Full Judgment Text
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
Date of Reserve: 8 September, 2010
th
Date of Order: 15 September, 2010
+ W.P.(Crl.) No. 363/2010
% 15.09.2010
Dinesh Yadav ... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anurag Jain, Advocate
Versus
CBI ... Respondent
Through: Mr. Vikas Pahwa, Standing Counsel for CBI
with Mr. Suchit Chandra, Advocate
JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA
1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not?
3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest?
JUDGMENT
1. The above petition and many more petitions have been filed by litigants
against the orders of Special Judge framing charge for the offences under Prevention of
Corruption Act coupled with or without charges for offences under IPC.
2. Some of the petitions were filed originally under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, some were filed as Revision Petitions and were converted as Writ
Petitions at the request of the parties, and some Writs were filed after dismissal of
Revision Petition.
3. In Dharambir Khattar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 159 (2009)
DLT 636 , the Bench of Dr. S. Muralidhar J. after considering the provisions of Section
19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act and after considering the legal position and after
scanning through various judgments of Supreme Court had observed as under:
“To conclude this part of the discussion it is held that in the context of
Section 19 (3) (c) the words "no Court shall exercise the powers of revision
in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial..." includes
an interlocutory order in the form of an order on charge or an order framing
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charge. On a collective reading of the decisions in V.C.Shukla and Satya
Narayan Sharma, it is held that in terms of Section 19 (3) (c) PCA, no
revision petition would be maintainable in the High Court against order on
charge or an order framing charge passed by the Special Court.”
4. In para 24, the Bench observed that a petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C.
and under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would also be not maintainable
“In the present petitions it was urged that notwithstanding the
above legal position, the powers of this Court under Article 226 and 227 of
the Constitution and Section 482 CrPC remained untramelled. In other
words, it was submitted that in appropriate cases, the said provisions could
be invoked notwithstanding the statutory bar to challenge an order on
revision passed by the Special Court. In the considered view of this Court,
this argument although attractive also does not survive after the
authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in State v. Navjot
Sandhu (supra). There a similar argument raised in the context of Section
34 POTA was negatived. An order by the Special Judge POTA regarding
call interception was challenged in the High Court by a petition under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution read with Section 482 CrPC. The
Supreme Court held that the High Court ought not to have entertained the
petition at all. It noticed the judgments in Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharasthra and Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan.”
5. In subsequent decision in R.C. Sabharwal Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation, 166 (2010) DLT 362 , the Bench of V.K. Jain J. re-affirmed the legal
position regarding the order on charge passed by Special Judge of CBI being an
interlocutory order and observed as under:
“For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs, I am in full agreement
with the view taken in Dharambir Khattar‟s case as regards the
interpretation of the expression „interlocutory order‟ used in Section
19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.”
6. However, Justice Jain’s Bench further observed that it was in full
agreement with the view taken in the case of Dharambir Khattar that inherent power of the
Court cannot be used to interfere with an order on charge or directing the framing of
charge in case attracting the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, meaning thereby
that a petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would not be maintainable before High Court
assailing an order on charge, which was also the view of the previous bench. However,
the bench of Justice Jain took contrary view to the view of Justice Muralidhar’s bench
regarding maintainability of a petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India and
observed as under:
“40. In the case of Dharambir Khattar (supra), this Court also observed that
in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nayjot
Sandhu(supra), the power of the Court under Article 226 and 227 of the
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Constitution cannot be used to interfere with an order of this nature. I have
carefully gone through the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Nayjot Sandhu (supra) and I find that in this case, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court did not rule out invoking of writ jurisdiction of the High
Court, in appropriate cases, even in respect of interlocutory orders. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed that the order of this Court challenged
before it did not indicate as to whether the Court was exercising its power
of superintendence under Article 226 of the Constitution or its inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was noted
that the respondent Geelani had not invoked Article 227 of the Constitution
and it was contended by Dr. Dhawan that the order was passed in exercise
of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The Hon'ble Supreme Court found it difficult to accept the
submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the order of this Court was under
Article 227 of the Constitution. Thus, Court felt, on the facts of the case
before it, that neither the power under Article 227 of the Constitution nor
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
should have been exercised, even if such powers were available. In para
28 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
“Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India
gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all
Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited
or fettered by any act of the State Legislature. The supervisory
jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate Tribunal's within
the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law.
The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to
meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even
with an interlocutory order...
