Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 724 OF 2019
Kashmira Devi .…Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Uttarakhand & Ors. …. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna,J.
1. The instant appeal has been filed by the appellant
assailing the impugned judgment and final order dated
29.06.2017 and 10.07.2017, passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Nainital in Government Appeal No. 42 of
2010, whereby the High Court has allowed the appeal
filed by the Respondent and set aside the acquittal of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
MAHABIR SINGH
Date: 2020.01.28
15:58:26 IST
Reason:
appellant passed by the trial court and convicted the
Page 1 of 30
appellant for the charges under Sections 304B and 498
A IPC.
2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that the
marriage between deceased/ Urmila @ Guddi and
Proforma Respondent No.3/Jagdish Singh was
solemnized four years back. At the time of the marriage
dowry was given by parents of the deceased as per their
financial capacity; despite the same the husband and in
laws of the deceased were not satisfied. Whenever
deceased used to visit her paternal house, she used to
complain about the harassment and brutal beating by
her husband, father in law, mother in law i.e.
Appellant/Kashmira Devi, brother of husband and
brother’s wife for nonfulfilment of demands for dowry, to
PW1/ Rajeshwari/ Mother of the deceased. In November,
2007 the deceased was severely beaten and harassed by
the accused persons. Due to the ill treatment of her in
laws she came back to her parental house. PW1 and her
husband/PW3 sent her back on 02.02.2008 to the
matrimonial house by stating that they are very poor and
in no position to fulfil the demands of the accused
Page 2 of 30
persons. On 08.02.2008, PW1 through the news spread
amongst the villagers received information that the
deceased was burnt, thereafter she called the inlaws of
her daughter to inquire about the incident, when she was
told by Proforma Respondent No 3 that she was burnt
due to stove burst. Immediately PW1 along with all her
family members reached the base hospital to see the
condition of deceased and on inquiring about how her
daughter was burnt, accused persons instead of giving a
satisfactory answer used derogatory words and started
threatening them and also told deceased to say on
inquiry by anybody that she has got burnt by stove. On
14.02.2008 deceased succumbed to her injuries. On
15.02.2008, PW1/Rajeshwari/Mother of the deceased
filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.
3. The statement of the deceased was recorded by
DW1/Darshani Devi on the first day after the incident
wherein deceased stated that all of a sudden, the stove
burst, oil spilled and caught fire. She had also stated that
no one was responsible for the incident. On 07.02.2008,
Page 3 of 30
second dying declaration was recorded by the Tehsildar
wherein she stated that the stove exploded and her saree
caught fire. The last dying declaration was recorded by
PW5/ Shishpal Singh/ Additional Tehsildar on
13.2.2008 wherein the deceased has stated that there
was quarrel between her and her mother in
law/appellant and in the course of quarrel her motherin
law set her ablaze and none of the others had any
involvement.
4. FIR No.2 of 2008 was registered on 29.02.2008
against the accused persons. The investigation of the
offence was taken up by PW8 and later on by
PW9/Devendra Singh who recovered clothes and stove
from the spot. Body of the deceased was sent to the
hospital for postmortem which was conducted by PW6/
Dr. R.K. Tamta and in the postmortem report he stated
that severe burn injuries were present on approximately
55% of the body including head, face, neck, breast, left
hand and right hand from front and back side. On
internal examination of the body it was found that the
membrane of the head was congested. In his opinion the
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cause of the death was septicaemia due to the ante
mortem burn injuries. After completion of the
investigation, charge sheet was filed under Sections 304
B and 498A of IPC. The appellant pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried. The prosecution examined as many
as 9 witnesses to bring home the guilt of the accused and
accused produced two witnesses.
5. Upon consideration of the evidence, the trial court
acquitted appellant and the other accused persons for the
charges under Section 304B and 498A IPC stating that
the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the
accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. Trial court
noted that on 07.02.2008 on the application of the SHO,
dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the
Tehsildar but the said dying declaration has not been
proved by the prosecution. Court held that there are
three dying declarations of the deceased, hence the dying
declarations have become dubious. It held that at the
time of the incident only the father in law and the mother
in law of the deceased were at home and none of the
family members were present at home. All the witnesses
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examined by the prosecution belong to the parents' place
of the deceased, but were not present on the spot. The
witness DW2/Dalveer Singh is the spot witness but he
has not been examined by the prosecution and has
rather been examined by the defence, who deposed that
deceased caught fire from stove. So far as the question of
dowry is concerned no prior complaint in this regard has
ever been filed by the parents of the deceased. Regarding
the FIR, court held that it has been lodged on the
instruction of the husband of PW1 with much delay and
only after due deliberations, on seeking legal advice. The
Investigating officer has shown in the site map of the spot
that the saree caught fire from the stove.
