Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
COLONEL HIS HIGHNESS SAWAI TEJ SINGHJI, MAHARAJA OF ALWAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT06/10/1978
BENCH:
KOSHAL, A.D.
BENCH:
KOSHAL, A.D.
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
UNTWALIA, N.L.
SEN, A.P. (J)
CITATION:
1979 AIR 126 1979 SCR (2) 62
1979 SCC (1) 512
ACT:
Constitution of India 1950-Art. 363-Covenants agreeing
to merger of princely states-Provision in Covenants that any
dispute relating to any item of property of Ruler or state
property to be referred for decision to a nominee of
Government of India and such decision shall be final and
binding on all concerned-Communication of the Government of
lndia to the effect that the settlement of the inventory of
properties was an integral part of an overall agreement in
respect of all outstanding matters of dispute-Whether Such
’decision’ an agreement and could be enforced by The Ruler-
Bar to jurisdiction of Civil Courts under Art. 363.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant who was the Ruler of a princely state
entered into a covenant agreeing to merge his state into a
union called the United States of Matsya. The Matsya
Covenant, by Art. Xl Cl. (2) provided that the ruler of each
state shall furnish to the Raj Pramukh an inventory of all
the inn movable properties, securities and cash balances
held by him as private property and cl. (3) provided that if
any dispute arose as to whether any item of property was the
private property of the ruler or the state property it shall
be referred to such person as the Government of India may
nominate in the decision of that person shall be final and
binding on all parties. The appellant furnished an inventory
of all properties claimed to be his private "property.
Sometime later the rulers of the constituent States of
Matsya entered into a Covenant with the Rajpramukh of the
United State of Rajasthan for merger of their States into
the State of Rajasthan in abrogation of the Matsya Covenant.
The Rajasthan Covenant by Art. XII, Cl. (2) provided for the
settlement of any dispute as to whether the property was
private property or state property by reference to such
person as the Government of India may nominate in
consultation with the Rajpramukh and that the decision of
such person shall be final and binding on the parties.
The Ministry of States, Government of India wrote on
14th September, 1949 to the appellant that the settlement of
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the inventory was an integral part of an overall agreement
in respect of all outstanding matters of dispute and did not
stand by itself. After correspondence with the Government of
India the appellant received a written communication
intimating the decision of the Government of India in
respect of 25 items of the property.
The appellant claimed that four buildings which were in
occupation of the State Government had been declared as his
private properties in the inventory appended to the letter
of the Government of India and that the State Govern-
63
ment should pay rent to him in respect of those buildings.
This claim of the appellant having been rejected, he filed a
suit in the district court for a declaration that the
properties were his private properties and that the
respondents should be ordered to pay rent to him.
The suit was transferred by the High Court to itself,
The High Court dismissed the suit on the ground that
adjudication of the dispute was barred by Art. 363 of the
Constitution.
In appeal to this Court it was contended that the
letter of 14th September, 1949 was the result of a decision
arrived at in pursuance of cl. (3) of Art. XI of Matsya
Covenant and cl. (2) of Art. XII of the Rajasthan Covenant
and must be construed as a decision of the Government of
India.
Dismissing the appeal,
^
HELD: 1. The decision sought to be enforced is an
agreement hit by Art. 363 of the Constitution and the High
Court was right in dismissing the suit. [74H]
2. The so-called decision was nothing but an agreement
between the Government of India and the appellant. The
letter clearly stated that the inventory furnished by the
plaintiff was discussed with him at New Delhi and that a
copy of the final inventory of the appellant’s private
properties, which had the approval of the Government of
India in the Ministry of States, Was forwarded to him. Under
clause (3) Art. XI of the Matsya Covenant as also clause (2)
of Art. XII of the Rajasthan Covenant, no approval of the
Ministry
of States was called for. What each of these clauses
provided was that if any dispute arose as to whether any
item of property was the private property of the ruler
concerned or of his erstwhile state, it was to be referred
to such a person as the Government of India might nominate,
and the decision of that person was to be final and binding
on all parties concerned. Neither the Government of India
nominated a person to whom the dispute was to be referred;
nor did any such person give a decision on the point. The
contents of the letter, are not at all relatable to those of
either of the two clauses. On the other hand, they clearly
indicate that the so-called "decisions" of the States
Ministry contained in the inventory appended to the letter
formed really the record of the agreement arrived at between
the Ministry of States and the plaintiff as a result of
negotiations. [71D-H]
3. Paragraph three of the letter talks of the
"settlement of the inventory’. which was tc. be an integral
part of an "overall agreement in respect of all outstanding
matters of dispute" and was not to stand by itself. What the
said was that all the disputes regarding the property of the
Ruler were to be settled by an overall agreement that the
contents of the inventory appended to the letter merely
recorded the settlement between the appellant and the
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Ministry and that even those contents were not to be
