Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1172 OF 2019
R. POORNIMA AND ORS. … PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
S. A. Bobde, CJI.
1. Persons who were appointed as District Judges (Entry Level) by
way of direct recruitment vide a Government Order G.O. Ms. No.
170, Home Department dated 18.02.2011 in the Tamil Nadu State
Judicial Service have come up with this Writ Petition seeking the
following reliefs:
“(a) Issue a Writ in the nature of a Writ of Certiorarified
Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, Order or Orders,
Signature Not Verified
Directions, to call for records relating to the last list of
Digitally signed by
Sanjay Kumar
Date: 2020.09.04
15:25:56 IST
Reason:
names recommended by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of High
Court of Madras to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for
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appointment as Judges of Madras High Court and quash
the same in so far as it relates to the names of
Respondents No. 5 to 23 herein and consequently direct
the Hon’ble Collegiums of the Madras High Court to
consider the names of the Petitioners also for appointment
as High Court Judges;
OR
(b) Issue a Writ in the nature of Writ of Mandamus or
any other appropriate Writ, Order or Orders, Directions,
directing the Respondents No. 1 to 4 to return the last list
of names for appointment as Judges of High Court,
Madras recommended by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of High
Court of Madras to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India;
AND
(c) Pass such further or other Order or Orders that this
Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
2. On 06.12.2019, this Court issued notice restricted only to one
question. The order passed on 06.12.2019 is selfexplanatory and
hence it is reproduced as follows:
“At the request of Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners,
prayer ‘A’ is allowed to be deleted.
Issue notice restricted to the question of the
entitlement of the petitioners to be considered by virtue of
having put in 18 years, as claimed.
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Dasti service, in addition, is permitted.”
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
4. The Petitioners as well as the Respondent Nos. 24 to 29 were
duly selected and appointed as District Judges (Entry Level) by way
of direct recruitment, vide a Government Order in G.O.Ms.No. 170,
Home Department, dated 18.02.2011. Therefore, obviously, they
have not completed 10 years of service as Judicial Officers, as on
date. But at the time of their appointment as District Judges, the
Petitioner Nos. 1 to 6had already practiced for more than 10 years as
advocates, the Petitioner No. 7 had practiced as advocate for 9 years
and 10 months and Petitioner No. 8 had practiced for 8 years and 6
months, after getting enrolled on the rolls of the Bar Council of
Tamil Nadu and Puducherry.
In the cadre of District Judges, the Petitioners and Respondent
5.
Nos. 24 to 29 are the seniormost, as seen from the annual list of
officers released by the High Court. The seniority of direct recruits
like the Petitioners herein over the promotees, was also reinforced by
the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Writ
Petition No. 20069 of 2014, by judgment dated 26.02.2015.
3
6. The short grievance of the petitioners is that despite being the
seniormost in the cadre of District Judges, they have been
overlooked and their juniors now recommended for elevation to the
High Court as Judges. This, according to the Petitioners, was done
by the Collegium of the High Court solely on the application of
Explanation (a) under Article 217(2) of the Constitution of India. The
contention of the Petitioners is that to determine the eligibility of a
person, subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (2) of Article 217 together
with Explanations (a) and (aa) should be applied simultaneously.
7. In simple terms, the Petitioners want the experience gained by
them as advocates to be clubbed together with the service rendered
by them as Judicial Officers, for determining their eligibility. Once
this clubbing is allowed, the Petitioners would like to take advantage
of their settled seniority position in the cadre of District Judges, over
and above that of Respondent Nos. 5 to 23. In other words, the
Petitioners want the best of both worlds.
8. Before proceeding further, we must note that the Respondent
Nos. 5 to 23 were appointed as Judicial Officers in the cadre below
that of District Judges. After a long service, they have gained
promotion to the post of District Judges. But their promotion
happened after the date on which the petitioners were directly
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recruited as District Judges. This is how and why the petitioners
became seniors to the respondents 5 to 23.
9. When vacancies arose for elevation to the High Court as
rd
Judges, as against the 1/3 quota meant to be filled up from among
the State Judicial Officers, the Collegium of the High Court found
that the Petitioners had not completed 10 years of service in a
Judicial Office as required by Article 217(2)(a). Therefore, the
Collegium recommended the names of persons who fulfilled the
eligibility criteria. Aggrieved by this action on the part of the
Collegium of the High Court, the Petitioners have come up with this
Writ Petition.
