Full Judgment Text
‘ REPORTABLE’
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1300 OF 2009
Majendran Langeswaran …..Appellant
Versus
State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. ….Respondents
J U D G M E N T
M.Y. EQBAL, J.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the
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judgment and order dated 25 July, 2008 passed by the
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High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 820 of 2002
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whereby the judgment and order dated 9 August, 2002
passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi in
Sessions Case No. 45 of 2001 convicting the accused-
appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(for short, “IPC”) and sentencing him to imprisonment for
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life and a fine of Rs. 100/- and in default of payment of fine,
rigorous imprisonment for one day was maintained and the
said appeal dismissed.
| ution ve | rsion in |
|---|
Cargo Ship Motor Vessel “Lok Prem” owned by the Shipping
Corporation of India was chartered by a private company of
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South Africa on 6 November, 1996 for carrying Chrome
Alloy. The accused-appellant and the deceased L.
Shivaraman along with other were helmsmen/seamen (crew
members) on the said ship. When the ship was sailing from
South Africa to Japan via Singapore, the auto pilot went out
of order which could not be repaired for non-availability of
technicians on board and thus requiring the crew on board
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to manually steer the ship. The accused and one M.Y.
Talgharkar showed reluctance to steer the ship manually
and insisted for repair of auto pilot and payment of their
long overdue overtime. The ship was taken to Singapore to
make the auto pilot functional but the same could not be
got repaired. The accused and said Talgharkar are alleged
to have instigated other crew members to insist and obtain
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it in writing from the Captain/Master of the ship (PW-5
Radha Krishan Ambady) that the ship would be got repaired
at Japan, otherwise they (crew members) shall not allow the
| from Si | ngapore. |
|---|
the ship reported the matter to the Shipping Corporation of
India, the General Secretary of the Union (NSUI) directed
the crew members to perform their duties in obedience to
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lawful commands of the Captain. On 30 November, 1996,
an altercation is stated to have taken place between the
accused and the deceased L. Shivaraman. As the accused
had sustained some cut injuries on his hands, he reported
st
the matter to the officials. On 1 December, 1996 when the
ship was on high seas, the appellant took off from his duty
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as helmsman on the ground of pain in his hands due to cut
injuries and another helmsman Baria was asked to do the
duty as replacement. As the accused and the deceased
were staying in Cabin No. 25, the accused was temporarily
shifted from that cabin to Cabin No. 23 due to the above
incident of assault. At about 1510 hours, the accused
allegedly approached IInd Officer Kalyan Singh (PW-6) with
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a blood-stained knife in his hand and his hands smearing in
blood and is alleged to have confessed before him that he
had killed L. Shivaraman. On being asked by Kalyan Singh
| nt hand | ed over |
|---|
to him which he placed in a cloth piece without touching the
same. Kalyan Singh (PW-6) then intimated the Captain and
other officers. The body of L. Shivaraman was found lying
in Cabin No. 23 in such a way that half of it was inside the
cabin and half of it outside. The officials of Shipping
Corporation of India were informed. On incident being
reported, pursuant to an instruction from concerned
quarter, the ship was diverted to Hongkong. On being so
directed by the Captain of the ship (PW-5), Kalyan Singh
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(PW-6) got the body of the deceased cleaned up for being
preserved in the fish room with the help of Manjeet Singh
Bhupal (PW-4) and Chief Officer V.V. Muralidharan (PW-18)
took photographs. The blood-stained knife was kept in the
safe custody of PW-5. The accused was then apprehended,
tied and disarmed before being shifted to the hospital on
board. Since the ship was having Indian Flag, as per the
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International Treaty of which India was a signatory, the act
of the accused was subject to Indian laws. Accordingly, a
case bearing R.C. No. 10(S) of 1996 was registered by the
| Investiga | tion (CB |
|---|
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on 6 December, 1996. On reaching Hongkong, the body of
deceased was handed over to Hongkong Police for post
mortem examination. Two CBI officers reached Hongkong
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on 7 December, 1996. The investigation of the case was
conducted by Anil Kumar Ohri, Dy. Superintendent of Police,
C.B.I. (PW-23). The Investigation Officer (I.O.) visited the
ship and recorded the statements of witnesses under
Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short,
“Cr.P.C.”). The blood-stained knife (Ex. P-3) and
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deceased’s boiler suit (Ex. 2a) as also relevant papers from
the Hongkong police were taken into his possession by the
I.O. The post mortem examination on the dead body was
conducted by Dr. Lal Sai Chak (PW-19). The accused was
arrested and brought to Delhi where he was medico legally
examined by a doctor. The specimen fingerprints and
signature of the accused were obtained. The knife and the
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specimen fingerprints were then sent to Central Forensic
Science Laboratory (CFSL) for comparison. The fingerprints
of the accused had tallied with the fingerprints appearing
| -3). Th | e accus |
|---|
Section 302 IPC. In support of its case, the prosecution
examined as many as 23 witnesses.
