Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 439
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1759 OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.6053 of 2021)
…
G.C. MANJUNATH & OTHERS APPELLANTS
VERSUS
SEETARAM ...RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court of
Karnataka dated 17.03.2021 in Criminal Petition No.4512 of
2020 in refusing to quash the order dated 11.06.2020 passed by
the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City
affirming the summoning order dated 07.05.2016 passed by the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU SACHDEVA
Date: 2025.04.03
16:26:31 IST
Reason:
learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru
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against the accused persons under Sections 326, 358, 500, 501,
502, 506 (b) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(for short “IPC”), the appellants/accused Nos.2, 3, and 5 have
preferred this appeal.
3. Briefly stated facts of the case are that the
complainant/respondent herein has been prosecuting certain
police officers for their illegal activities. Due to this, the
complainant alleged that some police officers had engaged
accused Nos.1 to 5, who were also police officers, to take revenge
against him. Accused Nos.1 to 5 were serving at the
Mahalakshmi Layout Police Station, and accused No.6 is the
daughter of the proprietor of Bruna Weekly Magazine.
4. The complainant stated that in order to seek revenge,
accused Nos.1 to 5 lodged false complaints against the
complainant and registered fabricated cases. They also
threatened him with dire consequences. On 10.04.1999, at about
10:30 p.m., accused Nos.2, 3, and 5 trespassed into his house,
dragged him out, and forcibly took him to the Mahalakshmi
Layout Police Station. There, the accused Nos.1 to 5 allegedly
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assaulted him after stripping him of his clothes and continued to
torture him throughout the night.
5. On 11.04.1999, accused Nos.2, 3, and 5 allegedly procured
a slate, forced the complainant to hold it with his name written
on it, and accused No. 6 took his photograph at that time.
Subsequently, the complainant was produced before the
Magistrate after registering false cases in Crime Nos.137 and 138
of 1999. The complainant showed his injuries to the learned
Magistrate, who referred him to a hospital. He was later released
and eventually acquitted in the above cases.
6. It was further averred that on 27.10.1999, at about 9:45
p.m., accused Nos.3 to 5 stopped the complainant while he was
riding his scooter. They slapped him, engaged an autorickshaw,
and took him to the Mahalakshmi Layout Police Station. Accused
No.1 was present at the station and abused the complainant in
filthy language, demanding that he should withdraw the case
filed by him. It was further alleged that accused No.1 then
instructed accused No.3 to take possession of the complainant’s
belongings. Accused No.3 removed his gold chain, wristwatch,
purse, spectacles, and Rs.26,000/- in cash, wrapped them in a
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handkerchief, and handed over the same to accused No.1.
Thereafter, they stripped the complainant of his clothes and
assaulted him throughout the night using a lathi and an iron rod
causing dislodgement of his tooth leading to profuse bleeding.
7. The complainant further stated that the accused persons
continued to torture the complainant and later produced him
before the Magistrate, registering a false case under Crime
No.448 of 1999 for the offences under Section 392 of the IPC. The
complainant reported the ill-treatment to the learned Magistrate,
who directed the jail authorities to provide him with medical
treatment. He was released from custody and sought treatment
at Victoria Hospital on 04.11.1999.
8. Subsequently, accused No.6, with the intent to defame and
ruin the complainant’s life, published the illegally taken
photographs along with defamatory slogans in the Bruna Weekly
Magazine on 25.01.2001, 10.09.2001, and 15.09.2001. Accused
No.6 also filed a case against the complainant in Crime No.146
of 2005. The complainant alleged that accused Nos.1 to 6 have
continuously threatened him, causing him mental agony, and
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have even threatened to kill him if he does not withdraw the
complaints filed against them.
9. Therefore, the complainant approached the Court of learned
VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru by filing
a private complaint P.C.R. No.6754 of 2007 dated 21.04.2007
and prayed for taking cognisance of the offences punishable
under Sections 196, 199, 200, 201, 211, 326, 327, 345, 338,
357, 368, 395, 397, 500, 501, 502, 506(b) read with Section 120B
of the IPC against accused Nos. 1 to 6.