It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence,
under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep
subordinate Courts and Tribunal's within the bounds of their
authority and not to correct mere errors. Further where the
statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require
very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of
superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It
is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be
exercised 'as the cloak of an appeal in disguise'.”
41. Thus, in the case of Nayjot Sandhu (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court
expressly recognized the powers of the High Court to interfere even with
an interlocutory order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution though it cautioned that such powers should be exercised
sparingly and only with a view to keep subordinate Courts within the limits
of their authority and only in very exception circumstances, warranting
interference in exercise of these extraordinary powers. Therefore, the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nayjot
Sandhu(supra) does not rule out invoking and exercise of constitutional
powers of this Court in appropriate cases.”
W.P.(Crl.) No. 363/2010 Page 3 of 11
7. Ultimately, the bench of Justice Jain was of the view that the constitutional
remedy under Article 226, 227 of the Constitution cannot be shut out on the ground that
the petitions under Article 226, 227 of the Constitution, if entertained against interlocutory
orders on framing charge, the revision petitions challenging such order may be re-filed as
Writ Petitions. According to R.C. Sabharwal‟s case (Supra), the remedy does not lie in
denying writ jurisdiction of the High Court, but, lies in exercising a self restrain by the High
Court in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, 227 of the Constitution in accordance
with authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court, sparingly and in exceptional
circumstances.
8. This Court is of the view that the very purpose of the statutory provisions
enacted by legislature under Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act stand
defeated if the petitions under Article 227 are entertained against the order on charge.
9. In R.C. Sabharwal‟s case the Single Bench gave the reasons as to why the
Legislature was forced to enact Section 19(3) (c) of Prevention of Corruption Act and why
expression ‘interlocutory order’ needs to be interpreted differently from the interpretation
given to it in the context of Section 397 of CPC in following manner:
12. One main object behind replacing Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947
by a new Act in the year 1988 was to expedite the proceedings initiated
under Prevention of Corruption Act by providing for day to day trial of
cases and incorporating prohibitory provisions with regard to grant of stay
and exercise of powers of revision on interlocutory order. It has been
experienced that those who are arraigned for trial under the provisions of
Prevention of Corruption Act, try to delay the trial, using one or the other
method and availing all possible remedies available to them in law,
presumably in the hope that with the passage of time, the evidence that
can be used against them during trial may not remain available, if they are
able to delay the progress of the case, to the extent they can possibly do.
Not only final or intermediate orders even interlocutory orders used to be
and are still challenged despite the accused knowing it fully well that such
orders cannot be subject matter of challenge in revisional jurisdiction.
Though there is an absolute bar on stay of proceedings, it is not
uncommon for the accused in such cases to seek stay of proceedings on
the ground that they are likely to be seriously prejudiced and failure of
justice is likely to be occasioned, unless the proceedings are stayed. Even
if the Court is not inclined to stay the proceedings, considering the
embargo placed by Section 19(3)(b)(c), the accused persons insist upon
the record of the trial being summoned, contending that examination of the
record would be necessary for the purpose of deciding the petition filed by
them. Section 22(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 provides that
where the powers under Section 397(1) of the Code are exercised, the
Court shall not ordinarily call for the record of the proceedings without
giving the other party an opportunity of showing cause why the record
should not be called for, or if the Court is satisfied that examination of the
record of the proceedings may be made from the certified copies. But it
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has been experienced that the record is requisitioned in many cases,
entertaining the submission of the petitioners to the effect that scrutiny of
the original record would be necessary for the purpose of proper and
complete appreciation of the controversy involved in the case. As a result,
even if there is no stay of proceedings, the trial comes to be stalled on
account of the record having been requisitioned by the Superior Court. In
fact, Trial Court Record has actually been summoned in Crl. Rev. P. No.
