Full Judgment Text
2026 INSC 413
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1946 OF 2013
A.P. STATE WAKF BOARD
THROUGH CHAIRPERSON
… APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
JANAKI BUSAPPA
AND OTHERS
…RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.
1. The present Civil Appeal arises out of the final
Judgment and Order dated 18.01.2011
(“Impugned Judgment”) passed by the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh (“High Court”) in Civil
Revision Petition No.3786 of 2009, whereby the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
High Court allowed the revision petition
NAVEEN D
Date: 2026.04.24
16:09:34 IST
Reason:
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 1 of 25
preferred by the plaintiffs and decreed the suit,
setting aside the Judgment and Decree dated
04.08.2009 (“Tribunal Judgment”) passed by
the Andhra Pradesh Wakf Tribunal, Hyderabad
(“Tribunal”) in O.S. No. 68 of 2000.
2. The Appellant herein is Andhra Pradesh State
Wakf Board, represented by its chairperson
(“Wakf Board”), who was the original defendant
no.1. The Respondents were the original
plaintiffs and their legal representatives.
3. The factual matrix, giving rise to the present
appeal, in brief, is that the plaintiffs, namely,
Janaki Busappa and others, instituted O.S. No.
68 of 2000 before the Tribunal, seeking reliefs of
permanent injunction and declaration against
the defendants and later plaint was amended
seeking relief of setting aside letter dated
21.08.1999 issued by the Appellant allotting
land to original Defendant No.2, Jamat Ahle
Hadees, for construction of Edgah.
4. The case set up by the plaintiffs was that they
are the absolute owners and possessors of land
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 2 of 25
admeasuring Ac. 3.00 in Sy. No. 914/B situated
at Kallur Village, Kurnool District (“suit
property”). It was asserted that the said property
was purchased by them under registered sale
deeds executed in the years 1985 and 1996. The
plaintiffs traced their title to a registered
partition deed dated 01.06.1945, contending
that the property originally formed part of a
“personal inam” granted by the erstwhile Nawab
of Kurnool.
5. It was further pleaded that Defendant No. 1 –
A.P. State Wakf Board, Appellant herein, vide
proceedings dated 21.08.1999, purported to
allot the suit land to Defendant No. 2 – Jamat
Ahle Hadees for construction of an Edgah,
which action, according to the plaintiffs, was
wholly illegal, arbitrary and without authority of
law. On this basis, the plaintiffs sought a
declaration that the said proceedings are null
and void, coupled with a decree of permanent
injunction restraining the defendants from
interfering with their peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the suit schedule property.
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 3 of 25
6. The defendants, on entering appearance, filed
their written statement contesting the claim of
the plaintiffs. It was specifically averred that the
suit land is not a private property but
constitutes “service inam” land attached to
Budda Buddi Mosque, as evidenced by Title
Deed No. 3826, and forms part of registered
Wakf property. The defendants contended that
the partition deed dated 01.06.1945 and the
subsequent sale deeds relied upon by the
plaintiffs are void and confer no valid title,
inasmuch as the land, being service inam, could
not have been alienated. Defendant No.2 was
already in possession of the land and had
commenced construction activities by raising
compound walls for the purpose of an Edgah.
7. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the
Tribunal framed the following issues for
consideration:
1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for
permanent injunction against the
defendants restraining them from
interfering with their peaceful
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 4 of 25
possession and enjoyment of the plaint
schedule property.
2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for
the relief of declaration to declare the
proceedings of the Defendant No.1 as
null and void.
3. Whether the suit is bad and
maintainable for want of mandatory
notice under Section 89 of the Wakf Act,
1995.
8. The Tribunal, upon appreciation of the oral and
documentary evidence on record, dismissed the
suit vide Judgment and Decree dated
04.08.2009. The Tribunal concluded that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish either lawful
possession or valid title over the suit property.
It was held that the material on record,
including partition deed dated 01.06.1945 and
the admissions of PW-1, indicated that the land
in question was a “service inam” granted for
rendering services to the mosque, thereby forms
part of Wakf land, consequently, disentitling the
alleged vendors from conveying any valid title to
the plaintiffs.
