Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
BRIJ MOHAN PARIHAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
M.P. STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT25/11/1986
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
DUTT, M.M. (J)
CITATION:
1987 AIR 29 1987 SCR (1) 369
1987 SCC (1) 13 JT 1986 935
1986 SCALE (2)894
ACT:
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939: ss. 68-C, 68-D, 68-F, 68-FF,
42 and 59: State Road Transport Corporation--Permit issued
to--Private operator whether entitled to ply his motor
vehicle as nominee of Corporation.
Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950:
s.19(2)(h)--State Road Transport Corporation not authorised
to allow private operator to run his vehicle on a permit
issued to the Corporation.
HEADNOTE:
Section 68-FF of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 prohibits
grant of permit in respect of notified area or notified
route by State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport
Authority except in accordance with the scheme published
under subs. (3) of s. 68-D but provides for grant of tempo-
rary permits in cases where no application for a permit has
been made by the State Transport Undertaking in respect of
such notified area or route. Section 59 bars transfer of
permits from one person to another except with the permis-
sion of the concerned Transport Authority. Section 42 pro-
hibits the owners of transport vehicles from plying them in
public places except in accordance with the conditions of
the permit.
Under an agreement entered into with the respondent
Corporation the petitioner was permitted to PlY his bus on a
specified route as a nominee of the former for a period of
five years ending on December 23, 1982. Thereafter the
respondent was issued temporary permits and the petitioner
was permitted by it to ply his motor vehicle on monthly
basis. The route in question had by that been brought within
a scheme published under s. 68-C of the Act.
The respondent through an advertisement dated August 12,
1984 invited tenders from private operators for the grant of
privilege of running buses as stage carriages as its nomi-
nees. Aggrieved by the said advertisement the petitioner
filed a writ petition in the High Court assailing the deci-
sion to invite tenders as arbitrary and illegal, and for a
writ in the nature of mandamns directing the respondent
Corporation to allow him to ply his motor vehicle as its
nominee for a further period of five years. Under an interim
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order of the Court he continued to ply his bus as a stage
carriage till May 31, 1985. Subsequently, the High Court
dismissed the petition since the scheme
370
published under s. 68-C of the Act had been approved and
brought into effect from June 1, 1985.
Dismissing the petition for special leave, the Court,
HELD: 1.1 It is not permissible under the Motor Vehicles
Act for a State Transport Undertaking to obtain a permit
under Chapter IV-A and to allow a private operator as its
nominee to operate under that permit his motor vehicle as a
stage carriage on the notified route. It cannot by granting
such permission collect any money either as nomination fees
or as royalty or supervision charges. Section 42 and 59 of
the Act which equally apply to permits issued under Chapter
IV-A, debar all holders of permits, including the State
Transport Undertakings from indulging in such unauthorised
trafficking in permits. [373E, 374A, D]
1.2 The petitioner was not, therefore, entitled to the
issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus to the respondent
Corporation to allow him to operate his’ motor vehicle as a
stage carriage under the permit obtained by the latter, as
its nominee. The agreement entered into by the petitioner
with the respondent was clearly contrary to the Act and
could not be enforced. The advertisement issued by the
respondent was equally ineffective. [374E]
2. If the respondent Corporation cannot run its vehicle
under a permit issued to it, it must surrender it so that
the Regional Transport Authority may grant the permit to
some other deserving applicant or it must transfer it to
somebody else with the permission of the Regional Transport
Authority granted under s.59 of the Act. It cannot allow the
permit to be used by others either for consideration or
without consideration. If it does so it would be exercising
the power of the Regional Transport Authority. The Corpora-
tioncannot thus indirectly clutch at the jurisdiction of the
Regional Transport Authority. [374F]
3.1 Even though the Corporation was established by the
State Government under the Road Transport Corporations Act,
1950 and the State Government had by an executive order
approved the action of the Corporation to allow private
operators to operate their vehicles under the permits issued
to the Corporation, the Corporation could not in law allow
its nominees to exploit the permits in such manner. [374B]
3.2 Section 19(2)(h) of the Road Transport Corporation
Act only authorises the Corporation to purchase or otherwise
secure by agreement vehicles owned or possessed by the owner
of any other undertaking for use thereof for the purpose of
its undertaking. It does not authorise the
371
Corporation to permit another person to run his vehicle on
his own under a permit issued to the Corporation by paying
some amount to the Corporation. [375B]
3.3 It would have been different if there had been a law
corresponding to the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Special
Provisions Act (27 of 1976) under which the competent au-
thority can authorise such operation subject to the condi-
tions specified therein. [374C]
Adarsh Travels Bus Service & Ant., v. State of U.P. &
Ors., [1985] 4 S.C.C. 557; Sumer Chand Sharma & Anr. v.
State of U.P. & Anr. [1986] 3 S.C.C. 263, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 3486 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 6.1.1986 of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 2577 of 1984.
K.K. Venugopal, G.L. Sanghi, M.N. Krishnamani and Diwan
Balak Ram for the Petitioner.