6. Being aggrieved by the order dated 25.02.2010, an
appeal was filed by the State of Uttarakhand, whereby
High Court set aside the order passed by the Trial Court
and convicted appellant under Section 304B read with
Section 498A of the IPC and sentenced her to undergo
imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000 for the
offence under Section 304B and in default of payment of
fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months.
Page 6 of 30
However, in view of the judgment in Smt. Shanti and
AIR 1991 SC 1226, though
Anr. Vs. State of Haryana
appellant was convicted u/s 498A IPC, no separate
sentence was awarded in view of the fact that substantive
sentence was awarded for major offence u/s 304B IPC.
7. The High Court noted that statement of deceased
was recorded firstly on 06.02.2008 wherein she deposed
that all of a sudden, the stove burst, oil spilled and
caught fire. She had also stated that no one was
responsible for the incident. This statement was signed
by members of the Gram Panchayat but they were not
examined. DW1 though examined, in her cross
examination deposed that she did not know who has
written this statement on 06.02.2008/Ex. B1. The court
held that this document does not inspire confidence. The
second statement was recorded on 07.02.2008 by the
Tehsildar in which also she stated that the stove
exploded and her saree caught fire. She put right thumb
impression on the statement. The last statement was
recorded on 13.02.2008 by PW5. The death of deceased
was due to burn injuries which are verified by the doctor.
Page 7 of 30
Court further noted that dying declaration made on
13.02.2008 is natural, voluntary and without any
influence. When statements were recorded on 06.02.2008
and 07.02.2008, the accused persons were present in the
room. However, on 13.02.2008, parents of the deceased
were also there and she gave statement without any fear.
Deceased made specific allegation against appellant
which cannot be termed as tutored. Further the High
Court held that in case the deceased did not die
unnatural death, it was expected that inlaws would
inform the parents of the deceased, which was not done
in this case. As regards the delay in lodging FIR, the
court opined that the foremost anxiety of the family
members was to look after the deceased instead of
lodging FIR. When the deceased died on 14.02.2008,
immediately after that on 15.02.2008 complaint was
lodged and FIR was registered. Thus, there was no
inordinate delay in filing the FIR. PW9 has deposed that
the stove did not burst and the same was taken into
possession. There is close proximity between demand of
dowry for which deceased was harassed and tortured by
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her inlaws and her death. With these findings, the High
Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent and set
aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial court and
convicted them.
8. In appeal before us, appellant has contended that
the High Court erred in ignoring that the prosecution
failed to present any material to rule out the possibility of
an accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of
the 'Death occurring otherwise than in normal
circumstances' as required under Section 304B of IPC
and further failed in establishing the fact that soon before
the occurrence there was cruelty/harassment in relation
to dowry demand and to bring on record any reliable
evidence of a subsisting dowry demand. Further the High
Court erred in ignoring the fact that the parents of the
deceased never made an attempt to report that there was
a demand for dowry to the police or the elders of the
locality and the fact that the allegation regarding dowry
was made for the first time on 15.02.2008 while the
incident took place on 06.02.2008. It is also contended
by the appellant that High Court erred in convicting the
Page 9 of 30
accused by reversing the judgment of acquittal of the
appellant even though the same was based on reasonable
and plausible grounds and in ignoring the evidences
brought on record and the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. It is also submitted by the appellant that the
High Court erred by relying on the threedying
declarations of the deceased in isolation and failed to
consider the possibility that the third dying declaration of
the deceased was a result of being brainwashed by her
parents. It is the contention of the appellant that error
was committed by the Court in bringing the case within
the ambit of the Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act
by proceeding under the presumption arising under
Section 304A and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act.