10. The contentions raised by the petitioners in the writ petition
are little different from the submissions made by Mr. Rakesh
Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. Let us first deal
with the contentions raised in the writ petition.
In their pleadings, the Petitioners have pitched their claim on—
11.
(i)
a cumulative reading of subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (2)
of Article 217 and Explanation (a) and (aa) thereunder;
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(ii) the decision of this Court in vs.
P. Ramakrishnam Raju
1
wherein this Court directed the number of
Union of India
years of practice as advocate, to be added to the number of
years of service rendered as a Judge of the High Court for
determining the qualifying service for pensionary benefits,
and
(iii) the reference made by a Division Bench of this Court to a 3
member bench in Dheeraj Mor vs. Hon’ble High Court of
2
of the question whether for the purposes of Article
Delhi
233, the number of years of practice as an advocate can be
clubbed together with the number of years of service as a
Judicial Officer for determining the eligibility for direct
recruitment to the post of District Judge.
At the outset, we shall point out that the ratio laid down in
12. P.
Ramakrishnam Raju has no application to the issue on hand. The
said decision was rendered in the context of advocates elevated to
the benches of the High Courts, not being appropriately
compensated in terms of pensionary benefits, when they retire after
less than 7 years/10 years/14 years of service. We cannot apply the
1 (2014) 12 SCC 1
2 (2018) 4 SCC 619
6
same ratio while considering the eligibility of a person for
appointment as a Judge of the High Court.
13. The reliance placed by the Writ Petitioners in Ground P of the
Writ Petition on the reference made in Dheeraj Mor is of no use to
them anymore. This is for the simple reason that by a judgment
dated 19.02.2020, a 3member bench of this Court has answered
the reference, in a way that will negate the argument of the
Petitioners.
14. In Dheeraj Mor , three categories of persons came up with a
claim for appointment to the post of District Judges by way of direct
recruitment. They were,(i)those who had 7 years of practice as an
advocate, but were serving in a judicial office on the date of
application/appointment, (ii)those who had completed 7 years of
service as Judicial Officers, but did not have 7 years of practice at
the Bar, and (iii) those who wanted the number of years of practice
as Advocate to be clubbed along with the number of years of service
as a Judicial Officer, for the purpose of arriving at the eligibility
criteria. After taking note of the diverse views expressed by different
benches of this Court in earlier cases, a Division Bench of this Court
passed an order on 23.01.2018 directing the matter to be placed
before a larger bench.
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15. The Petitioners herein filed the present Writ Petition in
September 2019. On the date on which the Petitioners filed the Writ
Petition and on the date on which the Writ Petition came up for
hearing, namely 06.12.2019, the reference in Dheeraj Mor was still
pending. The question was therefore at large on the date when this
court ordered notice in the present writ petition.
But subsequently, the reference has been answered by a three
16.
member bench of this court on 19.02.2020. The principles laid down
by the three member bench, are as follows:
(i)
For the purpose of Article 233(2), an advocate has to be
continuing in practice for not less than 7 years as on the
cutoff date and also at the time of appointment as District
Judge. Members of Judicial Service having 7 years’
experience of practice before they joined the service or those
having combined experience of 7 years as lawyer and
member of judiciary, are not eligible to apply for direct
recruitment as a District Judge, and
(ii) The decision in vs.
Vijay Kumar Mishra High Court of
3
upholding the eligibility of a Judicial
Judicature at Patna
Officer to apply for the post of District Judge by way of
3 (2016) 9 SCC 313
8
direct recruitment, does not lay down the law correctly and
hence, overruled.
17. Therefore, for the purpose of Article 233, it is not permissible
anymore, for people to hopon and hopoff between the two
independent streams of recruitment, in the light of the law laid down
in Dheeraj Mor . Hence the reliance placed by the Petitioners in their
pleadings, on the reference pending at that time in
Dheeraj Mor,
has become irrelevant.
Though was concerned with Article 233 of the
18. Dheeraj Mor
Constitution, an analogy was drawn by S. Ravindra Bhat, J. in
Paragraph 34 of his separate but concurring opinion in
Dheeraj
, to Article 217 with which we are concerned in the present case.
