Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 302 of 2004
PETITIONER:
Rajinder Singh Chauhan & Ors.
RESPONDENT:
State of Haryana and Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/11/2005
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & R.V. RAVEENDRAN
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Appellants call in question legality of the judgment
rendered by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court holding that the appellants’ stand about applicability
of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in
short the ’Act’) was not correct.
Controversy lies within a narrow compass.
Appellants were employees of the Haryana State
Federation of Consumers Co-operative Wholesales Stores
Limited (in short the ’CONFED’), fourth respondent herein.
The service conditions of its employees are covered by
CONFED Staff Service Rules, 1975 (in short the ’Rules’). On
account of continued financial losses, a restructuring plan
for gainful employment for employees was prepared. It was
noted that Retail Outlets (in short the ’ROL’) were causing
huge loss to the organization. Therefore, it was decided
that all ROL should be closed being financially non-viable.
Retrenchment compensation in terms of Section 25-F of the
Act was paid. In the retrenchment order it was specifically
stated as follows:
"It is made clear that employees of CONFED
from where the retrenchment is being effected
are not covered by Chapter V-B of the
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, necessitating
any permission under Section 25-N of the said
Act. Therefore the retrenchment is being
effected in accordance with Chapter V-A by
employing with Section 25-F and other
provisions of the said Chapter."
Questioning the retrenchment, writ petitions were filed
before the High Court taking the stand that provisions of
Section 25-N and not Section 25-F were applicable and in any
event the appellants were entitled to the benefit in terms
of Rule 35(b) of the Rules. High Court did not find any
substance in the stand and dismissed the Writ Petitions
holding that there was compliance with the requirements of
Section 25-F(b) of the Act.
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According to the learned counsel for the appellants the
High Court has erroneously held that Section 25-N has no
application. Even otherwise, it was contended that the
appellants were entitled to the benefits available under
Rule 35(b).
It was in this context submitted by the learned counsel
for the appellants that after completion of the probation
period, the appellants had become permanent employees and,
therefore, they were governed by the Rules and the benefits
under Rule 35(b) were clearly applicable.
In response, learned counsel for the respondents
submitted that the High Court’s view is in order.
In order to appreciate rival submissions the relevant
provisions need to be noted. Section 25-F, 25-K, 25-L and
25-N of the Act read as follows:
"25-F: Conditions precedent to retrenchment
of workmen: No workman employed in any
industry who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year under an employer
shall be retrenched by that employer until \026
(a) the workman has been given one
month’s notice in writing indicating the
reasons for retrenchment and the period
of notice has expired, or the workman
has been paid in lieu of such notice,
wages for the period of the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid, at the
time of retrenchment, compensation which
shall be equivalent to fifteen days’
average pay (for every completed year of
continuous service) or any part thereof
in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner
is served on the appropriate
Government (or such authority as may
be specified by the appropriate
Government by notification in the
Official Gazette).
25-K: Application of Chapter V-B: (1) The
provisions of this Chapter shall apply to an
industrial establishment (not being an
establishment of a seasonal character or in
which work is performed only intermittently)
in which not less than one hundred workmen
were employed on an average per working day
for the preceding twelve months.
(2) If a question arises whether an
industrial establishment is of a seasonal
character or whether work is performed
therein only intermittently, the decision of
the appropriate Government thereon shall be
final.
25-L: For the purpose of this chapter, - (a)
’Industrial Establishment" means:
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(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of
Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948(63 of
1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-
section(1) of Section 2 of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952); or
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f)
of Section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act,
1951 (69 of 1951);
(b) notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-clause(ii) of clause (a) of Section 2 ;
(i) in relation to any company in which
not less than fifty-one percent of the paid
up share capital is held by the Central
Government, or
(ii) in relation to any corporation (not
being a corporation referred to in sub-clause
(i) of clause (a) of Section 2) established
by or under any law made by Parliament,
the Central Government shall be the
appropriate Government.
25-N: CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO RETRENCHMENT OF
WORKMEN:
(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies,
who has been in continuous service for not
less than one year under an employer shall be
retrenched by that employer until, -
(a) the workman has been given three
months’ notice in writing indicating the
reasons for retrenchment and the period of
notice has expired, or the workman has been
paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the
period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the
appropriate Government or such authority as
may be specified by that Government by
notification in the Official Gazette
(hereafter in this section referred to as the
specified authority) has been obtained on an
application made in this behalf.
