part IX of
the Constitution.”
19. In Pratap Chandra Mehta v. State Bar Council of
15
4
Madhya Pradesh and others and in Usha Bharti v. State of
5
Uttar Pradesh and others , the concept of democratic principles
governing the democratic institutions have been discussed. In a
democratic institution, confidence is the foundation on which the
superstructure of democracy is built. The bedrock of democratic
accountability rests on the confidence of the electorate. If the
representative body does not have confidence in the office bearer
whom they selected, democracy demands such officer to be
removed in a democratic manner.
20. A cooperative society is registered on cooperative principles
of democracy, equity, equality and solidarity. Democratic
accountability, mutual trust, fairness, impartiality, unity or
agreement of feeling among the delegates, cooperativeness, etc.,
are some of the cardinal dimensions of the cooperative principles. A
body built on such principles cannot be led by a captain in whom the
co-sailors have no confidence.
21. If a person has been selected to an office through
democratic process, and when that person looses the confidence of
the representatives who selected him, those representatives should
necessarily have a democratic right to remove such an office bearer
4
(2011) 9 SCC 573
5
(2014) 7 SCC 663
16
in whom they do not have confidence, in case those institutions are
viewed under the Constitution/statues as democratic institutions.
22. In Bhanumati case (supra), at paragraph-67, this Court
elaborated on this principle:
“ 67. Any head of a democratic institution must
be prepared to face the test of confidence. Neither
the democratically elected Prime Minister of the
country nor the Chief Minister of a State is immune
from such a test of confidence under the Rules of
Procedure framed under Articles 118 and 208 of the
Constitution. Both the Prime Minister of India and
Chief Ministers of several States heading the Council
of Ministers at the Centre and in several States
respectively have to adhere to the principles of
collective responsibilities to their respective houses
in accordance with Articles 75(3) and 164(2) of the
Constitution.”
23. In Pratap Chandra Mehta case (supra), at paragraph-45,
the principle has been discussed as follows:
“45. In the instant case, the election process as
contemplated under the relevant laws is that the
members of a State Bar Council are elected by the
electorate of advocates on the rolls of the State Bar
Council from amongst the electorate itself. The
elected members then elect a Chairman, a
Vice-Chairman and the Treasurer of the State Bar
Council as well as constitute various committees for
carrying out different purposes under the provisions
of the Advocates Act. In other words, the body which
elects the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of a State Bar
Council always consists of members elected to that
Council. The democratic principles would require that
a person who attains the position of a Chairman or
17
Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, could be
removed by the same electorate or smaller body
which elected them to that position by taking
recourse to a “no-confidence motion” and in
accordance with the Rules. The body that elects a
person to such a position would and ought to have
the right to oust him/her from that post, in the event
the majority members of the body do not support the
said person at that time. Even if, for the sake of
argument, it is taken that this may not be generally
true, the provisions of Rule 122-A of the M.P. Rules
make it clear, beyond doubt, that a “no-confidence
motion” can be brought against the
elected
Chairman provided the conditions stated in the said
Rules are satisfied.”
24. In Usha Bharti case (supra) also, this Court eloquently held
at paragraph-53 as follows:
“ 53. In our opinion, the provision for removing
an elected representative such as Panchayat
Adhyaksha is of fundamental importance to ensure
the democratic functioning of the Institution as well
as to ensure the transparency and accountability in
the functions performed by the elected
representatives.”
25. No doubt, in the cases referred to above, the respective Acts
contained a provision regarding no confidence. What about a
situation where there is no express provision regarding no
confidence? Once the cooperative society is conferred a
constitutional status, it should rise to the constitutional aspirations
as a democratic institution. So, it is for the respective legislative
bodies to ensure that there is democratic functioning. When the
18
Constitution is eloquent, the laws made thereunder cannot be silent.
If the statute is silent or imprecise on the requirements under the
Constitution, it is for the court to read the constitutional mandate
into the provisions concerned and declare it accordingly. Article
243ZT has given a period of one year to frame/reframe the statues
in consonance with Part IXB and thereafter, i.e., with effect from
12.01.2013, those provisions which are inconsistent with Part IXB,
cease to operate.