Mor
Paragraph 34 of the said opinion reads as follows:
“34. This view is fortified by Article 217 (2), which
spells out two sources from which appointments can be
resorted to for the position of judge of a High Court: firstly,
member of a judicial service of a State [Article 217 (a)] and
an advocate with ten years’ experience [Article 217 (b)].
For the Supreme Court, Article 124 (3) (a) enables
consideration of a person with five years’ experience as a
High Court judge; Article 124(3)(b) enables consideration of
an advocate with ten years’ experience at the bar in any
High Court; Article 124(3)(c) enables consideration of a
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distinguished jurist. Significantly, advocates with
stipulated experience at the bar are entitled, by express
provisions of the Constitution [Articles 233 (2), Article 217
(b) and Article 124 (3) (b)] to be considered for
appointment to the District Courts, High Courts and the
Supreme Court, respectively. However, members of the
judicial service can be considered only for appointment (by
promotion) as District Judges, and as High Court judges,
respectively. Members of the judicial service cannot be
considered for appointment to the Supreme Court.
Likewise, academics or distinguished jurists, with neither
practise at the Bar, nor any experience in the judicial
service, can be considered for appointment as District
Judge, or as High Court judge.”
19. Therefore, the very foundation upon which the Petitioners have
built their case, at least in their pleadings, is now gone. But Mr.
Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners contended
—
(i) that while clause (1) of Article 217 prescribes the method of
appointment and the age up to which an appointee can hold
office, clause (2) merely stipulates the qualification for
appointment and the method of computation of such
qualification;
(ii) that the qualifications prescribed in subclauses (a) and (b) of
clause (2) of Article 217 are in the alternative, but Article 217 does
10
not create separate streams for appointment, with independent
quotas for such streams;
(iii) that to interpret Explanation (a) in such a manner that only a
person who resigned from Judicial service and became an
Advocate will be eligible to club both the periods, will result in
unfair and hostile discrimination of Judicial Officers, offending
Article 14 and hence such an interpretation has to be avoided;
and
(iv) that there are precedents where District Judges who had not
completed 10 years of service, were appointed as Judges of High
courts, by clubbing the number of years of practice they had at
the bar, together with the number of years of service they put in
judicial service.
20. Before we deal with the above submissions, let us take a look at
Article 217(2) of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
“(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as
a Judge of a High Court unless he is a citizen of India and
—
(a) has for at least ten years held a judicial office in the
territory of India; or
(b) has for at least ten years been an advocate of a
High Court or of two or more such Courts in succession;
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause—
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(a) in computing the period during which a person has
held judicial office in the territory of India, there shall be
included any period, after he has held any judicial office,
during which the person has been an advocate of a High
Court or has held the office of a member of a tribunal or
any post, under the Union or a State, requiring special
knowledge of law;
(aa) in computing the period during which a person has
been an advocate of a High Court, there shall be included
any period during which the person [has held judicial
office or the office of a member of a tribunal or any post,
under the Union or a State, requiring special knowledge of
law] after he became an advocate;
(b) in computing the period during which a person has
held judicial office in the territory of India or been an
advocate of a High Court, there shall be included any
period before the commencement of this Constitution
during which he has held judicial office in any area which
was comprised before the fifteenth day of August, 1947,
within India as defined by the Government of India Act,
1935, or has been an advocate of any High Court in any
such area, as the case may be.”
21. It is clear from the language of Article 217 that clause (1) merely
prescribes the method of appointment and the age up to which an
appointee can hold office. Clause (2) does two things. First it stipulates
the qualification for appointment under the 2 subclauses (a) and (b).
Then it stipulates the method of reckoning such qualification, under
the 2 limbs of the Explanation.
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22. Actually, clause (2) of Article 217 has 2 parts, the first of which
is in subclauses (a) and (b) and the second in Explanation (a) and
(aa). The first indicates in plain terms, that to be qualified for
appointment, a person (i) must be a citizen of India and (ii) must have
either held a judicial office for 10 years or been an Advocate of a high
court for 10 years.
Suppose there was no ‘Explanation’ under clause (2) of Article
23.
