Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 19
PETITIONER:
DEV SINGH & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
REGISTRAR, PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT15/04/1987
BENCH:
KHALID, V. (J)
BENCH:
KHALID, V. (J)
PATHAK, R.S. (CJ)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 1629 1987 SCR (2)1005
1987 SCC (3) 169 JT 1987 (3) 34
1987 SCALE (1)869
CITATOR INFO :
RF&E 1992 SC2219 (53,58,63,135)
ACT:
Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court Vol. I, Chap-
ter 18-A, Rules IX and X: Dismissal of ministerial staff of
subordinate courts by District Judge--Service appeal dis-
posed of by High Court--Whether judicial decision.
Constitution of India, Articles 136 and 235: Removal
from service of ministerial staff by District Judge-Service
appeal dismissed by High Court--Decision whether judicial or
administrative-Whether assailable in petition for special
leave.
HEADNOTE:
Sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the Punjab Courts Act,
1918 confers power of appointment of ministerial officers of
all courts controlled by a District Court and their suspen-
sion and removal on the District Court. Sub-section (3)
makes every appointment subject to such rules as the High
Court may prescribe in this behalf, while sub-section (4)
makes orders passed by the District Judge subject to the
control of the High Court.
Chapter 18-A of the High Court Rules and Orders framed under
Section 35(3) controls the appointments, promotion and
punishment of ministerial officials in the District and
other civil courts, other than the High Court. Sub-rule 2(a)
of Rule IX in that Chapter enables the District Judge to
inflict any of the penalties mentioned in sub-rule (1):
censure, fine, recovery of any pecuniary loss, withholding
of increments or promotions, suspension, removal and dis-
missal of the ministerial officers of his own court or any
court subordinate to him other than the Court of Small
Causes. Sub-rule (2) of Rule X provides ’for appeals to the
High Court against penalties. Sub-rule (3) requires the
persons appealing to the High Court to do so by a petition
to the District Judge, who shall forward the same to the
Registrar of the High Court with remarks that he may wish to
make. After reading the petition the High Court may either
(a) summarily reject it without hearing the petitioner; (b)
refer it to the District Judge for report and on receipt of
such report reject the petition without hearing; or (c) hear
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 19
the petitioner, and where other persons are held to be
concerned such other person in open court.
1006
Sub-rule (4) forbids the petitioners to attend personally at
the High Court unless summoned and provides for communica-
tion to them of orders on their petitions through the Dis-
trict Judge.
The appellants, who were the employees in the ministeri-
al establishment of the courts at Ferozepur and Zira, were
alleged to have taken a prominent part in raising objection-
able slogans against the Judicial Magistrate and the Dis-
trict Judge, in a demonstration organised by the subordinate
court officials, to protest against the slapping of a subor-
dinate by the Judicial Magistrate, Zira. They were charge-
sheeted for their misconduct. After enquiry it was found
that they contravened Rule 7(1) of the Government Employees
(Conduct) Rules, 1966 by acting prejudicially to the public
order, decency and morality and were dismissed from service
by the District Judge in his capacity aS the punishing
authority.
The appellants preferred a service appeal before the
High Court which was dismissed.
While granting the special leave on 2nd April, 1982 this
Court made the following order:
"Appeal will be heard ....... on the prelim-
inary issue as to whether the High Court in
disposal of appeal was acting in administra-
tive capacity under Art. 235 or as a Tribunal
or as a High Court and the circumstances in
which the appeal was maintained, if so."
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the
decision of the High Court in this case was the judicial
decision of a tribunal which could be examined by this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court,
HELD: 1.1 The appeal is not maintainable. Every decision
or order by an authority which has a duty to act judicially
is not subject to appeal to this Court. Article 136 contem-
plates appeals only from adjudications of courts and tribu-
nals. Such adjudication must doubtless be judicial. if the
power exercised was administrative in nature it would ex-
clude such a tribunal from the ambit of Article 136. [1029C;
1028H; 1020D]
1.2 Every authority which is required to act judicially
either by its constitution or by virtue of the authority
conferred upon it is
1007
not necessarily a tribunal for the purposes of Article 136.
A tribunal, whose adjudication is subject to appeal must
besides being under a duty to act judicially, be a body
invested with the judicial power of the State. [1029A]
1.3 There is a clear distinction between courts of law
exercising judicial powers and other bodies. Decisions by
courts are clearly judicial. That Is not the case with
bodies exercising administrative or executive powers. In
certain matters even judges have to act administratively and
in so doing may have to act quasi-judicially in dealing with
matters entrusted to them. It is only where the authorities
are required to act judicially either by express provisions
of the statute or by necessary implication that the decision
of such an authority would amount to a quasi-judicial pro-
ceeding. When Judges in exercise of their administrative
functions decide cases it cannot be said that their deci-
sions are either judicial or quasi-judicial decisions. The
test that has to be applied to find out whether an order is
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 19
a judicial order or not is the existence of a lis between
the parties. [1028F; 1025C]
In the instant case, the High Court while disposing of
the appeal was not acting as a tribunal. It was acting
purely administratively. It was not resolving any dispute or
controversy between two adversaries but only exercising its
power of control over the subordinate judiciary which is the
same as control under Article 235 of the Constitution of
India. [1028E; 1027C; 1029B; 1013C]
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh & Ors.,
[1955] 1 SCR 267; Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab,
[1962] Snppl. 3 SCR 713; Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v.
P.N. Sharma & Anr, [1965] 2 SCR 366; Harinagar Sugar Mills
Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala, [1962] 2 SCR 339; Jaswant
Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmichand and others, [1963] Suppl. 1
SCR 242; Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Limited,
Bombay, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 625; Indo-China Steam Navigation
Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs &
Ors., [1964] 6 SCR 594 and APHLC v. M.A. Sangma, [1978] 1
SCR 393, referred to.