26. Silence in Constitution and abeyance as well has been dealt
extensively by Michael Foley in his celebrated work “The Silence of
Constitutions”. To quote from the Preface:
“Abeyances refer to those constitutional gaps which
remain vacuous for positive and constructive
purposes. They are not, in any sense, truces between
two or more defined positions, but rather a set of
implicit agreements to collude in keeping
fundamental questions of political authority in a
state of irresolution. Abeyances are, in effect,
compulsive hedges against the possibility of that
which is unresolved being exploited and given
meanings almost guaranteed to generate profound
division and disillusionment. Abeyances are
important, therefore, because of their capacity to
deter the formation of conflicting positions in just
those areas where the potential for conflict is most
acute. So central are these abeyances, together with
the social temperament required to sustain them,
that when they become the subject of heightened
interest and subsequent conflict, they are not merely
accompanied by an intense constitutional crisis, they
19
are themselves the essence of that crisis.”
27. In Part II, Chapter Four, the author has also dealt with the
constitutional gaps and the arts of prerogative. To the extent
relevant, it reads as follows (Page-82):
“Gaps in a constitution should not be seen as simply
empty space. They amount to a substantial plenum
of strategic content and meaning vital to the
preservation of a constitution. Such interstices
accommodate the abeyances within which the
sleeping giants of potentially acute political conflict
are communally maintained in slumber. Despite the
absence of any documentary or material form, these
abeyances are real, and are an integral part of any
constitution. What remains unwritten and
indeterminate can be just as much responsible for
the operational character and restraining quality of a
constitution as its more tangible and codified
components. …”
28. Where the Constitution has conceived a particular structure
on certain institutions, the legislative bodies are bound to mould the
statutes accordingly. Despite the constitutional mandate, if the
legislative body concerned does not carry out the required structural
changes in the statutes, then, it is the duty of the court to provide
the statute with the meaning as per the Constitution. … “The job of
the Supreme Court is not to expound the meaning of the constitution
6
but to provide it with meaning” . The reference obviously is to
6
Walter Berns, ‘Government by lawyers and judges’, Commentary , June, 1987
at p.18.
20
United States Supreme Court. As a general rule of interpretation, no
doubt, nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute. However,
when there are adequate grounds to justify an inference, it is the
bounden duty of the court to do so. …“It is a corollary to the general
rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken
from a statue unless there are adequate grounds to justify the
inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to
7
express” . According to Lord Mersey in Thompson (Pauper) v.
8
Goold and Co. … “It is a strong thing to read into an Act or
Parliament words, which are not there, and in the absence of clear
necessity, it is wrong to do”. In the case of cooperative societies,
after the Ninety Seventh Amendment, it has become a clear or
strong necessity to do the strong thing of reading into the
legislation, the constitutional mandate of the cooperative societies
to be governed as democratic institutions. … “The constitutional
provisions have to be construed broadly and liberally having regard
9
to the changed circumstances and the needs of time and polity” .
29. Article 243ZT of the Constitution requires the laws relating to
cooperative societies in force in States prior to the commencement
7
Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statues, Twelfth Edition, page-33.
8
[1910] A.C. 409.
9
Constitutional Bench decision in State of West Bengal and others v.
Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and others
reported in [(2010) 3 SCC 571, Paragraph-45.
21
of the Amendment Act to be in tune with and in terms of the
constitutional concept and set up of cooperative societies. In fact, a
period of one year has been provided in the Constitution from the
commencement of the amendment for the required amendment or
repeal by the competent legislature or by the competent authority,
of laws which are inconsistent with Part IXB. As a corollary, the
Constitution enables the competent legislature or authority to
suitably amend the existing provisions in their laws in tune with the
constitutional mandate. Thereafter, in case there continues to be
silence in the Act or Bye-laws, the court will have to read the
constitutional requirements into the existing provisions. It is
essentially a process of purposive construction of the available
provisions as held by this Court in Pratap Chandra Mehta
case (supra).
30. Bye-law 18.2 of the first respondent, pertaining to the office
of the Chairperson of the Federation falling vacant before the expiry
of his elected term, will have to be analysed in the light of the above
principle. The provision reads as follows:
“18.2. The Chairperson of the Federation will be
elected by the Board for the Term of three years
and he / she shall continue to hold his / her
office till the new Chairperson is elected and
takes over. He / she shall be honorary
Chairperson. In case the elected Chairperson
vacates his / her office before expiry of his / her
22
term or due to any other reason the post of
Chairman falls vacant, the Board shall elect the
new Chairperson for the remaining term.
