Prof. Rasal Singh vs. University Of Delhi & Ors.

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
W.P.(C) 14760/2025, CM APPL. 60742/2025, CM APPL. 6409/2026, CM
APPL. 80060/2025
IN THE MATTER OF:
PROF. RASAL SINGH
S/O SHRI MAHARAJ SINGH
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
R/O 17, FIRST FLOOR, BD ESTATE,
MALL ROAD, DELHI – 110054
.....Petitioner
( Through: Ms. Geeta Luthra, Senior Advocate with Ms Shalini
Singh, Ms Prashansika Thakur, Mr Lakshay Saini, Advocates. )

versus

1. UNIVERSITY OF DELHI
THROUGH ITS VICE CHANCELLOR
UNIVERSITY CAMPUS, DELHI – 110007.

2. GOVERNING BODY, RAMANUJAN COLLEGE
THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI
NEW DELHI – 110019.

3. Ms. X
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR (DEPT. OF COMMERCE)
RAMANUJAN COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF DELHI
NEW DELHI – 110019.

4. MS. Y (DEPT. OF COMMERCE)
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR
RAMANUJAN COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF DELHI
Signature Not Verified
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Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
Signing Date:24.04.2026
16:58:10
W.P.(C) 14760/2025 Page 1 of 28

NEW DELHI – 110019.

5. MS. Z (DEPT. OF PSYCHOLOGY)
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR
RAMANUJAN COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF DELHI
NEW DELHI – 110019. .....Respondents

( Through: Mr. Mohinder JS Rupal, Mr. Hardik Rupal, Ms.
Aishwarya Malhotra and Ms. Tripta Sharma Advocates for R-1.
Mr. Jayant Mehta, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Jyoti Taneja, Mr. Shivam
Malhotra and Mr. Pallav Arora, Advocates for R-2. )
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserved on: 27.03.2026
Pronounced on: 24.04.2026
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JUDGEMENT
INDEX
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ......................................................................3
II. FACTUAL MATRIX ...............................................................................5
III. SUBMISSIONS OF PARTIES ..............................................................6
IV. POWERS TO SUSPEND FOR A CASE PERTAINING TO THE
POSH ACT .....................................................................................................9
V. THE POWER OF DEPUTY REGISTRAR (COLLEGES), DU TO
CONSTITUTE AN AD HOC FACT FINDING COMMITTEE
PURSUANT TO A COMPLAINT RECEIVED UNDER THE POSH
ACT .............................................................................................................. 16
VI. WHETHER THE SAID SUSPENSION ORDER IS STIGMATIC 25
VII. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................. 28
VIII. ORDER .............................................................................................. 28

Signature Not Verified
Signature Not Verified
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
Signing Date:24.04.2026
16:58:10
W.P.(C) 14760/2025 Page 2 of 28

In a nutshell, the controversy relates to the manner in which the
petitioner has been placed under suspension as well as the jurisdiction of the
respondent no. 2-Ramanujan College, University of Delhi (hereinafter
― College ‖) to pass an order of suspension de hors the provisions of the
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereinafter ― PoSH Act ‖).
2. The petitioner, a principal of the College has filed the instant petition
challenging the constitution of an ad hoc committee by the Deputy Registar
(Colleges) of respondent no. 1-University of Delhi (hereinafter ― DU ‖), as
well as its report dated 23.06.2025 (hereinafter ― Report ‖); furthermore, a
suspension order dated 18.09.2025 (hereinafter ― said Suspension Order ‖)
passed by the College, on the basis of the aforenoted Report, has also been
assailed.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
3. This Court vide order dated 26.09.2025 granted an interim stay on the
operation of the said Suspension Order, and left it for the concerned Internal
Complaints Committee (hereinafter ― ICC ‖) to consider as to whether any
interim measure/s against the petitioner are warranted, including suspension
and/or imposition of any other restrictions. The inquiry against the petitioner
was also directed to be expedited.
4. Aggreived by the interim order dated 26.09.2025, a Letters Patent
1
Appeals were preferred by the respondents. The Division Bench heard the
parties in detail and had posted the case for pronouncement of judgement on

1
LPA Nos. 622-624/2025.
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
Signing Date:24.04.2026
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W.P.(C) 14760/2025 Page 3 of 28

15.10.2025. However, prior to the pronouncement of judgement, learned
senior counsel for the petitioner herein, on instructions, stated that the
petitioner would continue to be on leave from the College till the disposal of
the instant writ petition. Bearing in mind the object of the PoSH Act and the
submissions made by the petitioner and his counsel, the Division Bench
disposed of the appeals, while observing the following:
― 4. The issues involved in this case are regarding the power of a
University/College to suspend a Principal in a case under the Sexual
Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Act, 2013, (hereinafter referred to as the „POSH Act‟) and the
power of the University/College to constitute an ad hoc fact finding
committee pursuant to receiving a complaint under the POSH Act which are
purely questions of law. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge is requested
to expeditiously decide the said issues so that a final and authoritative
pronouncement is made by the Court on these aspects and the College can
function smoothly thereafter. This would also pave the way for the
appropriate committee under the POSH Act to proceed further with the
enquiry into the complaints.

5. Without expressing anything on merits and considering that the
observations made by the learned Single Judge are only prima facie in
nature which will be finally adjudicated after hearing all the parties in
detail, the present appeals are disposed of, with a request to the learned
Single Judge to dispose of the writ petition as expeditiously as possible,
preferably within a period of three months from today.