2.1 In deciding the appeal under Rule X in Chapter 18-A
the High Court exercises only a supervisory administrative
control over the subordinate courts and does not act as a
tribunal disposing of an appeal involving a lis between two
rival parties and arriving at a judicial decision. [1019D]
1008
2.2 The appeal under Rule X(3) has to be by a petition,
to be routed through the District Judge who sends it to the
Registrar of the High Court. These are procedural formali-
ties which normally govern appeals preferred before the High
Court on the administrative side. The permission given to
the authority who imposes penalty to record his own remarks
which he wishes to make concerning his own order is further
proof of the fact that what the High Court has to consider
is not a matter on the judicial side but one in its power of
control and superintendence over the subordinate courts.
[1018A]
2.3 The procedure contained in Rule X(3) of hearing the
petition not similar to the procedure followed in regular
judicial proceedings. It is not obligatory for the High
Court to hear the petitioner. It can go into the papers and
reject it summarily without giving the petitioner an oppor-
tunity to be heard. Alternative, it could get a report from
the District Judge and on receipt of such a report dismiss
it without hearing the petitioner. Thirdly, it could give a
hearing to the petitioner and also those who will be affect-
ed. This manner of disposal of the petition makes it appar-
ent that it is not strictly a judicial proceeding but has
all the trappings of an administrative proceeding and an
administrative decision. [1018E-H]
2.4 Sub-rule (4) of Rule X again marks a complete depar-
ture from the normal judicial proceeding before a court. The
petitioners are forbidden to attend personally at the High
Court. They can do so only when summoned. In a judicial
proceeding, the party has a right to appear personally or
through counsel. This denial also robs the appeal of its
character of a judicial proceeding. [1019C]
2.5 The fact that Rule X is found in Chapter 18-A, which
deals with control, also gives the administrative shade to
the proceeding under this Rule. Section 35(4) of the Punjab
Courts Act, 1918, which stipulates that any order passed by
the District Judge under this section shall be subject to
the control of the High Court, further fortifies the view
that the proceedings under Rule X(3) and the decisions made
thereunder are not judicial in nature. [1019E]
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 19
It cannot, therefore, be said that in the instant case
the High Court while deciding the appeal acted as a tribunal
whose order can be challenged before this Court under Arti-
cle 136 of the Constitution. [1019F]
[The Registrar to transfer the records of the case to
the High Court. The latter to take the petition on its file
as a petition under
1009
Article 226 and dispose of the matter expeditiously.]
[1029D]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1278 of
1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.9.1981 of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in Service Appeals of the
Appellants.
V.M. Tarkunde, Mrs. Urmila Kapur and Ms. Janki Sriniva-
san for the Appellants.
Kapil Sibal and Ratbin Dass for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KHALID, J. 1. The appellants were the employees in the
ministerial establishment of the Courts at Ferozepore and
Zira having entered into service varying from the year 1952
to 1965. They are members of the Punjab Civil Courts Clerks
Association. On 24th July, 1980, there was an incident in
the Court of Shri N.S. Mundra, Judicial Magistrate, 1st
Class, Zira. On that day, one Jagdish Lal, a Senior Ahmad of
the Court was slapped. He is one of the appellants in this
appeal. On the day he was slapped, he presented a represen-
tation to the District and Sessions Judge Shri Nehra. An
enquiry was directed to be held by the Senior Sub-Judge,
Ferozepore into the incident. In this enquiry, it was found
that Shri Mundra, Judicial Magistrate, Zira slapped Jagdish
Lal. This incident caused resentment in the Association and
the Association, therefore, felt that something should be
done to demonstrate this resentment. Accordingly, it was
decided by the Association that a request should be made to
the District and Sessions Judge, Ferozepore, to transfer
Jagdish Lal from the Court at Zira to any other Court so
that calm could be restored. The appellants among others met
the District and Sessions Judge for this purpose on 28-
71980. It is alleged that the Sessions Judge did not accede
to the request of the representatives of the Association to
plead their case before him. This aggravated the situation.
Though the association and their representatives including
the appellants were keen to resolve the matter, the District
and Sessions Judge adopted a hardened attitude. The matter
came to the notice of the High Court. An enquiry by Justice
S.P. Goyal of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was
directed to be held and it was scheduled for 9th August,
1980. He was to reach the Canal Rest House at 4.00 P.M., but
he could reach only at 7.30 P.M. At that time, the District
and Sessions Judge, along with other Judicial
1010
officers were present to receive him. A demonstration was
organised by the subordinate Court officials. There was
continued slogan shouting from 4.00 P.M. till 7.30 P.M.
before Justice Goyal’s arrival. The appellants are said to
have taken a prominent part in raising objectionable slo-
gans. The slogans are:
"N.S. Mundra Murdabad; N.S. Mundra Hai Hai;
Dakia Mahajan Superintendent Murdabad; B.S.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 19
Nehra Murdabad; B.S. Nehra naun Chalta Karo;
Katal Nehra Murdabad; B.S. Nehra Murdabad;"
The appellants were charge-sheeted for this conduct of
theirs.
2. Justice Goyal alighted from his car and went inside
the visiting room of the rest house. He called the represen-
tatives of the Association. Some of them met him. They came
out after the meeting. There were other demonstrators wait-
ing for the result of the talks. After they came back, those
who raised slogans disbursed. On 11th August, 1980, the
District Judge sent a letter to Shri G.S. Khurana, Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Ferozepore, to hold preliminary enquiry
into the demonstration by the Court officials in front of
the Canal Rest House and the slogans raised there. Mr.