Rameshwar Nath for the Respondents.
The order of the Court was delivered by
VENKATARAMIAH, J. The petitioner in the above petition
filed under Article 136 of the Constitution has prayed for
special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Petition No. 2577
of 1984 dated 6.1.1986. In the petition filed under Article
226 of the Constitution before the High Court the petitioner
had questioned the validity of an advertisement issued by
the Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as ’the Corporation’) inviting tenders from
owners of motor vehicles for plying their vehicles on the
routes mentioned therein as nominees of the Corporation
under the permits issued in favour of the Corporation under
the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter
referred to as ’the Act’). It is alleged that the petitioner
who was an unemployed graduate entered into an agreement
with the Corporation to ply his bus as a nominee on the
route Gwalior to Chinor via Dabra for a period of five years
ending on December 23, 1982. The route in question came
within scheme No. 38 published under section 68-C of the
Act. The permit of the Corporation was to expire on
23.12.1982..Therefore the Corporation applied for renewal of
its permit but since it took time for finalisation, tempo-
rary permits were issued from time to time. The petitioner
was permitted to ply his
372
bus on the monthly basis during that period. Under the
agreement the petitioner was liable to pay periodically
certain amount to the Corporation as nomination fees or
supervision charges and additional taxes. But on 12.8.1984,
as stated earlier, tenders were invited by the Corporation
from private operators for the grant of the privilege of
running buses as stage carriages as the nominees of the
Corporation. Aggrieved by the said advertisement the peti-
tioner filed the writ petition, referred to above, in the
High Court. The petitioner contended that even though he had
been regularly paying the nomination fees and taxes, yet the
Corporation in order to earn more money by way of nomination
fees had invited tenders from others with a stipulation that
tenders of those giving the highest offers by way of nomina-
tion fees would be accepted and they would be appointed
nominees of the Corporation to ply the stage carriages. The
petitioner further contended that the decision to invite
tenders was arbitrary and illegal. In the Writ Petition he
obtained an interim order dated 11.9.1984 under which he was
allowed to operate his motor vehicle as a stage carriage on
the same terms and conditions as the nominee of the CorpOra-
tion. The petitioner continued to ply his motor vehicle on
the route in question on the basis of the temporary permits
issued in the name of the Corporation till 31.5.1985. Since
no temporary permit was obtained by the Corporation thereaf-
ter the petitioner could not ply his motor vehicle in ques-
tion. In the meanwhile under the orders passed by this Court
in Special Leave Petition Nos. 941, 4667 to 4669, and 7115-
7117 of 1985 dated July 22, 1985 filed by some others, the
petitioners therein who were similarly situated were allowed
to ply their motor vehicles on some other routes as the
nominees of the Corporation for a period of five years. The
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above order, it is alleged, was passed on a concession made
bY the Corporation. The said order is not supported by
reasons. The petitioner relying upon the above order con-
tended before the High Court in the writ petition filed by
him that he should also be permitted to ply his motor vehi-
cle as a nominee of the Corporation for a further period of
five years. The High Court declined to grant the request of
the petitioner since by then the scheme No. 38 had been
approved and had come into effect from June 1, 1985 and
dismissed the writ petition on January 6, 1986. Aggrieved by
the order of the High Court the petitioner has filed this
petition.
It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that since
the petitioner had been permitted to operate his motor
vehicle as a stage carriage service as a nominee of the
Corporation under a programme called ’Half a Million Job
Programme’ initiated by the Government of India which was
being implemented by the State of Madhya Pradesh he could
not be denied the privilege of continuing to operate his
motor vehicle on the notified route in question. Reliance is
also placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the
order passed by this Court on July 22, 1985 in some of the
special leave petitions referred to above permitting the
petitioners therein to operate their motor
373
vehicles as the nominees of the Corporation for a further
period of five years. After the disposal of the special
leave petitions referred to above on July 22, 1985 by this
Court, on October 17, 1985 a Constitution Bench of this
Court delivered its judgment in Adarsh Travels Bus Service &
Anr., v. State of U. P. & Others. [1985] 4 S.C.C. 557. In
that case the Constitution Bench held that reading sections
68˜C, 68-D(3) and 68-FF of the Act together it was clear
that once a scheme was published under section 68-D of the
Act in relation to any area or route or portion thereof,
whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of other per-
sons or otherwise, no person other than the State Transport
Undertaking could operate a stage carriage on the notified
route or in the notified area except as provided in the
scheme itself.