6. Needless to state that this concession given by the learned Senior Counsel
for the Respondent No.1/Principal is without prejudice to the rights and
contentions of Respondent No.1 on the merits of the case.

7. It is also made clear that none of the parties, i.e., the University, the
College and the Complainants, will take any step which will have the effect
of prejudicing the enquiry. They are directed not to circulate any message,
hold press conference or any meeting in this regard.

8. With these observations, the appeals are disposed of along with pending
application(s), if any. ‖

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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
Signing Date:24.04.2026
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W.P.(C) 14760/2025 Page 4 of 28

5. Pursuant to the directions and observations made by the Division
Bench, submissions on behalf of the parties were heard on 12.01.2026,
13.01.2026, 14.01.2026, 16.01.2026, 17.01.2026, 27.02.2026, 19.03.2026
and finally on 20.03.2026.
6. In addition to the two issues framed by the Division Bench in its order
dated 15.10.2025, Ms. Geeta Luthra, learned senior counsel, during the
course of arguments, has flagged another important issue pertaining to the
purportedly stigmatic nature of the said Suspension Order. She submits that
even if the College is assumed to have the powers to pass a suspension
order, the content and nature of the impugned order casts a stigma upon the
petitioner, and on that, it deserves to be set aside.
7. Considering the order dated 15.10.2025 passed by the Division
Bench, and the submissions made by the parties during the course of
hearing, the following issues fall for the consideration of the Court:
7.1. Whether the College had powers to suspend the petitioner for a
case pertaining to the PoSH Act.
7.2. Whether the Deputy Registrar (Colleges), DU had powers to
constitute an ad hoc fact finding committee pursuant to a
complaint received under the PoSH Act.
7.3. Whether the said Suspension Order is stigmatic.
II. FACTUAL MATRIX

8. Before delving into aforenoted issues, the facts material to adjudicate,
upon the instant lis , may be briefly adverted to. It appears that between
13.03.2025 to 24.04.2025, respondent nos. 3-5, who are Assistant Professors
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
Signing Date:24.04.2026
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W.P.(C) 14760/2025 Page 5 of 28

at the College, submitted to the DU, and the College, complaints against the
petitioner reporting certain allegations of misconduct, including sexual
harassment. On 05.05.2025, the Deputy Registrar (Colleges), DU
constituted a fact-finding committee (hereinafter ― Committee ‖) to examine
the allegations made by the respondent nos. 3-5 and to submit a report on the
same.
9. The Committee seems to have conducted various meetings and heard
the concerned parties, including the petitioner. On 23.06.2025, a report was
submitted by the committee, in which it opined that — (1) the charges
leveled against the petitioner are of the nature of sexual harassment; (2)
there is fear among all complainants, and since the petitioner is in a position
of authority, the complainants feel threatened and unsafe; (3) an
environment has been created which generates fear and anxiety among the
complainants owing to intimidation, shouting, and use of inappropriate
language; and (4) there is a possibility that there may be many instances
which may not have been reported.
10. Ultimately the Committee concluded that the charges levelled against
the petitioner are of a serious nature. A finding was also arrived at that the
instances brought before it potentially constitute sexual harassment as
defined under the PoSH Act. It, further, recommended that the complaints
be referred to the ICC of the DU. Thereafter, on the basis of the report
submitted by the Committee and after taking approval from the Vice
Chancellor of DU, the Chairperson of the College on 18.09.2025 passed the
said Suspension Order.
III. SUBMISSIONS OF PARTIES
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
Signing Date:24.04.2026
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W.P.(C) 14760/2025 Page 6 of 28

11. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner Ms. Luthra has vociferously
submitted that the power to decide whether an allegation of sexual
harassment is made or not is solely within the domain of the internal
complaint committee. It is also her contention that if a statute prescribes that
something must be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that
manner only or not at all.
12. She additionally submits that disciplinary action taken against the
petitioner on the basis of findings recorded in an enquiry which was
conducted on gross violation of principle of natural justice, must not be
sustained. According to her, a genuine hearing, reasonably granting
sufficient opportunity to the petitioner, should have been granted, and a
violation thereto invalidiate the entire exercise. According to her, even a
slightest likelihood of bias vitiates an administrative decision and in the
instant case, the respondents have acted in a mala fide manner.
13. Ms. Luthra during the course of her arguments, relied upon the
following authorities, Prof. Bidyug Chakraborty v. Delhi University and
2 3
Ors. , Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India and Anr. , Hareesh M.S. v.
4
Kerala State Financial Enterprises Ltd. , Nazir Ahmad v King Emperor
5
Privy Council , Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v Abhilash Lal
6 7
& Ors. , Cherukuri Mani w/o Narendra Chowdary v. Chief Secretary ,
Mount Columbus School and Ors. v. Central Board of Secondary

2
2009 (112) DRJ 391 (DB)
3
Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2024
4
WP(C) NO. 24867 OF 2024
5
1936 SCC OnLine PC 41
6
(2020) 13 SCC 234
7
(2015) 13 SCC 722
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
Signing Date:24.04.2026
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W.P.(C) 14760/2025 Page 7 of 28