Khurana recorded the statements of some officers on the same
day and submitted his report on that very day itself. Ac-
cording to his report, the appellants had taken a prominent
part in raising objectionable slogans in question. On the
basis of this report, the District Judge placed the appel-
lants under suspension by his order dated 14-8-1980. On 12th
August, 1980, the District Judge had intimated the High
Court about the finding in the preliminary report and had
sought guidance of the High Court. The appellants were
supplied with the articles of the charges and statements of
imputation etc. They gave their replies. While admitting
that they had taken part in the demonstration on the day in
question they denied that they had taken a prominent part in
the demonstration as leaders in raising objectionable and
defamatory slogans against their superior officers. A formal
enquiry was ordered against these appellants. After a de-
tailed enquiry it was found that the appellants had contra-
vened inter alia Rule 7(1) of the Government Employees
(Conduct) Rules, 19.66. and had thus acted prejudicially to
the public order, decency and morality and thereby contra-
vened Rule 7(1) of the Government Employees (Conduct) Rules,
1966. The District Judge, Ferozepore in his capacity as the
punishing authority then served a show cause notice on all
the appellants as to why the penalty of dismissal from serv-
ice be not imposed on them. The appellants submitted their
explanation. After
1011
considering the replies, the District Judge, by his order
dated 17.11.1980, imposed on them punishment of dismissal
from service.
3. The appellants preferred a service appeal in the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The High Court
considered the various contentions raised by the appellants
in detail and dismissed the appeal as having no merit. One
of the employees who had also filed appeal before the High
Court withdrew his appeal and is now reported to be practis-
ing law.
This appeal has, therefore, come up before us by special
leave under Article 136, against the order of the Single
judge in the above mentioned service appeal.
We have given only the bare facts in this judgment for
the reason that this Court issued notice on the SLP for
consideration of a preliminary point only which will be
evident by the orders passed on 3.12. 198 1, 4-1-1982 and
2-4-1982.
"Order of the Court on 3-12-1981:
Issue show cause notice on SLP returnable on
4-1-1982, on the question as to whether the
High Court in disposing of the appeal of the
petitioners was acting in administrative
capacity or as a Tribunal or as High Court.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 19
There will be interim injunction restraining
the respondents from evicting petitioner No. 2
from Government accommodation held by him on
the condition that the said petitioner contin-
ues to pay rent or compensation at hitherto
charged, pending notice."
"Order of the Court on 4. 1. 1982:
Special leave petition to be heard on the
question whether the High Court in disposing
of the appeal of the petitioners was acting in
an administrative capacity under Article 235
or as a Tribunal or as the High Court. The
special leave petition to be heard on 9.2.1982
on this question. Stay to continue till then."
"Order of the Court on 2.4. 1982:
Special leave granted. Printing of records and
filing of statement of case dispensed with.
Security dispensed with. Appeal will be heard
on present papers on the preliminary issue as
to whether the High Court in disposal of
appeal
1012
was acting in administrative capacity under
Article 235 or as Tribunal or as a High Court
and the circumstances in which the appeal was
maintained, if so. Hearing of appeal will be-
fixed on second Tuesday in July 1982 pre-
emptorily subject to overnight’s part heard."
From the above orders it is clear that the question that is
to be decided in this appeal is whether an appeal under
Article 136 lies to this Court from the order under chal-
lenge. That being so, it is necessary to consider the nature
of the appeal before the High Court and the rules governing
that appeal, before discussing the questions of law raised
by the appellant’s counsel with reference to various author-
ities of this Court, to contend that article 136 was at-
tracted.
4. The appointment of the ministerial officers of the
District Courts and Courts of Small Causes and their suspen-
sion and removal are provided under Section 35 of the Punjab
Courts Act, 1918. That Section reads as follows:
"35(1) The ministerial officers of the
District Courts and Courts of Small Causes
shall be appointed and,may be suspended or
removed by the Judges of those Courts respec-
tively.
(2) The ministerial officers of all Courts
controlled by a District Court, other than
Courts of Small Causes, shall be appointed,
and may be suspended or removed by the Dis-
trict Court.
(3) Every appointment under this section shall
be subject to such rules as the High Court may
prescribe in this behalf, and in dealing with
any matter under this Section, a Judge of a
Court of Small Causes shall act subject to the
control of the District Court.
(4) Any order passed by a District Judge under
this section shall be subject to the control
of the High Court."
5. The High Court framed rules under this section for
the subordinate services attached to or controlled by Dis-
trict Courts. These rules apply to subordinate services
attached to Civil Courts other than the High Court, namely
to ministerial and menial establishment of District and
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 19
Sessions Judge, Sub-Judge and Courts of Small Causes. Chap-
ter
1013
18-A of the rules is the one relevant for our purpose. A
close study of the scheme and the various provisions of
Chapter 18-A would make it abundantly clear that the ap-
pointments, promotions, punishments etc. of the ministerial
officials of the Courts subordinate to the High Court, were
fully within the powers of the District and Sessions Judge
subject to the control of the High Court. Chapter 18-A is
captioned ’control’. Though there were changes effected by
notifications issued by the State of Punjab regarding ap-
pointments, promotions in other services, after the coming
into force of the Government of India Act, 1935, it is
enough to note for our purpose that the appointment, promo-
tion and punishment of ministerial officials in the District
or other Civil Courts continued to be governed by the rules
in Chapter 18-A of the High Court Rules and Orders.
6. Control in chapter 18-A is the same as control under
Article 235 of the Constitution of India, Articles 233, 234
and 235 of the Constitution of India deal with the High
Courts’ control over the subordinate judiciary. Article 227
deals with the power of superintendence over all Courts by
the High Court. Its predecessor section in the Government of
India Act, 1935 was Section 224 which dealt with administra-
tive functions of the High Court. Article 233 deals with the
appointment of District Judges and Article 234 with the
recruitment of persons other than the District Judges to the
judicial service. Article 235 deals with the control over
subordinate courts and the control under this Article is
wider than the control under the corresponding provision of
the Government of India Act. For our purpose, it is suffi-
cient to note that Chapter 18-A contains provisions relating
to the control of the High Court over the subordinate judi-
ciary.
7. For the purpose of this appeal, we are concerned only
with Rules IX and X of the rules in Chapter 18-A. Rule IX
deals with punishment. We extract the entire section since
it would be profitable to have a correct look at this sec-
tion.
