Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RAM DAYAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
NARBADA AND ANOTHER
DATE OF JUDGMENT22/12/1972
BENCH:
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
BENCH:
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
GROVER, A.N.
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
CITATION:
1973 AIR 804 1973 SCR (3) 195
1973 SCC (1) 569
ACT:
Practice and Procedure--Special leave when may be revoked.
HEADNOTE:
Rule 97 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, states that
where a special appeal from the judgment of one judge does
not lie unless such judge has declared that the case is a
fit one for appeal, an application for such declaration may’
be made orally before or at the time when the judgment is
delivered and that the Court shall thereupon record an order
granting or refusing to grant such declaration.
In the present case, the only question was whether there was
proof that a person was dead, as not having been heard of
for more than 7 years, on the date his wife executed a gift
deed with respect to property worth about Rs. 200. The
appellant did not avail himself of the provision for leave
to appeal to a Division Bench. He however obtained special
leave from this Court, under Art. 136, but in the petition
for special leave, the fact that no application was made to
the single Judge of the High Court for leave to appeal to
the Division Bench, was not stated.
HELD : The special leave must be revoked, because, (a) the
appellant had not exhausted all his remedies in the High
Court before invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, and
(b) the value of the property involved is too small and the
question of law involved is of no public importance. [198E]
The Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Brothers, A. 1.
R. 1959 S.C. 1362 and The State of Bombay v. M/s. Ratilal
Vadilal and Brothers, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1.106, followed.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE- JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1559 of
1967.
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and order dated
February 22, 1967 of the Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Civil
Regular Second Appeal No. 202 of 1965.
Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
B. D. Sharma, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by.
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MATHEW, J. This is an appeal, by special leave, from a
decree of the High Court of Rajasthan passed in appeal by
which it dismissed the suit for recovery of possession of
the plaint property filed by appellant.
197
One Ram Prasad was the owner of the property in question.
He was not heard of by his wife Pani since 1950 for more
than 7 years. On June 4, 1962, she made a gift of the
property to the appellant, Ram Dayal, on the basis that Ram
Prasad was dead.
The appellant, alleging that respondents forcibly took
possession of the property, filed the suit for declaration
that he was the owner of the property and for recovery of
its possession.
The respondents contended that Ram Prasad was alive on June
4, 1962, that his wife had no right to execute the gift deed
and that the appellant was not in possession of the property
at any time.
The trial Court held that there was no proof that Ram Prasad
was dead on June 4, 1962, and, therefore, his wife was not
competent to execute the gift deed and dismissed the suit.
In appeal, the Court held that Ram Prasad must be deemed to
have been dead at the time when the gift deed was executed
by his wife and so the gift was valid and reversed the
decree of the trial Court.
It was against this decree that the appeal was filed before
the High Court. The High Court reversed the decree of the
appellate Court and restored the decree of the trial Court
on the, ground that there was no proof that Ram Prasad was
dead on the date of. the execution of the gift deed.
The respondents have filed an application for revocation of
the special leave to appeal on the ground that the appellant
did not avail himself of the provision for leave to appeal
to a division Bench of the High Court and that the value of
the property in question is only Rs. 200.
We heard counsel on both sides on the question of the revo-
cation of the special leave to appeal and we are of the
opinion that the leave to appeal should be revoked.
Section 18(2) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1,949
(Ordinance No. XV of 1949) provides:
"Notwithstanding anything here in before provided, an appeal
shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of
one Judge of the High Court made in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect
of a decree or order made in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to
the superintendence of the High Court where
the Judge who passed the judgment declares
that the case is a fit one for appeal."
198
Rule 97 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, states that
where a special Appeal from the judgment of one Judge does
not lie unless such Judge has declared that the case is a
fit one for appeal, an application for such declaration may
be made orally before or at the time when the judgment is
delivered and that the Court shall thereupon record an order
granting or refusing to ,grant such declaration. In this
case it is admitted that no application was made at or
before the time when the judgment was. delivered for leave
to appeal to a Division Bench. The fact that no such
application was made was also not stated in the petition for
special leave.
In the Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Brothers(1)
the Court said that although this Court has jurisdiction to
entertain an appeal against the order of a Court when an
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appeal lay from that order to another Court, the Court
should not give special leave and thereby short circuit the
legal procedure prescribed. In the State of Bombay v. M/s.
Ratilal Vadilal and Brothers(2) this Court held that the
proper course for an appellant is to exhaust all his
remedies (including those in the High Court) before invoking
the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136.
We are also of the opinion that the value of the- property
in question is too small and that the question of law
involved is not of such paramount public importance that we
would be justified in entertaining the appeal. It has
become imperative that no case be taken on the file of this
Court which does not rise to tile, measure of importance
which this Court has set for itself. One case is not just
one case more, and does not stop with being just one more
case. By revoking the special leave we would be discourag-
ing future applications for special leave of a similar
kind’, and thereby enforcing those rigorous standards in
this Court’s judicial administration which alone will give
us the freshness and vigour of thought and spirit that are
indispensable for wise decisions in the causes that are
legitimately" committed to us (see Frankfurter,
J. in Ex-parte Peru(")
Time is required for adequate reflection in those causes.
Reflection is a slow process. Wisdom, like good wine,
requires maturing (see Kinsella v. Krueger (4)
We revoke. the special leave to appeal and dismiss the
appeal with costs.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
(1) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1362.(2) A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1106,
(3) 318 U.S. 578 (1943).(4) 351 U.S. 470 (1956) 483--485.
199