217, then there would have been no scope for any argument, other
than to accept blindly, that the qualification stipulated in clause (2) of
Article 217, can be acquired by an individual from 2 separate sources,
namely (i) from the Bar or (ii) from the ‘ judicial service’ , as defined in
clause (b) of Article 236. This is for the reason that Subclauses (a)
and (b) are actually in the alternative, as can be seen from the use of
the word “or” in between. The word “or” in English grammar,
according to Merriamwebster dictionary, is a
coordinating
While the word which is also a conjunction, will
conjunction. “and” ,
denote something to be taken cumulatively, the word “or ” will denote
something to be taken alternatively. This is so far as the first part of
clause (2) is concerned. As stated earlier, the first part of clause (2) is
in subclauses (a) and (b).
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24. The second part of clause (2) of Article 217, which has taken
shape in the form of an ‘Explanation’, merely explains the manner in
which the periods indicated in subclauses (a) and (b) are to be
construed. Interestingly, the Explanation under clause (2) of Article
217 also has 2 parts, one going with subclause (a) and another going
with subclause (b).
25. Explanation (a) goes with subclause (a) and Explanation (aa)
goes with subclause (b). This is because, Explanation (a) permits the
addition, to the number of years of service of a Judicial Officer, some
other period also, namely (i) the period during which a person has
been an advocate of a High Court, or (ii) the period during which a
person has held the office of a member of a Tribunal. Similarly,
Explanation (aa) permits the addition, to the number of years during
which a person has been an advocate of a High court, some other
period, namely the period during which he has held any judicial office
or the office of a member of a Tribunal.
26. According to Explanation (a), the period of service rendered by a
person in a judicial office has to be computed by taking into account
the period during which he has been an advocate of a high court.
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27.
But the condition for such addition of some other period,
under Explanation (a) is that such other period should have
followed and not preceded the judicial service . This is made clear
by the use of the words “after he has held any judicial office” .
28. What is sought by the petitioners herein is to club with their
judicial service, the experience that they had at the Bar before
. In other words, the petitioners want the
joining judicial service
word “after” to be interpreted to mean and include “before”. We do not
know of any rule of interpretation which permits the word “after” to be
interpreted to mean and include “before”.
29. The telescoping of Explanation (a) and (aa) into subclauses (a)
and (b) of clause (2) of Article 217 would show that a person may
acquire the eligibility as indicated in Article 217(2)
(i) either exclusively from the Bar [as provided in clause (b)]
(ii) or exclusively from the judicial service [as provided in clause
(a)]
(iii) or from a cocktail of both [as provided in Explanation (a) and
(aa)]
15
30. But what is important to note is that Article 217(2) merely
prescribes the eligibility criteria and the method of computation of the
same. If a person is found to have satisfied the eligibility criteria, then
he must take his place in one of the queues. There are 2 separate
queues, one from judicial service and another from the Bar. One
cannot stand in one queue by virtue of his status on the date of
consideration of his name for elevation and at the same time keep a
towel in the other queue, so that he can claim to be within the zone of
consideration from either of the two or from a combination of both.
31. The queue to which a person is assigned, depends upon his
status on the date of consideration. If a person is an advocate on the
date of consideration, he can take his place only in the queue meant
for members of the Bar. Similarly, if a person is a judicial officer on
the date of consideration, he shall take his chance only in the queue
meant for service candidates.
Hopping on and hopping off from one queue to the other, is not
32.
permissible. Today, if any of the petitioners cease to be Judicial
Officers and become Advocates, they may be eligible to be considered
against the quota intended for the Bar. But while continuing as
Judicial Officers, they cannot seek to invoke Explanation (a) as it
16
applies only to those who have become advocates
after having held
.
a judicial office
33. The issue can be looked at from another angle also. The
petitioners successfully claimed and gained seniority over and above
the contesting respondents, on the ground that they were directly
recruited to the post of District Judges, before the contesting
respondents got promoted as District Judges. In other words, for the
purpose of seniority, the petitioners went solely by the date of
recruitment to the cadre of District Judges and not (i) by the total
length of service in a judicial office or (ii) by a combination of the
number of years of practice at the bar and the number of years of
judicial service. But for the purpose of determining the eligibility, they
want to go by the total period of practice as an Advocate and the
period of service in a judicial office. If clubbing is permitted, it should
be permitted even for the contesting respondents, which if done,
would upset even the seniority of the petitioners.