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 5 of 25
9. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the
plaintiffs preferred Civil Revision Petition No.
3786 of 2009 before the High Court under
Section 83(9) of the Wakf Act, 1995. The High
Court, upon consideration of the matter,
allowed the revision petition and set aside the
findings as recorded by the Tribunal.
10. The High Court held that the defendants had
failed to substantiate their claim that the land
in question is Wakf property, particularly in the
absence of production of Title Deed No. 3826. It
was further held that the plaintiffs had
established their independent title and
continuous possession over the suit property
through the partition deed dated 01.06.1945,
the subsequent registered sale deeds, and
supporting evidence including standing crops
on suit property.
11. Being aggrieved by the finding of the High Court
in the Impugned Judgment, the Appellant has
preferred the present Appeal before this Court.
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 6 of 25
12. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
Appellant submits that the Impugned Judgment
is unsustainable in law as well as on facts. He
contends, at the outset, that the High Court has
failed to advert to the foundational document
relied upon by the plaintiffs, namely, the
partition deed dated 01.06.1945, on which the
entire claim of title is based. A perusal of the
said document would demonstrate that the suit-
schedule property is described therein as
“service inam” land granted for rendering
services to Budda Buddi and Asthabal mosques,
and not as “personal inam” as asserted by the
plaintiffs.
13. He further submits that once the land is
admitted being “service inam” in nature, the
same partakes the character of Wakf property,
and the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs
had no transferable or heritable title therein. In
such circumstances, the partition deed dated
01.06.1945, as also the subsequent sale deeds
executed in favour of the plaintiffs, are void ab
initio and incapable of conferring any valid title.
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 7 of 25
Reliance is placed upon the judgment of this
1
Court in Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf Board ,
wherein it has been held that grants made for
religious or charitable purposes, including
service inams, would clothe the property with
the character of Wakf. It is, therefore, contended
that the suit property, being service inam land,
is inherently Wakf property and cannot be
alienated or transferred.
14. Learned Counsel further submits that the High
Court has committed a manifest error in shifting
the burden of proof upon the defendants,
contrary to the well-established principles
under Sections 101 to 103 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872. It is urged that the
plaintiffs, having approached the Tribunal
seeking declaration of title and injunction, were
required to establish their case independently
on the strength of their own evidence, and could
not succeed on the alleged weakness of the
defence. In this regard, reliance is placed on the
1
(1998) 2 SCC 642
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 8 of 25
decision of this Court in P. Kishore Kumar v.
2
Vittal K. Patkar .
15. He further submits that PW-1 i.e. plaintiff
no.11, has admitted that the suit property was
assigned for rendering services to the mosque to
his ancestors and that the partition deed does
not describe the land as personal inam. It is
further admitted that no document has been
produced to substantiate the claim that the
property is personal inam land.
16. It is further contended that the suit schedule
property stands duly notified as Wakf property
in accordance with the provisions of the Wakf
Act, 1995, as is evident from the Gazette
Notification dated 02.05.1963 issued under
Section 5(2) pursuant to a statutory survey
under Section 4, wherein the property in Sy. No.
914/B, covered under Title Deed No. 3826, has
been recorded as Wakf property attached to
Budda Buddi Mosque, and the said notification,
having not been challenged under Section 6,
2
(2024) 13 SCC 553
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 9 of 25
has attained finality and is binding. By a
subsequent notification dated 22.08.1985, the
Appellant assumed direct management of the
property on account of mismanagement by the
mutawallis.
17. Regarding possession of suit property, it is
submitted that the report of the Principal
District Judge, Kurnool dated 06.10.2007, in
compliance with the order of the High Court,
records the existence of minarets, compound
walls and other structures indicative of an
Edgah. In a suit for injunction, the burden lies
on the plaintiff to establish actual and lawful
possession as on the date of institution of the
suit, which burden has not been discharged in
the present case, and in any event, the alleged
possession of the plaintiffs is neither lawful nor
bona fide, having been obtained, if at all, during
the pendency of the proceedings by taking
advantage of interim orders, thereby
constituting an abuse of the process of law.