The election of the Chairperson will take place
in the first Board meeting of the Federation
after the expiry of the term of the elected
Chairperson or when the Chairperson’s post
falls vacant. In his / her absence, the meeting
shall elect its own Chairperson for that meeting
from amongst the eligible members present.
The Chairperson in such event shall exercise
such power as may be delegated to him by the
Board of Directors. The Managing Director of
the Federation shall not be entitled to vote and
contest the election for the post of
Chairperson.”
(Emphasis supplied)
31. Bye-law 23 deals with the powers of the Board of Directors:
“23.Powers and Functions of the Board
The entire administration, management and
control of the Federation shall be vested in the
Board of Directors. The Board of Directors shall
have and exercise all such powers and enter
into all such agreements made, all such
arrangements, take all such proceeding and do
all such acts and things as may be necessary or
proper for the due management of the
Federation and for carrying out objects for
which the Federation is established and for
securing and furthering its interest subject to
the provisions of the Act or such act as shall
hereafter take its place and to any rules which
may be passed by the State Government in
pursuance of the said Act and subject also to
these Bye-Laws and / or any Bye-law which may
be duly made by the Federation.”
32. Thus, the entire administration, management and control
of the Federation are vested in the Board of Directors as per the
23
Bye-law. This is in terms of proviso to Section 73 of the Gujarat
Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act”). The Section reads as follows:
“ Section 73 :- Final authority of society –
Subject to the provisions in this Act and the rules,
the final authority of every society shall vest in the
general body of the members in general meeting,
summoned in such a manner as may be specified in
the bye-laws:
Provided that, where the bye-laws of a society
provide for the election of delegates of such
members, the final authority may vest in the
delegates of such members elected in the prescribed
manner, and assembled in general meeting.”
33. The General Body of the first respondent-Federation, in
terms of Bye-law 13.1 comprises of the following:
“13.1 The General Meeting shall consist of
the following:-
(1) The Chairman of each of the affiliated Milk
Unions enrolled as Ordinary Members;
(2) The Registrar;
(3) The Dairy Management Expert co-opted by the
Board;
(4) Managing Director of the Federation;
(5) A nominee of the National Dairy Development
Board as long as the loan / interest of the
National Dairy Development Board have not
been fully repaid by the Federation.
The Chairman of the Board of Directors shall preside
over the General Meeting. In case of his absence, the
meeting shall elect a Chairman from among the
members present.”
24
34. The composition of the Board of Directors of the first
respondent-Federation is provided under Bye-law 18.1:
“18.1 The Board will consist of the following:
(i) Chairman of the affiliated milk unions
enrolled as ordinary members;
(ii) Registrar or his representative not below
the rank of Joint Registrar [C.S.];
(iii) One Dairy Management Expert to be
co-opted by the Board;
(iv) Managing Director of the Federation
[ex-officio];
(v) A nominee of the National Dairy
Development Board as long as the loan /
interest of the National Dairy Development
Board have not been fully repaid by the
Federation.”
35. “Committee” is defined under Section 2(5) of the Act:
“ Section 2(5) “committee” means the Managing
Committee or other governing body of a society to
which the direction and control of the management
of the affairs of a society is entrusted to.”
36. “Officer” is defined under Section 2(14) of the Act:
“ Section 2(14) “officer” means a person elected
or appointed by a society to any office of such
society according to its bye-laws; and includes a
chairman, vice-chairman, president, vice-president,
managing director, manager, secretary, treasurer,
member of the committee, and any other person
elected or appointed under this Act, the rules or the
bye-laws, to give directions in regard to the business
of such society.”
25
37. Section 4 of the Act provides for the registration of societies:
“ Section 4- Societies which may be registered –
A society, which has as its object the promotion of
the economic interests or general welfare of its
members or of the public, in accordance with
co-operative principles, or as society established
with the object of facilitating the operations of any
such society, may be registered under this Act:
Provided that it shall not be registered if, in the
opinion of the Registrar, it is economically unsound,
or its registration may have an adverse effect upon
any other society, or it is opposed to, or, its working
is likely to be in contravention of public policy.”