34. Though Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel submitted
that his clients cannot have any objection to the benefit of clubbing
being granted even to the contesting respondents, we think it is an
argument of convenience. For filling up the vacancies under the
service quota, the collegiums of the High courts consider the ACRs
17
and the judgments of the judicial officers, in the ratio of 1:3 or 1:5 or
so. To undertake this exercise, the High courts maintain seniority lists
of judicial officers. If there are 3 vacancies to be filled up, the profile of
9 or 15 seniormost officers are considered. If the argument of the
petitioners is accepted and the contesting respondents are also
granted the benefit of clubbing, they will be far seniors to the
petitioners in terms of the total number of years of service both at the
bar and in service. In such an event, the petitioners will not come
anywhere near the zone of consideration (within the first 9 or 15). In
every State, hundreds of judicial officers will satisfy the qualifying
criteria, if the argument of the petitioners is accepted. Take for
instance a case where a person is appointed as a District Judge after
10 years of practice at the Bar. If the contention of the petitioners is
accepted, even such a person will be eligible from day one of his
appointment as District Judge. Since all such persons cannot be
considered for the limited number of vacancies, a seniority list is
maintained and a particular number of officers are taken in the zone
of consideration, depending upon the number of vacancies sought to
be filled up under the quota. The cache in the argument of the
petitioners is that for the purpose of seniority, they do not want any
two services to be clubbed, but for the purpose of eligibility, they want
18
even the practice at the Bar to be clubbed. This is nothing but a self
serving argument.
35. As pointed out earlier, the petitioners were appointed in
February 2011. They will be completing 10 years of service in a
judicial office by February 2021. This is why, when this court ordered
notice in this writ petition on 06.12.2019, they have agreed to delete
prayer A and confine themselves to prayer B, which is just for
returning the list of names recommended by the collegium of the
Madras High court. Perhaps the petitioners have gained an impression
that if the list of names already recommended is returned and the
matter is taken up afresh after February 2021, they would have by
then become eligible in terms of subclause (a) of clause (2) of Article
217 and at that time they can claim the benefit of seniority over and
above the contesting respondents.
36. Referring to the discussions that took place in the Drafting
Committee of the Constitution, on the amendments proposed to the
Draft of Article 193(2)(b) of the Constitution, which corresponds to the
present Article 217(2)(b), for the insertion of the words “and is” and
the rejection of the said suggestion by the Drafting Committee, it is
contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that in
19
the light of the same, this Court cannot interpret Article 217(2)(b) in a
manner restricting it to “practising advocates”. The relevant portion of
the “Comments and Suggestions on the Draft Constitution”, from
Volume 4 of the “Framing of the Indian Constitution”, relied upon by
the learned counsel for the petitioners reads as follows:
“ The Editor of the Indian Law Review and some
other members of the Calcutta Bar have suggested that in
subclause (b) of clause (2) of article 193, after the word
“years” the words “and is” should be inserted.
Note : This amendment seeks to restrict the recruitment
of High Court judges under subclause (b) of clause (2) of
article 193 only to practising lawyers. If this amendment
is accepted then a person who has served as a district
judge for seven or eight years and has also practised as
an advocate of a High Court for seven or eight years before
being a district judge will not be eligible to be appointed as
a High Court judge whereas a member of the Provincial
Judicial Service who has served as a ‘munsif’ for only ten
years will be eligible to be so appointed, which is certainly
anomalous. This amendment cannot therefore be
accepted.”
37. On the basis of the above it is contended that Article 217(2)(b)
cannot be restricted to mean only those practising as advocates on
the date of consideration.
20
38. But the above argument loses sight of the fact that Article
217(2)(b) relates to the stream of advocates. When it comes to such a
stream, Explanation (aa) comes into play. Therefore, the reference to
the discussions in the Drafting Committee is of no relevance.
39. As a matter of fact, the present Explanation (a) was inserted
th
only by the Constitution (44 Amendment) Act, 1978 with effect from
20.06.1979. What was Explanation (a) till then, became Explanation
(aa) by the same Amendment. Therefore, the benefit of the present
Explanation (a) was not even available to judicial officers until
20.06.1979.
40. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners
upon the decision of this Court in vs.
Mahesh Chandra Gupta
4
, and the decision of the Delhi High court in
Union of India D.K.
5
Sharma vs Union of India in support of his contention that the
entitlement to practise as an advocate was sufficient to satisfy the
criteria under Article 217(2) and that the provision does not
contemplate actual practice.
