AMRIKA BAI vs. THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 29-03-2019

Preview image for AMRIKA BAI vs. THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

Full Judgment Text

  NON­REPORTABLE  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1036 OF 2011 AMRIKA BAI                       … APPELLANT V ERSUS THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH               … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T   N.V. RAMANA, J.   1. This   appeal   is   directed   against   judgment   dated 26.04.2010, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 604 of 1993,   whereby   the   appeal   preferred   by   the   appellant   was dismissed,   and   the   judgment  and   order   dated   11.06.1993 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, convicting Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date: 2019.03.30 10:44:20 IST Reason: the appellant  was  confirmed.   The  appellant  was  convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149; and Section 147 of 1 the IPC, and sentenced to imprisonment for life and one­year rigorous imprisonment respectively. 2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on the morning of 12.08.1989, the deceased, Kapil, was taking his cattle for grazing, at which time his cattle jumped on the door of the appellant’s   house,   which  led   to  the  appellant  abusing  the deceased.   Thereafter,   on   his   way   back,   the   deceased questioned the appellant as to why she abused him earlier in the morning. At this, the appellant, on the pretext of touching the feet of the deceased, caught hold of him. Then, the other accused, armed with deadly weapons, came to the spot and beat  the deceased  to  death. Pursuant to  this  an FIR  was registered against the accused on 12.08.1989 and charge­ sheet was filed.  3. Originally,   14   individuals   were   made   accused   in   the present case and out of them 10 were convicted by the trial court. During the pendency of their appeal before the High Court, accused no.3 Jhangul died, abating his appeal, and accused   nos.   1,   5,   6,   7   and   10   were   released   on   special reprieve   granted   to   them.   With   respect   to   the   remaining 2 accused   including   the   present   appellant,   the   appeal   was dismissed by the High Court. The present appeal before us concerns   only   accused   no.   13,   Amrika   Bai,   who   has sustained conviction as aforementioned.  4. Heard learned counsel for both the parties.  5. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   contended   that   the impugned   judgment   convicts   the   appellant   without   any credible and clinching evidence, and is thereby illegal. The counsel further submitted that Section 157   Cr.P.C. was not complied with and the counterfoil of the FIR was forwarded to the Magistrate after a delay of 4 days from its registration. He also submitted that the statements of prosecution witnesses are unnatural and contradictory, made with the intention to falsely implicate the appellant.  6. On   the   other   hand,   the   learned   counsel   for   the respondent­State submitted that the impugned judgment is well reasoned and does not suffer from any infirmity which merits interference.  7. The prosecution has relied on the testimonies of Dharmu (P.W. 7, father of the deceased), Bhagwat Bai (P.W. 8, sister of 3 the   deceased)   and   Babulal   (P.W.   9,   brother­in­law   of   the deceased) to secure the conviction of the appellant. It is to be noted that these prosecution witnesses are close relatives of the deceased and   in view  of  the  same,  this  Court has  to scrutinize their testimony with great care and caution.  8. In the facts of the present case, the appellant who was unarmed   is   implicated   in   the   incident   by   virtue   of   the testimonies of the aforementioned witnesses stating her role in allegedly catching hold of the deceased to facilitate his murder.   On   a   close   scrutiny   of   the   testimonies   of   the aforesaid witnesses, the role of the appellant in the incident is extremely doubtful.  9. The testimonies of Dharmu (P.W. 7), Bhagwat Bai (P.W. 8) and Babulal (P.W. 9), on the basis of which the appellant was implicated in the offence, are highly inconsistent with respect to the role of the appellant. While P.W. 8 deposed in line with the prosecution version that the appellant merely held the deceased   as   he   was   being   assaulted,   P.W.   9,   went   on   to depose in his cross­examination that the appellant in fact assaulted the deceased with a   lathi . Further, P.W. 7, in his 4 cross­examination, deposed that the appellant brought the tangia  from inside the house and handed it over to Chandra (accused no. 11, husband of the appellant) while admitting that his earlier statement, wherein he stated that Chandra had brought a   tangia   from inside the house, was incorrect. He   further   stated   that   the   appellant   did   not   leave   the deceased till he fell on the ground as a result of the assault.  10.   The   abovementioned   inconsistencies   found   in   the testimonies   of   the   prosecution   witnesses   create   a   doubt regarding the credibility of their testimonies  vis­à­vis  the role of the appellant.  11. Further, this Court fails to fathom a scenario wherein the appellant   single   handedly   caught   hold   of   the   deceased facilitating   his   assault,   particularly   when   P.W.8   has categorically   stated   in   her   cross­examination   that   the deceased was well built, such that he could have taken down two to three persons himself.  12. The   above   observations   cast   a   serious   doubt   on   the involvement  of   the  appellant  in  the   incident in  which  the deceased was beaten to death and she suffered unexplained 5 injuries. Thus, she cannot be termed to be a member of the unlawful assembly, much less one which was alleged to have been constituted with the common object of murdering the deceased. The law is well­settled on the aspect that mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object, being one of those set out in Section 141 I.P.C. and she was actuated by that common object. [ See Dani Singh  v.  State of Bihar , (2004) 13 SCC 203 ] 13.     Moreover,   the   fact   that   the   FIR   was   registered   on 12.08.1989   but   was   forwarded   to   the   Magistrate   only   on 16.08.1989, after a delay of 4 days, becomes significant in light of the abovementioned inconsistencies in the story of the prosecution with respect to the appellant. It appears that the appellant was roped in as an accused, due to the inimical relationship between the parties which clearly emanates from the record. 14.    In conclusion, since the involvement of the appellant as a member of the unlawful assembly has itself been put to doubt,   the   question   of   her   having   common   object   for 6 murdering the deceased under Section 302 read with Section 149 and her using force or violence under Section 147 IPC does not arise.  15. Taking into consideration the overall evidence, we feel that it is not safe to convict the appellant in the present case. 16. Thus, in light of the observations hereinabove, the appeal is allowed and the appellant is acquitted of offences under Section 302 read with Section 149 and Section 147 IPC.  ..............................................J.                                                                   (N.V. RAMANA)  ..............................................J.  (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR) ..............................................J.  (INDIRA BANERJEE) NEW DELHI; MARCH  29, 2019. 7