Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 390 of 2004
PETITIONER:
Shri Kailash Chand and Another
RESPONDENT:
Sh. Dharam Dass
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/10/2004
BENCH:
Arijit Pasayat & C.K. Thakker
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
O R D E R
The present appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated
November 27, 2001 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh,
Shimla in Civil Revision No. 35 of 1999. By the said order, a single
Judge of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissed the eviction
petition filed by the landlord reversing order of ejectment passed by
the Rent Controller, Shimla and confirmed by the Appellate Authority
(II), Shimla.
The appellant herein is the owner of a building being House
No. 108, Anandele, Shimla (’suit premises’ for short). He let the first
floor of the suit premises to the respondent. The landlord filed an
eviction petition against the tenant in respect of the first floor of the
building in November, 1980. The petition was allowed by the Rent
Controller by an order dated October 31, 1984. The tenant preferred
an appeal and challenged the decree of eviction. On September 17,
1986, however, a compromise was arrived at between the parties. On
the basis of the said compromise, the tenant agreed to vacate the first
floor in favour of the landlord and was inducted as tenant of the
ground floor of the same building.
According to the landlord, at the relevant time he was staying
all alone in Shimla. Subsequently, however, his wife had also shifted
from village Panhoi to Shimla. Moreover, the landlord wanted to get
his child educated at Shimla where best facilities for studies are
available. He, therefore, filed eviction petition against the tenant.
The Rent Controller, Shimla, by an order dated January 20, 1993,
held that the landlord wanted the premises for his bona fide
occupation and accordingly an order of eviction was passed. Being
aggrieved by the said order, the tenant preferred an appeal which was
dismissed by the Appellate Authority (II), Shimla, by an order dated
November 30, 1998. The aggrieved tenant carried the matter to the
High Court by filing Civil Revision 35 of 1999. According to the
landlord, a new ground which was never raised before the courts
below was put forth by the tenant contending that the eviction petition
filed by the landlord was not maintainable in view of third proviso to
sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent
Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’). Section 14
of the Act provides for eviction of tenants in certain cases on certain
grounds. Sub-section (3) deals with cases of requirement of building
premises by the landlord. The relevant part of sub-section (3) reads as
under :
"(3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an
order directing the tenant to put the landlord in
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possession\027
(a) in the case of a residential building, if \026
(i) he requires it for his own occupation :
xxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx
xxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx
Provided further that where the landlord has
obtained possession of any building or rented
land under the provisions of clause (a) or clause
(b) he shall not be entitled to apply again under
the said clause for the possession of any other
building of the same class or rented land :"
It was contended on behalf of the tenant before the High Court
that since the landlord had obtained possession of the first floor
earlier he was not entitled to apply again. The petition, therefore, was
not maintainable and was liable to be dismissed on that ground alone.
The High Court upheld the contention relying on a decision of this
Court in Molar Mal (dead) through LRs. vs. M/s. Kay Iron Works
(Pvt.) Ltd., [2000 (4) SCC 285].
A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Molar Mal had an
occasion to consider a similar provision in Haryana Urban (Control of
Rent and eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Haryana
Act"). Proviso to Section 13(3)(b) of the Haryana Act also creates
an embargo on the landlord from seeking eviction of the tenant if he
had earlier obtained eviction of other tenants under the said provison.
Considering the ambit and scope of the provision, the Bench
observed :
"On behalf of the landlord, it is next contended
that the proviso does not apply to the facts of this case,
since on the date of filing of the present eviction
petition, the landlord had not obtained possession of any
other tenanted premises. Subsequent possession
obtained by it would not be an embargo for the landlord
to claim possession of the present petition-scheduled
premises. Elaborating this argument on behalf of the
landlord, it is contended that if on the date of filing of
the eviction petition, a landlord has not by then obtained
possession of any other premises, then the proviso
would not be a bar for the landlord to file an eviction
petition and obtain possession of another premises, even
though during the pendency of the petition, he obtains
possession of other premises. The landlord wants us to
give a literal meaning to the words "entitled to apply
again" found in the proviso. If we give such a meaning
to the words "entitled to apply again" without taking
into consideration the object and scheme of the Act, the
proviso may give an impression that the embargo
incorporated in that proviso would be applicable only at
the stage of filing of the eviction petition. But such an
interpretation will run counter to the very scheme of the
Act. It goes without saying that the Haryana Urban
(Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 like any other
similar Act in other States in India is an enactment
which controls the fixation of rent and eviction of the
tenants from rented premises to which the Act is
applicable. This Act controls the right of a landlord to
seek eviction of tenanted premises, it restricts the right
of a landlord to seek eviction on those grounds
mentioned in the Act. As a matter of fact, a landlord
can seek eviction only the grounds enumerated under
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the Act and on no other grounds. This is clear from the
language of Section 13(1) of the Act which in specific
terms says that a tenant in possession of a building or
rented land shall not be evicted therefrom except in
accordance with the provisions "of this section".