293/2006, 352/2006 and 294/2006 being disposed of this order, which
shows that despite legislative restriction, the record of Trial Court
continues to be summoned by the Superior Courts. Ordinarily, the accused
in such cases command vast material resources and are in a position to
have access to the best legal assistance for the purpose of their defence. If
an order framing charge or directing framing of charge is not held to be an
interlocutory order, the inevitable result would be a flood of Revision
Petitions challenging such orders, coupled with request for either staying
the proceedings in exercise of inherent powers of the Court or seeking
summoning of the Trial Court record, thereby staying the trial for all
practical purposes. This is yet another reason why the expression
'interlocutory order' used in Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act needs to be interpreted differently from the interpretation
given to it in the context of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
13. With a view to expedite the trial of cases, involving offences under
Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, the Legislature has made a number of
changes in the regular procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal
Procedure for trial of criminal cases. Special Courts have been constituted
for trial of such cases. The Special Judges are required, as far as
practicable, to hold the trial on day to day basis. A specific provision has
been made placing embargo upon stay of proceedings under Prevention of
Corruption Act not only on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity
in the sanction unless such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a
failure of justice, but also on any other ground. Section 243(1) of the Code
has been amended so as to require the accused in a corruption case, to
give in writing, a list of the persons to whom he proposes to examine as his
witnesses and the documents on which he proposes to rely. Another
provision made in Section 22(b) of the Act provides that the proceedings
shall not be adjourned or postponed merely on the ground that an
application under Section 397 has been made by a party to the
proceedings. This provision was necessitated since it was experienced
that after filing a petition under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the accused would seek adjournment or postponement of
proceedings on the ground that the Revision Petition filed by him was
pending before the superior Court, and therefore, the trial Court should
keep its hands off the proceedings. A specific provision has been made in
Section 317 of the Code providing that the Judge may, for reasons to be
recorded by him and if he so thinks fit, proceed with the inquiry or trial in
the absence of accused or his pleader and record the evidence of any
witness subject to the right of the accused to recall the witnesses for cross-
examination. This provision was necessitated experiencing that either
accused or his pleader would be absent when the material witnesses are
present and that would necessitate adjournment of the case to another
date, thereby not only delaying the trial, but also causing inconvenience to
the witnesses and putting pressure on them to get tired and exhausted on
account of frequent visits to the Court. The objective behind all these
provisions is to expedite trial of the cases instituted under Prevention of
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Corruption Act. If an order framing charge or directing framing of charge in
such cases is not held to be an interlocutory order, the legislative objective
behind enactment of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is likely to be
substantially defeated. The virus of corruption continues to eat into the
vitals of our character and strength. With Government entering into large
commercial contract and making huge purchases with increased
expenditure on social welfare schemes and infrastructural projects, the
scope for corrupt practices has increased manifold as the schemes and
projects of the Government and its instrumentalities are executed only
through public servants which gives considerable scope for misconduct on
their part. Misuse of powers by those who occupy posts in Government is
capable of causing considerable damage to the image and reputation of
our country. We, therefore, need to curb and control the growing
temptation to make a fast buck and get rich overnight by indulging in
corrupt practices. This is possible only if those who indulge in such
activities are given swift and deterrent punishment, which, in turn, is
possible only if they are tried promptly and expeditiously, unhindered by
unnecessary interference from superior Courts. It is with this objective in
mind, Section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act has been enacted
so as to take away the revisional powers of the High Court in the cases
involving corruption by public servants.
10. This Court and the Apex Court have been consistently of the view as to
what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The legislative intent, as
expressed by introduction of Section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act, for speedier
disposal of corruption cases cannot be allowed to be defeated by opening a back-door
entry to the litigants for assailing orders on charge under Article 227 of the Constitution. It
is evident from the fact that more than 30 petitions out of the above were initially filed as
Revision Petitions but later on converted to Writ Petitions under Article 227 of the
Constitution by the order of the Court. This itself shows that since the Revision against
order on charge was barred by statute, the Court opened another door for doing the same
act which could not have been done by the petitioners due to the statutory prohibition.
11. In Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, AIR 1980 SC 892 , the Supreme
Court had occasion to consider a request made by the appellant to convert a revision into
a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and the Supreme Court made following
observations:
“17. It has been urged by the appellant in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad
Civil Appeal No. 2844 of 1979 that in case this Court is of the opinion that
a revision petition Under Section 115, Code of Civil Proceurde, is not
maintainable, the case should be remitted to the High Court for
consideration as a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. We are
unable to accept that prayer. A revision petition Under Section 115 is a
separate and distinct proceeding from a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution, and one cannot be identified with the other.”
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12. It would not be out of place to mention that revisional jurisdiction is part and
parcel of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. In Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh
Chandra Dey, 59 I.A. 283 , the Privy Council had observed that an application by party to
an Appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate Court, is an
appeal within the ordinary acceptance of the term. Similarly, in Raja of Ramnad v.
Ramid Rowthen and Ors., 53 I.A. 74 , a civil revision petition was considered to be an
appropriate form of appeal from the judgment of the subordinate Court. Thus the
appellate jurisdiction can be exercised by High Court in both forms – in the form of
Appeals, in the form of Revisions. Since the right to appeal and right to revision is
statutory right, if the statute has taken away this right, the question arises as to whether
this right should be permitted to the litigants under Article 227 of the Constitution or not ?