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3. The trial court vide judgment and order dated 9
August, 2002 held the appellant guilty of committing the
murder of L. Shivaraman taking note of the incident of
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assault of 30 November, 1996 in which the appellant had
sustained injuries at the hands of the deceased as motive
on the part of the appellant for commission of crime, the
extra- judicial confession made by him to Kalyan Singh (PW-
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6) and presence of his fingerprints on the knife that was
allegedly used as the weapon of offence.
4. Before the High Court while assailing the conviction
and sentence by the trial court, it was contended that there
was sufficient opportunity to force the appellant to hold the
knife (Ex.P-3) to get his fingerprints thereon; that no blood
was noticeable on the clothes of the appellant; that the
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clothes of the appellant which he was wearing at the
relevant time were not seized to establish that the same
carried blood stains of the deceased; two other helmsmen
| ar who w | ere pres |
|---|
made confession before Kalyan Singh (PW-6) were not
examined by the prosecution; that the weapon of offence
i.e. knife (Ex.P-3) was not shown to the doctor concerned
who had conducted post mortem examination on the dead
body of the deceased to find out whether the injuries could
have been caused by that weapon; that all the injuries
could not have been caused by the said weapon of offence
which had one blunt edge and the other sharp; that more
than one weapon was used to cause injuries on the person
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of the deceased by referring to existence of another knife
(Ex. 2b) in the parcel which contained deceased’s boiler suit
(Ex. 2a) which had also been sent to CFSL; that no
fingerprints were lifted from the second knife nor the same
was referred to the expert for matching with the cuts on the
boiler suit; and that the second knife was also not shown to
the doctor conducting post mortem on the body of the
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deceased to ascertain if the same could have been used as
a possible weapon of offence. As regards alleged extra-
judicial confession, the depositions of Captain Radha
| PW-5) a | nd Kaly |
|---|
referred to and variance in words allegedly used by the
appellant while making the same was demonstrated;
absence of any mention of such a confession in the Official
Log Book was also pleaded; and it was contended that the
I.O. did not detect any blood in Cabin No. 23 as the scene of
crime had also been cleaned and on account of such
tampering the crime could not be connected with the
appellant. It was contended that it was on account of
officers on board including Captain of the ship being
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unhappy with and inimical towards the appellant that he
was falsely implicated. It was contended that the previous
day incident of assault could not be reckoned as motive for
fatal assault on the deceased on the following day and such
motive alone in the absence of necessary links in the
circumstantial evidence would not be suffice to record
conviction against the appellant.
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5. After appreciation of the evidence of prosecution
witnesses and the documents exhibited therein, the High
Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution has
| lt of the | appellan |
|---|
the offence and accordingly dismissed the appeal affirming
the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed
by the trial court. Hence, this appeal by special leave.
6. Mr. G.Tushar Rao, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant has assailed the impugned judgment and order of
conviction and sentence as being illegal and contrary to
facts and evidence on record. Learned counsel submitted
that the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence and
a chain with regard to the circumstances leading to the
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guilt of the appellant has not at all been established.
Counsel submitted that it is settled law that extra-judicial
confession is a weak type of evidence and needs
corroboration in a case dependent wholly on circumstantial
evidence and in such cases the exact words used by the
accused have to be reproduced, but in this case even PW-6
before whom the appellant is alleged to have made
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confession has not been able to reproduce the exact words
and there are material contradictions in the statements of
prosecution witnesses. It is contended by the counsel that
| ich the | alleged |
|---|
knife Ex.P-3 was seized and sealed is not proper and the
probability of tampering with the knife cannot be ruled out.