8 9
Education , Surender Singh v. Union of India and Ors. , Aureliano
10
Fernandes v. State of Goa and Ors. , Krishnandatt Awasthy v. State of
11
Madhya Pradesh .
14. Mr. Jayant K. Mehta, Mr. Nikhil Goel learned senior counsel and Mr.
Mohinder JS Rupal learned counsel, appearing for the respondents have
submitted that the an employer, including the head of the College/University
has an inherent vested right to suspend any officer under its employement. It
is, further contended, that there exists no bar in the creation of a fact finding
committee to assist an employer, in discharging its functions/duties. The
creation of such a committee, is also contended by Mr. Mehta to be a right
of the employer.
15. He further contends that the concept of stigma can never be made
applicable to suspension orders and it lies only in the domain of punitive
measures such as termination/dismissal. The respondents have placed
reliance on the following decisions State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar
12 13
Mohanty , Shailendra Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh , Union of
14 15
India v. H.C. Goel , Union of India v. Dilip Paul , State of Orissa v.
16
Bidyabhushan Mohapatra , Union of India & Anr. v. Ashok Kumar

8
2024 SCC OnLine Del 2778
9
2023 SCC OnLine Del 4495
10
(2024) 1 SCC 632.
11
(2025) 7 SCC 545.
12
(1994) 4 SCC 126
13
Writ-A No. 6131 of 2025, Allahabad High Court.
14
AIR 1964 SC 364.
15
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1423.
16
1962 SCC OnLine SC 106.
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
Signing Date:24.04.2026
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W.P.(C) 14760/2025 Page 8 of 28

17 18
Aggarwal , Union of India v. Baij Nath , R.P. Kapur v. Union of India
19 20
& Anr. , Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat , Champaklal Chimanlal
21 22
Shah v. Union of India , Linda Eastwood v. Union of India & Anr. , M.
23
Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. , Bhim Sen Singh v. University
24 25
of Delhi , A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India .
IV. POWERS TO SUSPEND FOR A CASE PERTAINING TO THE
POSH ACT
26
16. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India and Anr. , a Five-Judge Bench of
the Supreme Court held the general principle to be that an employer can
suspend an employee pending an inquiry into his misconduct and the only
question that can arise in such suspension relates to the payment during the
period of suspension. Para. 11 of the said decision reads as under:
― 11. The general principle therefore is that an employer can suspend an
employee pending an enquiry into his conduct and the only question that
can arise on such suspension will relate to the payment during the period
of such suspension . If there is no express term in the contract relating to
suspension and payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory
provision in any law or rule, the employee is entitled to his full
remuneration for the period of his interim suspension; on the other hand if
there is a term in this respect in the contract or there is a provision in the
statute or the rules framed thereunder providing for the scale of payment
during suspension, the payment would be in accordance therewith. These
general principles in our opinion apply with equal force in a case where the

17
(2013) 16 SCC 147.
18
1972 SCC OnLine Del 1.
19
1963 SCC OnLine SC 47.
20
(2013) 4 SCC 301.
21
1963 SCC OnLine SC 42.
22
2015 SCC OnLine Del 14396.
23
(1999) 3 SCC 679.
24
2013 SCC OnLine Del 589.
25
(1969) 2 SCC 262.
26
1963 SCC OnLine SC 47.
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
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Signing Date:24.04.2026
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W.P.(C) 14760/2025 Page 9 of 28

government is the employer and a public servant is the employee with this
modification that in view of the peculiar structural hierarchy of
Government, the employer in the case of government, must be held to be the
authority which has the power to appoint a public servant. On general
principles therefore the authority entitled to appoint a public servant would
be entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his conduct
or pending a criminal proceeding, which may eventually result in a
departmental enquiry against him. This general principle is illustrated by
the provision in Section 16 of the General Clauses Act, 10 of 1897, which
lays down that where any Central Act or Regulation gives power of
appointment that includes the power to suspend or dismiss unless a different
intention appears. Though this provision does not directly apply in the
present case, it is in consonance with the general law of master and servant.
But what amount should be paid to the public servant during such
suspension will depend upon the provisions of the statute or rule in that
connection. If there is such a provision the payment during suspension will
be in accordance therewith. But if there is no such provision, the public
servant will be entitled to his full emoluments during the period of
suspension. This suspension must be distinguished from suspension as
punishment which is a different matter altogether depending upon the rules
in that behalf. On general principles therefore the government, like any
other employer, would have a right to suspend a public servant in one of
two ways. It may suspend any public servant pending departmental
enquiry or pending criminal proceedings; this may be called interim
suspension. Or the government may proceed to hold a departmental
enquiry and after his being found guilty order suspension as a
punishment if the rules so permit. This will be suspension as a penalty.
These general principles will apply to all public servants but they will
naturally be subject to the provisions of Article 314 and this brings us to an
investigation of what was the right of a member of the former Secretary of
State‟s Services in the matter of suspension, whether as a penalty or
otherwise. ‖
27
17. Similarly, in Balvantrai Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra , a
Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court also took note of the inherent
power of an employer to suspend an employee pending an inquiry into his
misconduct. Para. 4 of the said decision reads as under:

27
1967 SCC OnLine SC 11.
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18. The power of suspension lies with the College/University or the
institution concerned, with respect to the services of a teacher, principal, or
any other employee. This power, which is inherent to the office itself, may
be exercised without there being a contractual or statutory stipulation to this
effect. The employer or head of the institution, in furtherance of the
responsibility vested with it, to administer the institution/organisation, may,
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By:PURUSHAINDRA
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if it is found appropriate, suspend an employee, in the larger interest of the
organisation/institution.
19. In this connection reliance may be placed on the following passage
from K.D.Srivastava on ‗ Disciplinary Action Against Government Servants
28
and its Remedies ‘:
― 120. Suspension: Inherent power.
The Government have an implied power to place a Government servant
29
under suspension pending the completion of departmental enquiry.