"IX--Punishment--(1) The following penalties
may for good and sufficient reasons be imposed
upon members of the ministerial staff:-
(i) Censure,
(ii) Fine of an amount not exceeding one
month’s salary for misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duties,
1014
(iii) Recovery from pay of the whole or
part of any pecuniary loss caused to Govern-
ment by negligence or breach of orders,
(iv) Withholding of increments or promo-
tion including stoppage at efficiency bar,
(v) Suspension,
(vi) Removal, and
(vii) Dismissal.
(2)(a) Any of the above penalties may be
inflicted by the District Judge on the minis-
terial officers of his own Court of any Court
subordinate to him other than a Court of Small
Causes, and on the menials of his own Court.
(b) The Judge of a Court of Small
Causes may inflict any of the above penalties
on the ministerial officers or menials of his
own Court.
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 19
(c) The District Judge may, with the
previous sanction of the High Court, delegate
to any Subordinate Judge the power to inflict
penalties given in clause (a) to be exercised
by the Subordinate Judge in any specified
portion of the district subject to the control
of the District Court.
Note:- This delegation has been made to the Senior Sub-
Judge,. 1st Class, in each district in regard to the proc-
ess-serving establishment of all Courts in the district
except that of the District Judge’s Court and the Court of
the Judge, Small Causes, Lahore, Amritsar and Delhi.
(d) Any Subordinate Judge may fine, in an
amount not exceeding one month’s salary, any
ministerial officer of his own Court for
misconduct or neglect in the performance of
his duties.
(e) The Senior Subordinate Judge may inflict
any of the above penalties on menials of his
own Court or the Courts of other Subordinate
Judges in the same district."
In Sub-Rule (1), eight penalties are categorised. Sub-
Rule (2) enables the District Judge to inflict any of the
penalties mentioned in Sub-Rule (1). Rule IX(2)(c) enables
the District Judge, with the previous sanction of the High
Court, to delegate to any Subordinate Judge
1015
the power to inflict penalties given in clause (a). Then
comes the important section that deals with appeals i.e.
Rule X. We think it useful to extract the Rule in full.
"X. Appeals.--(1) The District Judge may on
appeal or otherwise reverse or modify any
order made under rule IX(2) by any Court under
his control including a Court of Small Causes,
and his order shall be final:
Provided that nothing in this rule
shall preclude the High Court from altering
where it deems fit any such appellate order of
a District Judge on petition by an aggrieved
person or otherwise:
Provided further that the District
Judge shall not enhance any punishment but
should, if he considers enhancement desirable,
refer the case to the High Court for orders.
(2) Appeals against penalties in-
flicted by a District Judge shall lie to the
High Court in the following cases only:-
(a) Penalties mentioned in Rule
IX(iii) to (viii) in respect of ministerial
servants, holding permanent and pensionable
posts;
(b) Orders of substantive appointment
by promotion or otherwise to a permanent and
pensionable post the maximum pay of which is
Rs.75 or more per mensem;
(c) Orders of temporary appointment
which is to last more than three months or has
in fact lasted more than three months in
respect of posts the maximum pay of which is
Rs.75 or more per mensem.
(3) Persons appealing to the High
Court under this rule shall do so by petition.
Such petition, accompanied by a copy of the
order complained against, shall be presented
to the District Judge who passed the order
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 19
within one month of the date of such order
(the period between the
1016
date of application for the copy and the date
on which it is supplied being excluded). The
District Judge will forward the petition to
the Registrar of the High Court without unnec-
essary delay, and in forwarding the same he
will be at liberty to record any remarks which
he may wish to make concerning any matter
stated in the petition.
After reading the petition, the High
Court may either--
(a) Summarily reject it without hear-
ing the petitioner;
(b) refer it to the District Judge for
report and on receipt of such report reject
the petition without hearing the petitioner;
or
(c) hear the petitioner, and in cases
where other persons are held to be concerned
in the subject of the petition, such other
person in open Court.
Nothing in these rules shall debar
the High Court or a District Judge, from
altering, if deemed fit, any order of punish-
ment or appointment not provided for above
which may be passed by a District Judge,
Senior Subordinate Judge OF the Judge of a
Small Causes Court in respect of ministerial
or menial establishment when an aggrieved
person petitions or otherwise. District and
Sessions Judges should not, therefore, with-
hold any petition addressed to the High Court
whether an appeal lies to it in the case or
not under these rules. In a case in which no
appeal lies the District and Sessions Judge
should forward it without any comments and
relevant documents unless he wishes to do so
or is so required by the High Court.
(4) Petitioners are forbidden to
attend personally at the High Court unless
summoned to do So. Orders on their petitions
will be communicated to them through the
District Judge concerned.
(5) In order that a dismissed offi-
cial may be able to exercise his right of
appeal, the charge against him should be
reduced to writing, his defence should either
be taken in, or reduced to writing and the
decision on such defence
1017
should also be in writing. The record of the
charge, defence and decision should in all
cases be such as to furnish sufficient infor-
mation to the appellate authority to whom the
dismissed official may prefer an appeal.
(6) Establishment orders, in which
an appeal lies to the High Court as a matter
of right, should state briefly the claims of
the persons appointed as well as those of
their seniors, if any, who are considered
unfit for the appointments in question, and
where the order of seniority has not been
followed the reasons for departure from it
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 19
should be stated."
8. Rule X(1) deals with the powers of the District Judge
to reverse or modify any order made under Rule IX(2) passed
by any Court under his control. This sub-section contains
two provisos. The first proviso gives the High Court an
absolute power to alter when it deems fit any order passed
by the District Judge in appeal when an aggrieved person
moves the High Court or even suo moto. The second proviso
restricts the powers of the District Judge to enhance any
punishment imposed and makes it subject to the orders of the
High Court when such a case is referred to the High Court
for orders. Rule X(2) deals with appeals against penalties
inflicted by District Judge as in the case on hand. This
section provides that appeals shall lie to the High Court
from orders imposing penalties by the District Judge, but
not in all cases. Appeals lie only against orders imposing
penalties mentioned in Rule IX(iii) to IX(viii). In other
words, an appeal does not lie when the District Judge passes
an order imposing a penalty of censure or of fine of not
more than one month’s salary for misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duties.