Counsel submitted that circumstances and the evidence on
record indicate that the appellant was susceptible to being
forced to hold the knife so as to get his fingerprints on the
knife. It is surprising, counsel submitted, that there are
about 14 stab wounds both minor and major on the neck
and torso as per post mortem report, but there was no
blood noticeable on the appellant nor did any of the
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witnesses noticed blood either on the clothes of the
appellant or the bridge or the alleyway from the scene of
occurrence to the bridge nor were the clothes of the
appellant were ever seized by the Captain/Master of the
ship (PW-5), IInd Officer (PW-6), the Chief Officer (PW-18),
Senior Inspector Hongkong Police (PW-20) or the
Investigating Officer of CBI (PW-23) and, therefore, the
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chain in the prosecution case of circumstantial evidence
gets fatally broken due to this aspect. It is submitted by
the counsel that from the evidence it is clear that at the
| pellant is | alleged |
|---|
Kalyan Singh (PW-6), there were two helmsmen, namely,
Baria and Talgharkar and as per the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, they also could have heard the
appellant, but these two persons were not examined at all
which goes to show that the prosecution tried to hide
something. It is contended that the knife Ex. P-3 (weapon
of offence) was not shown to the doctor (PW-19) who
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conducted the post mortem of the deceased on 6
December, 1996 in Hongkong to take his opinion as to
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whether it could be Ex.P-3 alone which could have caused
the injuries on the body of the deceased and in the absence
of such examination, the weapon remains unconnected to
the injuries on the deceased. Counsel contended that the
injuries on the deceased were not consistent with the
weapon (Ex.P-3) and that too in the absence of the opinion
of the doctor who conducted post mortem and was not
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shown the alleged weapon of offence. The counsel
contended that from the evidence on record it is clear that
there was more than one weapon containing the blood of
| art from | Ex.P-3 k |
|---|
knife about which there is no mention nor any plausible
reason as to wherefrom it came and why no one bothered
about it. The counsel submitted that the doubt created by
this circumstance has neither been looked into, considered
or removed by the prosecution at all and this being a case
purely based on circumstantial evidence, the benefit of
doubt ought to be extended to the appellant. The
prosecution, counsel submitted, is expected and is duty
bound to eliminate every element of suspicion in every
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circumstance relied upon by it so as to enable the courts to
come to the hypothesis consistent with the guilt of the
accused and simultaneously inconsistent with the
innocence of the accused person. It is contended that the
Captain of the ship got the scene of offence cleaned and no
site plan of the scene of occurrence prepared.
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7. Mr. Mukul Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing
for the respondent-CBI, on the other hand, submitted that
the trial court and the High Court have dealt with the issue
| fession b | eing leg |
|---|
prosecution has also been able to prove that the same was
without any inducement, threat or promise which factor the
appellant has not been able to discard from any of the
witness. The prosecution has been able to prove the motive
to commit such a crime. Similarly, the recovery of knife,
CFSL report and post mortem report clearly indicate that
the injuries were from a single blade weapon. Even though
there is no eye-witness to the actual crime, yet the
prosecution has been able to bring home the guilt of the
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accused under Section 302 IPC by proving the complete
chain of circumstances beyond reasonable doubt. The
appellant neither in cross-examination of various witnesses
nor in any explanation in his statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C. has been able to make a dent in the entire evidence.
The counsel submitted that even in a case of circumstantial
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evidence, the evidence has to be appreciated as a whole
and not in pieces, one bit here and one bit there.
8. We have considered the arguments advanced by
| er side a | nd have |
|---|
findings recorded by the trial court as also by the High
Court.
9. Admittedly, the entire case is based on the
circumstantial evidence as no one has seen the murder
having been committed by the accused-appellant. Although
the trial court has not given much weightage to the
confession alleged to have been made by the accused-
appellant before PW-5, PW-6 and PW-20, but the High Court
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based the conviction on the basis of extra-judicial
confession also. The trial court while dealing with the
confession alleged to have been made by the accused,
observed as under:
“52. Now in the present case the prosecution
is relying on the confession of the accused
before Kalyan Singh (PW-6), the repetition
confession before Sh. R.K. Ambady (PW-5)
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and the confession allegedly made by the
accused before Inspector Wai (PW-20).
| on the b<br>efore him | ridge.<br>that he |
|---|
54. So far as the confession before Inspector
Wai (PW 20) is concerned, the same cannot
be looked into in view of the law laid down in
State vs. Ranjan Raja Ram 1991 (1) CCC 134.