Assuming that there is no statutory rule which empowers the Government to
suspend an officer pending an enquiry, yet even in the absence of a statutory
rule Government have power to suspend an officer from performing the
duties of his officer pending an enquiry into the charges levelled against
him. In this connection a distinction must be drawn between suspending the
contract of service of an officer and suspending an officer from performing
the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting. The
suspension in the latter sense is always an implied term in every contract of
service. When an officer is suspended in this sense it means that the
Government merely issues a direction to the officer that so long as the
contract is subsisting and till the officer is legally dismissed he must not do
anything in the discharge of the duties of his office. In other words the
employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which, because
30
the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey.

140. Suspension: Departmental enquiry.
“ Suspension pending enquiry" is, in the very nature of things, something
temporary. This power is intended only to enable an enquiry or
investigation to be made under fair and impartial conditions. be confused
with it. It does not involve any punishment and is not to The power of
suspension pending enquiry is different from the power of dismissal or
punishment and consequently the Chairman has the power to suspend the
31
Secretary pending an enquiry. ‖


28 th
6 Ed., Eastern Book Company, Pg. 747-756.
29
Narayan Prasa, Rewary v. State of Orissa , AIR 1957 Ori 51.
30
(1888) 39 Ch D 339, Gurudeva Naryan Srivastava v. State of Bihar , AIR 1955 Pat
131.
31
Badri Prasad v. President, District Board, Mirzapur, AIR 1952 All 681
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KUMAR KAURAV
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20. Further, Suranjan Chakraverti in her celebrated commentary titled
32
‗Law of Wrongful Dismissals‘, while relying on Nrishingha Murari
33
Chakravarti v. District Magistrate has opined as under:
“In Nrishingha Murari Chakravarty v. District Magistrate and Collector,
this distinction was recognised. The High Court said, -
"In my opinion, we are not dealing with 'penalty‟ of suspension. It is true
that an employee can be suspended by way of punishment, but in that case,
it is the suspension which is the substantive punishment and there is no
other punishment. Suspension pending a departmental enquiry or a criminal
charge is a different matter altogether. There, the petitioner is asked not to
associate himself directly with the activities of his employment, because as a
result. of the pending enquiry or criminal charge, it would be embarrassing
for all parties concerned for him to be directly associated with the work of
the office. 1Jn such a case, some interim arrangement is made for a
subsistence allowance, and it is implied that if the proceedings enure in his
favour. then he would get his full wages. In this case the· petitioner bas been
suspended because there was a criminal case pending and not as a
substantive punishment.”

21. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana, in the case of R. P. Kapur v.
34
Union of India , in a similar vein noted as:
― It is true that suspension as a punishment could only be the result of an enquiry
and an act of judgment on the part of the competent authority, but that would be
wholly different from suspension during the pendency of an enquiry at which
stage no act of judgment would be involved except, of course, judgment on the
question whether the nature of the charge needed suspension from office as a
desirable step. ‖

22. It also be noted that while an employer has the inherent right to
suspend its employee, the said action ought to be conducted with an
application of mind. A general proposition that simpiciter declares
suspension to be possible, without any, judicial review or a mechanism for

32 th
6 Ed., Law Book Company, Pg. 507.
33
AIR 1961 Cal. 225
34
AIR 1963 Punj. 87
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KUMAR KAURAV
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checks and balances, would be de hors the principles of service law
jurisprudence.
23. In the instant case, there is no dispute with regard to the said
Suspension Order having been passed, in accordance with, and after
obtaining the requisite permission from the Vice Chancellor, DU. Thus, with
the procedure for suspension qua adherence to the DU Ordinances not being
an issue, and the power of suspension having been found to be vested with
the Chairperson of the College, on this ground, the said Suspension Order is
found to be unassailable.
24. The power of suspension, as has been established through the
discussion in the preceding paragraphs, is an inherent power of the
employer, traceable to the master-servant relationship itself, and where
service rules and office regulations exist, it must be exercised in consonance
with, and circumscribed by, those rules and regulations. The PoSH Act
neither confers this power afresh, nor does it take it away. The answer to this
question lies, in the first instance, in the plain text of the statute itself.
Section 28 of the PoSH Act, which is the legislature‘s own declaration of the
relationship between this Act and other laws, categorically provides that the
provisions of the Act shall be “in addition to” and “not in derogation” of
the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.
25. The significance of this provision cannot be overstated. It is a non-
obstante clause in reverse, rather than the PoSH Act overriding other laws, it
is expressly declared to supplement and coexist with the existing legal
framework, including the service rules and disciplinary regulations that
govern the employment relationship. The employer‘s power to suspend,
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flowing as it does from those very service rules and regulations, survives
wholly intact alongside the PoSH Act and is in no way eroded or supplanted
by it. This interpretation is further fortified by the scheme and structure of
the PoSH Act itself. Section 11 of the Act, as interpreted by the Supreme
35
Court in Sohail Malik (Dr.) v. Union of India , makes explicit that where
the respondent is an employee, the inquiry by the ICC shall be conducted ―in
accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the
respondent.‖
“47 .That being said, the requirement of Section 11(1) as we have concluded
above, is that in case the „respondent‟ is an „employee‟, the inquiry by the
ICC must be in accordance with the service rules applicable to him, if
service rules do not exist, it shall be conducted as may be prescribed, or if
he is a domestic worker, the Local Committee must forward the complaint
to the police . The definitions of the word „employee‟ and „workplace‟ as
quoted above in this judgement at their respective places are completely
neutral, in the sense that they do not suggest that the „respondent‟ must
necessarily be an employee of the workplace where the aggrieved woman
works.”

