Full Judgment Text
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 592 OF 2008
STATE OF RAJASTHAN ...Appellant
VERSUS
SHOBHA RAM ...Respondent
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 593 OF 2008
SHRI RAM ...Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF RAJASTHAN ...Respondent
J U D G M E N T
1. These appeals are directed against the judgment and order
passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur
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Bench, Jaipur in Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 2000, dated
03.06.2005. The High Court, while affirming the judgment of the
Trial Court in Sessions Case No. 49/99, dated 15.03.2000, has
convicted Shri Ram - A-1, under Section 302 read with Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code (“the IPC” for short) and reversed the
judgment of the Trial Court and acquitted Shobha Ram - A-2. It is
the acquittal of A-2, which is called in question by the
appellant – State of Rajasthan in Criminal Appeal No. 592 of
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2008.
2. Criminal Appeal No. 593 of 2008 is preferred by Shri Ram -
A-1, being aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence
passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court.
3. The facts in brief are: The incident occurred on
16.02.1999 at about 5.30 p.m. PW-1 - Mohanlal, who is the
brother of the deceased-Trilokchand had lodged the FIR before
S.H.O., Police Station Chechat, regarding the alleged assault on
the deceased by the accused persons. On the fateful day, the
appellants on account of their past enmity over the well located
in their lands, formed common intention to cause death of
Trilokchand (since deceased) and in furtherance of their common
intention, they caused injuries to the deceased with stones
resulting in his death. The FIR was registered and after the
completion of the investigation, the investigating agency had
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filed a charge-sheet against A-1 and A-2 under Section 302 read
with Section 34 of the IPC. The accused persons denied the charge
and pleaded false implication and, therefore, the Trial had
commenced against both the accused A-1 and A-2.
4. During the Trial, the prosecution, in order to prove the
guilt of the accused persons had examined several witnesses
including PW-1 and PW-2 Smt. Manoharbai wife of the
deceased, PW-3 Bhawanishankar, PW-4 Kalulal, PW-6 Basantilal and
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other witnesses. Prosecution had projected PW-2 and PW-6 as eye
witnesses to the incident.
5. The Trial Court after appreciating the evidence of the eye
witnesses and others, has come to the conclusion that the
testimony of PW-2 does not corroborate with the FIR and other
material available on record and, therefore, it could be safely
concluded that PW-2 had not seen the occurrence of actual
incident and therefore, the evidence at the most can only be an
hearsay evidence. However, the Trial Court has believed the
evidence of PW-6, who, in his evidence, has categorically stated
that A-1 was assaulting the deceased with the stones and A-2 was
sitting on the chest of the deceased. The Trial Court placing
reliance on the evidence of PW-6 has convicted and sentenced the
accused persons under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC
to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-
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each, and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a
further period of six months.
6. Aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence passed
by the Trial Court, the accused persons had filed appeals before
the High Court. The High Court has confirmed the conviction and
sentence of A-1 passed by the Trial Court. However, the High
Court has acquitted A-2, only on the ground that A-2 had not
actively participated in the commission of the offence and,
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therefore, the Trial Court was not justified in convicting A-2
for an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34
of the IPC.
7. It is the correctness or otherwise of the judgment and order
passed by the High Court which is called in question by the
appellants in this appeal.
8. We will first take up the appeal of A-1. The Trial Court
and the High Court has convicted A-1 based on the evidence of the
sole eye-witness, namely, PW-6. In order to satisfy ourselves, we
have once again carefully analyzed the evidence on record and the
conviction of A-1 by the Trial Court with the aid of the sole
eye-witness of PW-6. In his evidence PW-6 has stated, A-2 was
acting in concert with A-1 in causing the murder of the deceased,
wherein A-1 was assaulting the deceased with stones and A-2 had
facilitated the execution of the common design by sitting on the
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chest of the deceased. Despite cross-examination at length, PW-
6, has maintained his version, thereby, not leaving any scope for
the defense to elicit anything against the prosecution witness.
Therefore, in our opinion, the evidence of the said witness is of
sterling quality and therefore reliable and trustworthy, leaving
us with no other alternative but to accept his evidence.
Therefore, we decline to interfere with the finding and
conclusion reached by the Trial Court insofar as convicting A-1
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is concerned. Therefore, we reject the appeal filed by A-1 and
confirm the orders passed by the Trial Court and the High Court.
9. While considering the appeal filed by the State of
Rajasthan, we have carefully perused the judgment and order
passed by the High Court. The High Court has acquitted, A-2,
only on the ground that merely sitting on the chest of the
deceased rules out the possibility of active participation by A-2
in the commission of offence and therefore has acquitted him from
the charges under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
10. The nuances of Section 34 of the IPC has been explained by
this Court in several decisions, but we will only refer to the
decision in the case of Nadodi Jayaraman and others vs. State of
Tamil Nadu [(1992) 3 SCC 161] and Saravanan and Another vs.