This particular judgment has been relied on
by counsel for the accused and it had been
argued that since the facts of the present
case were identical, therefore, the accused in
the present case deserves acquittal. I have
carefully gone through the judgment State vs.
Ranjan Raja Ram (supra). In that case the
extra judicial confession was made before a
person who had just joined the ship on 2.6.78
and the occurrence had taken place on
th th
9 /10 June 1978. He was a stranger to the
accused. It was the prosecution case (in that
case) the accused had kept on telling his
having committed the murder to every one.
It was not believed by the court. In para 26 of
the judgment it was mentioned that the name
of PW in that case had come for the first time
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| ” |
|---|
10. On the contentions of the accused-appellant,
the High Court while dismissing the appeal of the
accused by the impugned judgment held as under:
“13. ……. One cannot lose sight of the fact
that according to Kalyan Singh (Pw-6), on
reaching the bridge of the ship, the appellant
had first told him that he had killed Shivraman
and then repeated the same in Hindi also by
uttering, ?KHALAS KAR DIYA?. The statement so
made in Hindi was only in continuation to the
confession initially made by him wherein he had
specifically named Shivraman. Thus, the
words ?KHALAS KAR DIYA? Uttered by the
appellant in Hindi are to be read in the context
of his initial confession naming Shivraman. No
real variance in the content of confession
initially made and the one repeated in Hindi is
thus brought out.
xxx xxx xxx
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15. …. The omission to mention the exact
words in the log book entry dated 2.12.1996
vide Ex. PW-5/D in the circumstances cannot
make the testimony of Kalyan Singh (PW-6) in
regard to confession by the appellant
uncreditworthy. The log book entry (Ex.PW-5/D)
does carry a mention that the information
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| mmitted<br>he appe | the cri<br>llant at |
|---|
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16. Non-examination of two seamen,
namely, Baria and Thalgharkar, who were
manually steering the ship at the relevant time
when the appellant made his confessional
statement before Kalyan Singh (PW-6) cannot
be a ground to discard an otherwise
unimpeached testimony of Kalyan Singh (PW-6)
in regard to confession made to him by the
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| from T<br>ition on | algharka<br>extra ju |
|---|
xxx xxx xxx
20. ….. Since the clothes which the
appellant was wearing at the relevant time were
not taken into possession to prove the existence
of bloodstains, if any, thereon and as none of
the witnesses testifies about presence of
bloodstains on his clothes, the conclusion that
follows is that there were no bloodstains on his
clothes when the appellant approached Kalyan
Singh (PW-6) at the bridge to confess his guilty.
This fact could have been of considerable
significance in adjudging the culpability of the
appellant had the effect of the same been not
offset by the strong incriminating evidence
which constitute the basis for convicting the
appellant. … The clothes of the appellant, as
noticed earlier, were not soaked in deceased’s
blood nor there is any evidence of his feet or
footwear, if any, the appellant was wearing,
having got smeared in deceased’s blood before
his proceeding to the bridge and in such
circumstances, no blood could be expected to
have fallen down in the alleyway from the scene
of the crime to the bridge.
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xxx xxx xxx
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| or exami<br>ard box | nation a<br>was, on o |
|---|
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Page 19
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xxx xxx xxx
| oticed e<br>tain inju | arlier, e<br>ries on |
|---|
xxx xxx xxx
28. Keeping in view the incriminating
evidence available on record proving the guilt of
the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, we find
no reason to arrive at a finding different from
the one recorded by the learned trial court in
regard to the complicity of the appellant in
committing the murder of L. Shivaraman on
board. Hence, the impugned conviction and
sentence are maintained and the appeal is
dismissed being bereft of merit.”
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11. Now, we have to consider whether the judgment of
conviction passed by the trial court and affirmed by the
High court can be sustained in law. As noticed above, the
| on circ | umstanti |
|---|
has seen the accused committing murder of the deceased.