26. The PoSH Act nowhere prescribes the power of suspension, nor does
it seek to regulate or restrict its exercise. That domain is left entirely to the
service rules and the applicable regulations of the institution. The inevitable
conclusion, therefore, is this ―the power of suspension vests with the
employer and is governed by, and circumscribed by, the service rules and
office regulations of the institution or organisation concerned.‖ It draws its
life from the contract of employment, service rules, and the inherent
authority of the employer, not from the PoSH Act. It exists independently of
the PoSH Act. It is exercisable in the context of a PoSH inquiry, but it is the
service rules, not the PoSH Act, that define its scope, limits, and the

35
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2751.
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competent authority to exercise it. To hold otherwise would be to read into
the PoSH Act a restriction that the legislature has, by the express terms of
Section 28, deliberately declined to impose.
V. THE POWER OF DEPUTY REGISTRAR (COLLEGES), DU TO
CONSTITUTE AN AD HOC FACT FINDING COMMITTEE
PURSUANT TO A COMPLAINT RECEIVED UNDER THE POSH
ACT
36
27. In Sohail Malik (Dr.) v. Union of India , the Supreme Court after
taking note of the preamble of the PoSH Act, declared the object and
purpose of the Act to be as follows:
― 52. The long title of the POSH Act and its „Preamble‟ are relevant internal
aid for the purpose of interpretation and are therefore quoted herein:
“An Act to provide protection against sexual harassment of women at
workplace and for the prevention and redressal of complaints of sexual
harassment and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
WHEREAS sexual harassment results in violation of the fundamental rights
of a woman to equality under articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India
and her right to life and to live with dignity under article 21 of the
Constitution and right to practice any profession or to carry on any
occupation, trade or business which includes a right to a safe environment
free from sexual harassment;
AND WHEREAS the protection against sexual harassment and the right to
work with dignity are universally recognised human rights by international
conventions and instruments such as Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination against Women, which has been ratified on the
25th June, 1993 by the Government of India;
AND WHEREAS it is expedient to make provisions for giving effect to the
said Convention for protection of women against sexual harassment at
workplace.”

53. The POSH Act was enacted by the legislature, recognizing the
legislative void which was highlighted by this Court in its seminal
judgment in Vishaka (supra). Its intent is to uphold women's right to

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equality under Articles 14 and 15 and right to a dignified life under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The POSH Act does not merely
punish acts of sexual harassment, but actively imposes a legal duty on
employers to prohibit and prevent harassment, it ensures that the women
in each workplace have open access to a mechanism for redressal of
complaints of sexual harassment in the form of ICC. It aims to bring
about safety and accountability in the workplace in order to enable women
to pursue their career without the fear of a hostile environment. It is thus
seen that the POSH Act is a social welfare legislation and it must be
interpreted as thus . ‖

37
28. In Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa , the Supreme Court noted
the legislative vaccum which existed prior to the enactment of the PoSH
Act, and the landmark shift which the said statute has brought, in the manner
in which office-spaces and work environments are to function in this
Country. Para. 57 of the said decision reads as under:
― 57. After the passage of fifteen years from the date of the verdict delivered
in Vishaka‟s case (supra), the PoSH Act, was legislated on 22nd April, 2013
and finally notified on 9th December, 2013. The Act lays down a
comprehensive mechanism for constitution of Internal Complaints
Committee, Local Committee and Internal Committees, the manner of
conducting an inquiry into a complaint received, duties of an employer,
duties and powers of the District Officer and others, penalties for
noncompliance of the provisions of the Act, etc. Accompanying the Act are
the Rules, 2013⁶⁸ that have been framed in exercise of powers conferred
under Section 29 of the PoSH Act and amongst others, lays down the
manner in which an inquiry into a complaint of sexual harassment ought to
be conducted (Rule 7), the interim reliefs that can be extended to the
aggrieved women during the pendency of the inquiry (Rule 8), the manner of
taking action for sexual harassment (Rule 9) etc. It is noteworthy that sub-
rule (3) of Rule 7 provides that the respondent shall file his reply to the
complaint within a stipulated time along with the relevant documents and
give details of the witnesses and sub-rule (4) stipulates that the Complaints
Committee shall make an inquiry into the complaints “in accordance with
the principles of natural justice .‖