regarded as final settlement of the matters dealt with
therein unless they formed part of an agreement embracing
all items of property. [72B-C]
4. In the instant case instead of having the disputes
referred for decision to a person nominated by the parties
they decided to adopt the method of mutual agreement to
settle those disputes. Such mutual agreement could not
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be regarded as a decision by a person nominated by the
Government of India either under clause (3) of Art. of
Matsya Covenant or clause (2) of Art. Xll of Rajasthan
Covenant. It must be deemed to be nothing more nor less than
an agreement simpliciter even though it was labelled as a
decision of the States Ministry. [72H-73B]
5. Article 363 of the Constitution bars the
jurisdiction of all courts in any dispute arising out of any
agreement which was entered into or executed before the
commencement of the Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian
Sate to which the Government of India was party. The
operation of the Article is not limited to any "parent"
Covenant and every agreement whether it was primary or one
entered into in pursuance of the provisions of a preceding
agreement would fall within the ambit of the Article. The
fact that the agreement contained in the letter dated the
14th September, 1949 had resulted from action taken under
the provisions of the Rajasthan Covenant, is no answer to
the plea raised on behalf of the respondents that Art. 363
of the Constitution is a bar to the maintainability of the
two suits, although that agreement did not flow directly
from the Rajasthan Covenant but was entered into by ignoring
and departing from the provisions of clause (2) of Art. XII
thereof. [73D-E]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No 12 of
1965.
From the Judgment and Decree dated 29-4-1965 of the
Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil Misc. Case No. 67 of
1965.
B. D. Sharma for the Appellant.
S. N. Kacker, Sol. Genl., U. R. Lalit and Girish Chandra
for Respondent No. l.
S. M. Jain for Respondent No. 2
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KOSHAL, J. The facts forming the background to this
appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan
against its judgment dated the 29th April 1968, in so far as
they are undisputed, may be stated in some detail. On the
28th February 1948, the Rulers of the erstwhile States of
Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli entered into a
Covenant (hereinafter referred to as the Matsya Covenant)
agreeing to merge their States into one State known as the
United State of Matsya which was to come into being on the
1st of April 1948 with the Ruler of Dholpur as its Raj
Pramukh. Article VI of the Covenant provided that the Ruler
of each Covenanting State shall, as soon as may be
practicable and in any event not later than the 15th March,
1948, make over the administration of his State to the Raj
Pramukh and that thereupon all rights, authority and
jurisdiction belonging to such Ruler which appertained or
were incidental to the Government of his State. shall vest
in the United State of Matsya.
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Article Xl of the Covenant provided for the private
properties of the Ruler and ran thus:
"1. The Ruler of each Convenanting State shall be
entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of
all private, properties (as distinct from State
properties) belonging to him on the date of his making
over the administration of that State to the Raj
Pramukh.
"2. He shall furnish to the Raj Pramukh before the
1st May, 1948, an inventory of all the immovable
properties, securities and cash balances held by him
.16 such private property.
"3. If any dispute arises as to whether any item
of property is the private property of the Ruler or
State property it shall be referred to such person as
the Government of India may nominate and the decision
of that person shall be final and binding on all
parties concerned."
The United State of Matsya came into being as
stipulated in the Matsya Covenant on the 1st of April 1948
and during the same month the Ruler of Alwar, who is the
appellant before us, furnished to the Raj Pramukh an
inventory of all the immovable properties, securities and
cash balances held and claimed by him as his private
properties.
On the 11th of April 1948, the Rulers of ten States,
namely, Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur, Jhalawar, Kishengarh,
Kotah, Mewar, Partabgarh, Shahpura and Tonk entered into a
Covenant agreeing to merge them into one State named the
United State of Rajasthan. That Covenant was superseded by
another dated the 10th of March 1949 (hereinafter called the
Rajasthan Covenant) through which the United State of
Rajasthan was to consist of the said ten States as also of
four others, namely, Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer , and
Jodhpur, with the Ruler of Jaipur as the Raj Pramukh. Clause
(c) of Article I of the Rajasthan Covenant defined the
expression "new Covenanting State" to mean any of the said
four States. Article II of the Covenant last mentioned
provided that the United State of Rajasthan would include
any other State, the Ruler of which entered into an
agreement with the Raj Pramukh, with the approval of the
Government of India? to the integration of that State with
the United State of Rajasthan
Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant provided:
"(1) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall be
entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of
all private properties (as distinct from State
properties), belonging to
66
him on the date of his making over the administration
of that State to the Raj Pramukh of the former Rajasthan
state or as the case may be, to the Raj Pramukh of the
United State under this Covenant.