While dealing with the said conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the
conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should in the first
instance be fully established, and all the facts so
established should also be consistent with only one
hypothesis i.e. the guilt of the accused, which would mean
that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove that the chain
of event is complete and not to leave any doubt in the mind
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of the Court.
12. In the case of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar vs.
State of M.P. , AIR 1952 SC 343, this Court observed as
under:
“It is well to remember that in cases where
the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance
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| be prov<br>hain of | ed. In ot<br>evidence |
|---|
13. In the case of Padala Veera Reddy vs. State of
A.P., 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, this Court opined as under:
“10. Before adverting to the arguments
advanced by the learned Counsel, we shall at
the threshold point out that in the present
case there is no direct evidence to connect
the accused with the offence in question and
the prosecution rests its case solely on
circumstantial evidence. This Court in a series
of decisions has consistently held that when a
case rests upon circumstantial evidence such
evidence must satisfy the following tests:
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(1) the circumstances from which an
inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must
be cogently and firmly established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a
definite tendency unerringly pointing towards
guilt of the accused;
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(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively,
should form a chain so complete that there is
no escape from the conclusion that within all
human probability the crime was committed
by the accused and none else; and
| cumstan<br>viction | tial evid<br>must b |
|---|
14. In the case of C. Chenga Reddy & Ors. vs. State
of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193 , this Court while considering a
case of conviction based on the circumstantial evidence,
held as under:
“21. In a case based on circumstantial
evidence, the settled law is that the
circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such
circumstances must be conclusive in nature.
Moreover, all the circumstances should be
complete and there should be no gap left in
the chain of evidence. Further, the proved
circumstances must be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and
totally inconsistent with his innocence. In the
present case the courts below have
overlooked these settled principles and
allowed suspicion to take the place of proof
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besides relying upon some inadmissible
evidence.”
15. In the case of Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy
| (2006) | 10 SCC |
|---|
considered the case of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence and held as under:
“26. It is now well settled that with a view to
base a conviction on circumstantial evidence,
the prosecution must establish all the pieces
of incriminating circumstances by reliable and
clinching evidence and the circumstances so
proved must form such a chain of events as
would permit no conclusion other than one of
guilt of the accused. The circumstances
cannot be on any other hypothesis. It is also
well settled that suspicion, however grave it
may be, cannot be a substitute for a proof
and the courts shall take utmost precaution in
finding an accused guilty only on the basis of
the circumstantial evidence. (See Anil Kumar
Singh
v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67 and Reddy
Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P., (2005) 7 SCC
603).”
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16. In the case of Sattatiya vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2008) 3 SCC 210, this Court held as under:
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| circumst<br>mpatible | ances a<br>with the |
|---|
This Court further observed in the aforesaid decision that:
“17. At this stage, we also deem it proper to
observe that in exercise of power under
Article 136 of the Constitution, this Court will
be extremely loath to upset the judgment of
conviction which is confirmed in appeal.
However, if it is found that the appreciation of
evidence in a case, which is entirely based on
circumstantial evidence, is vitiated by serious
errors and on that account miscarriage of
justice has been occasioned, then the Court
will certainly interfere even with the
concurrent findings recorded by the trial court
and the High Court— Bharat v. State of M.P.,
(2003) 3 SCC 106. In the light of the above,
we shall now consider whether in the present
case the prosecution succeeded in
establishing the chain of circumstances
leading to an inescapable conclusion that the
appellant had committed the crime.”
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Page 25
26
17. In the case of State of Goa vs. Pandurang
Mohite , (2008) 16 SCC 714, this Court reiterated the
settled law that where a conviction rests squarely on
| ence, t | he infer |
|---|
justified only when all the incriminating facts and
circumstances are found to be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused or the guilt of any person. The
circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the
accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with
the principal fact sought to be inferred from those
circumstances.
18. It would be appropriate to consider some of the
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recent decisions of this Court in cases where conviction was
based on the circumstantial evidence. In the case of G.