38. A conjoint reading of all the provisions under the Act and the
Bye-laws of the Society would clearly show that the functional
authority of the first respondent-Federation vests in the Board of
Directors. The entire administration, management and control of the
Federation is with the Board. Thus, the Board of Directors is bound to
do all such acts and things as may be necessary for the proper
management of the Federation. The Chairperson of the first
respondent is elected by the Board for a term of three years and
th
after the 97 Amendment to the Constitution, the term is five years.
When the post of Chairperson falls vacant, the Board is bound to
elect a new Chairperson for the remaining term. The post of
Chairperson may fall vacant on account of variety of reasons like
resignation, death or cessation of membership in the Board,
26
operation of Section 76B of the Act, i.e., removal by the Registrar on
account of persistent default or misconduct.
39. The removal by no confidence is not expressly provided in
the Bye-laws. Neither is there any such provision in the Act or Rules.
The only enabling provision is Bye-law 18.2 which mandates that in
case the office of the Chairperson of the Federation falls vacant
before the expiry of his term for any reason, the Board has to elect a
new Chairperson for the remaining term.
40. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant,
inviting reference to the doctrine of c asus omissus and placing
reliance on the Full-Bench decision of the High Court of Kerala in
S. Lakshmanan, President, Thiruvilwamal Weavers
Co-operative Society v. V.Velliankeri, Member of Board of
Directors, Thiruvilwamala Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd.
10
and others and the decisions of the other High Courts submits
that no such power of removal of the Chairperson by no confidence
can be read into the provisions of the Act, Rules or Bye-laws. To
quote from S. Lakshmanan case (supra) :
“16. The Committee is elected by following the
procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules
and is guaranteed a tenure as prescribed in the
Bye-laws, by virtue of Rule 39(1). It can only be
10
AIR 2002 Kerala 325
27
removed by the procedure prescribed in the Act or
the Rules or the Bye-laws. The only contingency
under which the Committee may be removed before
the end of its tenure is indicated in Section 33(1) of
the Act. Section 33(1) of the Act envisages the
passing of a no-confidence motion by the General
Body which results in wholesale removal of the
Committee. Barring this provision, there is no other
provision by which an elected individual member of
the Committee can be removed. We are, therefore,
unable to accept the contention of the appellants
that such a drastic power can be read into the Act,
even where there are no provisions. …”
41. In Veeramachaneni Venkata Narayana v. The Deputy
Registrar of Co-operative societies, Eluru, West Godavari
11
District and others , at paragraph-10, the view taken by the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh, is as under:
“10. … As sufficient safeguards are provided in the
event of an office-bearer of the committee not
conducting himself properly or not discharging his
duties as required of him under the provisions of the
Act, the Rules and the bye-laws, the Legislature
obviously did not intend to provide for the removal of
an office-bearer of a committee by way of passing of
‘no-confidence’ motion against him.”
42. In Hindurao Balwant Patil and another
12
v. Krishnaro Pashuram Patil and others , the High Court of
Bombay took the view that:
11
I.L.R. [1975] A.P. 242
12
AIR 1982 Bombay 216
28
“10. … The Act, Rules and the bye-laws do no confer
any right upon the members of the Board of
Directors to remove the Chairman and the
Vice-Chairman by passing a mere vote of no
confidence. Therefore it will not be proper to confer
such a wider power upon the board of directors by
taking recourse to the doctrine of implied or inherent
power.”
43. In Jagdev Singh v. The Registrar, Co-operative
13
Societies, Haryana and others , the Full-Bench of High Court of
Punjab and Haryana held as follows:
“22. …. the answer to the question posed in the
beginning of the judgment, is that in absence of any
provision in the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act,
1961, Rules and the Bye-laws made thereunder (as
also in the Haryana Cooperative Societies Act, 1984,
Rules and the Bye-laws made thereunder) for moving
a no-confidence in the President of a Managing
Committee/ Chairman of a Board of Directors of a
Co-operative Bank, it is not permissible to move such
a motion, inasmuch as such a power cannot be
inferred nor such a power is inherent in the members
of the Managing Committee/Director of the Bank.
