Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 99 OF 2009
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 5166 of 2008)
V.V.G. REDDY … APPELLANT
Versus
APSRTC, NIZAMABAD REGION & ANR. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
S.B. Sinha, J.
1. Leave granted.
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2. Appellant is before us questioning the judgment and order dated
21.9.2007 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature of
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Appeal No.658 of 2007 and others
whereby and whereunder the said writ appeal preferred from a judgment and
order dated 29.10.2002 passed in W.P. No. 21410 of 2002 filed by appellant
and others was allowed.
3. Respondent – Corporation is constituted and incorporated under the
Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (64 of 1950). Appellant joined its
services as a conductor in the year 1981. A disciplinary proceeding was
initiated against him. He was placed under suspension in the year 1982. In
the said disciplinary proceeding, he, having been found guilty was
dismissed from services.
An industrial dispute was raised by him, which was eventually
referred to the Labour Court by the State of Andhra Pradesh in exercise of
its powers conferred upon it under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, “the Act”).
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4. By reason of an Award dated 1.8.1988, the Labour Court directed his
reinstatement in service with continuity therein but without attendant
benefits and back wages.
5. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said Award, appellant was
reinstated in service. However, he was not paid his salary at par with his
colleagues whose services had been regularized with effect from 1.10.1983.
6. He filed an Execution Petition being E.P. No. 18 of 1989 in I.D. No.
581 of 1987 before Labour Court, Hyderabad praying that his services be
directed to be regularized at par with his colleagues with effect from
1.10.1983. The said Execution Petition was allowed.
7. As despite the same, his pay was not fixed at par with his colleagues
and no notional increments had been granted, a legal notice was issued on
his behalf by an Advocate on 2.3.1992.
He thereafter filed a writ petition before the High Court which was
marked as Writ Petition No. 21410 of 2002 praying for grant of notional
increments for the period between 1.10.1983 and 15.2.1989.
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By reason of a judgment and order dated 29.10.2002, the said writ
petition was allowed by a learned single judge of the High Court, directing:
“The controversy in this writ petition is no more
res integra, in view of the decision of a Division
Bench of this Court in APSRTC, Khammam
Region and another Vs. P. Nageswara Rao. The
Division Bench while dealing an analogous
question has held that when an award was passed
by the labour court directing the respondents to
reinstate the petitioner into service, the action of
the respondent – Corporation in fixing the pay
without taking into consideration the notional
increments is illegal. It is further held that the
Corporation cannot rely on any circular or
regulation that takes away the plain meaning of the
award in the judgment.”
8. A writ appeal was preferred thereagainst by the respondent herein.
However, the said writ appeal was barred by limitation and an application
for condonation of delay having not been allowed, the same was dismissed.
A Special Leave Petition filed thereagainst being Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 1114 of 2004 was allowed by a judgment and order dated
13.2.2007 in terms whereof the matter was remitted to the High Court for
disposal of the case on merit. By reason of the impugned judgment, the writ
appeal preferred by the respondent herein has been allowed.
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9. Ms. T. Anamika, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
would urge that in view of the fact that the appellant was denied back wages
only by the Labour Court and having been reinstated in service with
continuity, the High Court committed a serious error in declining to grant
notional increments in his favour from the date of his dismissal till the date
of passing of the Award. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on
the decision of this Court in Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh & ors. [AIR 1962 SC 1334].
10. Mr. D. Mahesh Babu, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment.
11. The award appeared to have been passed by the labour court on
consent of the parties. Appellant himself stated so in his affidavit in support
of the writ petition.
12. The terms of the consent order have not been produced before us by
the appellant. We will, however, proceed on the premise that the parties
thereto agreed that the appellant would be reinstated within a month from
the said date. Appellant was, therefore, not only denied back wages but also
the attendant benefits.
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13. Interpretation of terms of consent will depend upon the nature of the
lis and the background events.
14. Appellant, as noticed hereinbefore, had not only foregone back wages
but also attendant benefits. The word “attendant benefits” should be given
its natural meaning. The “attendant benefits” was in regard to a period for
which he had been denied back wages. A person may be denied back wages
which otherwise can be interpreted to mean that he would be entitled to
claim the benefit of increments notionally.