(2). An application for permission under sub-
section (1) shall be made by the employer in
the prescribed manner stating clearly the
reasons for the intended retrenchment and a
copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in
the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under
sub-section (1) has been made, the
appropriate Government or the specified
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authority, after making such enquiry as it
thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer,
the workmen concerned and the persons
interested in such retrenchment, may, having
regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the
reasons stated by the employer, the interests
of the workmen and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be
recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant
such permission and a copy of such order
shall be communicated to the employer and the
workmen.
(4) Where an application for permission has
been made under sub-section (1) and the
appropriate Government or the specified
authority does not communicate the order
granting or refusing to grant permission to
the employer within a period of sixty days
from the date on which such application is
made, the permission applied for shall be
deemed to have been granted on the expiration
of the said period of sixty days.
Xxx xxx xxx
(7). Where no application for permission
under sub-section (1) is made, or where the
permission for any retrenchment has been
refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to
be illegal from the date on which the notice
of retrenchment was given to the workman and
the workman shall be entitled to all the
benefits under any law for the time being in
force as if no notice had been given to him.
Xxx xxx xxx
(9). Where permission for retrenchment has
been granted under sub-section (3) or where
permission for retrenchment is deemed to be
granted under sub-section (4), every workman
who is employed in that establishment
immediately before the date of application
for permission under this section shall be
entitled to receive, at the time of
retrenchment, compensation which shall be
equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for
every completed year of continuous service or
any part thereof in excess of six months."
Section 25-F appears in Chapter V-A of the Act which
relates to lay-off and retrenchment. Section 25-K, L and N
appear in Chapter V-B which relates to special provisions
relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure in certain
establishments. In other words Chapter V-A deals with the
general provisions relating to lay-off and retrenchment,
while special provisions have been made for certain
establishments covered by Chapter V-B. Section 25-N refers
to workman in an industrial establishment. The expression
"Industrial Establishment" is defined in Section 25-L,
which means a factory or a mine or a plantation.
Admittedly, the employer is not covered by the definition of
the "Industrial Establishment". Therefore, the High Court
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was right in holding that Section 25-N has no application.
There is no dispute that the requirements of Section
25-F have been complied with by the employer.
The residual question is whether any benefit was to be
extended under Rule 35. Rule 4, 10(5&6) and 35(b) of the
Rules read as follows:
"Rule 4 (a) "Permanent" employee means an
employee who has been continued on vacant
permanent post. The staff of the federation
shall be classified into the following:
1.
Class-I
Managing Director, Addl.
Managing Director
2.
Class-II
Business Manager, Accounts
officers, general Manager,
establishment officer and
Assistant Manager.
3.
Class-III
Accountants, Assistants,
purchase and Sale Assistant
Accounts Assistant,
Storekeepers, Cashiers, Clerks,
Stenographers/Steno-typists and
Salesmen.
4.
Class-IV
Driver, Peons, Daftri,
Chowkidar and Sweepers.
4(b). "Probationer" means an employee who
is provisionally employed to fill a permanent
vacancy of post and has not been made
permanent or confirmed in services. The
probation period will be 12 months for all
the posts of Class I, II, III which may
further be extended by such time as deemed
fit, but in no case it will exceed 24 months,
in all. The probation period for Class-IV
shall be 6 months which may further be
extended by such time as may be deemed fit
but in no case total period of probation
shall exceed 12 months.
4(c). "Temporary" employee means an
employee who has been appointed for a limited
period for work which is of an essentially
temporary nature.
4(d). An "Apprentice" means a learner who
is given a nominal stipend during the period
which will ordinarily be of 6 months before
he is taken up as a temporary employee.
4(e). Every employee shall be given a written
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order regarding his appointment,
confirmation, promotion, transfer and ending
of service as the case may be.
Rule 10 (5): If the work and conduct of an
employee during the period of probation is
found satisfactory, he will be confirmed from
the date of completion of the probation
period.
10(6). No employee will be deemed to have
been confirmed in the federation service
unless specific orders in this regard are
issued. The appointing authority shall have
to take a decision regarding confirmation or
reversion or removal of a probationer within
the prescribed period of probation.