The Office bearers can only be removed in
accordance with Section 27 of the Act read with
Rules 25 and 26 of the Rules. With respect we are
unable to agree with the law laid down by the
Division Bench in Haji Anwar Khan's case (AIR 1980
Punjab & Haryana 306) (supra) (which was a case
under the Wakf Act), to our mind, does not lay down
correct law.”
44. It may be seen that all these decisions dealt with the
pre-Ninety Seventh Amendment status of the cooperative societies.
13
AIR 1991 P & H 149
29
The amendment providing constitutional status to the societies has
brought out radical changes in the concept of cooperative societies.
Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core
constitutional values of a cooperative society. Such societies are to
be registered only if they are founded on cooperative principles of
democracy, equality, equity and solidarity.
45. We may also refer to another argument by Shri Sibal. That
once the Act provides for a fixed term, the only mode of unsettling
the term is as provided under the Act. In the instant case, it is
Section 76B of the Act, which reads as follows:
“ 76B. Removal of officer. - (1) If, in the opinion of
the Registrar, any officer makes persistent default or
is negligent in performance of the duties imposed on
him by this Act or the rules or the bye-laws or does
anything which is prejudicial to the interests of the
Society or where he stands disqualified by or under
this Act, the Registrar may, after giving the officer an
opportunity of being heard, by order remove such
officer and direct the Society to elect or appoint a
person or a qualified member in the vacancy caused
by such removal and the officer so elected or
appointed shall hold office so long only as the officer
in whose place he is elected or appointed would
have held if the vacancy had not occurred.
(2) The Registrar may, by order, direct that the
officer so removed shall be disqualified to hold or to
contest election for any office in the society from
which he is removed and in any other society for a
period not exceeding four years from the date of the
order and such officer may stand disqualified
accordingly."
30
46. The provision simply deals with removal for misconduct or
persistent default/non-performance. A person with good conduct
may still not earn the confidence of the people who selected him to
the office. The very concept of cooperation is to work jointly towards
the same end. Unless there is cooperativeness among the elected
cooperators who constitute the Governing Body for achieving the
object for which the society is constituted and for which those
representatives are elected by the members entrusting them with
the management of affairs of the society, there will be total chaos.
Cooperation among the cooperators is the essence of democratic
functioning of a cooperative society. If there is no democracy in a
cooperative society, it ceases to be a cooperative society as
conceived by the Constitution of India under the Ninety Seventh
Amendment.
47. There is no quarrel with the well-settled proposition that a
right to elect is not a fundamental right nor a common law right; it is
a statutory right, and any question relating to election has to be
resorted within the four corners of the Act as held by this Court in
14
Jyoti Basu and others v. Debi Ghosal and others . To quote
paragraph-8:
14
(1982) 1 SCC 691
31
“8. A right to elect, fundamental though it is to
democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a
fundamental right nor a common law right. It is pure
and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be
elected. So is the right to dispute an election.
Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right
to be elected and no right to dispute an election.
Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject
to statutory limitation. An election petition is not an
action at common law, nor in equity. It is a statutory
proceeding to which neither the common law nor the
principles of equity apply but only those rules which
the statute makes and applies. It is a special
jurisdiction, and a special jurisdiction has always to
be exercised in accordance with the statute creating
it. Concepts familiar to common law
and equity must
remain strangers to election law unless statutorily
embodied. A court has no right to resort to them on
considerations of alleged policy because policy in
such matters as those, relating to the trial of election
disputes, is what the statute lays down. In the trial of
election disputes, court is put in a strait-jacket. Thus
the entire election process commencing from the
issuance of the notification calling upon a
constituency to elect a member or members right up
to the final resolution of the dispute, if any,
concerning the election is regulated by the
Representation of the People Act, 1951, different
stages of the process being dealt with by different
provisions of the Act. There can be no election to
Parliament or the State Legislature except as
provided by the Representation of the People Act,
1951 and again, no such election may be questioned
except in the manner provided by the Representation
of the People Act. So the Representation of the
People Act has been held to be a complete and
self-contained code within which must be found any
rights claimed in relation to an election or an election
dispute. We are concerned with an election dispute.
