Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
S. N. SUNDALAIMUTHU CHETTIAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
PALANIYANDAVAN
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
12/08/1965
BENCH:
MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
BENCH:
MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
SUBBARAO, K.
BACHAWAT, R.S.
CITATION:
1966 AIR 469 1966 SCR (1) 450
CITATOR INFO :
R 1969 SC 764 (16)
ACT:
Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, of 1955 s. 2(a)
and (ee)-"carry on personal cultivation", scope
of--Son-in-law if member of family.
HEADNOTE:
The cultivating tenant of land belonging to the appellant
died leaving his widow and daughter as his heirs. The
respondent, who was the daughter’s husband and the holder of
a power of attorney from the heirs, filed an application
before the Sub-Collector, under s. 3(3)(a) of the Madras
Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, for depositing
arrears of rent on behalf of the heirs. The appellant
objected on the ground that neither the wife nor the
daughter was a cultivating tenant under the Act, as they
were not personally cultivating the land; but the Sub-
Collector overruled the objection and directed the
respondent to deposit the arrears. The appellants revision
petition to the High Court was dismissed.
In the appeal to this Court, on the question as to whether
the respondent was rightly allowed to deposit the arrears.
HELD : The orders of the Courts below should be set aside
and the matter remitted to the Sub--Collector for deciding
as to whether the respondent was putting in physical labour
in the cultivation of the land. [453 E]
A son-in-law can be regarded as a member of the family, and
therefore, though the heirs of the cultivating tenant were
not themselves exerting their physical labour, if the
respondent was doing so, the heirs could be regarded as
cultivating tenants under s. 2(a) and (ee) of the Act. But
as there was no finding as to the nature of work which the
respondent was doing, the matter should be remitted to the
Sub-Collector for a decision. [452 G-H; 453 A-B, D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 480 of 1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated
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September 4, 1964 of the Madras High Court Civil Revision
Petition No. 1251 of 1963.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
S. C. Agarwala, D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg and M. K.
Ramamurthy, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mudholkar, J. This is an appeal against an order passed by
the High Court of Madras dismissing a petition for revision
under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the
revision application the appellant had challenged the order
of the Sub-Collector,
451
Cheranmahadevi, by virtue of which the respondents were per-
mitted to deposit the arrears of rent due in respect of a
holding of which one Kanda Devan was a tenant. The
aforesaid order was made under s. 3 (3) (a) of the Madras
Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955.
It is common ground that this Act which was originally to,
remain in force for a period of three years is still in
force by virtue of the provisions of amending acts passed
extending its duration from time to time. The expression
"cultivating tenant" is defined thus in s. 2 (a) of the Act
:
" cultivating tenant’ in relation to any land means a person
who carries on personal cultivation on such land and, under
a tenancy agreement, express or implied, and includes-
(i) any such person who continues in possession of the land
after the determination of the tenancy agreement and
(ii) the heirs of such person, but does not include a mere
intermediary or his heirs;"
By the Amending Act, Madras Act 14 of 1956, cl. (ee) was
added to s. 2 which purports to define the meaning of the
expression "carry on personal cultivation". Clause (ee)
reads thus
"a person is said to carry on personal cultivation on a land
when he contributes his own physical labour or that of the
members of his family in the cultivation of that land;"
The provisions set out above are relevant for consideration
in this appeal. What happened was that Kanda Devan, who was
the cultivating tenant, died some time before the
proceedings before the Sub-Collector commenced. He left
behind as his heirs his widow Palaniachi Ammal and his
daughter Ramalakshmi Ammal. The respondent before us is the
daughter’s husband and holds a power of attorney both from
her and Palaniachi Ammal. There was default in payment of
rent and so the respondent by virtue of the power of the
attorney in his favour made an application in the year 1962
before the Sub-Collector under s. 3 (3) (a) of the Act for
depositing the rental arrears. The appellant who is the
landlord contested the application on the ground that
neither the wife nor the daughter of the deceased Kanda
Devan was a cultivating tenant as defined in the Act because
they were not personally cultivating the land and that,
therefore, they were not
452
entitled to the protection afforded by the Act. The Sub-
Collector over-ruled the objection and, as already stated,
directed the respondent to deposit the rental arrears. The
question is whether the respondent was rightly allowed to
deposit the arrears.
