Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
A. NADAMUNI & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE PROHIBITION & EXCISE COMMISSIONER,NAMPALLY, HYDERABAD &
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/01/1997
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
This special leave petition has been filed against the
Order of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh, made on
December 13, 1996 in Writ Appeal No. 1437/96 confirming the
judgment of the learned single Judge, dated December 4, 1996
in Writ Petition No. 11385/96.
The only question for our consideration is: whether the
Superintendent of Excise who is also Registrar for certain
purposes of Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964
(for short, the ’Act’) has the power to disqualify an
existing member of the Srikalahsthi Toddy Tappers Co-
operative Society? The object of the Society is to
ameliorate the economic conditions of tappers by providing
them means of livelihood by tapping the Toddy tress allotted
by the Excise authorities. The provisions of the Act, the
rules made thereunder and the by-laws of the Society
regulate the admission of the members. The toddy tappers Co-
operative Society should consist of members who are really
and actually in the avocation of tappers and are allotted
Palmera trees for tapping toddy as their sources of
livelihood. On a complaint that non-tappers were admitted
and are members of the Society at the behest of a member, a
writ petition came to be filed in the High Court. Pursuant
to an interim direction given by the High Court to conduct
tapping test, the competent officers conducted the same in
that behalf. The authorities came to conclude that the
petitioners were not the tappers as they did not fulfil the
condition of the tapping experience etc, and accordingly
were removed from the membership which decision was
confirmed by the High Court in the writ petition as also in
appeal.
It was contended that the Registrar (Superintendent of
Excise) has no power to remove them from membership of
Society. The primary contention raised in the High Court as
reiterated by Shri L.N. Rao, learned counsel for the
petitioners, is that while power under Section 19, in the
matter of admission of the members of the Society, was
delegated to the Superintendent of Excise, power under
Section 21, namely, disqualification for being a member of
the Society etc. was not delegated to him. Therefore, the
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Superintendent of Excise was without jurisdiction to remove
the petitioners from the membership of the Society. We find
no force in the contention. It is seen that admission of the
members is governed by the provisions of Section 19 of the
Act. Section 21 prescribes disqualification for being a
member of the Society. Sub-section (1) postulates that a
person shall be disqualified for being admitted as, and for
being a member, in the circumstances enumerated in cause (a)
to (e). Clause (aa) was also introduced in 1988 and thereby
another ground for disqualification came to be added to the
existing grounds. Under the said clause (aa), a person who
is not eligible for membership of the Society under Section
19 is disqualified for being admitted as, and for being, a
member of the Society. Under these circumstances, once the
power of non-admission of a member of the Society under
Section 19 has been engrafted in Section 21 and delegated
for removal from membership as envisaged in Rule 20 of the
Rules, Superintendent of Excise has power under Rule 20
which empowers him to consider the ineligibility of being
removed from membership under Section 19, Section 19 power
was delegated to the superintendent of Excise. The
inescapable consequence is that the subsequent
disqualification for being a member of the Society also
becomes available under Rule 20 s a disqualification if the
member ceases to be a tapper. It would be one of the factors
to be considered under Rule 20. As a consequence, it is not
necessary that there should be an express separate
conferment of power of the Registrar under Section 21 on the
Superintendent of Excise. We, therefore, hold that the view
taken by the High Court is not vitiated by any error of law
warranting interference.,
The special leave petition is dismissed