" (2) If any dispute arises as to whether any item
of property is the private property of the Ruler of a
Covenanting State other than a new Covenanting State,
or is State pro perty, it shall be referred to such
person as the Government of India may nominate in
consultation with the Raj Pramukh, and the decision of
that person shall be final and binding on all parties
concerned:
"Provided that no such dispute shall be so
referable after the first day of May, 1949.
"(3) The private properties of the Ruler of each
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new Covenanting State shall be as agreed to between the
Government of India in the States Ministry and the
Ruler concerned, and the settlement of properties thus
made shall be final."
On the 1st of May 1949, the Rulers of the States of
Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli which were the
constituent States of the United State of Matsya, entered
into an agreement (hereinafter called the Amending
Agreement) with the Raj Pramukh of the United State of
Rajasthan merging with four States into it with effect from
the 15th of May 1949 in abrogation of the Matsya Covenant.
While subscribing to the Amending Agreement the Ruler of
Dholpur acted not only in his capacity as such but also as
the Raj Pramukh of the United State of Matsya. Article IV of
that Agreement effected amendments in the Rajasthan Covenant
so as to make it applicable to the said four States with
effect from the date last mentioned. No charge, however, was
made in the provisions of clause (c) of Article I of Article
XII of the Rajasthan Covenant.
On the 14th of September 1949, Mr. V. P. Menon of the
Ministry of States, Government of India, wrote the following
letter to the Ruler of Alwar:
"My dear Maharaja Sahib,
"Your Highness will recall that the inventory of
immovable properties, securities and cash balances
furnished by Your Highness in accordance with Article,-
XI of the Covenant for the formation of the United
State of Matsya was discussed with Your Highness at New
Delhi on the 9th and 10th April, 1949. I now forward
for Your Highness’s information a
67
copy of the final inventory of Your Highness’s
private properties. It has the approval of the Government of
India in the Ministry of States.
"2. The following claims of Your Highness and the
counter-claims of the former Matsya Government are
still under consideration and the decision will be
communicated to Your Highness as soon as possible.
(1) cash balance of the Alwar State treasury;
(2) claim for Rs. 4,82,520 as arrears of Privy
Purse of Your Highness for 6 years from 1936-37 to 1942-43.
"3. Your Highness will appreciate that the
settlement of the inventory is an integral part of an
over-all agreement in respect of all outstanding
matters of dispute and does not stand by itself.
"With kind regards,
"Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
"(V. P. Menon)"
This letter was accompanied by a copy of the "final’
inventory which listed 32 items. Reproduced below is the
item at Serial No. 1 of that inventory:
------------------------------------------------------------
"S. Description of property. Decision of the State
No Ministry.
------------------------------------------------------------
1. City Palace including adjoining
building. . . . . . Ancestral. The portion of
the building at present
in use by the State for
administrative purposes
or for Museum and
Imperial Bank will
continue to be so used
till such time as
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required. The
requirements of the State
in future will not be of
the same order as today
and every effort will be
made to release the
accommodation at present
occupied in the Zenana &
Mardana Mahals at the
earliest practicable
date. The State will bear
the maintenance cost of
the portions used by it.
Any addition or
alteration in the portion
used by the State will
require the prior consent
of His Highness and
should be carried out at
State expense."
------------------------------------------------------------
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Thereafter, correspondence went on between the Ministry
of States and the Ruler of Alwar and on the 24th September
1952 the later received from the former a written
communication dealing with 26 items of properties. The
opening clause of Para 2 of the letter stated:
"2. The Government of India have carefully
considered all the outstanding questions in respect of
your High Courts private properties, in consultation
with the Rajasthan Government, and their decisions in
respect thereof are as follows:-"
The description of each item covered by the letter was
followed by the decision in respect thereof That part of the
letter which deals with item 26 is set down below:
"(26) City Palace including adjoining buildings:
The City Palace with the adjoining buildings,
comprising of the Jagir office, Central Record, lmperial
Bank, Treasury, Gandhi National School etc. will be your
Highness’s ancestral property. The secretariat building will
however be State 1) property.