9. We are not concerned here with the orders mentioned
in Rule X(2)(b) and (c). Sub-rule (3) of Rule X deals with
the procedure in filing appeals to the High Court. It states
that appeals shall be by a petition. It obligates presenta-
tion of the petition to the District Judge who passed the
order within the time prescribed therein. The District Judge
is directed to forward the petition to the Registrar of the
High Court without unnecessary delay. The District Judge is
given powers to record his remarks which he may wish to make
concerning any matter stated in the petition.
10. A reading of this sub-rule makes it abundantly clear
that the appeal to be heard by the High Court is something
which it has to do in
1018
exercise of its powers of control over the subordinate
courts on the administrative side. The appeal has to be by a
petition. It is to be routed through the District Judge who
sends it to the Registrar of the High Court. These are the
procedural formalities which normally govern appeals pre-
ferred before the High Court, on the administrative side.
The permission given to the authority who imposes penalty to
record his own remarks which he wishes to make concerning
his own order is further proof of the fact that what the
High Court has to consider is not a matter on the judicial
side but one in its power of control and superintendence
over the subordinate courts. Appeals under the general law
have their own procedure, which is different from the proce-
dure detailed for the appeals under these rules of the
deciding authority forwarding the appeal through the proper
channel to the controlling authority and of the freedom of
the deciding authority to give its own remarks over and
above the order already passed. This procedure robs the
appeal to the High Court of the characteristics of the
normal appeal culminating in judicial orders. The matter
will be further clear when we look at the procedure that is
to be followed by the High Court in disposing of the appeals
contained in this subsection itself.
11. Rule X(3) enables the High Court to summarily reject
the appeal without hearing the petitioner or refer it to the
District Judge for report and on receipt of such report
reject the petition without hearing the petitioner; secondly
to hear the petitioner, and in cases where other persons are
held to be concerned in the subject of the petition, such
other person in open court. The procedure contained in this
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 19
rule of hearing the petition is not similar to the procedure
followed in regular judicial proceedings. Under these rules
it is not obligatory for the High Court to hear the peti-
tioner. It can go into the papers and reject it summarily
without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. It
can also refer it to the District Judge for report. The
second method of disposal of this petition is to get a
report from the District Judge and on receipt of such a
report to dismiss it without hearing the petitioner and
thirdly to give a hearing to the petitioner and also those
who will be affected by the disposal of the petition. The
manner of disposal of the petition under this rule makes it
abundantly clear that this petition which the appellants
call an appeal is not strictly a judicial proceeding involv-
ing a lis between two adversaries and the decision thereon
is not a judicial decision. It has all the trappings of an
administrative proceeding and an administrative decision.
1019
Sub-clause (4)gives further insight into the nature of
the appeal. It reads:
"(4) Petitioners are forbidden to attend
personally at the High Court unless summoned
to do so. Orders on their petitions will be
communicated to them through the District
Judge concerned."
This again marks a complete departure from the normal judi-
cial proceeding before a court. The petitioners are forbid-
den to attend personally at the High Court. They can do so
only when summoned to do so. In a judicial proceeding, the
party has a right to appear personally or through his coun-
sel. Here that right is denied to him. This denial also robs
the appeal of its character of a judicial proceeding. Orders
passed by the High Court on such petitions will be communi-
cated to the parties through the District Judge concerned.
12. A close study of these rules leaves no doubt in our
mind that in deciding the appeal under Rule X, the High
Court exercises only a supervisory administrative control
and does not act as a Tribunal disposing of an appeal in-
volving a lis between two rival parties and arriving at a
judicial decision. As indicated above Rule X is in Chapter
18-A which deals with control. This gives the administrative
shade to the proceeding under this rule. Section 35(3)
contains the rule making power. Section 35(4) stipulates
that any order passed by the District Judge under this
section shall be subject to the control of the High Court,
thus fortifying our conclusion that the proceedings under
this section and the decisions made thereunder are not
judicial in nature. This appeal can be disposed of with this
conclusion and it is not necessary to refer to the various
authorities cited before us. However, for the completeness
of the judgment, we think it proper to briefly refer to the
various authorities cited before us, for and against the
position that the High Court, while deciding this appeal,
acted as a Tribunal whose order can be challenged before
this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, though in
our view the decisions cited dealt with situations different
from the one we are dealing here.
13. In Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and
Others, [1955] 1 SCR 267 a Constitution Bench of this Court
was considering the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution in an election case. It is
not necessary for our purpose to state the facts of the case
here. It was contended that the special jurisdiction that
was conferred in the Election Tribunal could be in-
1020
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 19
voked by an aggrieved party only by means of an election
petition, whose decision was final and conclUsiVe and that
therefore a challenge to the order of the Tribunal under
Article 136 of the Constitution was not maintainable. To
support this contention Article 329 and the nonobstante
clause therein were called in to aid. This Court repelled
that contention as untenable though apparently attractive.
This Court held that the expression ’Tribunal’ as used in
Article 136 did not mean samething as ’Court’, but included
in its ambit all adjudicating bodies provided they were
constituted by the State and were invested with the judicial
as distinguished from purely administrative or executive
functions. This decision has been pressed into service by
the appellants’ counsel to contend that the High Court in
the case on hand having been constituted by the State and
invested with judicial power was a Tribunal and therefore,
its decision could be examined by this Court under Article
136. In our view, this decision cannot help the appellants
because this decision clearly held that if the power exer-
cised was administrative in nature it would exclude such a
Tribunal from the ambit of Article 136.
14. In Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1962]
Suppl. 3 SCR 7 13, an employee in PEPSU was dismissed by the
Revenue Secretary. Against this order he preferred an appeal
to the State Government. The Revenue Minister, PEPSU felt
that the order of dismissal was too harsh and instead, he
should be reverted and made an endorsement to that effect on
the file, but no written order was served on the employee.
After the merger of PEPSU with Punjab, the Revenue Minister,
Punjab, sent the file to the Chief Minister for his advice.