41. But both those decisions arose out of a challenge to the
appointment of members of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal as
4 (2009) 8 SCC 273
5 2011 SCC Online Del 1773
21
Judges of the High courts. These decisions cannot apply to the case
of a person holding a judicial office. Mahesh Chandra Gupta (supra)
was a case where the appointment of a Member of the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal as an Additional Judge of the Allahabad High
Court was under challenge. As seen from Para 38 of the Report, what
fell for consideration of this Court in the said case was “whether
actual practise as against the right to practise is a prerequisite
constitutional requirement of the eligibility criteria under Article
217(2)(b)”. Subclause (b) of Clause (2) of Article 217 prescribes the
number of years a person should have been an Advocate to become
eligible for consideration. Therefore, if the petitioners want to be
considered from the category as advocates, irrespective of their
present status as judicial officers, they can always do so, provided
they do not stand in the queue intended for judicial officers. The case
of the petitioners, as on date falls under Article 217(2)(a) and not
Article 217(2)(b). Hence, (supra) will not
Mahesh Chandra Gupta
come to their rescue. The judgment of the Delhi High court in D.K.
Sharma followed the ratio in Mahesh Chandra Gupta.
42. It is relevant to note that the expression “judicial office”
appearing in Article 217(2)(a) was interpreted in
Shri Kumar Padma
22
6
vs. only to mean a judicial office belonging
Prasad Union of India
to the judicial service defined in Article 236(b). Therefore, the case of
a Member of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal could not have fallen
within the ambit of Article 217(2)(a). This is why the decision in
(supra) was rendered in the context of
Mahesh Chandra Gupta
Article 217(2)(b) and not Article 217(2)(a).
43. The words “ has held ” and the words “ has been ” appear
repeatedly in subclauses (a) and (b) as well as Explanation (a) and
(aa) under Article 217(2). In relation to a person from the category of
judicial service, subclause (a) uses the words “has held”. But in
relation to a person from the category of advocate, subclause (b) uses
the words “has been”. This is quite relevant for the reason that even
in Explanation (a) and (aa) the words “has held” always preceded the
words “judicial office” and the words “has been” always preceded the
word “advocate”.
44. In common parlance, the words “has held” stand in contra
distinction to the words “is holding” or “has been holding”.
45. On the other hand the words “has been” do not have any such
connotation. The Cambridge Dictionary states that the words “has
been” are in present perfect continuous form . The Dictionary says
6 (1992) 2 SCC 428)
23
that
we may use the present perfect continuous, either to talk
about a finished activity in the recent past or to talk about a
single activity that began at a point in the past and is still
continuing . Keeping this in mind, Explanation (a) confers the benefit
of clubbing to a limited extent, to a person who has held a Judicial
Office. To be eligible for the limited benefit so conferred, a person
should have been an Advocate “
after he has held any judicial
office ”. There is no confusion either in the language of Article 217(2)
or in our mind.
46. The argument that it will be discriminatory to allow the benefit
of clubbing only to a person who held a judicial office and later
became an advocate, does not appeal to us. In fact, Article 217(2)
does not guarantee any one with the right to be appointed as a judge
of the High Court. In a way, a person holding a judicial office is better
placed, as he is assured of a career progression (though in a limited
sense) after being placed in something like a conveyor belt. There is
no such assurance for an advocate. Therefore, the argument based
upon Article 14 does not impress us.
It was also contended that a few persons whose names are
47.
mentioned in Paragraph 16 of the Writ Petition, got appointed to the
24
High Court without completing 10 years of service as District Judges.
But we do not know whether they got so appointed by clubbing the
number of years of practise at the Bar. The factual situation that
prevailed in those cases is not available. In any case a majority of
those whose names are mentioned in Para 16 of the Writ Petition, got
th
appointed to the High Court before Constitution (44 Amendment)
Act, 1978. Therefore, we do know what was done in those cases.
48. Therefore, in fine, we are of the considered view that the claim of
the writ petitioners is wholly untenable and the writ petition is
misconceived. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no
order as to costs.
………………………..CJI.
(S.A. Bobde)
…………………………...J.
(A.S. Bopanna)
……………………………J.
(V. Ramasubramanian)
New Delhi
September 04, 2020
25