37
(2024) 1 SCC 632.
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29. Similar are the observations made by this Court in Surender Singh v.
38
Union of India . Para. 14 of the said decision reads as under:
― 14. After the passage of about 15 years from the date of verdict in
Vishaka's case, POSH Act, 2013 was legislated on 22.04.2013 which was
notified on 09.12.2013. The Act laid down a comprehensive mechanism for
constitution of Internal Complaint Committee (ICC), Local Committee and
Internal Committees; the manner of conducting the enquiry into the
complaint received, the duties and powers of the employer and District
Officer and penalties for non-compliance of the provisions of the Act. ‖

30. Sections 9(1), 11, 16 and 17 of the PoSH Act then read as under:
― 9. Complaint of sexual harassment.
(1) Any aggrieved woman may make, in writing, a complaint of sexual
harassment at workplace to the Internal Committee if so constituted, or the
Local Committee, in case it is not so constituted, within a period of three
months from the date of incident and in case of a series of incidents, within
a period of three months from the date of last incident ‖

― 11. Inquiry into complaint.
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 10, the Internal Committee or the
Local Committee, as the case may be, shall, where the respondent is an
employee, proceed to make inquiry into the complaint in accordance with
the provisions of the service rules applicable to the respondent and where
no such rules exist, in such manner as may be prescribed or in case of a
domestic worker, the Local Committee shall, if prima facie case exist,
forward the complaint to the police, within a period of seven days for
registering the case under section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860), and any other relevant provisions of the said Code where applicable
Provided that where the aggrieved woman informs the Internal Committee
or the Local Committee, as the case may be, that any term or condition of
the settlement arrived at under sub-section (2) of section 10 has not been
complied with by the respondent, the Internal Committee or the Local
Committee shall proceed to make an inquiry into the complaint or, as the
case may be, forward the complaint to the police ‖
“ 16. Prohibition of publication or making known contents of complaint
and inquiry proceedings.


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Notwithstanding anything contained in the Right to Information Act, 2005
(22 of 2005), the contents of the complaint made under section 9, the
identity and addresses of the aggrieved woman, respondent and witnesses,
any information relating to conciliation and inquiry proceedings,
recommendations of the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the
case may be, and the action taken by the employer or the District Officer
under the provisions of this Act shall not be published, communicated or
made known to the public, press and media in any manner: Provided that
information may be disseminated regarding the justice secured to any
vicitim of sexual harassment under this Act without disclosing the name,
address, identity or any other particulars calculated to lead to the
identification of the aggrieved woman and witnesses. ‖

― 17. Penalty for publication or making known contents of complaint and
inquiry proceedings.

Where any person entrusted with the duty to handle or deal with the
complaint, inquiry or any recommendations or action to be taken under the
provisions of this Act, contravenes the provisions of section 16, he shall be
liable for penalty in accordance with the provisions of the service rules
applicable to the said person or where no such service rules exist, in such
manner as may be prescribed. ‖

31. The scheme of the PoSH Act, and the aforenoted pronouncements of
the Supreme Court as also this Court, would reveal that the legislature
through the said enactment has designed a carefully crafted mechanism to
deal with complaints relating to sexual harassment. Considering the
sensitive nature of such cases, the Act makes provisions of confidentiality
and the constitution of two different committees—an Internal Complaints
Committee (― ICC ‖) and a Local Committee for inquiring into the said
complaints. The words used in the Act are that the Committees ― shall ‖
inquire into the said complaint.
32. If, however, there is another committee such as the fact finding
formed in the instant case, which is given the mandate of inquiring into the
complaint of sexual-harassment, the same would be de hors the PoSH Act,
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and in complete violation of it. If such a committee is allowed to be
formulated before the complaint is sent to the ICC, the same would violate
the express words of the statute, which state that the ICC/Local Committee
― shall ‖ inquire into the said complaint.
33. The consequence of allowing such a pre-ICC fact-finding may also
have serious consequences on the sanctity of the inquiry. For instance, the
victim may be forced to enter into an environment/atmosphere not catered
and specialized for handling complaints of such sensitive nature. Moreover,
such an ad hoc committee could also serve as a means to delay the
substantive inquiry under the PoSH Act. The complaint of a genuine victim
would then hangfire till the ad hoc committee concludes its inquiry.
34. There is, importantly, no rule/law/regulation governing the
constitution of such a committee, and naturally, there is no law providing
timelines in relation to its proceedings. The ICC and the Local Committee as
envisaged under the PoSH Act are specialized bodies containing members
having the requisite expertise to deal with matters of such sensitivity. The
scheme of the PoSH Act also requires a deadline driven, time-limit
constrained adjudication. Under the said Act, complaints are required to be
39
sent to the Local Committee by the concerned Nodal Officer within 7 days.
Further, the entire fact-finding exercise by the ICC/Local Committee is
40
further required to be completed within a period of 90 days. Moreover, the

39
Section 6 of the Posh Act.
40
Section 11 of the PoSH Act.
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inquiry report is required to be submitted within 10 days from the
41
completion of inquiry to the employer/district officer.
42
35. The Supreme Court in Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa has
succiently and authoritatively laid down the twin foundational principles of
natural justice. Para 36 of the said decision reads as under:
― 36. The twin anchors on which the principles of natural justice rest in the
judicial process, whether quasi-judicial or administrative in nature, are
Nemo Judex In Causa Sua, i.e., no person shall be a judge in his own
cause as justice should not only be done,but should manifestly be seen to
be done and Audi Alteram Partem, i.e. a person affected by a judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative action must be afforded an opportunity of
hearing before any decision is taken.”