The Chief Minister passed an order confirming the order of
dismissal and the order was duly communicated to the employ-
ee. This order was challenged by him before the High Court.
It was contended before the High Court by the State of
Punjab, with success, that the order of dismissal started
with proceedings beginning with the enquiry and culminating
in punishment and that the first part involved a decision on
evidence while the second part of taking action an adminis-
trative one. This dichotomy was ingeniously put forward
before this Court to render the appeal not maintainable by
contending that the order of dismissal was not a judicial
order. This Court repelled that contention. This Court held
that departmental proceedings taken against a Government
servant were not divisible in the sense in which the High
Court understood it. There is just one continuous proceeding
though there are two stages in it. Mudholkar, J. speaking
for the Constitution Bench observed thus in repelling this
contention:
1021
" ..... There is just one continuous pro-
ceedings though there are two stages in it.
The first is coming to a conclusion on the
evidence as to whether the charges alleged
against the Government servant are established
or not and the second is reached only if it is
found that they are so established. That stage
deals with the action to be taken against the
Government servant concerned. The High Court
accepts that the first stage is a judicial
proceeding and indeed it must be so because
charges have to be framed, notice has to be
given and the person concerned has to be given
an opportunity of being heard. Even so far as
the second stage is concerned, Article 311(2)
of the Constitution requires a notice to be
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 19
given to the person concerned as also an
opportunity of being heard. Therefore, this
stage of the proceeding is no less judicial
than the earlier one. Consequently any action
decided to be taken against a Government
servant found guilty of misconduct is a judi-
cial order and as such it cannot be varied at
the will of the authority who is empowered to
impose the punishment. Indeed, the very object
with which notice is required to be given on
the question of punishment is to ensure that
it will be such as would be justified upon the
charges established and upon the other attend-
ant circumstances of the case. It is thus
wholly erroneous to characterise the taking of
action against a person found guilty of any
charge at a departmental enquiry as an admin-
istrative order."
This judgment will not help us in this case. It only lays
down a general principle that a departmental enquiry and a
decision is one continuous process consisting of the enquiry
part and the decision making part, both the aspects of which
are judicial in nature, and the decisions taken therein are
in exercise of judicial power.
15. The counsel for the appellants placed strong reliance
on the decision of a Constitution Bench in the case of Asso-
ciated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma and another,
[1965] 2 SCR 366, to contend that the decision of the High
Court in this case was a judicial decision of a Tribunal
within the scope of Article 136. In that judgment this Court
considered most of its previous decisions relating to the
scope of Article 136. What fell to be decided in that case
was whether the State Government was a Tribunal when it
exercised its authority under Rule 6(5) and 6(6) of the
Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Serv-
ice Rules, 1952. It is necessary to
1022
briefly state the facts of the case. The employer-company
appointed the first respondent as a Welfare Officer as re-
quired by the Factories Act. 1984 and as per the rules men-
tioned above. The letter of appointment stated that the
first respondent was liable to be transferred from one unit
of the company to another and that his services could bet
terminated by one month’s notice or with one month’s pay in
lieu thereof. The Welfare Officer was not prepared to go 10
a place to which he was transferred. Thereupon the company
terminated the services of the 1st respondent with one
month’s salary. He appealed to the State of Punjab under
Rule 6(6). The State of Punjab ordered his reinstatement. As
the previous concurrence of the Labour Commissioner, as
required by rule 6(3), proviso (2) was not obtained, the
company brought the matter to this Court under Article
136(1) of the Constitution. A preliminary objection was
raised before this Court that the appeal to this Court was
incompetent because the second respondent was not a Tribunal
when it decided the appeaL.within the meaning of Article
136(1) of the Constitution. Rule 6(6) read as follows:
"6(6) A welfare officer upon whom the punish-
ment mentioned in clause (v) of sub-rule (3)
is imposed may appeal to the State Government
against the order of punishment within thirty
days from the date of receipt of the order by
him. The decision of the State Government
shall be final and binding."
It was by virtue of this rule that the State Government got
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 19
the powers of appeal. Dealing with the preliminary objection
the Constitution Bench speaking through Gajendragadkar, CJ
referred to this Court’s earlier decision in Harinagar
Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhun jhunwala and oth-
ers, [1962] 2 SCR 339, and observed as follows:
" ..... On the preliminary question as to
whether the appeals were competent, the
learned Judge agreed with the majority deci-
sion that the Central Government was a tribu-
nal within the meaning of Article 136(1).
Construing Article 136(1), the learned Judge
observed that courts and tribunals act judi-
cially in both senses which he had earlier
discussed and in the term ’tribunal’ are
included all others, which are not so includ-
ed. Among the powers of the State, said Hi-
dayatullah, J. is included the power to decide
controversies between parties. This is un-
doubtedly one of the attributes of the State
and is aptly called the judicial power
1023
Of the State. Broadly speaking, certain spe-
cial matters go before tribunals, and the
residue goes before the ordinary courts of
civil judicature. Their procedure’, may dif-
fer, but the functions are not essentially
different (pp. 362-63). Thus, it would be
noticed that all the learned Judges who heard
this case, were agreed in taking the view that
the essential power which was exercised by the
courts and tribunals alike was the judicial
power of the State."
16. This Court then referred to its decision in Jaswant
Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmichand and Others, [1963] Suppl. 1
SCR 242 in which the finding that an appeal under Article
136(1) against the order of a Conciliation Officer was
incompetent, was considered. Under clause 29 of the order
promulgated in 1954 under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
1947, the Conciliation Officer could grant or refuse permis-
sion to alter the terms of employment of workmen at the
instance of the employer. This Section did not suit the
employer. That was challenged before this Court. This Court
held that the Conciliation Officer was not a Tribunal be-
cause he was not invested with the judicial power of the
State as he was empowered merely to lift the ban statutorily
imposed on the employers’ rights and was not authorised to
pronounce a final and binding decision in any dispute.