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 10 of 25
18. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that
the plaintiffs have sought to rely upon
additional documents for the first time before
this Court, which were not part of the record
before the courts below, and such reliance is
impermissible in law being contrary to the
principles governing admission of additional
evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, as reiterated by this
3
Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin ,
4
and N. Kamalam v. Ayyasamy .
19. Learned Senior Counsel rests his submission
stating that the High Court has ignored the fact
that a similar suit, being O.S. No. 1197 of 1999,
in respect of a portion of land in the same survey
number, was dismissed by the competent civil
court holding the property to be Wakf property,
and the said judgment having attained finality,
the same ought to have been taken into
consideration.
3
(2012) 8 SCC 148
4
(2001) 7 SCC 503
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 11 of 25
20. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the Respondents submits that the
proceedings initiated by the Wakf Board in the
year 1999, seeking to allot the suit property for
construction of an Edgah, were wholly illegal
and without authority of law. It is contended
that the Respondents, having purchased the
property under registered sale deeds in the year
1996, were in settled, continuous and peaceful
possession thereof for several decades, to the
knowledge of the Wakf Board. Despite such
knowledge, the Wakf Board neither instituted
any suit for declaration of title nor sought
recovery of possession in accordance with law
but instead attempted to dispossess the
Respondents through executive action and use
of State machinery, which is impermissible in
law. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of
this Court in Wakf Board of A.P. v.
5
Biradavolu Ramana Reddy , to contend that
extinguished rights cannot be revived
subsequently.
5
(1999) 6 SCC 582
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 12 of 25
21. It is further contended that the Wakf Board has
failed to establish its title, inasmuch as it has
relied solely upon Title Deed No. 3826 but has
not produced or proved the same before any
court. The reliance upon Gazette Notification
dated 02.05.1963 is misconceived, as the said
notification does not specifically refer to Survey
No. 914/B. He further contends that earlier
decisions of the High Court concerning the same
Title Deed No. 3826 had gone against the Wakf
Board and were not challenged.
22. Learned Senior Counsel lastly submits that the
reliance placed on the recitals in the partition
deed of 1945 is misplaced, as such recitals
cannot constitute binding admissions against
third parties. It is contended that the said
document is loosely drafted and cannot be
determinative of title. Reliance is placed upon
the judgment of this Court in Nagindas
6
Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam , to contend
that admissions in private documents bind only
the parties thereto.
6
(1974) 1 SCC 242
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 13 of 25
23. Having heard learned Counsels for the parties
and upon perusal of the pleadings and material
on record, the principal question which arises
for consideration is whether the suit schedule
property admeasuring Ac. 3.00 in Sy. No. 914/B
of Kallur Village is Wakf property or not?
24. At the outset, reference must necessarily be
made to the crucial document relied upon by the
Respondents, namely, the partition deed dated
01.06.1945, from which the entire claim of title
is sought to be traced. A bare perusal of the said
document evidently indicates that the lands
covered thereunder, including the suit schedule
property, are described as “service inam” lands
assigned for rendering services to Budda Buddi
Mosque and Asthabal Masjid. Once such a
recital is borne out from the very document on
which the Respondents predicate their title, the
plea that the property constitutes “personal
inam” stands clearly belied. It is undisputed and
settled that lands granted as service inam for
religious or charitable purposes partake the
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 14 of 25
character of endowed property and are
impressed with a public or religious trust,
thereby restricting their alienability.
25. On a careful consideration of the material on
record, it becomes evident that the suit
property, being service inam, could not have
been validly partitioned or subsequently
alienated so as to confer title upon the
predecessors of the Respondents. In this regard,
it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of
this Court in Sayyed Ali (supra) wherein it was
categorically held that a grant of land for
rendering religious or charitable services does
not vest absolute title in the individual, and
such grants, being for purposes recognised
under Muslim law as pious, religious or
charitable, would clothe the property with the
character of Wakf. The said principle squarely
applies in the present case, where the recital in
the partition deed itself establishes the land as
service inam attached to a mosque. The High
Court, however, proceeded to treat the partition
deed as conferring independent title, without
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 15 of 25
adverting to its recitals in their proper
perspective, which, in our opinion, constitutes a
manifest error.