13. It is settled law that supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to whether an inferior Court or
Tribunal, has acted within its limits and not to correct an error apparent on the face of
record, much less an error of law. In using supervisory power under Article 227 of the
Constitution, High Court does not act as an Appellate Court and it is not permissible for a
High Court, on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution, to review or weigh the
evidence upon which inferior Court or Tribunal passed the order or to see if it committed
an error of law in decision. While passing an order on charge, the Special Judge has to
take a prima facie view on the basis of evidence placed on record along with the charge-
sheet and decide if the accused should be put to trial for certain offences as allegedly
committed by him or not. The accused is put to notice of the offences by framing charges
of the offences and then evidence is lead. In every revision against the order on charge
and in every petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. or under Article 227 of the Constitution,
the only grievance raised before the High Court is that charge of the alleged offences
was not made out and charge has been wrongly framed and the only prayer made is that
the charges framed against the accused persons should be set aside and accused should
be discharged. Once it has been authoritatively laid down by this Court that order on
charge is an interlocutory order and no revision against the charge would lie and no
petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would lie, entertaining a petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution against the order on charge by the High Court and then re-appreciating
the evidence collected by prosecution, and giving a finding whether charge was made out
or not, would result in deleting Section 19 (3) (c) from the Prevention of Corruption Act
and what has been prohibited directly would be done indirectly.
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14. In Maruti Bala Raut Vs. Dashrath Babu Wathare and Others, (1974) 2
SCC 615 , Supreme Court had observed that it is not for the High Court to discuss the
evidence and come to a conclusion different from the conclusion arrived at by the
Tribunal. The High Court, while exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution,
was not entitled to discuss the evidence given and to come to its own conclusion on the
evidence and if this is permitted then it would clearly amount to overstepping the limits of
power under Article 227 of the Constitution. When an order on charge is assailed before
the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution and it is stated that it was a fit case for
discharge of the accused, in fact, the prayer made to the High Court is invariably to
scrutinize the evidence collected by CBI and come to a conclusion different to the one
arrived at by the Special Court.
15. In Nagendra Nath Bora Vs. Commissioner, Hills Division, Assam, AIR
1958 SC 398 , Supreme Court had held that the powers of High Court under Article 227 of
the Constitution are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the constitution. It
has been further laid down that power of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution
was limited to see that the subordinate Court and Tribunal function within the limits of their
authority and the High Court cannot sit in appeal against the order of Tribunal under
Article 227 of the Constitution.
16. In Nibaran Chandra Bag, V. Bahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 SC
1895 , it was laid down by Supreme Court that jurisdiction conferred by Article 227 of the
Constitution was not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the
decisions of Subordinate Courts or Tribunals but was merely a power of superintendence
to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority.
17. In Jagir Singh Vs. Ranbir Singh and another, AIR 1979 SC 381 , it was
observed by the Supreme Court that power under Article 227 of the Constitution was a
discretionary power and this power could only be exercised sparingly to keep subordinate
Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct errors in their
judgments. Where the Criminal Procedure Code itself banned the exercise of revisional
powers by the high Courts, it would indeed require very exceptional circumstances to
warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution, since the power of
superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law.
18. In M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath and others, AIR 2000 SC 1997 , the
Supreme Court while considering the scope of Article 142 of the Constitution of India
observed that the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be construed as
W.P.(Crl.) No. 363/2010 Page 8 of 11
powers which authorize the court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant and this
power cannot be used to ‘supplant’ substantive statutory law applicable to a case or
cause under consideration of the Court. The Supreme Court further observed that Article
142 of the Constitution even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a
new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing
with a subject and thereby achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved
directly.
19. In Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash, AIR 2004, SC 3892 , the Supreme
Court observed that in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
227 of the Constitution High Court cannot indulge into re-appreciating or evaluation of
evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences.
20. Even if it is considered that while considering charge on the basis of
evidence collected by the prosecution two views were possible and the Trial Court had
taken one view, which was plausible view, the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution cannot interfere with the order of the Trial Court of framing charge, more so,
when the order is held to be an interlocutory order in view of Section 19 (3) (c) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act.
