ASHUTOSH ASHOK PARASRAMPURIYA vs. M/S. GHARRKUL INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD.

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 08-10-2021

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Full Judgment Text

NON­REPORTABLE  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).  1206         OF 2021  (Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No(s). 7573 of 2014) ASHUTOSH ASHOK  PARASRAMPURIYA & ANR.  ….APPELLANT(S)                  VERSUS M/S. GHARRKUL  INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. & ORS …RESPONDENT(S) WITH         CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).  1207      OF 2021  (Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No(s). 9520 of 2014) J U D G M E N T Rastogi, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The   present   appeals   are   directed   against   the   common Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by NEETU KHAJURIA Date: 2021.10.08 17:48:25 IST Reason: th judgment and order dated 18   July, 2014 filed at the instance of 1 the appellants under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(herein after being referred to as “CrPC”) against the order th dated 10  November, 2012 pursuant to which they were summoned to answer to a charge of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881(hereinafter being referred to as the “NI Act”) that came to be dismissed by the High Court under the order impugned. 3. The seminal facts in brief necessary for the present purpose are stated as under. 4. The appellant nos. 1 and 2 in Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No. 7573 of 2014 and appellant nos. 2, 3 and 4 in Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No. 9520 of 2014 are the Directors of the appellant no.   1(Ameya   Paper   Mills   Pvt.   Ltd.)   in   Criminal   Appeal   @ SLP(Criminal)   No.   9520   of   2014,   the   Private   Limited   Company established under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956.  It is the case of respondent no. 1­complainant that it is a Private Limited Company dealing in the business of production and selling spices under the name and style of M/s. Gharkul Industries Private Ltd. and the appellants being well acquainted with respondent no.1­ complainant   and   being   in   need   of   financial   assistance   for   their 2 business approached respondent no.1­complainant with a request to   provide   them   financial   assistance.     Respondent   no.   1­ complainant considering the relations and need of the appellants provided financial assistance and on negotiations, Memorandum of Understanding was executed which was signed by appellant no. 2­ Dilip Shrikrishna Andhare(Appellant no. 2 in Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No. 9520 of 2014) with consent of all the appellants in the presence of two attesting witnesses. 5. It is also the case of respondent no. 1­complainant that all the appellants had agreed that the amount so received from respondent no. 1 would be returned within a specified time as agreed in the Memorandum   of   Understanding   and   accordingly   payments   were made by respondent no. 1­complainant as and when demanded by various  cheques   details   which  were   furnished   in   the   complaint. Accordingly, a total amount of Rs. 1,50,19,831/­ was received by rd the appellants through cheque during the period 23   November, th 2007 to 12  March, 2009, the details of which are as under:­
DateCheque No.Bank HDFC<br>BankAmount
23/11/07417895HDFC Bank20,00,000/-
3
30/11/07417896HDFC Bank16,00,000/-
18/01/08417909HDFC Bank6,00,000/-
21/01/08417915HDFC Bank5,00,000/-
22/01/08417916HDFC Bank10,00,000/-
23/01/08417917HDFC Bank5,39,831/-
30/01/08417919HDFC Bank7,00,000/-
01/02/08461840S.B.I.3,00,000/-
15/02/08461840S.B.I.5,00,000/-
26/02/08507485HDFC Bank3,00,000/-
01/03/08507487HDFC Bank4,00,000/-
11/03/08461844S.B.I.3,50,000/-
18/03/08507483HDFC Bank80,000/-
24/03/08507497HDFC Bank3,04,000/-
04/04/08507509HDFC Bank3,00,000/-
0/04/08507500HDFC Bank2,70,000/-
28/04/08507506HDFC Bank24,000/-
01/05/08507507HDFC Bank1,27,000/-
06/05/08507514HDFC Bank2,25,000/-
30/05/08461861S.B.I.2,50,000/-
04/06/08507519HDFC Bank4,00,000/-
27/06/08507426HDFC Bank2,50,000/-
12/03/09333407S.B.I.10,00,000/-
12/03/09333408S.B.I.10,00,000/-
12/03/09333409S.B.I.10,00,000/-
4
12/03/09333410S.B.I.10,00,000/-