Regarding the conclusion in that case this Court observed as
follows:
" ..... The condition precedent for bringing
a tribunal within the ambit of Article 136,
observed Shah, J., who spoke for the Court,
’is that it should be constituted by the
State’ and he added that a tribunal would be
outside the ambit of Article 136 if it is not
invested with any part of the judicial func-
tions of the State but discharges purely
administrative or executive duties. After
examining the scheme of the relevant provi-
sion, it was observed that ’in deciding wheth-
er an authority required to act judicially
when dealing with matters effecting rights of
citizens may be regarded as a tribunal’ though
not a court, the principal incident is the
investiture of the ’trappings of a court’such
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 19
as authority to determine matters in cases
initiated by parties. sitting in public, power
to compel attendance of witnesses and to
examine them on oath, and others .......
Some, though not necessarily all such trap-
pings, will ordinarily make the authority
which is under a duty to act judicially, a
’tribunal’."
1024
17. Then dealing with the question whether the State
Government when it exercised its authority under rule 6(5)
and rule 6(6) was a tribunal or not, this Court observed as
follows:
"The question which we have to decide in the
present appeal is whether the State Government
is a tribunal when it exercises its authority
under Rule 6(5) or Rule 6(6). No rules have
been made prescribing the procedure which the
State Government should follow in dealing with
appeals under these two sub-rules, and there
is no statutory provision conferring on the
State Government any specific powers which are
usually associated with the trial in courts
and which are intended to help the court in
reaching its decisions. The requirements of
procedure which is followed in courts and the
possession of subsidiary powers which are
given to courts to try. the cases before them,
are described as trappings of the courts, and
so, it may be conceded that these trappings
are not shown to exist in the case of the
State Government which hears appeals under
Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6). But as we already
stated, the consideration about the presence
of all or some of the trappings of a court is
really not decisive. The presence of some of
the trappings may assist the determination of
the question as to whether the power exercised
by the authority which possesses the said
trappings, is the judicial power of the State
or not. The main and the basic test however,
is whether the adjudicating power which a
particular authority is empowered to exercise,
has been conferred on it by a statute and can
be described as part of the State’s inherent
power exercised in discharging its judicial
functions. Applying this test, there can be no
doubt that the power which the State Govern-
ment exercises under Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6),
is a part of the State’s judicial power. It
has been conferred on the State Government by
a statutory Rule and it can be exercised in
respect of disputes between the management and
its Welfare Officers. There is, in that sense,
a lis; there is affirmation by one party and
denial by another, and the dispute necessarily
involves the rights and obligations of the
parties to it. The order which the State
Government ultimately passes is described as
its decision and it is made final and binding.
Besides, it is an order passed on appeal.
Having regard to these distinctive features of
the power conferred on the State Government by
Rule 6(5) and Rule
1025
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 19
6(6), we feel no hesitation in holding that it
is a Tribunal within the meaning of Article
136( 1)."
What follows from this case and the authorities referred
therein is this: The State is invested in Some cases with a
power to decide controversies between parties. This power is
undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State and that is
called the judicial power of the State. What has to be
remembered is that this power is exercised to resolve con-
troversies between parties. In Associated Cement’s case also
this Court took notice of the fact that a dispute existed
between the management and its welfare officer. It was held
that there existed a lis the decision of which lis was
rendered by the State in exercise of its judicial power.
This was the test that has to be applied to find out whether
an order is a judicial order or not.
18. In Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Limited,
Bombay, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 625 the question considered by a
Constitution Bench was whether the decision of an arbitrator
to whom industrial disputes were voluntarily referred under
Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. was
quasi-judicial in character and his decision amounted to a
determination or order under Article 136(1) of the Constitu-
tion of India. This Court held that for invoking Article
136(1), two conditions must be satisfied--(1) The proposed
appeal must be from any judgment, decree, determination,
sentence or order, that is to say, it must not be against a
purely executive or administrative order. If the determina-
tion or order giving rise to the appeal is a judicial or
quasi-judicial determination or order, the first condition
is satisfied. (2) The second condition imposed by the Arti-
cle is that the said determination or order must have been
made or passed by any Court or Tribunal in the territory of
India. These conditions, therefore, require that the order
complained against must have a judicial or quasi-judicial
character and the authority whose order is complained
against must be a Court or a Tribunal. Unless both the
conditions are satisfied, Article 136(1) cannot be invoked.
The decision of the arbitrator, it was held, could be cha-
racterised as quasi-judicial one, but the power of the
arbitrator is not in exercise of the sovereign power or one
by conferment of a statutory power by the State. He gets the
power to adjudicate by virtue of the authority given by the
parties. It was held that an appeal from the order of the
arbitrator did not lie under article 136(1) of the Constitu-
tion.
19. In Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit
Singh, Additional Collector of Customs and Others, [1964] 6
SCR 594 the question
1026
debated was whether the Central Board of Revenue exercising
its appellate power under Section 190 of the Sea Customs Act
or the Central Government exercising its revision jurisdic-
tion under Section 191 could be held to be a Tribunal under
Article 136. This Court repeated the principle laid down in
the earlier decisions that two conditions have to be satis-
fied before an appeal could be entertained in this Court
under Article 136: the order impugned must be an order of a
judicial or quasi-judicial character and should not be
purely an administrative or executive order; and that the
said order should have been passed either by a Court or a
Tribunal in the territory of India. After examining the
earlier decisions and the tests laid down therein and also
after examining the procedure prescribed in the Act in
relation to the adjudication of disputes under these sec-
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 19
tions, it was held that the Central Board of Revenue and the
revisional authority, the Central Government, had the char-
acter of a Tribunal under Article 136 of the Constitution
and thus the preliminary objection that the appeal was not
maintainable was overruled. Since great stress was laid by
the learned counsel for the appellants on this authority, we
would like to extract the relevant portion on which such
reliance was placed to distinguish it from the facts of our
case.