10. The learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate by
order dated 26.12.2009, recorded the sworn statement of the
complainant, took cognisance of the complaint dated 21.04.2007
and issued summons to accused No.1 to 6 in C.C No. 368 of
2010. Being aggrieved, accused No.6 approached the High Court
by way of filing Criminal Petition No.4364 of 2010 challenging the
order dated 26.12.2009. By order dated 30.03.2012, the High
Court set aside the order dated 26.12.2009 insofar as accused
No.6 is concerned and remanded the matter to the learned
Magistrate for a fresh consideration.
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11. Thereafter, by order dated 07.05.2016, the learned VII
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, held that there was
prima facie material to register the case against accused Nos.1 to
5 for the offences under Sections 326, 358, 500, 501, 502, 506
(b) read with Section 34 of the IPC and accordingly ordered to
register a criminal case against accused Nos.1 to 5 as well as
issued summons against accused Nos.1 to 5. However, in the
said order, the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, found that the materials on record are insufficient to
take cognisance of the offence punishable under Sections 196,
199, 200, 201, 211, 34, 338, 357, 367, 368, 395 and 397 of the
IPC. Insofar as the aspect of delay in filling the private complaint
is concerned, the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate observed that sufficient material was produced to
prove that the complainant was pursuing this case by way of
writing letters/complaints to the Higher Officials. Further, the
charges against accused No.6 were dropped.
12. Being aggrieved by the order dated 07.05.2016 passed by
the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, accused
Nos.1 to 3 and 5 approached the Court of LXI City Civil and
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Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City by way of filing Criminal
Revision Petition No.720 of 2017. By order dated 11.06.2020,
the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City
dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition No.720 of 2017 filed by
the accused Nos.1 to 3 and 5.
13. Being aggrieved, the accused Nos.1 to 3 and 5 approached
the High Court by way of filing Criminal Petition No.4512 of 2020
praying to set aside the order dated 07.05.2016 passed by the
learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru
in taking cognisance of offences punishable under Sections 326,
358, 500, 501, 502 and 506(b) read with Section 34 of the IPC
against them and in registering the case in C.C. No.368 of 2010
and issuing summons against them as well as the order dated
11.06.2020 passed by the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions
Judge, Bengaluru City predominantly on the ground that a prior
order of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”) and Section 170 of the
Karnataka Police Act, 1963 (for short “Police Act”) was not
obtained from the Government before prosecuting the accused
persons.
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14. During the pendency of the Criminal Petition No.4512 of
2020 before the High Court, accused No.1 passed away. By
impugned order dated 17.03.2021, the High Court dismissed the
Criminal Petition No.4512 of 2020 filed by accused No.2, 3 and
5. The High Court observed that sufficient material was placed
on record against the accused persons for facing criminal trial.
As regards the plea of limitation under Section 197 of the CrPC
read with Section 170 of the Police Act, the High Court further
observed that the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bengaluru and the learned LXI City Civil and
Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City have not gone into the aspect of
obtaining a prior order of sanction. However, the High Court held
that it was evident that the complainant made sufficient efforts
to get the order of sanction. Further, the High Court noted that
the accused persons exceeded their limits and assaulted the
complainant resulting in grave injuries. Ergo, the High Court
held that the same cannot be termed as an act done in the
discharge of the official duty and protection cannot be given
under Section 197 of the CrPC. In other words, the High Court
held that an order of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC and
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Section 170 of the Police Act was not necessary in the instant
case. The High Court noted that the judgment of this Court in
D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695 (“D.
Devaraja”) relied upon by the accused persons cannot come to
their rescue. The High Court observed that the Supreme Court
in the said judgment has categorically held that the protection
given under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police
Act has its own limitation and that the said protection would be
available only for the acts done by the public servant in discharge
of his official duty or if it is reasonably connected with the
discharge of his official duties and not in instances such as the
present case. Being aggrieved, accused Nos.2, 3, and 5 have
preferred the present appeal before this Court.
15. During the pendency of the present proceedings, the
learned senior counsel appearing for the accused persons
submitted that accused Nos.1, 3, and 4 have passed away,
resulting in abatement of the criminal proceedings against them.
Consequently, the present appeal survives only insofar as
accused Nos.2 and 5 are concerned. It was further submitted
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that accused Nos.2 and 5 have attained superannuation from
their posts in the years 2015 and 2020, respectively.