Section 13 enumerates various grounds on which a
landlord can seek possession. This right is further
restricted if the landlord has obtained possession of
similar premises under the same provisions of law by
the proviso. Now the question is whether the bar under
the proviso is applicable only to the filing of an
application or it is a bar on the right of the landlord. If
the interpretation suggested by the landlord is accepted
then the bar will be on the application by the landlord
and not on his right to evict. This, in our opinion, will
not be the correct interpretation of the proviso. A
careful perusal of the various provisos found in sub-
section (3) of Section 13 of the Act clearly shows that
the legislature intended to further restrict the right of a
landlord to seek eviction under the clauses mentioned in
that sub-section apart from the restrictions imposed in
Section 13 of the Act. For example, if the landlord is
seeking eviction of a tenant on the ground that the same
is required for the use of his son then, in view of the
proviso applicable to that sub-section, he can seek
eviction of the premises only once. Similarly, if the
landlord is seeking eviction for his own occupation
under Section 13(3)(b) of the Act then by virtue of the
proviso applicable to that sub-section, the landlord can
seek such eviction only once in regard to the premises
of the same nature. Therefore, in our opinion, the bar
imposed by the proviso is in fact a bar on the right of the
landlord to seek actual eviction and not confined to the
filing of the application for eviction. On behalf of the
landlord, it is contended that while interpreting a statute
the courts should apply the rule of literal construction
and if it is so interpreted then the wording of the proviso
would show that the restriction imposed by the proviso
is restricted to the stage of filing of the application for
eviction only. We agree with this contention of the
landlord that normally the courts will have to follow the
rule of literal construction which rule enjoins the court
to take the words as used by the legislature and to give it
the meaning which naturally implies. But, there is an
exception to this rule. That exception comes into play
when application of literal construction of the words in
the statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is
shown that the legal context in which the words are used
or by reading the statute as a whole, it requires a
different meaning. In our opinion, if the expression
"entitled to apply again" is given its literal meaning, it
would defeat the very object for which the legislature
has incorporated that proviso in the Act inasmuch as the
object of that proviso can be defeated by a landlord who
has more than one tenanted premises by filing multiple
applications simultaneously for eviction and thereafter
obtain possession of all those premises without the bar
of the proviso being applicable to him. We are of the
opinion that this could not have been the purpose for
which the proviso is included in the Act. If such an
interpretation is given then the various provisos found in
sub-section (3) of Section 13 would become otiose and
the very object of the enactment would be defeated.
Any such interpretation, in our opinion, would lead to
absurdity. Therefore, we have no hesitation in
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interpreting the proviso to mean that the restrict
contemplated under that proviso extends even up to the
stage when the court or the tribunal is considering the
case of the landlord for actual eviction and is not
confined to the stage of filing of eviction petition only."
The attention of the Court was invited to two decisions of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana in (i) Brij Lal Puri v. Muni Lal
[AIR 1979 P&H 132] and (ii) Jagir Singh v. Jagdish Pal Sagar
[1980 (1) RCR 494 (P&H)], wherein the High Court held that the
proviso does not lay down that if the entire building which is needed
by a landlord for his personal use, is occupied by more than one
tenant, he or she cannot take out proceeding against other tenants
after having evicted one. It was further observed; "The object of this
proviso is that a landlord should not be allowed to seek unreasonable
ejectment of tenants from independent buildings if he has already
succeeded in evicting a tenant from the building which is sufficient
for his personal occupation." Observing that the law was not
correctly laid down by the High Court, the two-Judge Bench
proceeded to state;
"Based on the above-cited two judgments of the
High Court it is contended that the landlord in the
instant case is seeking eviction of a part of the premises
owned by it which is leased to the present appellant.
Eviction of the three other tenants referred to
hereinabove was from the premises which are parts of
the same premises, therefore, in view of the above
judgment the bar under the proviso is not applicable.