26. The record further discloses that the admissions
of PW-1, who, in categorical terms,
acknowledged that the suit property was
assigned to his ancestors for rendering services
to the mosque and that no document exists to
establish the same as personal inam land.
These admissions, being substantive evidence,
go to the root of the matter and corroborates the
recitals contained in the partition deed dated
01.06.1945. Admissions made by a party,
particularly when consistent with documentary
evidence, cannot be lightly disregarded or
brushed aside. The High Court, however,
brushed aside the said admissions on the
ground that PW-1 lacked personal knowledge,
being not contemporaneous to the execution of
the said partition deed. In our considered
opinion, such an approach is unsustainable.
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 16 of 25
27. In this context, the reliance placed on Nagindas
Ramdas (supra) is equally misplaced. While
there can be no dispute with the proposition
that clear and unequivocal admissions made by
the parties in pleadings constitute substantive
evidence, the said decision also recognises that
evidentiary admissions may not be conclusive
but can be evaluated in the context of the overall
material on record. In the present case, the
admissions of PW-1, are required to be
appreciated in the context of the overall material
on record, which, as discussed above, clearly
corroborates with the recitals contained in the
partition deed dated 01.06.1945 and have been
rightly relied upon by the Tribunal. The High
Court, in discarding the same, has failed to
appreciate their evidentiary value in the proper
perspective.
28. Another contention advanced on behalf of the
Respondents that the partition deed is loosely
drafted and therefore not determinative of the
nature of the property cannot be accepted,
inasmuch as the recitals therein are clear and
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 17 of 25
unambiguous in describing the land as service
inam, and no material has been placed on
record to discredit the same.
29. Apart from the above, the Wakf character of the
property is further borne out from the material
placed on record by the Appellant, including the
Survey Commissioner’s Report dated
30.04.1956 and the Gazette Notification dated
02.05.1963 issued under Section 5(2) of the
Wakf Act, 1995, which collectively indicate that
the property forms part of Wakf land attached
to Budda Buddi Mosque. The High Court has
expressed reservations on account of the non-
production of Title Deed No. 3826 and the
absence of specific survey numbers in the
notification. While such deficiencies may be
relevant, the same cannot be viewed in isolation
so as to dislodge the cumulative evidentiary
effect of the material on record. The existence of
Title Deed No. 3826 stands established and
corroborated by endorsement dated 21.01.2003
of the Collector, Kurnool, indicating the inability
to produce the original owing to its brittle
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 18 of 25
condition, that cannot, by itself, be treated as
fatal. A cumulative consideration of the material
on record would indicate that the property bears
the character of Wakf land.
30. Another aspect which requires consideration is
the reliance placed by both parties on earlier
decisions rendered in proceedings concerning
lands in the same or adjoining survey numbers.
In our considered view, such reliance is of
limited assistance in the present case. The
findings recorded in earlier proceedings are
essentially founded upon the evidence adduced
in those cases and cannot be mechanically
applied to a subsequent dispute involving
different parties and independent claims of title.
Each case must necessarily be adjudicated on
the basis of the pleadings and evidence brought
on record therein. In the present case, the
determination of the nature and character of the
suit property must rest upon the evidence led in
the present case.
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 19 of 25
31. In the same vein, the reliance placed by the
Respondents on Wakf Board A.P. (supra) to
contend that the Appellant’s right with respect
to the suit property has been extinguished,
which, in our opinion, is misconceived and
inapplicable to the facts of the present case. The
said decision pertains to the question of
limitation in a suit instituted by a Wakf for
recovery of possession from an alienee and
turns upon the applicability of Article 96 of the
Limitation Act in the context of alienation by a
previous manager. The present case, however,
does not involve any such issue of limitation or
recovery from an alienation by a mutawalli or
manager, but rather concerns the anterior
question as to the very nature and character of
the property. The ratio of the said judgment,
therefore, has no application to the controversy
at hand.