August   2010,   a   letter   was   issued   to   the   appellants   demanding balance­sheet of the Company, which was supplied and accordingly st accounts were confirmed by the appellants and on 21  June 2012, the appellants issued a letter admitting the outstanding balance of st respondent no. 1­complainant as on 31  March, 2012 to the extent of Rs.1,49,94,831/­.  According to respondent no. 1, the appellants as Directors of their Company are responsible for conduct of their business and for the affairs of the Company. 7. Appellant No. 1­Company in Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) nd No. 9520 of 2014 issued a cheque on 2  June, 2012 in favour of respondent no. 1­complainant towards part payment of the amount valued for Rs. 10,00,000/­ drawn on State Bank of India, Finance Branch   at   Nagpur,   Maharashtra   which   was   deposited   by respondent   no.   1­complainant   in   UCO   Bank,   Amravati, Maharashtra for encashment.  However, the same was dishonoured due to “funds insufficient”.  The intimation of dishonour of cheque th was received by respondent no. 1­complainant on 4   June, 2012. After   dishonour   of   cheque,   notice   was   issued   to   the   appellants 5 demanding the said amount of cheque, which was refused to be accepted by the appellants in spite of intimation given by the Postal Authorities and, thus, the notice was returned with remark “not claimed”. 8. In the background of the above facts, respondent no. 1 filed a complaint against the appellants under Section 138 of NI Act in which   a   specific   averment   was   made   that   respondent   no.   1   by considering the need of the appellants for financial assistance and their relations, provided such financial assistance to the appellants by executing Memorandum of Understanding, which was signed by Appellant   no.   2­Dilip   Shrikrishna   Andhare.     It   is   specifically contended   that   appellant   no.   2   signed   the   said   document   with consent   of   all   the   remaining   appellants   in   the   presence   of   two attesting witnesses.  It is the case of respondent no. 1­complainant as revealed from the complaint that all the appellants agreed that the amount provided by respondent no. 1 would be refunded within one or two years.  The contents of the complaint further reveal that respondent no. 1 had demanded balance­sheet of appellant no. 1 Company, which was provided and the appellants also confirmed 6 st the balance in their accounts by issuing letter dated 21   June, 2012.     The   cheque   involved   in   the   criminal   case   initiated   by nd respondent no. 1 against the appellants is dated 2  June, 2012.  It is further averred in para 5 & 7 of the complaint that all Directors of the appellant Company are responsible for its business and all the appellants are involved in the business of the Company and are responsible for all the affairs of the Company.   nd 9. After contending about the fact of issuance of cheque dated 2 June, 2012 by the appellants to respondent no. 1 and dishonour of cheque   for   want   of   sufficient   funds,   on   receipt   of   intimation th regarding dishonour of cheque on 4  June, 2012, respondent no. 1 issued legal notice to the appellants on the address of appellant no. 1­Company as well as on their residential address by registered th post acknowledgment due on 26   June, 2012 demanding amount of   Rs.10   lakhs   which   is   alleged   to   have   been   refused   by   the appellants as per endorsement made by the Postal Department.   10. In   the   light   of   the   above   averments   in   the   complaint   and documents filed on record, and so also the specific averment made in paragraph 5 and 7 of the complaint that all the appellants are 7 equally responsible for the offence committed by them and they have issued the said cheque to discharge their legal liability towards respondent no. 1­complainant.  11. The learned trial Court taking cognizance of the complaint by th order dated 10  November, 2012 issued summons to the appellants rd herein directing them to appear before the Court on 23  November, 2012 and the appellants were granted bail on furnishing security of rd Rs.2,000/­ by an Order dated 23  November, 2012 by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate.  12. The order passed by the learned trial Judge summoning the present appellants came to be challenged in two separate criminal petitions filed under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing/setting aside of the criminal complaints/Summary criminal case registered th against them as well as the summons dated 10  November, 2012. Both the petitions were tagged together and came to be dismissed th by the High Court under the order impugned dated 18  July, 2014. 