9. On the other hand in the counter affidavit filed by
the Respondents they have submitted that the High
Court properly appreciated the statement of the deceased
made on 13.02.2008 wherein the deceased supported the
prosecution case and also evidence of PW5 and
accordingly convicted and sentenced the appellant u/s
304B and 498A IPC by stating that dying declaration is
Page 10 of 30
acceptable even in the absence of the other corroborative
evidence. It was further submitted that the High Court
has applied correct position of law before convicting the
appellant under Section 304B by discussing the
applicability of Section 304A and Section 113B of the
Evidence Act relying on the judgment of Sanjay Kumar
(2011) 11 SCC 733 and holding
Jain Vs State Of Delhi
that deceased died within seven years of marriage and
she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her
husband and relatives for bringing insufficient dowry and
further in holding that accused persons including the
appellant had failed to rebut the presumption under
Section 113B of the Evidence Act. It is further submitted
by the Respondent that deposition of PW1, PW2 and PW3
clearly establish the fact that deceased was subjected to
cruelty by her inlaws in bringing insufficient dowry and
on various occasion she has told it to her parents. On the
contention of the dying declaration it is submitted that
the High Court had rightly held that dying declaration
made on 13.02.2008 is only found to be trustworthy after
Page 11 of 30
assessing each dying declaration relying on the ratio of
the judgment Ashabai and Another Vs State of
(2013) 2 SCC 224 wherein it was held
Maharashtra
that when there are multiple dying declarations, each
dying declaration has to be assessed independently on its
own merits as evidentiary value and one cannot be
rejected solely because of certain variations in another
declaration. It was further submitted that the High Court
has rightly held that the prosecution has proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the material on
record and evidence of material witnesses. Respondents
have further submitted that in the present case trial
court acquitted the accused persons without any cogent
reason and the High Court as First Appellate Court re
appreciated and scanned the evidences and passed a
wellreasoned judgment whereby the appellant has been
appropriately convicted.
10. Heard Shri Aakash Sirohi, learned counsel for the
appellant, Dr. Rajiv Nanda, learned counsel for the
respondent State and perused the appeal papers.
Page 12 of 30
11. As noticed the learned Sessions Judge by the
judgement dated 25.03.2010 in Sessions Trial No.13/2008
had acquitted the appellant herein and the other co
accused of the charge alleged against them under Section
304B and 498A of IPC. The High Court having re
appreciated the evidence and having considered the
matter in its entirety has convicted Jagdish Singh, the
husband of the deceased and Govind Singh and Mahendra
Singh, the fatherinlaw and brotherinlaw of the
deceased under Section 498A IPC. The appellant
Kashmira Devi, motherinlaw of the deceased is convicted
under Section 304B IPC and sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs.10,000/, in
default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months.
In respect of the conviction against the appellant under
Section 498A no separate sentence is awarded. While
arriving at the conclusion the High Court in addition to
the other evidence available on record has also referred to
the dying declaration recorded on 13.02.2008. In the said
dying declaration the deceased Urmila @ Guddi had stated
that the appellant, her motherinlaw had gone to the
Page 13 of 30
room and started quarrelling with her. She poured the
bottle of kerosene kept in the room on her clothes and
started quarrelling with her, during which time she
torched her. The other evidence available on record
related to the demand of dowry to which the other accused
were also a party and, in that light, insofar as the death
caused, the deceased had not made any allegation relating
to death against the other accused. All the accused were
convicted under Section 498A of IPC and the appellant
was convicted under Section 304B as well, since the
deceased had held her responsible for her death.
12. The learned counsel for the appellant while
assailing the judgment passed by the High Court has
referred to the judgment passed by the Sessions Court
wherein based on the same evidence available on record
the Sessions Court had arrived at the conclusion that the
charge against the accused was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The learned counsel would further
contend that the High Court has committed a serious
error in discarding the earlier two dying declarations dated
Page 14 of 30
06.02.2008 and 07.02.2008 wherein the deceased had
categorically stated that the appellant nor her family
members were responsible but it was an accident due to
stove burst. In that light it was contended that the dying
declaration dated 13.02.2008 is not reliable and the same
was required to be discarded. It is contended that the
dying declaration dated 07.02.2008 was recorded by the
Tehsildar based on the request made as per procedure.
Hence it is contended that the very approach adopted by
the High Court was erroneous and the judgment is liable
to be set aside and restore the judgment passed by the
Sessions Court.