" ...... The fact that the status of the
Customs Officer who adjudicates under Section
167 (12A) and section 183 of the Act is not
that of a Tribunal, does not make any differ-
ence when we reach the stage of appeal or
revision. A period of limitation is prescribed
for the appeal, a procedure is prescribed by
Rule 49 that the appeal or revision must be
accompanied by a copy of the decision or order
complained against, and the obvious scheme is
that both the appellate and the revisional
authorities must consider the matter judicial-
ly on the evidence and determine it in accord-
ance with law. It is obvious that heavy fines
are imposed in these proceedings and the
confiscation orders passed may affect ships of
very large value. By his appeal or revisional
application the ship owner naturally contends
that the order of confiscation is improper or
invalid and he sometimes urges that the fine
imposed is unreasonable and excessive. Where
disputes of this character are raised before
the appellate or the revisional authority, it
would be difficult to accede to the argument
that the authority which deals with these
disputes in its appellate or revisional juris-
diction is not a tribunal under Article 136.
These authorities are constituted by the
legislature and they are empowered to deal
with the
1027
disputes brought before them by aggrieved
persons. Thus, the scheme of the-Act, the
nature of the proceedings brought before the
appellate and the revisional authorities, the
extent of the claim involved, the nature of
the penalties imposed ’and the kind of enquiry
which the Act contemplates, all indicate that
both the appellate and the revisional authori-
ties acting under the relevant provisions of
the Act constitute Tribunals under Article 136
of the Constitution, because they are invested
with the judicial power of the State, and are
required to act judicially. Therefore, we must
over-rule the preliminary objection raised by
the Additional Solicitor General and proceed
to deal with the appeal on the merits."
This judgment can be easily distinguished from the case on
hand on the finding that the High Court in this case, as
already indicated by us, was acting purely administratively
and was not making a judicial decision and the procedure
adopted was totally different from the procedure in a Court.
This decision, therefore, cannot create any hurdle for our
conclusion against the appellants.
20. In APHLC v. M.A. Sangma, [1978] 1 SCR 393 this Court
was dealing with the jurisdiction of the Election Commission
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 19
to decide the question of a symbol to the parties contesting
the election. It was held that the decision from the Elec-
tion Commission was amenable to appeal under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India since the powers were conferred on
the Election Commission by rules, that the Election Commis-
sion was dealing with the matter between two rival parties
and that the decision taken was a judicial decision. Here
again, the Court reiterated the several tests to determine
whether a particular body or authority was a Tribunal within
the ambit of Article 136 or not. These tests are not exhaus-
tive. The two necessary pre-requisites for that authority to
come within Article 136(1) are that it must be constituted
by the State and invested with some judicial power of the
State. These two tests, it was held, were unfailing one,
while some of the other test or tests may not be present. At
pages 409 and 410 the matter is made abundantly clear in the
following statement of law by the Court:
" ...... There is thus a lis between two
groups of the Conference. The Commission is
undoubtedly the specified and exclusive adju-
dicating authority of this lis. The Commission
is created by the Constitution and the power
to adjudicate the dispute flows from Article
324 as well as
1028
from Rule 5 and is thus conferred under the
law as a fraction of judicial power of the
State. The Commission has prescribed its own
procedure in the Symbols Order, namely, to
give a hearing to the parties when there is a
dispute with regard to recognition or regard-
ing choice of symbols ..... "
" ....... To repeat, the power to
decide this particular dispute is a part of
the State’s judicial power and that power is
conferred on the Election Commission by Arti-
cle 324 of the Constitution as also by rule 5
of the rules. The principal and non-failing
test which must be present in order to deter-
mine whether a body or authority is a tribunal
within the ambit of Article 136(1), is ful-
filled in this case when the Election Commis-
sion is required to adjudicate a dispute
between two parties, one group asserting to be
recognised political party of the State and
the other group controverting the proposition
before it, but at the same time not laying any
claim to be that party .......
21. We have considered the above decisions
carefully. In our view, the principles laid
down in these cases cannot help the appellants
in support of the plea that the High Court
While disposing of the appeal was acting as a
tribunal. The relevant provisions quoted in
the earlier part of the judgment relating to
the appeal in question, in our judgment,
clearly establish that the High Court acted on
the administrative side in deciding the ap-
peal.
22. There is a clear distinction between
courts of law exercising judicial powers and
other bodies. Decisions by courts are clearly
judicial. That is not the case with bodies
exercising administrative or executive powers.
In certain matters even Judges have to act
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 19
administratively and in so doing may have to
act quasi-judicially in dealing with the
matters entrusted to them. It is only where
the authorities are required to act judicially
either by express provisions of the statute or
by necessary implication that the decisions of
such an authority would amount to a quasi-
judicial proceeding. When Judges in exercise
of their administrative functions decide cases
it cannot be said that their decisions are
either judicial or quasi-judicial decisions.
23. Every decision or order by an authori-
ty which has a duty to act judicially is not
subject to appeal to this Court. Article 136
contemplates appeals to this Court only from
adjudications of courts and tri-
1029
bunals. Such adjudication must doubtless be
judicial. This does not mean that every au-
thority which is required to act judicially,
either by its constitution or by virtue of the
authority conferred upon it, is necessarily a
tribunal for the purpose of Article 136-A
tribunal, whose adjudication is subject to
appeal, must besides being under a duty to act
judicially, be a body invested with the judi-
cial power of the State.
24. In the appeal before the High Court,
the High Court was following its own proce-
dure, a procedure not normally followed in
judicial matters. The High Court was not
resolving any dispute or controversy between
two adversaries. In other words, while decid-
ing this appeal there was no |is before the
High Court. The High Court was only exercising
its power of control while deciding this
appeal. We have. therefore, no hesitation to
hold that the appeal is not maintainable.
However, we do not propose to dismiss it
without leaving any remedy to the appellants.
We direct the Registrar to transfer the re-
cords of the case to the Punjab and Haryana
High Court requesting the High Court to take
this petition on its file as a petition under
Article 226 and dispose of the matter as
expeditiously as possible on the available
pleadings and documents. There will be no
order as to costs.
P.S.S.
Appeal dismissed.
1030