The question is who are parties to an election
dispute and who may be impleaded as parties to an
election petition. We have already referred to the
scheme of the Act. We have noticed the necessity to
rid ourselves of notions based on common law or
32
equity. We see that we must seek an answer to the
question within the four corners of the statute. What
does the Act say ?”
48. In the background of the constitutional mandate, the
question is not what the statute does say but what the statute must
say. If the Act or the Rules or the Bye-laws do not say what they
should say in terms of the Constitution, it is the duty of the court to
read the constitutional spirit and concept into the Acts. … “In so far
as in its Act Parliament does not convey its intention clearly,
expressly and completely, it is taken to require the enforcement
agencies who are charged with the duty of applying legislation to
spell out the detail of its legal meaning. This may be done either- (a)
by finding and declaring implications in the words used by the
legislator, or (b) by regarding the breadth or other obscurity of the
express language as conferring a delegated legislative power to
elaborate its meaning in accordance with public policy (including
15
legal policy) and the purpose of the legislation” .
49. The conventional view is that the legislature alone makes the
law. But as Bennion puts it:
“The truth is that courts are inescapably possessed
of some degree of legislative power. Enacted
legislation lays down rules in advance. The
commands of Parliament are deliberate prospective
th
15
Bennion on Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion, 6 Edition, p.136.
33
commands. The very concept of enacted legislation
postulates an authoritative interpreter who operates
ex post facto . No such interpreter can avoid
legislating in the course of exercising that function. It
can be done by regarding the breadth or other
obscurity of the express language as conferring a
delegated legislative power to elaborate its meaning
in accordance with public policy (including legal
16
policy)” .
50. According to Donaldson J.:
“The duty of the courts is to ascertain and give effect
to the will of Parliament as expressed in its
enactments. In the performance of this duty the
judges do not act as computers into which are fed
the statues and the rules for the construction of
statues and from whom issue forth the
mathematically correct answer. The interpretation of
statutes is a craft as much as a science and the
judges, as craftsmen, select and apply to the
appropriate rules as the tools of their trade. They are
not legislators, but finishers, refiners and polishers of
legislation which comes to them in a state requiring
17
varying degrees of further processing.”
51. In the celebrated case of Seaford Court Estates v.
18
Asher , Lord Denning has succinctly summarized the principle on
the role of the court. To quote:
“Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it
must be remembered that it is not within human
powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which
may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to
th
16
Bennion on Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion, 6 Edition, p.137.
17
Corocraft Ltd v Pan American Airways Inc. [1968] 3 WLR 714 at 732.
18
[1949] 2 All ER 155
34
provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity… A
judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the
draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive
task of finding the intention of the Parliament, and
he must do this not only from the language of the
statue, but also from a consideration of the social
conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief
which it was passed to remedy, and then he must
supplement the written word so as to give “force and
life” to the intention of the legislature. … Put into
homely metaphor it is this: A judge should ask
himself the question how, if the makers of the Act
had themselves come across this ruck in the texture
of it, they would have straightened it out? He must
then do as they would have done. A judge must not
alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he
can and should iron out the creases.”
52. In Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawaz Jung
19
(Dead) by Lrs. and others , this Court, at paragraph-17 of the
judgment, has also dealt with the principles in following words:
“17. … The legislature often fails to keep pace
with the changing needs and values nor is it realistic
to expect that it will have provided for all
contingencies and eventualities. It is, therefore, not
only necessary but obligatory on the courts to step in
to fill the lacuna. When courts perform this function
undoubtedly they legislate judicially. But that is a
kind of legislation which stands implicitly delegated
to them to further the object of the legislation and to
promote the goals of the society. Or to put it
negatively, to prevent the frustration of the
legislation or perversion of the goals and values of
the society. So long as the courts keep themselves
tethered to the ethos of the society and do not travel
off its course, so long as they attempt to furnish the
felt necessities of the time and do not refurbish
them, their role in this respect has to be welcomed.”
