Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 3608 of 2005
PETITIONER:
Smt. Ram Sakhi Devi
RESPONDENT:
Chhatra Devi and Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/07/2005
BENCH:
Arijit Pasayat & S.H. Kapadia
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Leave granted.
Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned
Single Judge of the Patna High Court in Second Appeal in terms of
Section 100 of the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in short the ’code’.
The respondents are the legal heirs of the original plaintiff - Ishraj
Narayan Singh. The original plaintiff filed a suit seeking declaration of
his title over the suit land and declaration of want of title of Smt. Ram
Sakhi Devi, the appellant herein, the defendant No. 3 in the suit. The
trial court had decreed the suit but in appeal the First Appellate Court
reversed it. The respondents filed the second appeal before the Patna High
Court. By the impugned judgment the High Court restored the judgment and
decree of the trial court and set aside the judgment and decree of the
First Appellate Court.
Though many points were urged in support of the appeal, the pivotal plea
was that the High Court could not have interfered with the judgment and
decree of the First Appellate court without framing a substantial question
of law as enjoined by Section 100 of the Code. The High Court can only
exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the code in Second Appeal on
the basis of substantial question of law framed at the time of admitting
appeal . A Second Appeal can be heard and decided only on the basis of
substantial question of law , if any. The judgment rendered by the High
Court in Second appeal without following the aforesaid procedure is not
sustainable in law.
Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the
question of law is self evident and on a technical plea that a question of
law has not been framed, the well reasoned judgment should not be set
aside.
As mandated by sub-section 3 of Section 100 of the Code, the memorandum of
appeal shall precisely state substantial question or questions of law
involved in the appeal. Where the High Court is satisfied that in any case
any substantial question of law is involved it shall formulate that
question under sub-section 4 and the second appeal has to be heard on the
question so formulated as stated in sub-section 5 of Section 100.
Section 100 of the Code deals with "Section Appeal". The provision reads as
follows:
"Section 100 - (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this
Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie
to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court
subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case
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involves a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex
parte.
(3) In an appeal under this Section, the memorandum of appeal shall
precisely state the substanteal question of law is involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substanteal question of law is
involved in any case , it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the
respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal , be allowed to argue that
the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take
away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be
recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not
formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such
question."
A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does not show
that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that the second
appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the
judgment cannot be maintained.
In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, [2000] 1 SCC 434 this Court in para 10,
has stated thus:
"10. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential
for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not
permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate Court without
doing so."
Yet again in Roop Singh (Dead) Through LRS. v. Ram Singh (dead) Through
Lrs., [2000] 3 SCC 703, this court has expressed that the jurisdiction
of a High Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of
law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads:
"7. It is to be reiterated that under section 100 CPC jurisdiction of the
High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals
which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any
jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact
while interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its
jurisdiction under section 100 CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of
the matter the High Court did not even notice the question of law
formulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal as there is
no reference of it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact findings
courts after appreciating the evidence held that the defendant entered into
the possession of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a tenant and
his possession was permissive and there was no pleading or proof as to
when it became adverse and hostile. There findings recorded by the two
courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material
on record and there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those
findings, It the defendant got the possession of suit land as a lessee or
under a batai agreement then from the permissive possession it is for him
to establish by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and
possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. Mere possession for
a long time does not result in converting permissive possession into
adverse possession Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, [1994] 6 SCC 591.
Hence the High Court ought not to have interfered with the findings of
fact recorded by both the courts be low."
The position has been reiterated in Kanhaiyalal and Ors. v. Anupkumar and
Ors., JT (2002) 10 SC 98.
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Reference may also be made to R. Lakshmi Narayan v. Santhi, [2001] 4 SCC
688, M.S.V. Raja and Anr. v. Seeni Thevar and Ors., [2001] 6 SCC 652,
R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple and
Anr., [2003] 8 SCC 752, Md. Mohammad Ali (dead) by Lrs. v. Jagadish Kalita
and Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 271, Chadat Singh v. Bahadur Ram and Ors., JT (2004)
6 SC 296, Kishori Lal and Anr. v. Madan Gopal (d) by Lrs. and Ors., JT
(2004) 8 SC 422 and Mathakala Krishnaiah v. V. Rajagopal, [2004] 10 SCC
676.
In the circumstances, the impugned judgment is set aside. We remit the
matter to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. The appeal is
disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.