13. Ms.   Arundhati   Katju,   learned   counsel   for   the   appellants submits that there is no specific averment made that they have committed the offence and are responsible for conduct of business 8 of   the   Company,   which   is   one   of   the   essential ingredient/requirement   and   in   the   absence   of   such   averment, merely because the appellants are the Directors of the Company, they   are   not   to   be   held   vicariously   liable   and   cannot   be   made accused in the proceedings. 14. It was further the case of the appellants that no notice relating nd to dishonour of cheque dated 2  June, 2012 has been received by them and there is no averment made in the complaint that on the date of issuance of cheque, the appellants were either the Managing Directors   or   were   responsible   for   day­to­day   business   of   the Company. 15. Mr. Sidhartha Dave, learned senior counsel for the appellants in   Criminal   Appeal   @   SLP(Criminal)   No.   7573   of   2014   further submits that they are the non­executive Directors of the Company and were not responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company which is the mandatory requirement for initiation of the proceedings under Section 138 of NI Act and submits that the pre­ condition   as  referred   to   under   Section  141   of   NI   Act  not  being complied   with,   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   trial   Judge   in 9 summoning the present appellants is nothing but a clear abuse of process of law and the finding which has been recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment is not legally sustainable in law and   in   support   of   his   submission   has   placed   reliance   on   the judgments   of   this   Court   in   S.M.S.   Pharmaceuticals   Ltd.  Vs. 1   Neeta Bhalla and Another    and  Pooja Ravinder Devidasani Vs. 2 .   State of Maharashtra and Another   16. Per contra, Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel for the respondents, while supporting the order passed by the High Court in the impugned proceedings, submits that the appellants in Criminal   Appeal   @   SLP(Criminal)   No.   7573   of   2014   claimed themselves to be a non­executive Directors but the record indicates that they are the Directors of the Company and in support thereof, Form   No.   32   which   has   been   obtained   from   the   Registrar   of Companies   placed   on   record   clearly   indicates   that   all   are   the st Directors of the Company as on 1   April 2007 and responsible to the Company for the conduct of business actively involved in the business  of   the   Company   and  responsible  for  the   affairs   of  the 1 2005(8) SCC 89 2 2014(16) SCC 1 10 Company and there is nothing to indicate that they were appointed as non­executive Directors and what is being urged by the learned counsel for the appellants may be their defence which is a matter of trial and is not open to be examined at this stage and once the compliance of the statute has been made as required by law, their petitions have been rightly rejected by the High Court and needs no further indulgence of this Court. 17. During   the   course   of   submission,   learned   counsel   for   the respondents submits that apart from dishonour of cheque in the instant matters, there are other cheques issued by the appellants which were also dishonoured and separate complaints have been filed   by   the   respondent(s)   but   because   of   the   pendency   of   the present appeals before this Court, no action has been taken by the trial Judge.   The details of the cases including this case are as under:­
Sl. No.Case No.CourtCheque Amount(In Rupees)
1.S.C.C No.<br>2500/20123rd<br>JMFC,<br>Amravati10,00,000/­(Ten Lakhs<br>only) vide Cheque No.<br>493018 dated 02.06.2012
2.S.C.C. No.<br>4984/20123rd<br>JMFC,<br>Amravati10,00,000/­(Ten Lakhs<br>only) vide Cheque No.<br>493017 dated 17.07.2012