21. In Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed v. Tufelhussein Samasbhai
Sarangpurwala, AIR 1988 SC 184, the Supreme Court had observed that High Court
should not interfere and would be in error in interfering with the Trial Court order under
Article 227 of the Constitution where two views were possible and the Trial Court had
taken one view.
22. In Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte and antoher, AIR
1975 SC 1297 , power of superintendence of High Court was gone into by the Supreme
Court and it was observed that this power cannot be invoked to correct the error of fact
which can only be corrected by a superior court in exercise of a statutory power of appeal.
The High Court in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
cannot convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right
of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate court or tribunal final.
23. In view of these observations made by the Supreme Court in above cases,
I consider that incase of Prevention of Corruption Act, framing of charge once having
been held as an interlocutory order and no revision maintainable under the Statute, the
High Court cannot open the doors of review of the order of Special Judge under Article
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227 of the Constitution nullifying the statutory provisions. The function of High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited to see that subordinate Court or Tribunal
functions within its limit or authority and not to see whether the order passed by the Trial
Court or Tribunal was the correct order or not. Under Article 227 of the Constitution, the
High Court cannot correct the errors in the order.
24. In Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi and another ,
AIR 1968 SC 222 , Supreme Court observed that the powers of the High Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution was not greater than the powers under Article 226 of the
constitution and it was limited to see that the Tribunal functions within the limits of its
authority. The High Court will not review the discretion of the Authority judicially
exercised, but it may interfere if the exercise of the discretion is capricious or perverse or
ultra vires.
25. It is well known fact that trials of corruption cases are not permitted to
proceed further easily and a trial of corruption case takes anything upto 20 years in
completion. One major reason for this state of affairs is that the moment charge is
framed, every trial lands into High Court and order on charge is invariably assailed by the
litigants and the High Court having flooded itself with such revision petitions, would take
any number of years in deciding the revision petitions on charge and the trials would
remain stayed. Legislature looking at this state of affairs, enacted provision that
interlocutory orders cannot be the subject matter of revision petitions. This Court for
reasons as stated above, in para No. 3 & 4 had considered the state of affairs prevalent
and came to conclusion that no revision against the order of framing of charge or order
directing framing of charge would lie. Similarly, a petition under Section 482 of Cr. P.C.
would also not lie. I am of the opinion that once this Court holds that a petition under
Article 227 would lie, the result would be as is evident from the above petitions that every
order on charge which earlier used to be assailed by way of revision would be assailed in
a camouflaged manner under Article 227 of the Constitution and the result would be same
that proceedings before the trial court shall not proceed.
26. The decisions on a petition assailing charge requires going through the
voluminous evidence collected by the CBI, analyzing the evidence against each accused
and then coming to conclusion whether the accused was liable to be charged or not. This
exercise is done by Special Judge invariably vide a detailed speaking order. Each order
on charge of the Special Judge, under Prevention of Corruption cases, normally runs into
40 to 50 pages where evidence is discussed in detail and thereafter the order for framing
of charge is made. If this Court entertains petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution to
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re-appreciate the evidence collected by CBI to see if charge was liable to be framed or, in
fact, the Court would be doing so contrary to the legislative intent. No court can
appreciate arguments advanced in a case on charge without going through the entire
record. The issues of jurisdiction and perversity are raised in such petitions only to get
the petition admitted. The issue of jurisdiction is rarely involved. The perversity of an
order can be argued in respect of any well written judgment because perversity is such a
term which has a vast meaning and an order which is not considered by a litigant in its
favour is always considered perverse by him and his counsel. Therefore, entertaining a
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order on charge would amount to
doing indirectly the same thing which cannot be done directly, I consider that no petition
under Article 227 can be entertained.
27. However, since there are two views, one expressed by the Bench of
Justice Jain in R.C. Sabharwal „s (supra) case and one held by the Bench of Justice
Muralidhar in Dharamvir Khattar‟s (supra) case and by this Bench, I consider that it was a
fit case where a Larger Bench should set the controversy at rest. The matter is, therefore,
referred to the Chief Justice for referring the following question:
“ Whether an order on charge framed by a Special Judge under the
provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, being an interlocutory order,
and when no revision against the order or a petition under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. lies, can be assailed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, whether or not the offences committed include the offences under
Indian Penal Code apart from offences under Prevention of Corruption
Act?”
to a Larger Bench.
28. The matter be listed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for referring it to a
th
Larger Bench on 17 September, 2010.
There is no stay of proceedings before the Trial Court. Proceedings before the
Trial Court shall continue.
SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA, J.
September 15, 2010
acm
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