State of Pondicherry [(2004) 13 SCC 238]. In the case of Nadodi
Jayaraman and others (Supra), the Court has observed:-
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“ 9. Section 34 of IPC enacts that when a criminal act is
done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of
all, each of such persons, is liable for that act in the same
manner as if it were done by him alone. The section thus lays
down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal
act. The essence of that liability is found in the existence of
“common intention” animating the accused leading to the doing of
a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. The section is
intended to meet a case in which it is difficult to distinguish
between the act of individual members of a party and to prove
exactly what part was played by each of them. It, therefore,
enacts that once it is found that a criminal act has been
committed by several persons in furtherance of the common
intention of all, each of such persons is liable for the criminal
act as if it were done by him alone. It is thus an exception to
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the general rule of criminal jurisprudence that it is the primary
responsibility of the person who actually commits a crime and
only that person can be held guilty and punished in accordance
with law for his individual act.
15. It is thus clear that the criminal act referred to in
Section 34 IPC is the result of the concerted action of more than
one person if the said result was reached in furtherance of the
common intention and each person must be held liable for the
ultimate result as if he had done it himself. ”
11. A perusal of Section 34 of the IPC would clearly indicate
that there must be two ingredients for convicting a person with
the aid of Section 34 of the IPC. Firstly, there must be a
common intention and secondly, there must be participation by the
accused persons in furtherance of the common intention. If the
common intention is proved, it may not be necessary that the acts
of the several persons charged with commission of an offence
jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be
different in character, but must be arising out of the same
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common intention in order to attract the provision. The said
principle is reiterated in a three-judge bench decision in
Suresh & Anr. vs. State of U.P. [(2001) 3 SCC 673] and
Ramaswami Ayyangar and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu [(1976) 3
SCC 779], wherein the court has stated that the acts committed by
different confederates in the criminal action may be different,
but all must in one way or the other participate and engage in
the criminal enterprise, for instance, one may only stand guard
to prevent any person coming to the relief of the victim or to
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otherwise facilitate the commission of crime. Such a person also
commits an "act" as much as his co-participants actually
committing the planned crime. In the case of an offence involving
| physical violence, the person | who | instigates or aids the |
| commission of the crime must be physically present and such | ||
| presence of those who in one way or the other facilitate the | ||
| execution of the common design, is itself tantamount to actual | ||
| participation in the 'criminal act.'<br>12. Insofar as common intention is concerned, it is a state of<br>mind of an accused which can be inferred objectively from his | ||
| conduct displayed in the course | of commission of crime and also | |
| from prior and subsequent attend | ant circumstances. As observed in | |
| Hari Ram vs. State of U.P. [(2004) 8 SCC 146], the existence of<br>direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, |
| State of U.P. | [(200 | 4) 8 SCC 146] |
|---|
therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the
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circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the
proved circumstances. Therefore, in order to bring home the
charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by
evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan
or meeting of mind of all the accused persons to commit the
offence before a person can be vicariously convicted for the act
of the other.
13. The facts in the present case in the light of the evidences
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on record are that, A-1 and A-2 are brothers having an old enmity
with the deceased resulting in a constant skirmish over the well
located in their lands. On the said date of incident, the
animosity culminated to an assault on the deceased by the accused
persons when the deceased was nearing his land. It has come in
the evidence of PW-6, that A-1 was assaulting the deceased with
stones and A-2 was sitting on the chest of the deceased. The
aforesaid chain of events gives a clear picture of the whole
incident that had taken place on that fateful day. The evidence
of, PW-6, when seen in entirety and in its proper perspective, we
can conclude that both the accused persons i.e. A-1 and A-2 had a
common intention to assault and kill the deceased person with A-2
as a participant in the crime with the intention of lending
weight to the commission of an offence pursuant to a pre-
concerted plan. In our opinion, the High Court was not justified
in coming to the conclusion that merely because A-2 was sitting
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on the chest of the deceased person, the said accused person is
entitled for the benefit of doubt and thereby an acquittal. In
our opinion, the reasoning and conclusion reached by the High
Court is against the well settled legal principles.
14. In the result, while allowing the appeal of the appellant-
State of Rajasthan (Criminal Appeal No.592 of 2008), we dismiss
the appeal filed by Shri Ram – A-1 (Criminal Appeal No.593 of
2008) and confirm the judgment and order of conviction and
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sentence against the accused persons so passed by the Trial Court
under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and set aside
the judgment and order passed by the High Court in acquitting
accused A-2. We further direct that the Accused A-2 Shobha Ram
shall surrender forthwith to serve out the remaining period of
sentence. The Trial Court is directed to send the compliance
report to this Court within one month’s time from the date of
receipt of a copy of this judgment. Registry shall send back the
lower court records with a copy of this judgment to the Trial
Court forthwith for information and necessary action.
Ordered accordingly.
........................J.
(H.L. DATTU)
JUDGMENT
........................J.
(RANJAN GOGOI)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 16, 2013.
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