3.S.C.C No.7th1,15,39,200/­(One Crore
11
2600/2014JMFC,<br>AmravatiFifteen Lakhs Thirty Nine<br>Thousand and Two<br>Hundred only) vide Cheque<br>No. 493007 to 493016<br>Cheque No. 493020 and<br>493021<br>All dated 05.04.2014
18. Learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in  A.K. Singhania Vs. Gujarat State 3   Fertilizer Company Limited and Another     and  Gunmala Sales 4 Private Limited Vs. Anu Mehta and Others     . 19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the material available on record.  20. In this regard, taking note of the three­Judge Bench decision of   this   Court   in  S.M.S.   Pharmaceuticals   Ltd. (supra)   would   be apposite.  While dealing with an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, the Court explaining the duty of a Magistrate while issuing process and his power to dismiss a complaint under Section 203 without even issuing process observed thus:­ 3 2013(16) SCC 630 4 2015(1) SCC 103 12
“5. … a complaint must contain material to enable the Magistrate<br>to make up his mind for issuing process. If this were not the<br>requirement, consequences could be far­reaching. If a Magistrate<br>had to issue process in every case, the burden of work before the<br>Magistrate as well as the harassment caused to the respondents to<br>whom process is issued would be tremendous. Even Section 204 of<br>the Code starts with the words ‘if in the opinion of the Magistrate<br>taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for<br>proceeding’. The words ‘sufficient ground for proceeding’ again<br>suggest that ground should be made out in the complaint for<br>proceeding against the respondent. It is settled law that at the time<br>of issuing of the process the Magistrate is required to see only the<br>allegations in the complaint and where allegations in the complaint<br>or the charge­sheet do not constitute an offence against a person,<br>the complaint is liable to be dismissed.”
21. After so stating, the Court analysed Section 141 of the NI Act<br>and after referring to certain other authorities answered a reference<br>which reads as follows:­
19(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint<br>under Section 141 that at the time the offence was<br>committed, the person accused was in charge of, and<br>responsible for the conduct of business of the<br>company. This averment is an essential requirement of<br>Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint.<br>Without this averment being made in a complaint, the<br>requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be<br>satisfied.
(b) The answer to the question posed in sub­para (b)<br>has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a<br>company is not sufficient to make the person liable<br>under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company<br>cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible<br>to the company for the conduct of its business. The<br>requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought<br>to be made liable should be in charge of and<br>responsible for the conduct of the business of the<br>company at the relevant time. This has to be averred
13
as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in<br>such cases.
(c) The answer to Question (c) has to be in the<br>affirmative. The question notes that the managing<br>director or joint managing director would be<br>admittedly in charge of the company and responsible<br>to the company for the conduct of its business. When<br>that is so, holders of such positions in a company<br>become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue<br>of the office they hold as managing director or joint<br>managing director, these persons are in charge of and<br>responsible for the conduct of business of the<br>company. Therefore, they get covered under Section<br>141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is<br>dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for<br>the incriminating act and will be covered under sub­<br>section (2) of Section 141.”
22.The same principle has been reiterated inS.K.
Alagh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others 5; Maharashtra State
Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. & AnotherVs.Datar
Switchgear Ltd. and Others 6 and GHCL Employees Stock Option<br>Trust Vs. India Infoline Limited 7.
TrustVs.India Infoline Limited.