13. The learned counsel for the State however seeks to
sustain the judgment passed by the High Court. It is
contended that the Sessions Court in fact had proceeded
at a tangent and arrived at a wrong conclusion which is
contrary to the wellestablished legal position. In the
instant facts a young lady aged about 22 years was killed
for nonfulfilling the dowry demand. The incident had
occurred within the statutory period of seven years from
Page 15 of 30
the date of marriage and there was sufficient evidence
available on record to indicate the demand for dowry
immediately prior to the death. In that circumstance
while the death had occurred, a presumption had arisen
as contemplated under Section 304B of IPC and Section
113B of the Evidence Act. The ingredients, therefore, had
been satisfied and it was for the appellant to dispel the
presumption, which they have failed to do and, in that
circumstance, the High Court having referred in detail to
the legal position and the evidence available on record has
arrived at its conclusion which does not call interference.
14. In the instant case the undisputed position is that
the deceased Urmila @ Guddi was given in marriage to one
of the accused Jagdish Singh. The marriage was
performed about four years prior to the date of the
incident which occurred on 06.02.2008 and the death on
14.02.2008. Since the complaint against the accused was
for demand of dowry and the death being caused for non
fulfilment of the same, the sequence which occurred
leading to the demand of dowry as well as the death is to
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be noticed at the outset. In that regard the mother of the
deceased Rajeshwari Devi was examined as PW1. She had
stated with regard to the marriage and that her daughter
was being harassed by her inlaws for taking insufficient
dowry. The articles that were given at the time of the
marriage were also referred and it was stated by her that
her daughter came back to the parental house stating that
her husband and the inlaws were demanding dowry. The
father of the deceased was working at Delhi and as such
the mother of deceased informed him about the demand.
He returned to the village from Delhi after a couple of days
and went along with his daughter Urmila to her inlaws.
The incidents that occurred there are referred and also the
daughter being beaten and being injured in the eye was
referred. Immediately thereafter on 06.02.2008 she heard
from other villagers that her daughter was burnt.
Thereafter though she went and saw her daughter in the
Base Hospital, Srinagar she was not allowed to accompany
her daughter when she was shifted from the said hospital
to Doon hospital in Dehradun.
Page 17 of 30
15. In that circumstance she thereafter went to that
place after her husband had reached. She had stated that
when she initially went to Srinagar Hospital her daughter
was surrounded by the accused and was not being allowed
to speak to PW1, the mother. However subsequently
when she visited her daughter on 13.02.2008 she was able
to interact with the daughter who had at that stage
informed her that her motherinlaw was responsible for
her death as she had poured kerosene and burnt her. The
father of the deceased was examined as PW3 who has also
spoken with regard to the same in a manner to
corroborate the version of PW1, the mother. PW2, Bheem
Raj Singh who was examined as a witness being the uncle
has stated with regard to PW1 having told him about the
harassment caused by the inlaws of the deceased
demanding for dowry and about the ultimate death. He
has stated that whenever she went home, the deceased
used to complain about her inlaws. PW4, Smt. Geeta
Devi, a close relative of the deceased has also spoken in
the same terms. The evidence of PW1 to PW4 would
indicate that the same would not only establish the
Page 18 of 30
ingredients of Section 498A IPC where there was a
demand for dowry but would also satisfy the ingredients of
Section 304B IPC relating to the cruelty and harassment
being caused soon before her death and the same being in
connection with the demand for dowry. Therefore, insofar
as the conviction ordered by the High Court under Section
498A of IPC the same is justified.
16. Insofar as the death having occurred and the
appellant being convicted under Section 304B of IPC, in
addition to the said evidence available on record the High
Court has relied on the dying declaration dated
13.02.2008. As noticed, there are three dying declarations
of deceased Urmila @ Guddi – one recorded on 06.02.2008
by DW1Darshani Devi, Chairman, Mahila Mangal Dal;
second recorded on 07.02.2008 by Tehsildar, Srinagar;
and the third recorded on 13.02.2008 by PW5Shispal
Singh Rawat, Additional Tehsildar by which time, the
parents of deceased Urmila had also come. In the dying
declarations recorded on 06.02.2008 and 07.02.2008,
deceased Urmila had stated that due to excessive pumping
Page 19 of 30
of stove, the stove exploded and she caught fire and
sustained burn injuries and at that time, her fatherinlaw
and motherinlaw i.e. the accused were on the second
floor. In the third dying declaration recorded on
13.02.2008, deceased Urmila stated that on 06.02.2008 at
about 07:00 p.m., appellant Kashmira Devi, her mother
inlaw came to her room and started quarrelling with her
and thereafter, her motherinlaw poured kerosene oil on
her clothes and set her on fire. Deceased further stated
that except her motherinlaw, no one was responsible for
the incident.