35(b). Confirmed employee shall be entitled
to one month’s pay and allowance for every
completed year of service. In addition to
this, they will also be entitled to such pay
and allowance as may be due to them on
account of accumulated earned leave upto the
maximum of one month.
Rule 35(b) inter-alia provides that confirmed employees
shall be entitled to one month’s pay and allowance for every
completed year of service on retrenchment of service. In
addition they are entitled to pay and allowance as may be
admissible to them on account of accumulative earned leave
upto the maximum of one month.
The stand of the respondents was that the appellants
were not confirmed employees. The appointment order of each
of the appellants contains the stipulations which are as
follows:
"1. Your appointment as Sales man is purely
temporary.
2. During the period of probation, your
services are liable to be terminated
without giving any notice or assigning any
reason.
3. You shall be governed by the terms and
conditions contained in the Staff Service
Rules of the Federation, amended from time
to time."
This is a case where the period of probation is fixed
having regard to Rule 4(b) read with Rule 10 as quoted above.
Rule 10(6) no doubt provides that no employee shall be deemed
to have been confirmed in the service unless specific order
in this regard is issued. Relying on this provision, learned
counsel for the fourth respondent submitted that there was no
specific orders of confirmation and, therefore, the
appellants should be deemed to have continued as probationers
till the date of termination of their services. A similar
stand was considered in Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Co-
operative Sugar Factories Federation, Lucknow and Ors. (AIR
1986 SC 1844). A Constitution Bench of this Court in The
State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh (AIR 1968 SC 1210) noted as
follows:
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"Where as in the present case, the service
rules fix a certain period of time beyond
which the probationary period cannot be
extended and an employee appointed or
promoted to a post on probation is allowed to
continue in the post after completion of the
maximum period of probation without an
express order of confirmation, he cannot be
deemed to continue in that post as a
probationer by implication. The reason is
that such an implication is negatived by the
service rule forbidding extension of the
probationary period beyond the maximum period
fixed by it. In such a case, it is
permissible to draw the inference that the
employee allowed to continue in the post on
completion of the maximum period of probation
has been confirmed in the post by
implication."
In High Court of M.P. through Registrar and Ors. v.
Satya Narayan Jhavar (2001 (7) SCC 161), this Court
categorised the provisions for probation as follows:
"The question of deemed confirmation in
service jurisprudence, which is dependent
upon the language of the relevant service
rules, has been the subject-matter of
consideration before this Court, times
without number in various decisions and there
are three lines of cases on this point. One
line of cases is where in the service rules
or in the letter of appointment a period of
probation is specified and power to extend
the same is also conferred upon the authority
without prescribing any maximum period of
probation and if the officer is continued
beyond the prescribed or extended period, he
cannot be deemed to be confirmed. In such
cases there is no bar against termination at
any point of time after expiry of the period
of probation. The other line of cases is that
where while there is a provision in the rules
for initial probation and extension thereof,
a maximum period for such extension is also
provided beyond which it is not permissible
to extend probation. The inference in such
cases is that the officer concerned is deemed
to have been confirmed upon expiry of the
maximum period of probation in case before
its expiry the order of termination has not
been passed. The last line of cases is where,
though under the rules maximum period of
probation is prescribed, but the same
requires a specific act on the part of the
employer by issuing an order of confirmation
and of passing a test for the purposes of
confirmation. In such cases, even if the
maximum period of probation has expired and
neither any order of confirmation has been
passed nor has the person concerned passed
the requisite test, he cannot be deemed to
have been confirmed merely because the said
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period has expired."
In above view of the matter, the stand of the
appellants that they were deemed to have been confirmed at
the end of 24 months and they were permanent employees is in
terra firma. ’Salesmen’ belong to Class III of the category
of permanent employees. The definition of "Probationer"
given in Rule 4(b) fully supports the appellants’ stand that
the probation period shall not exceed 24 months in all.
Therefore as was held in Om Prakash’s case, Satya Narayan
Jhavar’s case and Dharam Singh’s case (supra) the appellants
inferentially have to be treated as permanent employees, and
consequently the benefits under Rule 35(b) were available to
them. But the same shall not be in addition to what is
payable under Section 25-F. The amount which is higher of
the two i.e. of Section 25-F or Rule 35(b) shall be paid to
the appellants. If any amount has already been paid in
terms of Section 25-F the same shall be adjusted while
making the payment under Rule 35(L), which shall be made
within three months. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid
extent. No costs.