This decision was reiterated in an office Memorandum
issued by the Government of Rajasthan in the Political
Department on the 30th of December 1952. Through a letter
dated the 14th of October 1959 proceeding from his Private
Secretary and addressed to the Chief Secretary, Ministry of
Home Affairs, Government of India. the Ruler of Alwar
claimed rent for three properties known as the Secretariat
building, Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman Station
adjoining the City Palace and the bungalow at Sariska, which
were in the occupation of the Rajasthan Government. The
claim was made on the ground that all the four properties
had been declared to be the private properties of the Ruler
in the inventory appended to the letter dated the 14th
September 1949 mentiond above. The claim was rejected by the
Ministry of Home Affairs which asserted in its letter dated
the 24th of December 1959 that the four properties in
question had not been recognized as the private properties
of the Ruler. The claim was reiterated by the Ruler through
a letter issued by Shri Gopesh Kumar Ojha, his Legal &
Financial Adviser, but the name was again turned down by the
Ministry of Home Affairs through their letter dated the
6th/8th of December 1960 in which the position taken was:
"The Statement regarding the extent of your
Private Property rights in the City Palace area made in
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our letter dated 24-12-59 are based upon the decision
reached in March 1952 after discussion with your
Highness and we regret that they cannot now be
reopened."
69
2. It was in the above background that the Ruler of
Alwar filed two suits, being suits Nos. 4 and 5 of 1963, in
the court of the District Judge, Alwar. In Suit No. 5 the
prayer made was that the three properties known as the
Secretariat building, Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman
Station be declared to be the private properties of the
plaintiff and that the State of Rajasthan be ejected
therefrom, or, in the alternative, be ordered to pay rent at
a specified rate. A decree for 36,000% was also claimed for
mesne profits. In suit No. 4 of 1963, the Claim was that the
plaintiff was entitled to rent or mesne profits in respect
of a building forming part of the Mardana Palace.
3. Both suits were resisted by the Union of India and
the State of Rajasthan who were joined as the two defendants
to each of them and it was claimed inter-alia that the
provisions of article 363 of the Constitution of India were
a complete bar to their maintainability.
4. The two suits were transferred by me High Court of
Rajasthan to itself and the question of their
maintainability was mooted before it with reference to the
provisions of article 363 of the Constitution 1 which
states:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution
but subject to the provisions of article 143,
neither the Supreme Court nor any other court
shall have jurisdiction in any dispute
arising out of any provision of a treaty,
agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or
other similar instrument which was entered
into or executed before the commencement of
this Constitution by any Ruler of Indian
State and to which the Government or the
Dominion of India or any of its predecessor
Governments was a party and which has or has
been continued in operation after such
commencement, or in any dispute in respect of
any right accruing under or any liability or
obligation arising out of any of the
provisions of this Constitution relating to
any such treaty, agreement, covenant,
engagement, sanad or other similar
instrument.
(2) In this article-
(a) "Indian State" means any territory
recognised before the commencement of
this Constitution by His Majesty or the
Government of the Dominion of India as
being such a State; and
(b) "Ruler" includes the Prince, Chief or
other per son recognised before such
commencement by
70
His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of
India as the Ruler of any Indian State.
The High Court proceeded to determine whether the
dispute in suit No. 5 of 1963 was one arising out of an
agreement such as fell within the ambit of article 363 (as
was contended by the defendants) or was merely a one-sided
decision of the Government of India and, therefore, outside
the purview of the article as was asserted by the plaintiff.
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It held that the "decisions" contained in the latter dated
the 14th of September 1949 had really resulted from an
agreement between the Ministry of States and the plaintiff,
that the extent of the building adjoining the City Palace
was not to be found with precision in the inventory appended
to the said letter, that consequently there was a real
dispute between the parties whether the suit property was
included in the expression "adjoining building" and that the
adjudication of such a dispute was barred by the provision
of article 363 of the Constitution. Suit No. 5 of 1963 was,
therefore, dismissed, but with no order as to costs. In
regard to suit No. 4 of 1963, however, the High Court held
that the property in dispute was clearly a part of the City
Palace itself as it was comprised in the Mardana Mahal that
the dispute was altogether illusory in view of the fact that
right up to the 8th of December 1960, the Government of
India had been taking the stand that the disputed property
was the private property of the plaintiff, that the dispute
was consequently not barred by the provisions of article 363
of the Constitution, and that the suit, there fore, deserved
to be decided by the District Judge on merits. In the
result, suit No. 4 of 1963 was remitted to the trial court
for decision according to law.