19
(1991) 3 SCC 67
35
53. The cooperative society registered under the Central or the
State Act is bound to function as a democratic institution and
conduct its affairs based on democratic principles. Democratic
functioning on democratic principles is to be reflected in the
respective Acts or Rules or Bye-laws both on the principle and
procedure. If not, it is for the court to read the democratic principles
into the Act or Rules or Bye-laws. If a procedure is prescribed in any
Act or Rule or Bye-law regarding election of an office bearer by the
Board, as defined under Article 243ZH(b) of the Constitution of India,
and for removal thereof, by way of a motion of no confidence, the
same procedure has to be followed. In case there is no express
provision under the Act or Rules or Bye-laws for removal of an office
bearer, such office bearer is liable to be removed in the event of loss
of confidence by following the same procedure by which he was
elected to office.
54. Now that this Court has declared the law regarding the
democratic set up of a cooperative society and that it is permissible
to remove an elected office bearer through motion of no confidence,
and since in many States, the relevant statutes have not carried out
the required statutory changes in terms of the constitutional
mandate, we feel it just and necessary to lay down certain
36
guidelines. However, we make it clear that these guidelines are open
to be appropriately modified and given statutory shape by the
competent legislature/authority. Having gone through the provisions
regarding motion of no confidence in local self-governments, we find
that there is no uniformity with regard to the procedure and process
regarding motion of no confidence. Some States provide for a
protection of two years, some for one year and a few for six months,
to the office bearers in office before moving a motion of no
confidence. However, majority of the States provide for two years
and a gap of another one year in case one motion of no confidence
is defeated. Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 provides for a protection
of two years and one year, Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 provides for a
protection of two years and one year, Himachal Pradesh Panchayati
Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and two years,
Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993
provides for a protection of two and a half years, Madhya Pradesh
Municipalities Act, 1961 provides for a protection of two years and
one year, Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection
of two years and one year, Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959
provides for a protection of two years, Orissa Grama Panchayats Act,
1964 provides for a protection of two years, Punjab Panchayati Raj
Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years, Rajasthan
37
Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and
one year, Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 provides for a
protection of two years and Uttar Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1947,
as followed by Uttarakhand, provides for a protection of two years
and one year. Having regard to the set up in local self-governments
prevailing in many of the States as above, we direct that in the case
of cooperative societies registered under any Central or State law, a
motion of no confidence against an office bearer shall be moved
only after two years of his assumption of office. In case the motion
of no confidence is once defeated, a fresh motion shall not be
introduced within another one year. A motion of no confidence shall
be moved only in case there is a request from one-third of the
elected members of the Board of Governors/Managing Committee of
the cooperative society concerned. The motion of no confidence
shall be carried in case the motion is supported by more than fifty
per cent of the elected members present in the meeting.
55. Though for different reasons, we agree with the view taken
by the High Court of Gujarat. The contra views expressed by the
High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Kerala and Punjab and
Haryana are no more good law in view of the Ninety Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution of India.
38
56. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.
..…….…..…………J.
(ANIL R. DAVE)
..……………………J.
(KURIAN JOSEPH)
New Delhi;
March 19, 2015.
39
ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.8 SECTION IX
(For judgment)
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s).3047/2015
(@ SLP(C) No. 6237/2014)
VIPULBHAI M. CHAUDHARY Appellant(s)
VERSUS
GUJARAT COOP. MILK MARKT. FED. LTD & ORS Respondent(s)
WITH
C.A. No.3048/2015 from SLP (C) No.3799/2014
C.A. No. 3049/2015 from SLP (C) No. 5270/2014
Date : 19/03/2015 These appeals were called on for pronouncement
of Judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Anip Sachthey,Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Abhijeet Sinha,Adv.
Mr. Vikash Singh,Adv.
Mr. Tushar Mehta, ASG
Ms. Hemantika Wahi,Adv.
Mr. Kabir H., Adv.
Mr. Anil Kumar Mishra-I,Adv.
Mr. Ashok Desai, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Shamik Sanjanwala, Adv.
Mr. Nandish Chudgar, Adv.
Mr. Kunal Nanavati, Adv.
Mr. Kailash Pandey, Adv.
Mr. Ranjeet Singh, Adv.
Mr. K. V. Sreekumar,Adv.
Mr. Purvish Jitendra Malkan,Adv.
Ms. Dharitre Malkan, Adv.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kurian Joseph pronounced the
reportable judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice
Anil K. Dave and His Lordship.
40
Leave granted.
The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed
reportable judgment.
(MEENAKSHI KOHLI) (JASWINDER KAUR)
COURT MASTER COURT MASTER
[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file]
41