Parshwanath vs. State of Karnataka , (2010) 8 SCC 593,
this Court elaborately dealt with the subject and held as
under:
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| this princ<br>een facts | iple a di<br>called |
|---|
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24. In deciding the sufficiency of the
circumstantial evidence for the purpose of
conviction, the court has to consider the total
cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each
one of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt
and if the combined effect of all these facts
taken together is conclusive in establishing
the guilt of the accused, the conviction would
be justified even though it may be that one or
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28
| tion can<br>stantial | succeed<br>evidenc |
|---|
19. In the case of Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik vs.
State of Maharashtra , (2012) 4 SCC 37, while dealing
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with the case based on circumstantial evidence, this Court
observed as under:
“12. There is no doubt that it is not a case of
direct evidence but the conviction of the
accused is founded on circumstantial
evidence. It is a settled principle of law that
the prosecution has to satisfy certain
conditions before a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained.
The circumstances from which the conclusion
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29
| ave any<br>court. | substan<br>Irresistib |
|---|
13. To put it simply, the circumstances
forming the chain of events should be proved
and they should cumulatively point towards
the guilt of the accused alone. In such
circumstances, the inference of guilt can be
justified only when all the incriminating facts
and circumstances are found to be
incompatible with the innocence of the
accused or the guilt of any other person.”
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20. Last but not least, in the case of Brajendrasingh
vs. State of M.P . , (2012) 4 SCC 289, this Court while
reiterating the above principles further added that:
“28. Furthermore, the rule which needs to
be observed by the court while dealing with
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30
| e establi<br>me the g | shed by<br>uilt of th |
|---|
21 . As discussed hereinabove, there is no dispute with
regard to the legal proposition that conviction can be based
solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested on
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the touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence as
laid down by this Court. In such a case, all circumstances
must lead to the conclusion that the accused is the only one
who has committed the crime and none else.
22. From the prosecution side, a number of witnesses
have been examined to complete the chain of events and to
prove the version given in the FIR and subsequent thereto.
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We have re-appreciated and analysed the evidence brought
on record from the prosecution side. On the analysis of the
evidence, we have found many inconsistencies and
| prosec | ution v |
|---|
hereinafter.
23. Admittedly, there is no eye witness in this case
despite the fact that the occurrence took place in the cargo
ship and obviously some of the crew members were living
and/or on duty around the ship. Both the accused and the
deceased were good friends and both were staying in one
cabin viz . Cabin No.25. Before the occurrence, the accused
was shifted to Cabin No.23. Admittedly, therefore both the
accused and the deceased were staying in separate cabin
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on the date of occurrence.
24. The accused-appellant and the deceased were
helmsmen on the ship which was sailing from South Africa
to Japan via Singapore. Since the auto-pilot went out of
order and could not be repaired, the crew members were
directed to manually steer the ship. The accused and one
Talghakar showed reluctance to steer the ship manually
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32
and insisted for repair of the auto-pilot and payment of their
long overdue overtime. The prosecution case is that the
accused and the said Talghakar instigated other crew
| and obtai | n it in w |
|---|
(PW-5) that the ship would be got repaired at Japan
otherwise they (crew members) shall not allow moving of
the ship from Singapore.
25. The prosecution case is that the accused is alleged
to have confessed before PW-6 about the commission of the
offence and the blood-stained knife was handed over to PW-
6 which was subsequently seized but no blood was
noticeable on the clothes of the appellant which were found
at the relevant time. The other helmsmen, namely, Baria
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and Talghakar who were present when the appellant is
alleged to have made confession before PW-6, were not
examined by the prosecution.
26. The knife (Ex.P-3) was not shown to the doctor
concerned who had conducted post mortem examination on
the dead body of the deceased to find out whether the
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injuries could have been caused by that weapon.
Surprisingly, another knife (Ex.2b) alleged to have been
recovered from the boiler suit was also not shown to the
| whether | the said |
|---|
the commission of the offence.
27. From the evidence, it reveals that after the said
incident the appellant was tied up and kept on the bridge
for at least 2 to 3 days before being shifted. The contention
of the appellant’s counsel was that the appellant was
susceptible of being forced to hold the knife (Ex.P-3) so as
to get his fingerprints on the knife which was never kept
inside the fish room along with the dead body.