5. It is the judgment of the High Court in suit No. S
of 1963 alone that is challenged in this appeal.
6. Mr. B. D. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant-
Ruler, has vehemently contended that the letter dated the
14th December 1949 was not the result of an agreement
between the plaintiff and the Government of India and that,
on the other hand, it was a decision arrived at in pursuance
of clause (3) of Article XI of the Matsya Covenant. In
support of this contention it was pointed out that the
letter was issued as a sequel to the inventory furnished by
the plaintiff under clause (2) of that Article and that the
operative part of the inventory appended to the letter is
headed "decision of the States Ministry" which, according to
learned Counsel, clearly negatives an agreement. It was
further urged that even the Rajasthan Covenant did not
envisaged any agreement in so far as the plaintiff was
concern cd because he was not the Ruler of a "new
Covenanting State" with
71
in the meaning of that expression as used in clauses (2) and
(3) of Article XII thereof, that it was clause (2) of that
Article which governed him and which again provided for a
decision being given on disputes relating to properties and
that the letter dated 14th September 1949 must still be
construed as a decision if the Matsya Covenant was held to
be inapplicable. A careful examination of the material on
the record, however, clearly makes out that the contention
is without substance as we shall presently show.
7. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff had furnished
the inventory of the properties held by him in accordance
with Article XI of the Matsya Covenant as is stated in the
opening paragraph of the letter dated the 14th of September
1949. It further cannot be gain-said that the third column
of the inventory to that letter was headed "decision of the
State Ministry". These two factors, without more, might have
gone a long way to support the case propounded on behalf of
the plaintiff, but they are sought to be used out of context
as is clear from a perusal of the entire letter from which
it can be safely spelt out that the so-called "decision" was
nothing but an agreement arrived at between the Government
of India and the plaintiff. It is pertinent that the letter
mentions that the inventory furnished by the plaintiff was
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discussed with him at New Delhi on the 9th and 10th of April
1949 and then states that a copy of the final inventory of
the plaintiff’s private properties, which had the approval
of the Government of India in the Ministry of States, was
forwarded to him. Now, under clause (3) of Article XI of the
Matsya Covenant as also clause (2) of Article XII of the
Rajasthan Covenant no approval of the Ministry of States was
called for. In fact, what each of those clauses provided was
that if any dispute arose as to whether any item of property
was the private property of the Ruler concerned or of his
erstwhile State, it was to be referred to such person as
the Government of India might nominate, and the decision of
that person was to be final and binding on all parties
concerned. Now, it is not the case of the plaintiff that the
Government of India nominated a person to whom the dispute
was to be referred; nor is it claimed by him that such a
person gave any decision. The contents of the letter,
therefore, are not at all relateable to those of either of
the two clauses just above-mentioned. On the other hand,
they clearly indicate that the so-called "decisions" of the
Sates Ministry contained in the inventory appended to the
letter formed really the record of the agreement arrived at
between the Ministry of States and the plaintiff as a result
of negotiations held on the 9th and 10th of April 1949. In
this connection, reference may pointedly be made to
paragraph 3 of the letter which bears repetition:
72
"3. Your Highness will appreciate that the
settlement of the inventory is an integral part of an
overall agreement in respect of all outstanding matters
of dispute and does not stand by itself."
This paragraph talks of "the settlement of the
inventory" which was to be an integral part of an "over-all
agreement in respect of all outstanding matters of dispute"
and was not to stand by itself. In our opinion, the
paragraph is a clincher against the plaintiff and indicates
without any shadow of doubt that what the letter said was
that all the disputes regarding the property of the Ruler
were to be settled by an over-all agreement, that the
contents of the inventory appended to the letter merely
recorded the settlement between the plaintiff and the
Ministry of States and that even those contents were not to
be regarded as a final settlement of the matters dealt with
therein unless they formed part of an agreement embracing
all items of property.