36. The ad hoc Fact Finding Committee was tasked with inquiring into a
complaint of sexual harassment, a matter which, by its very nature, is
judicial or at the very least quasi judicial exercise, inasmuch as it involves
determination of facts, appreciation of evidence, and conclusions that have
direct and serious consequences for the Petitioner. Such an exercise to be
valid in the eyes of law, must necessarily satisfy both the anchors of natural
justice. The said committee, constituted without any governing rules or
statutory mandate, operated without any assurance of impartiality expected
by the rule of nemo judex in causa sua and offered no structured, rule-
governed opportunity of hearing as mandated by the rule of audi alterem
partem. The constitution of a parallel, extra-statutory committee in
substitution of or prior to the ICC, therefore, offends not merely the express
provisions of PoSH Act but also the foundational principles of natural
justice.

41
Section 13 of the PoSH Act.
42

(2024) 1 SCC 632.
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37. The Supreme Court in Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India (supra),
while declaring the law to require strict compliance with the provisions of
the PoSH Act, noted as under:
― 97.⁠ ⁠Be that as it may, in our opinion, the petitioner seems to have confused
two separate inquiries conducted under two separate dispensations as one
cohesive process. The legal machinery to deal with the complaints of sexual
harassment at workplace is well delineated by the enactment of the Sexual
Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013 (hereinafter “the 2013 Act”)
and the Rules framed thereunder. There can be no departure whatsoever
from the procedure prescribed under the 2013 Act and the Sexual
Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Rules, 2013 (for short “the 2013 Rules”), either in matters of
complaint or of inquiry thereunder. The sanctity of such procedure stands
undisputed. The inquiry under the 2013 Act is a separate inquiry of a fact-
finding nature. Post the conduct of a fact-finding inquiry under the 2013
Act, the matter goes before the department for a departmental enquiry
under the relevant departmental rules [the CCS (CCA) Rules in the present
case] and accordingly, action follows. The said departmental enquiry is in
the nature of an in-house mechanism wherein the participants are restricted
and concerns of locus are strict and precise. The ambit of such inquiry is
strictly confined between the delinquent employee and the department
concerned having due regard to confidentiality of the procedure. The two
inquiries cannot be mixed up with each other and similar procedural
standards cannot be prescribed for both. In matters of departmental
enquiries, prosecution, penalties, proceedings, action on inquiry report,
appeals, etc. in connection with the conduct of the government servants, the
CCS (CCA) Rules operate as a self-contained code for any departmental
action and unless an existing rule is challenged before this Court on
permissible grounds, we think, it is unnecessary for this Court to dilate any
further. ‖
38. Accepting the constitution of such a extra-statutory Fact Finding
Committees, has the potential of rendering otiose and nugatory the PoSH
Act.
39. The creation of an ad hoc fact finding committee, such as that formed
in the instant case by the Registrar (Colleges), DU is unbeknownst to the
law, and is in violation of the PoSH Act.
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40. Before delving into the third issue which has arisen for consideration
in the instant case. A brief reference may be made to the argument of Ms.
Luthra who contends that neither the ad hoc fact finding committee, nor the
said Suspension Order could ever have been passed/formed since the subject
matter is covered by the PoSH Act.
41. Section 28 of the PoSH Act reads as under:
― 28. Act not in derogation of any other law.
The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the
provisions of any other law for the time being in force. ‖
42. Section 12 of the PoSH Act then deals with interim measures which
could be made during the pendency of the ICC proceedings. They read as
under:
― 12. Action during pendency of inquiry.
(1) During the pendency of an inquiry on a written request made by the
aggrieved woman, the Internal Committee or the local Committee, as the
case may be, may recommend to the employer to
(a) transfer the aggrieved woman or the respondent to any other
workplace; or
(b) grant leave to the aggrieved woman up to a period of three months; or
(c) grant such other relief to the aggrieved woman a may be prescribed.
(2) The leave granted to the aggrieved woman under this section shall be in
addition to the leave she would be otherwise entitled. (3) On the
recommendation of the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the
case may be, under sub-section (1), the employer shall implement the
recommendations made under sub-section (1) and send the report of such
implementation to the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the
case may be. ‖

43. A bare perusal of the aforenoted provision would reveal that there is
no provision of suspension under Section 12 of the Act. It is, therefore, the
case that an order suspending a person under inquiry, cannot be made by the
ICC. It, would, however, be unfathomable to declare that a person who is the
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subject matter of inquiries, on the basis of sexual harassment complaints,
cannot be suspended, pending the conclusion of the ICC proceedings. It is,
here, that the inherent powers of the employer/head of an institution, can be
resorted to suspend a person, accused of such complaints. The said
suspension powers, would be in furtherance of, and supplement, the ICC
proceedings. They cannot in any manner be construed as being in derogation
of the ICC.
44. Per contra, the very constitution of an ad hoc committee to inquire
into the factum of sexual harassment, whether the same has occurred, or
whether the underlying facts amount to sexual harassment, are questions
which are to be answered by the ICC/Local Committee. The said
committees owe their very existence to answering such questions. The
constitution of such an ad hoc committee would in fact be in express
derogation of the object and purpose of the PoSH Act, and also frustrate the
intention of the legislature.
45. The reliance placed by Mr. Mehta on the decisions in Nirmala J.
Jhala v. State of Gujarat (supra) and Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v.
Union of India (supra) arose in the context of general service jurisprudence,
where a preliminary fact verification before initiation of disciplinary
proceedings may be permissible. However, complaints of sexual harassment
stand on a distinct footing. The PoSH Act specifically creates a self-
contained mechanism for redressal of such complaints through the Internal
Complaints Committee/Local Committee. Once the legislature has expressly
designated the ICC/Local Committee as the authority which shall inquire
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into such complaints, the constitution of any parallel or pre-ICC fact-finding
body would be outside the statutory scheme.
46. Accordingly, in light of the above, the second issue is decided in
favour of the petitioner. The third issue framed by the Court may now be
considered.
VI. WHETHER THE SAID SUSPENSION ORDER IS STIGMATIC
47. The law does not require order of suspension to be elaborate or should
contain stigma against an officer.
48. In KD Srivastava (supra), the meaning of Stigma has been explained
as under:
“ 14. ‘Stigma’: Meaning of.— A 'stigma' is something that
detracts from the character or reputation of a person. It is a
blemish, a disgrace, imputation, a mark or label indicating a
43
deviation from a norm. ”