16. We have heard the learned senior counsel for the
appellants/accused No.2 and 5 and the learned counsel for the
respondent/complainant. We have perused the material on
record.
17. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants/
accused persons submitted that there has been an inordinate
and unexplained delay in filing the present complaint. In this
regard, it was contended that the complaint was lodged only on
21.04.2007, pertaining to an alleged incident that is stated to
have occurred during the period 1999-2000, while the accused
were in active police service. Learned senior counsel further
argued that several criminal cases had been registered against
the complainant, in which he was ultimately acquitted in the year
2006. It was pointed out that immediately following his acquittal,
the present complaint came to be filed in 2007. In this backdrop,
it was submitted that the present complaint is nothing but a
retaliatory measure, filed vindictively against the accused
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persons solely for having discharged their official duties as police
officials.
18. Learned senior counsel further contended that, admittedly,
the complaint was filed without obtaining the requisite prior
sanction as mandated under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section
170 of the Police Act. It was submitted that the High Court
erroneously observed that the acts alleged against the accused
persons bore no connection with their official duties. Accordingly,
it was argued that the High Court committed an error in
concluding that prior sanction was not necessary before
initiating criminal proceedings against the accused persons.
19. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the
expression “under colour or in excess of any such duty” employed
in Section 170 of the Police Act is of particular significance. It
was contended that the offences alleged against the accused
persons would squarely fall within the ambit of the phrase “under
colour or in excess of any such duty.” Therefore, it was urged that
obtaining prior sanction from the competent Government
authority is an indispensable prerequisite before entertaining
prosecution against the accused persons. In support of this
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contention, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in
Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur vs. State of Mysore, AIR
1963 SC 849 (“Virupaxappa”). In the said case, while
interpreting Section 161(1) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, this
Court held that the phrase “under colour of duty” encompasses
acts done by police officers ostensibly in the discharge of their
official functions, even if they exceeded the authority vested in
them under the Act.
20. Learned senior counsel further contended that the High
Court misinterpreted the ratio laid down by this Court in D.
Devaraja . In this regard, it was submitted that in the said
judgment, this Court unequivocally held that even if a police
officer acts in excess of the scope of his official duties, so long as
there exists a reasonable nexus between the act complained of
and the discharge of his official functions, the mere fact of
exceeding authority would not, by itself, disentitle the officer from
the statutory safeguard of obtaining prior government sanction
before initiation of criminal proceedings. In view of the foregoing
submissions, the learned senior counsel submitted that the
impugned order passed by the High Court is liable to be set aside.
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21. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/complainant vehemently contended that, at the time
of the complainant’s arrest in connection with certain criminal
cases, he was subjected to physical assault at the hands of the
accused persons. It was further submitted that this fact was duly
brought to the attention of the learned Magistrate, who, on each
occasion, issued directions to both the Jailor and the
Investigating Officer to ensure that the complainant was provided
with necessary medical treatment for the injuries allegedly
sustained during the said assault.
22. Learned counsel further submitted that he has placed
relevant documents on record before this Court, including the
wound certificate, which clearly reflects that the complainant
sustained grievous injuries, including broken teeth. Additionally,
it was pointed out that the X-ray report corroborates the medical
findings, indicating the presence of a healing socket and
confirming that Injury No. 2 is grievous in nature. In light of these
materials, learned counsel for the complainant argued that a
prima facie case was clearly made out against the accused
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persons. Consequently, learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bengaluru took cognisance of the offences against
them by order dated 07.05.2016, which was subsequently
affirmed by the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru City, by order dated 11.06.2020, and further upheld
by the High Court in the impugned order.
23. It was further submitted that, in the present case, learned
VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate duly considered the
materials placed on record, which demonstrate that the
complainant had made consistent efforts from the year 2002 to
2006 to obtain sanction for prosecution. The learned Magistrate
has also noted that the complainant had addressed multiple
representations to the head of the department seeking the
requisite sanction; however, no conclusive or effective response
was forthcoming from the authorities. Learned counsel for the
complainant further pointed out that the High Court, in the
impugned order, similarly recorded that all necessary steps were
taken by the complainant to secure the sanction, but despite his
earnest efforts, the competent authority failed to grant the same.
