Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 618-620 of 2001
PETITIONER:
State of Haryana
RESPONDENT:
Surender & Ors. etc.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/06/2007
BENCH:
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & D.K. JAIN
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a
Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
directing acquittal of the respondents who were found guilty of
offences punishable under Sections 302 and 394 read with
Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ’IPC’)
and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and 10 years
respectively.
2. Background facts in a nutshell are as under:
On 1.2.1994 Sushila Devi (PW-14) along with her
brothers Purshotam (hereinafter referred to as ’deceased’) and
Yashbir (PW-13) boarded a train at Sakurbasti (Delhi) at 6.30
p.m. for coming to Rohtak for treatment of Yashbir in Medical
College and Hospital, Rohtak. When the train was in motion
between Railway Stations Dehkora and Sampla, four
unidentified and unknown persons description of whom were
given in the report Ex./PD/1 allegedly entered into the
compartment where deceased along with Yashbir and Sushila
Devi was sitting and one of the assailants stood near deceased
and shouted to take out whatever they had in their
possession. Deceased-Purshotam asked him to wait.
Meanwhile the said youngman again shouted asking
Purshotam to hand over money and when Purshotam was in
the process of handing over the money, the youngman with
one hand snatched the money and gave a knife blow to the
deceased in his abdomen. On receipt of the injury, Purshotam
fell down. Yashbir (PW-13) who was sitting by the side of
Purshotam got up and proceeded towards that man and was
able to caught hold of his hand in which he was having a
knife. The other appellant fired a shot from the pistol hitting
Yashbir (PW-13). Some of the pellets also hit another
passenger Ashok Kumar. When the train slowed down near
Sampla Railway Station, both the persons who had caused
injuries and the other two accused persons got down from the
compartment and fled away. With the help of Sajjan Singh
(PW-3), both Purshotam and Yashbir injured were taken to
Civil Health Centre, Sampla and then to Medical College and
Hospital, Rohtak. However, Purshotam succumbed to the
injuries on the way to M.C.H. Rohtak. Udey Raj (PW-2),
Assistant Station Master received a telephonic message from
Control Room Delhi, with regard to the firing incident. He sent
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message (Ex.PA) to Station House Officer, Police Station,
Government Railway Police, Rohtak. When the train reached
Railway Station, Rohtak, police officials were deputed to guard
the compartment. SI Manohar Lal (PW-11), recorded the
statement of Sushila Devi (Ex.PB/1) on 1.2.1984 at Medical
College and Hospital, Rohtak and making his endorsement
Ex.PB/2 he sent the same to the police station for registration
of a case and on its basis formal FIR (Ex.PB/2) was recorded.
SI Manohar Lal, (PW-11) then went to Railway Station, Rohtak
and inspected the compartment. He took into possession
blood, pellets and empty cartridge from the compartment vide
memos Ex.PR and PR/1. He also prepared inquest report
(Ex.PU), and took into possession the clothes of the deceased
and Yashbir (PW-13), vide recovery memos Ex.PN and PM
respectively. He recorded the statements of the witnesses. On
completion of investigation charge sheet was placed and since
accused persons claimed trial, they were put to trial. On the
basis of the evidence on record, more particularly,
identification by eye-witnesses (PWs. 13/14) the trial Court
recorded conviction and imposed sentences as noted supra.
3. The conviction as recorded by the Trial Court was
questioned in three appeals filed by the respondents. In the
appeal the primary stand taken was that there was variance in
evidence as to the role played by the accused persons.
Additionally, it was urged that no test identification parade
was held and, therefore, the identification for the first time in
the Court was of no consequence.
4. In response, learned counsel for the State pointed out
that the accused persons themselves declined to take part or
to be put in the test identification parade for the purpose of
identification. The High Court brushed aside the stand of the
State and as noted above directed acquittal.
5. In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the
appellant stated that the accused persons cannot take
advantage of their own lapse. When they were asked to take
part in test identification parade they refused to participate.
That being so, the High Court has not indicated any reason as
to how the same was of any help to the accused and High
Court has wrongly drawn adverse inference.
6. On a perusal of the High Court’s order it is crystal clear
that the same is clearly unsustainable. The evidence of the
eye-witnesses i.e Yashbir (PW-13) and Sushila (PW-14) has not
been discussed. Both are injured witnesses. The High Court
did not indicate any reason as to why it discarded the plea of
the State that the accused persons having denied to
participate in the TI parade cannot make a grievance about
identification in Court. The High Court has even not discarded
the stand of the State as to why the plea relating to TI parade
cannot be raised by the accused. The only reason indicated
by the High Court for directing acquittal reads as follows:
"The argument of the learned Deputy
Advocate General, has been that once the
assailants refused to join the identification
parade, there would be a presumption that
they themselves were involved and none else.
The Court cannot feel complacent and
convinced because one person has lost life and
other escaped death, about the participation of
certain persons named by the police in a crime
unless they are connected with the
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commission of the crime undoubtedly without
the least shadow of doubt. As already
discussed above when the identification of the
appellants has taken place in Court after
about two years of the occurrence for the first
time and the statements of the witnesses of the
occurrence are contrary to the recoveries of
weapons from the appellants, it would not be
safe to sustain the conviction of the appellants
which may result into miscarriage of justice.
Hence, it is sufficient to say that the appellants
deserve the benefit of doubt. The appeals filed
by the appellants are allowed and the
appellants are acquitted of the charges framed
against them."
7. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the
evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally,
the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the
presumption of innocence of the accused is further
strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs
through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases
is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the
case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to
his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused
should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court
is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A
miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the
guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a
case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon
the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence where the
accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as
to whether any of the accused really committed any offence or
not. [See Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2002 (2) Supreme 567)]. The principle to be followed by
appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of
acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and
substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is
clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials
have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a
compelling reason for interference. These aspects were
highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr.
v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1973 SC 2622), Ramesh Babulal
Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996 (4) Supreme 167), Jaswant
Singh v. State of Haryana (2000 (3) Supreme 320), Raj Kishore
Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors. (2003 (7) Supreme 152), State of
Punjab v. Karnail Singh (2003 (5) Supreme 508), State of
Punjab v. Pohla Singh and Anr. (2003 (7) Supreme 17) and
V.N. Ratheesh v. State of Kerala (2006 (10) SCC 617).
8. Above being the position, the High Court’s judgment is
clearly unsustainable and is set aside. The appeals are
allowed. The accused shall forthwith surrender to custody to
serve remainder of the sentence.