It is not disputed that Palaniachi Ammal and Ramalakshmi
Ammal are the heirs of Kanda Devan, who, being a tenant, was
entitled to the protection of the Act. It is also not
disputed that after the death of Kanda Devan the land is
being cultivated on behalf of these two women and that they
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are not personally cultivating them, in the sense that they
are not contributing physical labour for its cultivation.
It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondent that
it is not necessary for a tenant to contribute physical
labour before he can be held entitled to the benefit of the
provision. Two decisions of the Madras High Court bearing
on the point were cited before us. The first of these is
Kunchitapatham Pillai v. Ranganatham Pillai.(1) In that case
Balakrishna Iyer J., held that in order to qualify as a
cultivating tenant within the meaning of the definition
given in the Act it was not necessary that a person should
put his own muscular effort into the soil. Construing a
similar expression occurring in the Tanjore Tenants and
Pannaiyal Protection Ordinance IV of 1952 Rajagopala
Ayyangar J., observed in an unreported case W. P. No. 426 of
1953 :
"Before a person can be a cultivating tenant,
he or members of his family must contribute
his or their own physical labour. I do not
consider that the supervision of panniyals
could be characterised as physical labour
within the meaning of the definition clause."
The view taken by Balakrishna Iyer J., was held to be too
wide in Abubucker Lebbai v. Zamindar of Ettayapuram.(2)
Rajamannar C.J., who delivered judgment of the Court, after
considering the views of Balakrishna Iyer J., and Rajagopala
Ayyangar J., and also certain English decisions agreed with
the view of the latter, and in our view, rightly.
It is, however, said that though the heirs of Kanda Devan
are not themselves exerting their physical labour the
respondent who is the holder of a power of attorney from
them is doing so and that, therefore, the heirs must be
regarded as cultivating tenants. Reliance is placed in this
connection on cl. (ee) which gives the meaning of the
expression "to carry on personal cultivation". Before the
heirs can be given the benefit of this definition it is
necessary for them to establish that someone is contributing
(1) [1958] 1 M. L. J. 272.
(2) [1961] 1 M. L. J. 256.
453
his physical labour in the cultivation of the land and that
someone is a member of their family. Mr. S. C. Agarwal,
appearing for the respondent, said that a son-in-law can be
regarded as a member of the family because the word ’family’
is not to be construed in a narrow sense or meaning only a
member of a Hindu joint family. He is quite right there
because the Act applies to all tenants irrespective of the
personal laws which govern them. In Webster’s New World
Dictionary one of the meanings of family is "a group of
people related by blood or marriage relatives". A person
can, therefore, be properly regarded as being the member of
his wife’s family and not merely of his father’s family.
Mr. Viswanatha Sastri for the appellants, however, contends
that even so the respondent is not contributing any physical
labour but is only doing some kind of supervision. He
further points out that according to the decision in
Abubucker Lebbai’s case(1) the work of supervision is not
tantamount to physical labour. There is, however, no
finding by the Sub-Collector as to the nature of work, if
any, which the respondent is doing in connection with the
supervision of the land in question. In the absence of such
a finding and in the absence of any relevant material before
us we cannot deal with this argument. We do not even know
whether there were any pleadings of the parties on the point
and whether any evidence was led thereon by the parties. In
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the circumstances we think that in the interest of justice
we should set aside the orders of both the courts below and
remit the matter to the Sub-Collector for deciding as to
whether the respondent was putting in physical labour in the
cultivation of the field. If there is no material on record
bearing on the point he should give opportunity to both the
parties to make necessary pleadings and to adduce evidence.
Accordingly we allow the appeal set aside the decisions of
the courts below and remit the matter to the Sub-Collector
for a decision adverting to what we have said in our
judgment. Costs in this Court will be paid by the appellant
as ordered on May 3, 1965. Costs in the two courts below
will abide the result.
Appeal allowed.
(1) [1961] 1 M. L. J. 256.
454