28. Apart from the aforesaid, it appears from the post
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mortem report that there were about 14 stab wounds on
the neck but there was no blood found on the dress of the
appellant or on the scene of occurrence. Though the
deceased was alleged to have been assaulted as many as
14 times by a sharp-edged weapon and there was massive
blood at the site of the offence, no blood had spilled on the
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appellant or his clothes. Moreover, there is nothing on
record by way of explanation from the prosecution side as
to why the clothes of the appellant were not seized.
| d knife | (Ex.P-3) |
|---|
doctor who conducted the post mortem of the deceased in
Honkong to take his opinion as to whether it was Ex.P-3
alone which could have caused those injuries especially
when another knife was found from the boiler suit.
29 . A very relevant piece of evidence which has been
noticed by the High Court, but not given due consideration,
is that apart from the blood-stained knife (Ex. P-3) and
certain other items mentioned in the letter of Investigating
Officer, one sealed cardboard parcel containing blue soaked
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boiler suit worn by the deceased at the time of incident was
also sent to CFSL for examination and opinion. In the said
sealed cardboard box, two Exhibits (2a and 2b) were found.
Ex.2a was the dark blue coloured boiler suit and the Ex.2b
was metallic blade fitted in a wooden handle like a knife.
The length of the metallic blade is about 5.5 centimeter
with one edge sharp and another blunt having a round tip
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at one end. None of the prosecution witnesses including
the Investigating Officer, stated anything as to how and
wherefrom the said knife (Ex.2b) was recovered and kept
| in the sa | me card |
|---|
(Ex.2b) also bore human blood-stained matching ‘O’ group
of the deceased. As per the post mortem report, stab
wounds on the neck and chest of the deceased might be by
the use of the said weapon Ex.2b. The said knife (Ex.2b)
was not subjected to examination to find out the presence
of fingerprints, if any, of the appellant. The said knife
(Ex.2b) was also not shown to the doctor (PW-19) who
conducted the post mortem examination on the body of the
deceased, to seek his opinion if the same could have been
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possible weapon of offence. Even the opinion of the expert
witness (PW-22) was not sought as to whether the cuts on
the boiler suit could have been caused by that knife.
30. One more important aspect which has not been
taken note of by the trial court and the High Court is that as
per the prosecution case, the appellant was the trouble
maker and instigated other crew members not to steer the
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ship manually unless the officers give it in writing about
fulfillment of their demand of payment of long overdue
overtime. This vital piece of evidence regarding the enmity
| ith the | higher o |
|---|
been suppressed: instead, the prosecution tried to show
that there was no enmity towards the appellant.
31. Admittedly, after the alleged incident, the Master of
the ship got the scene of offence cleaned like a vision and
nothing was kept intact in and around the cabin where the
offence was committed. Even the Investigating Officer
failed to inspect the cabin. No site plan was prepared by
the Investigating Officer. Before the arrival of the
Investigating Agency officials, the place of occurrence
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including cabin was completely washed and cleaned in such
a way as if nothing had happened in the cabin and the
place around it.
32. On consideration of all these relevant facts and vital
piece of evidence, it can safely be concluded that the
offence committed by the appellant has not been fully
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established beyond all reasonable doubts. The very fact
that two blood-stained knives were found by the
prosecution proves that the prosecution failed to give
| ion as | to wh |
|---|
deceased by using another knife (Ex.2b). The High Court
has committed grave error in holding that in view of the
findings arrived at by the trial court that offence was
committed by using the knife (Ex.P-3), the presence of
another knife (Ex.2b) with blood-stains will not demolish
the case of the prosecution. In our view, from the
circumstances the conclusion of the guilt of the appellant
herein has not been fully established beyond all shadow of
doubt as the circumstances are not conclusive in nature --
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neither the chain of events is complete nor the
circumstances lead to the conclusion that the offence was
committed by the appellant and none else. Hence, the
impugned judgment of the High Court affirming the
judgment of conviction passed by the trial court cannot be
sustained in law.
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33. For the reasons aforestated, this appeal deserves to
be allowed and the impugned judgment is liable to be set
aside. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the
| High Cou | rt and |
|---|
aside. The appellant is directed to be released forthwith if
not required in any other case.
…………………………….J.
(P. Sathasivam)
…………………………….J.
(M.Y. Eqbal)
New Delhi,
July 1, 2013.
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