49. The reason for suspension per se , however, may not be treated to be a
stigma. In some cases, pending departmental inquiry or on account of
inevitable circumstances, the employer may immediately require an
employee to be placed under suspension.
50. For example, if the employer receives an input from the discrete
sources regarding indulging an employee into unlawful activity, he may not
be required to assign reasons, or where discrete information is received, but
the gravity of the allegations are serious, the employer can straightforwardly
place the employee under suspension without even assigning the slightest of

43
Kamal Kishore Lakshman v. Pan American World Airways , (1987) 1 SCC 146.
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the reason in contemplation of the departmental enquiry as per the
applicable Service Rules. The reason can be withheld to be made part of the
departmental inquiry when full fledged inquiry shall be conducted. It be also
noted that it is for these reasons that the Courts normally adopt hands off
approach in interfering into the order of suspension.
51. However, in some cases, if circumstances so require, an employer can
always narrate a brief reason for suspension. Say for example, the
suspension order may recite ― pending departmental inquiry, the employee
stands suspended ‖, however, if the employee seeks reasons they may be
supplied, to him alone.
52. While passing an order of suspension, no opinion should be formed,
and no stigma should be imposed. These are the bare minimum yardstick
which must be followed in the cases of suspension. The said Suspension
Order which is the subject matter of the instant case reads as under:
― Dear Prof. Rasal Singh, On account of written complaints submitted by
three faculty members against you alleging serious misconduct and
harassment , and considering the gravity of the matter , you are hereby
placed under suspension with immediate effect pending the outcome of the
ongoing inquiry into the matter from Internal Complaints Committee.
During the period of suspension:

a) You shall render full cooperation to the Internal Complaints Committee.
b) You shall refrain from contacting, influencing, or intimidating, directly or
indirectly, any complainant, faculty, staff, or student in connection with the
said complaints.
c) You shall not enter the premises of Ramanujan College or discharge any
administrative, financial, or academic function unless expressly authorized
in writing by the Governing Body or the Chairperson.
d) You shall not leave the station without prior approval in writing by the
Governing Body or the Chairperson.
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e) You shall be entitled to receive subsistence allowance in accordance with
the provisions of the applicable service rules/statutes during the suspension
period. ‖

[Emphasis Supplied]

53. A bare perusal of the aforenoted would reveal that any individual who
reads the said order would form a negative opinion of the petitioner. A
colleague, or prospective employer, before whose eyes passes the words
― serious misconduct and harassment ‖, shall cause only an unfavourable and
prejudicial impression to be made of the petitioner. No person deserves to be
met with such treatment, while an inquiry is pending in relation to its
conduct/actions. But for this, if the bare words of the suspension order itself
become a punishment for a given accused/answering respondent, the
constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence shall get
compromised.
54. The reproduction of the nature of allegations, with emphasis on their
seriousness and gravity, is not a neutral recitation of background facts. It is
an editorial judgment, a characterization, which the employer is not entitled
to make at the stage of suspension. The employer‘s role at this stage is
limited to determining whether the continuance of the employee in service
would prejudice the inquiry or is otherwise undesirable in the public interest.
It does not extend to adjudicating upon or publicly affirming the character of
the allegations.
55. At this stage, the Court also takes note of the submission, rightly
made my Mr. Mehta, wherein he contended, that if the said Suspension
Order, is found to be non-compliant with the applicable law, the respondents
be granted liberty to modify the suspension order.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
56. Thus, in light of the discussion above, the following conclusions can
be reached:
56.1. Despite the PoSH Act, not providing for the interim measure of
suspension, an employer in exercise of its inherent rights, can
suspend a person who is the subject-matter of an inquiry under the
PoSH Act;
56.2. The creation of a fact finding committee in order to determine
whether a given complaint is to be sent to the ICC/Local
Committee is de hors the provisions of the PoSH Act, and
impermissible in law; and
56.3. The said Suspension Order, in the facts of the instant case, is
stigmatic in nature, deserves to be set aside.
VIII. ORDER
57. The said Suspension Order is set aside.
58. Liberty is, however, granted in favour of the respondent no. 2 to pass
a fresh order.
59. Accordingly, the petition along with all pending applications stand
disposed of.
(PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV)
JUDGE

APRIL 24, 2026
P /Rao
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