Admittedly, the approved scheme published under section
68-D of the Act has come into operation in respect of the
route in question excluding the operation of stage carriages
by all others. Section 68-FF of the Act states that where an
approved scheme has been published under sub-section (3) of
section 68-D of the Act in respect of any notified area or
notified route the State Transport or the Regional Transport
Authority, as the case may be, shall not grant any permit
except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme. It
further provides that where no application for a permit has
been made by the State Transport Undertaking in respect of
any notified area or notified route in pursuance of an
approved scheme, the State Transport Authority or the Re-
gional Transport Authority, as the case may be, may grant
temporary permits to any person in respect of such notified
area or notified route subject to the condition that such
permit shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit
to the State Transport Undertaking in respect of that area
or route. It is not, however, permissible under the Act for
the Corporation to obtain a permit under Chapter IV-A of the
Act and to allow a private operator as its nominee to oper-
ate under that permit his motor vehicle as a stage carriage
on the notified route. It cannot by granting such permission
collect any money either as nomination fees or as royalty
’or supervision charges. Section 59 of the Act which lays
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down the general conditions attached to all permits provides
that save as provided in section 61 of the Act, a permit
shall not be transferable from one person to another except
with the permission of the Transport Authority which granted
the permit and shall not without such permission operate to
confer on any person to whom a vehicle covered by the permit
is transferred any right to use that vehicle in the manner
authorised by the permit. Section 61 of the Act only deals
with the question of transfer of the permit on the death of
the holder of the permit in favour of his successor. Section
42 of the Act provides that no owner of a transport vehicle
shall use or permit the use of the vehicle in any public
place whether or not such vehicle is actually carrying any
passenger or goods save in accordance with the conditions of
a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State
TranSport Authority or the Commission
374
authorising the use of the vehicle in that place in the
manner in which the vehicle is being used. Section 42 and
section 59 of the Act which are in Chapter IV of the Act
apply to permits issued under Chapter IV-A of the Act also
since in Chapter IV-A of the Act we do not find any provi-
sion which is inconsistent with these two sections. Section
68-B of the Act only provides that Chapter IV-A of the Act
and the rules and orders made thereunder shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in
Chapter IV of the Act or any Other law for the time being in
force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any
such law. Even though the Corporation is established by the
State Government under the Road Transport Corporations Act,
1950 and the State Government has by an executive order
approved the action of the Corporation to allow private
operators to operate their vehicles under the permits issued
to the Corporation as the nominees of the Corporation, the
Corporation cannot in law allow its nominees to exploit the
permits by running their motor vehicles against payment of
some amount to the Corporation since there is no statutory
provision authorising the grant of such permission. It would
have been different if there had been a law corresponding to
the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Special Provisions Act (27
of 1976) under which the competent authority can authorise
such operation subject to the conditions specified therein
(See Sumer Chand Sharma and Another v. State of U.P. and
Another, [1986] 3 S.C.C. 263). The provisions of the Act and
in particular sections 42 and 59 clearly debar all holders
of permits including the Corporation from indulging in’ such
unauthorised trafficking in permits. The agreement entered
into by the petitioner with the Corporation is clearly
contrary to the Act and cannot, therefore, be enforced. In
the circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to the
issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Corporation
to allow him to operate his motor vehicle as a stage car-
riage under the permit obtained by the Corporation as its
nominee. It follows that the advertisement issued by the
Corporation is equally ineffective. The position would not
be different even where the permit is issued in favour of
the Corporation under Chapter IV of the Act. If the Corpora-
tion cannot run its vehicle under a permit issued to it, it
must surrender it so that the Regional Transport Authority
may grant the permit to some other deserving applicant or it
must transfer it to some body else with the permission of
the Regional Transport Authority granted under section 59 of
the Act. It cannot however allow the permit to be used by
somebody else to run his vehicle either for consideration or
without consideration. If it does so it would be exercising
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the power of the Regional Transport Authority. The Corpora-
tion cannot thus indirectly clutch at the jurisdiction of
the Regional Transport Authority. It is hoped that the
Corporation will desist from entering into such agreements
with third parties, which are wholly illegal and from con-
tinuing to allow them to run their vehicles as its nominees.
The concerned Regional Transport Authority should immediate-
ly take action to stop such illegal operation of transport
375
vehicles on all routes, both notified and non-notified
routes.
It is seen that in one of the documents filed before the
High Court it was asserted that the Corporation could allow
private operators to operate their vehicles in the name of
the Corporation under section 19(2)(h) of the Road Transport
Corporation Act, 1950. That provision only authorises the
Corporation to purchase or otherwise secure by agreement
vehicles owned or possessed by the owner of any other under-
taking for use thereof by the Corporation for the purposes
of its undertaking. It does not however authorise the Corpo-
ration to permit another person to run his vehicle on his
own under a permit issued to the Corporation by paying some
amount to the Corporation. Hence no reliance can be placed
on the above provision.
It was lastly contended on behalf of the petitioner that
since the Corporation was not in a position to operate its
motor vehicles on the notified routes in accordance with the
approved scheme, the scheme itself is liable to be quashed.
Since the said prayer is not made in the writ petition, we
cannot consider the said question It is open to the peti-
tioner if he is so advised to approach the High Court for
appropriate relief in this regard. We may, however, record
here that in the counter-affidavit filed before this Court
it is stated that the Corporation is already operating its
own motor vehicles on the route in question. The Special
Leave Petition is, however, dismissed.
P.S.S. Petition
dismissed.
376