17. When dying declarations of deceased Urmila were
recorded on 06.02.2008 and 07.02.2008, accused were
present in the room. However, by the time when her third
dying declaration was recorded on 13.02.2008, parents of
deceased Urmila had come and deceased had given the
statement without any fear of the accused. On the very
next day i.e. on 14.02.2008, deceased died and on
15.02.2008, PW1Rajeshwari Devi, mother of deceased
filed a complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the
Page 20 of 30
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rudraprayag. On 29.02.2008,
FIR in Crime Case No.2 of 2008 was registered under
Sections 498A and 304B IPC against all the accused.
Since it has come in evidence that at the time of recording
dying declarations on 06.02.2008 and 07.02.2008, her in
laws were present, it cannot be said that the statement
was recorded voluntarily and without fear.
18. The appellant is convicted under Sections 498A
IPC and 304B IPC – dowry death. For sustaining the
conviction under Section 304B IPC, the following
essentials must be satisfied:
(i) the death of a woman must have been caused by
burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under
normal circumstances;
(ii) such death must have occurred within seven years
of her marriage;
(iii) soon before her death, the woman must have been
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
or by relatives of her husband;
(iv) such cruelty or harassment must be for or in
connection with demand for dowry;
(v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been
meted out to the woman soon before her death.
Page 21 of 30
(Vide Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Others (2000)
5 SCC 207 and Smt Shanti and Another v. State of
Haryana ).
(1991) 1 SCC 371
19. In the present case, PW1Rajeshwari Devi, mother
of deceased and PW3Bachan Singh, father of deceased
has stated that deceased Urmila was harassed by her in
laws for bringing insufficient dowry. They have also
stated that after the marriage, when deceased came to
her parental home, she was complaining that her
husband and inlaws including fatherinlaw, motherin
law and others were demanding dowry. PW1 further
stated that deceased Urmila was beaten up by accused
persons due to which, her eye was damaged and she was
operated. PW1 – stated that when deceased again went
back to her parental home, on 02.02.2008, PW1 had
taken deceased to her inlaws house where, they were not
even offered a glass of water and the accused persons
enquired as to what they have brought with them. PW1
told them that they were not in a position to fulfil their
demands and after overnight stay, on 03.02.2008, PW1
returned to her house. From the evidence of PW1,
Page 22 of 30
prosecution has proved that “soon before the death”,
deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment. When
prosecution has established that deceased was subjected
to dowry harassment “soon before the death” and that
within seven years of marriage deceased Urmila had died
an unnatural death, the presumption under Section 113
B of the Evidence Act is to be raised against the appellant
that she caused the dowry death. Once the prosecution is
able to establish the ingredients of Section 304B IPC, it is
for the accused to rebut the presumption. But the
accused have not adduced any reliable evidence to rebut
the presumption. The evidence of DW1 and DW2
relating to the incident will not be sufficient when the
incident is viewed keeping in perspective the evidence of
prosecution relating to the demand for dowry preceding
the actual incident. In fact, when the deceased was
shifted from Kota hospital, Srinagar to Dehradun
hospital, PW1 tried to accompany them but the accused
refused to take PW1 along. Not informing about the
incident and refusal of the appellant and other accused
Page 23 of 30
to take PW1 along with them to the hospital, are strong
circumstances against the appellant.
20. In the above background, the justification for the
reliance placed on the third dying declaration dated
13.02.2008 by the High Court is to be examined. The
evidence of PW1, as noted, would disclose that when she
first went to the Hospital in Srinagar, she found that the
deceased was surrounded by her husband and inlaws
while PW1, the mother of the deceased was not allowed to
interact with her daughter. It is in that circumstance the
said declarations dated 06.02.2008 and 07.02.2008 were
recorded. Firstly, the statement dated 06.02.2008 was not
recorded by a Competent Authority or an Officer but is
recorded by the socalled Panchayat in the manner to aid
the accused. Insofar as the second dying declaration
dated 07.02.2008 it is no doubt true that it has been
recorded after a communication being addressed to the
Tehsildar and after being certified by the doctor that the
deceased was mentally fit to make the declaration.
Though the said requirements are satisfied, the
surrounding circumstances in which the statement was
Page 24 of 30
recorded while she was under the control of her inlaws.
Such statements relied on by the appellant would not
inspire confidence in the Court. In addition, it is noticed
that the same is in the form of question and answer which
could also be out of context depending on the manner in
which the questions were put.