8. It may be noted here that the Matsya Covenant had
been abrogated with effect from the 15th May 1949 by the
Rajasthan Covenant as modified by the Amending Agreement and
there was thus no question of any decision being given after
that date under clause 3 of Article XI of the Matsya
Covenant and that the only surviving provision under which
disputes regarding property owned by the plaintiff could be
determined after the 15th of May 1949, was Article XII of
the Rajasthan Covenant. It is true that the expression "new
Covenanting State" as defined in clause (c) of Article I of
that Covenant meant only any of the four States of Bikaner,
Jaipur, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur, that the definition was not
amended by any provision of the Amending Agreement, so that
the State of Alwar could not be regarded as a "new
Covenanting Stat._" for the purpose of clause (3) of Article
XII of the Rajasthan Covenant and that the clause of that
Article in accordance with which disputes relating to
property claimed by tho Ruler of Alwar as his private
property were to be determined was clause (2) which provided
for their decision by a person nominated by the Government
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of India in that behalf. The fact remains, however, that no
such person was ever nominated and that the letter dated the
14th September, 1949, cannot be construed (for reasons
already stated by us) as laying down a decision of any such
person. What appears to have happened is that instead of
following the course indicated in clause (2) last mentioned
and having the disputes referred for decision to a person
nominated by the Government of India, the parties (the
Government of India and the appellant) decided to adopt the
method of mutual agreement to settle those disputes-a method
which always remained open to them, notwithstanding the
Matsya
73
Covenant and the Rajasthan Covenant. Such mutual agreement
could, by no stretch of imagination be regarded as a
decision by a person nominated by the Government of India
either under clause (3) of Article XI of the Matsya Covenant
or clause (2) of Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant and
must be deemed to be nothing more or less than an agreement
simpliciter even though it was labelled as a "decision of
the States Ministry" in the inventory appended to the letter
dated the 14th September, 1949.
9. Another contention raised by Mr. Sharma was that
even if the letter dated the 14th September, 1949 was held
to evidence an agreement, it was not hit by the provisions
of article 363 of the Constitution inasmuch as it was an
agreement resulting from the Rajasthan Covenant which alone
according to him, was the agreement covered by the article.
This contention is also without substance. Article 363 of
the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of all courts in any
dispute arising out of any agreement which was entered into
or executed before the commencement of the Constitution by
any Ruler of an Indian State to which the Government of
India was a party. The operation of the article is not
limited to any "parent" Covenant and every agreement whether
it is primary or one entered into in pursuance of the
provisions of a preceding agreement would fall within the
ambit of the article. Thus the fact that the agreement
contained in the letter dated the 14th September 1949 had
resulted from action taken under the provisions of the
Rajasthan Covenant, is no answer to the plea raised on
behalf of the respondents that article 363 of the
Constitution is a bar to the maintainability of the two
suits, although we may add, that agreement did not flow
directly from the Rajasthan Covenant but was entered into by
ignoring and departing from the provisions of clause (2) of
Article XII thereof.
10. The only other contention put forward by Mr. Sharma
was based on the contents of column 3 of Item 1 of the
inventory appended to the letter dated the 14th September
1949. He drew our attention to the mention in that column of
the portions of the adjoining building being occupied by the
State for administrative purposes or for Museum and Imperial
Bank and also comprising the Zenana and Mardana Mahals.
According to him, this meant that the entire building
adjoining the City Palace was held to be the private
property of the plaintiff, which finally vested in the
plaintiff as from the date of the letter and of which the
plaintiff could not be divested by any subsequent decision
of the Ministry of States. In this connection, Mr. Sharma
urged that the Ministry of States had no power of reviewing
a settlement once arrived at and argued that if it was
claimed that such
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a power existed, the determination by a court of the limited
question of the power of review would be barred by the
provisions of article 363 of the Constitution. This
contention also is of no avail to him. As held above, the
agreement dated the 14th September 1949 was not to stand by
itself but was to be a part and parcel of an overall
agreement embracing all outstanding matters of dispute. It
follows that the terms of the agreement contained in the
letter were liable to change till a final agreement was
reached, and in this view of the matter no finality could be
said to attach to those terms until all the disputes became
the subject-matter of an agreed settlement. The terms of the
inventory attached to the letter were thus merely tentative,
the process of settlement being a continuous one till all
the disputes were finally resolved. And the ultimate
decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs conveyed in its
letter of the 24th of December 1959, not to treat the
Secretariat building, Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman
Station adjoining the City Palace to be the private property
of the plaintiff, was based upon a mutual agreement between
the parties which was reached after discussion in March
1952, as part of an over-all agreement as is evident from
the letter of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated the 6th/8th
of December 1960.
11. In view of the conclusions arrived at above, we
hold that the ‘’decision" sought to be enforced by the
plaintiff is an agreement hit by article 363 of the
Constitution and that the High Court was right in dismissing
suit No. 5 of 1963 as being not maintainable. The appeal,
therefore, fails and is dismissed, but with no order as to
costs.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.
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