We find it difficult to accept this argument of the
landlord also. From the language of the proviso we do
not find any support for this argument of the appellant
or to the conclusions arrived at by the High Court in the
above-referred judgments. The proviso does not make
any such distinction between a landlord seeking
possession of the premises held by more than one tenant
occupying the same building or the tenants occupying
different independent buildings under the same landlord.
As we have observed, the object of the proviso like any
other provisions of the Act, is to further restrict the right
of the landlord to seek eviction; if that be so, we do not
find any justification in reading into the proviso
something as conferring a larger right on the landlord to
evict more than one tenant if those tenants are
occupying different parts of the same premises.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that the view expressed
by the High Court in the above-referred case does not
lay down the correct law. Consequently, the argument
of the landlord based on the said judgment is also
rejected."
Before us, the learned counsel for the respondent-tenant
contended that the point is finally concluded by this Court in Molar
Mal. Since the appellant-landlord has already obtained possession in
previous proceeding from the respondent-tenant, bar of third proviso
to sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act got attracted and he was
not entitled to apply again under sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the
Act for possession of the ground floor occupied by the tenant. The
High Court was, therefore, right and wholly justified in dismissing
the petition.
Learned counsel for the landlord, on the other hand,
strenuously argued that the landlord has not got possession as
contended by the tenant. Pursuant to the compromise arrived at
between the parties, the landlord obtained possession of first floor,
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but in lieu thereof, he allowed the tenant occupy the ground floor.
Thus, it was not a case of obtaining of possession. It was submitted
that third proviso to Section 14(3) of the Act would not apply to such
compromise and exchange of premises so as to deprive the right of
the landlord to get eviction of tenant on the ground of bona fide
requirement. It was also urged that what is contemplated by the third
proviso to Section 14(3) of the Act is that a landlord on the "self-
same grounds" is not entitled to apply again for possession of any
other building, if he has obtained possession from the tenant. But if
the circumstances have changed or his need is increased, the bar has
no application and the petition for eviction of tenant will be
maintainable and the case has to be decided on its own merits. It was
also contended that if the interpretation sought to be suggested by the
tenant is accepted irrespective of need and requirement by the
landlord that the petition would not be held maintainable, the
provision should be held arbitrary, unreasonable and ultra vires.
In support of the above contentions, the learned counsel drew
our attention to the following decisions : Food Corporation of India
v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Others, [1994 (3) SCC 324],
K.S. Sundararaju Chettiar v. M.R. Ramachandra Naidu, [1994 (5)
SCC 14], State of Punjab & Another v. Khan Chand, [1974 (2) SCR
768], Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. & Another, [2002
(4) SCC 105], Rakesh Wadhawan & Others v. Jagdamba industrial
Corporation & Others, [2002 (5) SCC 440]; Suraj Mal v.
Radheyshyam [1988 (3) SCC 18].
Having considered the rival contentions of the parties, in our
opinion, prima facie the submission of the landlord deserves serious
consideration. In our opinion, it may be possible for the landlord to
argue that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it may not be
said that the landlord has obtained possession of a building or
premises falling within the mischief of third proviso to Section 14(3)
of the Act. Again, the third proviso to Section 14(3) of the Act may
apply to the facts which were before the court when the
suit/application was decided by the court/authority and the landlord
has obtained possession of a building or a part thereof. But if the
circumstances have changed and the necessity increases, it may be
possible for the landlord to apply under sub-section (3) of Section 14
of the Act on the ground of bona fide requirement. To such a
situation, third proviso to Section 14(3) of the Act may not prohibit
him from approaching a competent court/authority. It appears to us,
as observed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in two cases
referred to above, that the object of the proviso is to restrict the
landlord from seeking unreasonable ejectment of tenants. If he was
successful in evicting a tenant from a building and his personal
requirement is fulfilled or satisfied, he cannot invoke Section 14(3) of
the Act again. But if the requirement still continues or the
circumstances are different, the third proviso to Section 14(3) of the
Act has no application. The submission of the learned counsel that if
the third proviso to Section 14(3) of the Act is not interpreted
reasonably as submitted by him, it may have to be tested on the touch
stone of Article 14 cannot be said to be totally ill-founded.
In view of the aforesaid, in our view a fresh look is necessary
on the provision, so that the grey areas noticed by us earlier may be
creased out. It is, therefore, appropriate that the matter be placed for
consideration of the question by a Bench of three Judges.
Accordingly, we direct the Registry to place the papers before
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for taking an appropriate action.
Ordered accordingly.