21. As noted in the evidence of PW1, the mother of the
deceased, she was not allowed to accompany the deceased
when she was shifted to Doon Hospital. However, she
subsequently went there and was able to interact with her
daughter and in that circumstance after about a week
from the incident the declaration was recorded on
13.02.2008 after being certified by the doctor about the
deceased being conscious and fit to make the statement.
The said statement refers to the incident and the manner
in which it had occurred. The indicator to the
truthfulness of such statement is that the deceased had
only mentioned about the appellant i.e., the motherinlaw
who had indulged in the act of pouring kerosene and
setting her on fire. She had not implicated her husband
Page 25 of 30
nor her fatherinlaw who was in the house but has stated
that her fatherinlaw was sitting in another room having
her daughter on his lap and has in fact stated that when
she started crying, her fatherinlaw came there and he
extinguished the fire. If it was a case of false implication,
there was no reason for the deceased to have been so
specific insofar as the act of causing the death without
naming the other members of the family when all of them
were involved in the act of demanding dowry and was
complaining earlier about the harassment meted out by
them.. In such circumstance, the reliance placed on the
dying declaration dated 13.02.2008 is justified.
22. While arriving at such conclusion the High Court
has kept in view a decision of this Court in the case of
Nallam Veera Stayanandam & Ors. Vs. The Public
(2004) 10 SCC 769
Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.
wherein it is held that each dying declaration has to be
considered independently on its own merit as to its
evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of
the contents of the other. It is held therein that the Court
Page 26 of 30
has to consider each of them in its correct perspective and
satisfy itself which one of them reflects the true state of
affairs. The consideration made herein above would also
indicate that on an independent consideration, the dying
declaration dated 13.02.2008 is reliable for the reasons
stated above. To the same effect the High Court has also
relied on another decision of this Court in the case of
Ashabai & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra (2013) 2 SCC
224 wherein it is held that when there are multiple dying
declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately
assessed and evaluated on its own merits.
23. The High Court has also taken note of a decision of
this Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs.
(2015) 1 SCC 323 wherein it is held
Suvarnamma & Anr.
that the dying declaration recorded by the police officer
was consistent with the circumstances on record while
dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate was not
found to be consistent. If the said decision is kept in view,
as already noticed, though the dying declaration dated
07.02.2008 was recorded by Tehsildar, the circumstance
Page 27 of 30
in which it was recorded was taken note by us. Further,
the dying declaration dated 13.02.2008 was recorded by
the Additional Tehsildar, Shri Shishpal Singh who was
examined as PW5. He has stated with regard to the memo
received from the hospital and having met the medical
officer he recorded the statement of the deceased who was
lying with burn injuries in the emergency ward. The
validity of the statement so recorded, therefore, stands
established. In addition, the High Court has also referred
to various other decisions on the subject. Hence the High
Court having examined the matter threadbare has arrived
at its conclusion in recording the conviction in the manner
as it has done which is justified and does not call for
interference.
24. Having arrived at the above conclusion the
quantum of sentence requires consideration. The High
Court has awarded life imprisonment to the appellant on
being convicted under Section 304B IPC. The minimum
sentence provided is seven years but it may extend to
imprisonment for life. In fact, this Court in the case of
Page 28 of 30
Hem Chand Vs. State of Haryana (1994) 6 SCC 727 has
held that while imposing the sentence, awarding extreme
punishment of imprisonment for life under Section 304B
IPC should be in rare cases and not in every case. Though
the mitigating factor noticed in the said case was different,
in the instant case keeping in view the age of the appellant
and also the contribution that would be required by her to
the family, while husband is also aged and further taking
into consideration all other circumstances, the sentence
as awarded by the High Court to the appellant herein is
liable to be modified.
25. In the result the following:
O R D E R
(i) The conviction of the appellant recorded by the
High Court under Section 304B IPC and Section
498A IPC through its judgement dated 29.06.2017
is upheld and affirmed.
(ii) The sentence ordered by the High Court
through its order dated 10.07.2017 is modified and
the sentence of imprisonment for life is altered by
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ordering the appellant to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of seven years which
shall include the period of sentence already
undergone by the appellant. The fine as imposed
and the default sentence is sustained.
(iii) The appeal is allowed in part, in the above
terms. (iv) The parties to bear their own cost.
Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………………….J.
(R. BANUMATHI)
……………………….J.
(A.S. BOPANNA)
New Delhi,
January 28, 2020
Page 30 of 30