15. We may, however, notice that in A.P. State Road Transport
Corporation & ors. vs. Abdul Kareem [(2005) 6 SCC 36], this Court held:
“…..the Labour Court specifically directed that the
reinstatement would be without back wages. There
is no specific direction that the employee would be
entitled to all the consequential benefits.
Therefore, in the absence of specific direction in
that regard, merely because an employee has been
directed to be reinstated without back wages, he
cannot claim a benefit of increments notionally
earned during the period when he was not on duty
during the period when he was out of service. It
would be incongruous to suggest that an
employee, having been held guilty and remained
absent from duty for a long time, continues to earn
increments though there is no payment of wages
for the period of absence.”
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16. In A.P. SRTC & Anr. vs. S. Narsagoud [(2003) 2 SCC 212], this
Court held:
“9. We find merit in the submission so made.
There is a difference between an order of
reinstatement accompanied by a simple direction
for continuity of service and a direction where
reinstatement is accompanied by a specific
direction that the employee shall be entitled to all
the consequential benefits, which necessarily flow
from reinstatement or accompanied by a specific
direction that the employee shall be entitled to the
benefit of the increments earned during the period
of absence. In our opinion, the employee after
having been held guilty of unauthorised absence
from duty cannot claim the benefit of increments
notionally earned during the period of
unauthorised absence in the absence of a specific
direction in that regard and merely because he has
been directed to be reinstated with the benefit of
continuity in service.”
17. In Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma (supra), this Court upon
referring to Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules framed by the State of Uttar
Pradesh, held as under:
“11. In our view, this contention is wholly
misconceived. Rule 54, as amended in 1953,
stands as follows :
“54.(1) When a Government servant who
has been dismissed, removed or suspended is
reinstated, the authority competent to order the
reinstatement shall consider and make a specific
order—
(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be
paid to the Government servant for the period of
his absence from duty and
(b) whether or not the said period shall be
treated as a period spent on duty.
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(2) Where such competent authority holds
that the Government servant has been fully
exonerated or, in the case of suspension, that it
was wholly unjustified, the Government servant
shall be given the full pay to which he would have
been entitled, had he not been dismissed, removed
or suspended, as the case may be together with any
allowances of which he was in receipt prior to his
dismissal, removal or suspension.
(3) In other cases, the Government servant
shall be given such proportion of such pay and
allowances as such competent authority may
prescribe.
Provided that the payment of allowances
under clauses (2) and (3) shall be subject to all
other conditions under which such allowances are
admissible.
(4) In a case falling under clause (2) the
period of absence from duty shall be treated as the
period spent on duty for all purposes.
(5) In a case falling under clause (3) the
period of absence from duty shall not be treated as
period spent on duty unless such competent
authority specifically directs that it shall be so
treated for any specified purposes.”
This rule has no application to cases like the
present in which the dismissal of a public servant
is declared invalid by a civil court and he is
reinstated. This rule, undoubtedly enables the
State Government to fix the pay of a public
servant whose dismissal is set aside in a
departmental appeal. But in this case the order of
dismissal was declared invalid in a civil suit. The
effect of the decree of the civil suit was that the
appellant was never to be deemed to have been
lawfully dismissed from service and the order of
reinstatement was superfluous, The effect of the
adjudication of the civil court is to declare that the
appellant had been wrongfully prevented from
attending to his duties as a public servant. It would
not in such a contingency be open to the authority
to deprive the public servant of the remuneration
which he would have earned had he been
permitted to work.”
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The said decision, in our opinion, has no application to the fact
situation obtaining in the present case.
18. Appellant has not been directed to be reinstated in service by reason
of an Award holding that the order of termination was wholly illegal and,
thus, void ab initio. On what premise, parties entered into a compromise is
not known. It is possible to hold that findings of the Enquiry Officer which
might have been accepted by the disciplinary authority holding him guilty
of misconduct had not been set aside; the Management might have thought
that denial of back wages and attendant benefits would be sufficient
punishment. If that be so, appellant being not in service during the period in
question, namely, 1.10.1983 to 15.2.1989, in our opinion, would not be
entitled to increment.
19. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
.……………………………….J.
[S.B. Sinha]
...…………………………..…J.
[Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]
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New Delhi;
JANUARY 13, 2009