32. It is also necessary to advert to the settled
principle that a plaintiff seeking declaration of
title must succeed on the strength of his own
case and not on the weakness of the defence.
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 20 of 25
The Respondents, in the present case, having
approached the Tribunal seeking declaration
and injunction, were required to establish a
clear and lawful title to the suit property.
However, as noticed hereinabove, the very
document relied upon by them militates against
their claim. The High Court, in reversing the
findings of the Tribunal, has effectively shifted
the burden upon the Appellant, which, in the
facts of the present case, is legally untenable.
33. At this juncture, reference may be made to the
decision of this Court in P. Kishore Kumar
(supra) , wherein it has been reiterated that in a
suit for declaration of title, the burden lies
squarely upon the plaintiff to establish a clear
and legally sustainable title, and such a claim
cannot succeed merely on perceived
weaknesses in the defendant’s case. The failure
to produce cogent title documents is fatal to the
claim.
34. The aforesaid position is further reinforced by
the settled principle under Section 101 of the
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 21 of 25
Evidence Act, 1872 as elucidated by this Court
7
in Rangammal v. Kuppuswami , wherein it
has been held that the burden of proving a fact
always lies upon the party who asserts it, and
until such burden is discharged, the opposing
party is under no obligation to establish its case.
It has been further emphasised that a court
cannot proceed on the weakness of the defence
unless the party on whom the burden lies has
first discharged the same. Applying the said
principle to the present case, the Respondents,
having asserted title to the suit property, were
under a legal obligation to establish the same by
cogent evidence, which, as noticed hereinabove,
they have failed to do.
35. Insofar as the aspect of possession is concerned,
the material on record does indicate that the
Respondents had adduced evidence of
cultivation and existence of standing crops.
However, it is equally well settled that mere
physical possession, in the absence of lawful
title, would not entitle a party to the relief of
7
(2011) 12 SCC 220
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 22 of 25
declaration or injunction. Such possession,
even if assumed, cannot be treated as lawful.
Furthermore, we deem it necessary to make
reference to the report dated 06.10.2007 of the
District Judge, Kurnool, submitted before the
High Court. The said report records the
existence of compound walls, minarets and
other features indicative of an Edgah, lending
support to the case of the Appellant that the
property was being used for religious purposes.
The High Court, in contrast, has inferred
possession in favour of the Respondents
primarily on the basis of standing crops,
without adverting to the legal character of such
possession or the relevant admissible material
on record, which, in our view, is not in
consonance with settled principles.
36. Taking into consideration the above discussion
and material on record, we are of the considered
opinion that the suit schedule property is
“service inam” land attached to a religious
institution and partakes the character of Wakf
property. The Respondents have failed to
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 23 of 25
establish any valid title or lawful possession so
as to entitle them to the reliefs claimed.
37. The findings recorded by the Tribunal are borne
out from comprehensive appreciation of the
evidence adduced before it. However, the High
Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction
has re-appreciated the entire evidence and
substituted its own finding disregarding
material aspects such as the recitals in partition
deed dated 01.06.1945 and the admissions of
PW-1, and has accorded undue significance to
perceived deficiencies in the Appellant’s
evidence proceeding to shift the onus of proof
wrongly upon the defendant.
38. In the light of above, the Impugned Judgment
dated 18.01.2011 passed by the High Court
being unsustainable in law is set aside, and the
Judgment and Decree dated 04.08.2009 passed
by the Tribunal is restored.
39. This Appeal is allowed in above terms.
40. There shall be no order as to cost.
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 24 of 25
41. Pending application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
.……..………..……………………..J.
[M.M. SUNDRESH]
.……..………..……………………..J.
[ AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ]
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 24, 2026.
C. A. No. 1946/2013 Page 25 of 25