Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RUDRADHAR R. TRIVEDI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGHTHE SECRETARY & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/07/1996
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
G.B. PATTANAIK (J)
CITATION:
1996 SCALE (5)475
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (for short, the ’Act’) was published on July 11,
1953. Successive declaration under Section 6 came to be
published in the year 1955-56. Thereafter, as many as 40
awards have been passed determining the compensation. In
this case notice was issued by the second respondent on May
15, 1963 under Section 9 of the Act pursuant to which the
petitioner had filed his objections. Thereafter, the award
came to be made on 13.3.1985. He filed writ petition
challenging the validity of the notification under Section
4(1) and the declaration under Section 6. Primary
contention raised in the writ petition was that the
petitioner had not been given notice under Section 5-A
whereas being a sub-lessee, he was an interested person. The
High Court was not impressed with the argument. He further
contended that there was inordinate delay in passing the
award. On that account, notification under Section 4(1) and
declaration under Section 6 were required to be set aside.
That contention was also negatived. The learned single Judge
by judgment dated February 16, 1996 dismissed the writ
petition. On appeal, the Division Bench in the impugned
order dated June 12, 1996 in Appeal No.423/96 confirmed the
same.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that
since the land in an extent of 567 acres was acquired for
public purpose, namely, establishment of IIT, transfer of
60 acres of land to NITIE by the IIT by a resolution of the
Government, viz., 95 of 1970, dated June 26, 1970 was
clearly a fraud on public purpose. Therefore, the
acquisition is not valid in law. In support thereof, the
learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of Bombay
High Court in The Industrial Development & Investment Co.
Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [AIR 1989 Bom.156]
and of Delhi High Court in Union of India vs. Nand Kishore
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[AIR 1982 Delhi 462]. We find no force in the contention. It
is settled law that the land acquired for public purpose can
be transferred to another public purpose. Paramount
consideration will be service of the public purpose. The
NITIE is also one of the public institutions imparting
technical education in the region. Under these
circumstances, the transfer of 60.8312 acres of land handed
over to NITIE pursuant to the resolution made by the
Government is not vitiated by any error of law nor the
notification under Section 4(1) and declaration published
under Section 6 become bad in law. The aforesaid decisions
bear no relevance.
It is next contended that in view of the inordinate
delay in passing the award, the acquisition should be
required to be quashed. We find no force in the contention.
It is seen that in Maharashtra State, as per the rules
prevailing, pursuant to the notice under Section 5-A a
personal hearing is required to be given to all the owners.
In a massive acquisition like this, it would be well neigh
impossible to the Land Acquisition Officer to pass the award
within a short span of time. Under these circumstances,
necessarily delay had occasioned in passing the awards. The
petitioner had evoked at a belated stage in 1985, after
practically 22 years. The High Court was, therefore, clearly
right in refusing to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The SLP is accordingly dismissed.