23.In the light of the ratio inS.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
(supra) and later judgments of which a reference has been made
what is to be looked into is whether in the complaint, in addition to
AlaghVs.State of Uttar Pradesh & Others
;Maharashtra State
andGHCL Employees Stock Option
5<br>6<br>72008 (5) SCC 662
2010 (10) SCC 479
2013 (4) SCC 505
14 asserting that the appellants are the Directors of the Company and they   are   incharge   of   and   responsible   to   the   Company   for   the conduct   of   the   business   of   the   Company   and   if   statutory compliance of Section 141 of the NI Act has been made, it may not open for the High Court to interfere under Section 482 CrPC unless it   comes   across   some   unimpeachable,   incontrovertible   evidence which   is   beyond   suspicion   or   doubt   or   totally   acceptable circumstances which may clearly indicate that the Director could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques and asking him to stand the trial would be abuse of process of Court.  Despite the presence of basic averment, it may come to a conclusion that no case is made out against the particular Director for which there could be various reasons. 24. The issue for determination before us is whether the role of the appellants in the capacity of the Director of the defaulter company makes   them   vicariously   liable   for   the   activities   of   the   defaulter Company as defined under Section 141 of the NI Act?   In that perception,   whether   the   appellant   had   committed   the   offence chargeable under Section 138 of the NI Act? 15 25. We  are  concerned in this  case  with  Directors who  are not signatories to the cheques.   So far as Directors who are not the signatories to the cheques or who are not Managing Directors or Joint   Managing   Directors   are   concerned,   it   is   clear   from   the conclusions drawn in the afore­stated judgment that it is necessary to aver in the complaint filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act that at the relevant time when the offence was committed, the Directors were in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.   26. This averment assumes importance because it is the basic and essential averment which persuades the Magistrate to issue process against   the   Director.     That   is   why   this   Court   in   S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals   Ltd. (supra)   observed   that   the   question   of requirement of averments in a complaint has to be considered on the basis of provisions contained in Sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act read in the light of the powers of a Magistrate referred to in Sections   200   to   204   CrPC   which   recognise   the   Magistrate’s discretion   to   take   action   in   accordance   with   law.     Thus,   it   is 16 imperative that if this basic averment is missing, the Magistrate is legally justified in not issuing process. 27. In the case on hand, reading the complaint as a whole, it is clear that the allegations in the complaint are that at the time at which the cheques were issued by the Company and dishonoured by the Bank, the appellants were the Directors of the Company and were   responsible   for   its   business   and   all   the   appellants   were involved in the business of the Company and were responsible for all the affairs of the Company.  It may not be proper to split while reading   the   complaint   so   as   to   come   to   a   conclusion   that   the allegations as a whole are not sufficient to fulfil the requirement of Section 141 of the NI Act.  The complaint specifically refers to the point of time when the cheques were issued, their presentment, dishonour and failure to pay in spite of notice of dishonour.  In the given   circumstances,   we   have   no   hesitation   in   overruling   the argument made by the learned counsel for the appellants. 28. Indisputedly,   on   the   presentation   of   the   cheque   of nd Rs.10,00,000/­(Rupees Ten Lakhs only) dated 2   June 2012, the cheque was dishonoured due to “funds insufficient” in the account 17 and after making due compliance, complaint was filed and after recording   the   statement   of   the   complainant,   proceedings   were initiated   by   the   learned   Magistrate   and   no   error   has   been committed by the High Court in dismissing the petition filed under Section 482 CrPC under the impugned judgment.  29. The submission of learned counsel for the appellants that they are the non­executive Directors in the  light of the documentary evidence placed on record by Form No. 32 issued by the Registrar of Companies, both the appellants are shown to be the Directors of the Company, still open for the appellants to justify during course of the trial. 30. In   our   considered   view,   the   High   Court   has   rightly   not interfered in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the complaint. 31. Before   concluding,   we   would   like   to   observe   that   the proceedings could not be processed further in view of the interim th order passed by this Court dated 17  October 2014 and because of the instant appeals, the other cases instituted by the respondent(s)­ complainant have been held up before the trial Court.  Since these 18 are the old cases instituted in the year 2012 and could not be processed further because of the pendency of the appeals in this Court, we may consider it appropriate to observe that let all the three cases of which a reference been made in para 17 of this Judgment be clubbed together and be disposed of expeditiously as possible on its own merits in accordance with law without being influenced/inhibited by the observations made by us in the present judgment not later than six months from the date parties record their attendance before the trial Court.  All the parties shall record nd their attendance before the concerned trial Court on 22  November, 2021. 32. Consequently, the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. 33. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.       ………………………..J.           (AJAY RASTOGI)       ..………………………J.       (ABHAY S. OKA) NEW DELHI OCTOBER 08, 2021 19