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24. Learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the
accused persons “under the colour of official duty” removed his
clothes and had abused and assaulted him. These acts neither
have any bearing on official duties nor are they connected
remotely to official duties. Instead, it was submitted that the
accused persons exceeded the limits allowed by the law. The act
of raid and seizure is part of official duties but the further acts of
the accused persons cannot fall within the scope of official duty.
It was argued that even the High Court noted that the brutal
conduct of the accused persons, which included not only
breaking the complainant’s teeth but also causing grievous
injuries, clearly demonstrates that they far exceeded the bounds
of their official duties. Accordingly, learned counsel for the
complainant submitted that the High Court was justified in
holding that criminal proceedings could have been initiated
without prior sanction.
25. It was argued that this Court in Bakhshish Singh Brar vs.
Gurmej Kaur, (1987) 4 SCC 663 (“Bakhshish Singh”) dealt
with the issue of sanction under Sections 197 and 196 of the
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CrPC. It was submitted that the said case involved a police officer
accused of causing grievous injuries and death during the course
of a raid and search. It was submitted that in the said judgment,
this Court noted that, in order to determine whether the officer,
while ostensibly acting in the discharge of his official duties, had
exceeded the limits of his official capacity, the court must first
take cognisance of the offence. Accordingly, this Court observed
that, in such circumstances, the trial need not be stayed merely
due to the absence of sanction for prosecution at the initial stage.
Hence, learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the
High Court was justified in holding that a prior sanction was not
necessary in this case thereby dismissing the criminal petition
filed by the accused persons.
26. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the rival parties and
after a thorough examination of the material available on record,
the core issue that emerges for determination is, whether, the
learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was legally
justified in taking cognisance of the offences alleged against the
accused persons in P.C.R. No.6754/2007, in the absence of the
prior sanction contemplated under Section 197 of the CrPC read
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with Section 170 of the Police Act. The real question, therefore,
is whether the acts complained of are reasonably connected to,
or performed, in the purported discharge of the official duties of
the accused persons, so as to attract the statutory protection
afforded by the said provisions.
27. Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act reads as follows:
“170. Suits or prosecutions in respect of acts done
under colour of duty as aforesaid not to be
entertained without sanction of Government. —(1) In
any case of alleged offence by the Commissioner, a
Magistrate, Police Officer or Reserve Police Officer or
other person, or of a wrong alleged to have been done by
such Commissioner, Magistrate, Police Officer or Reserve
Police Officer or other person, by any act done under
colour or in excess of any such duty or authority as
aforesaid, or wherein it shall appear to the court that the
offence or wrong if committed or done was of the
character aforesaid, the prosecution or suit shall not be
entertained except with the previous sanction of the
Government.
(2) In the case of an intended suit on account of such a
wrong as aforesaid, the person intending to sue shall be
bound to give to the alleged wrongdoer one month's
notice at least of the intended suit with sufficient
description of the wrong complained of, failing which
such suit shall be dismissed.
(3) The plaint shall set forth that a notice as aforesaid
has been served on the defendant and the date of such
service, and shall state whether any, and if so, what
tender of amends has been made by the defendant. A
copy of the said notice shall be annexed to the plaint
endorsed or accompanied with a declaration by the
plaintiff of the time and manner of service thereof.”
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28. Section 197 of the CrPC is set out hereinbelow for
convenience:
“ 197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.— (1)
When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate
or a public servant not removable from his office save by
or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any
offence alleged to have been committed by him while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty, no court shall take cognisance of such offence
except with the previous sanction—
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
case may be, was at the time of commission of the
alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs
of the Union, of the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
case may be, was at the time of commission of the
alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs
of a State, of the State Government:”
29. A plain reading of Section 170 of the Police Act reveals that
the legislature, in its wisdom, has sought to afford a statutory
safeguard to certain public functionaries, including
Commissioners, Magistrates, Police Officers, and Reserve Police
Officers. The provision is categorical in its stipulation that where
any offence is alleged to have been committed, or any wrong
alleged to have been occasioned, by such officials in the
discharge of their duties or in the exercise of their lawful
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authority, no court shall entertain any prosecution or suit
against them without the prior sanction of the Government.
Importantly, the protective umbrella of Section 170 is not
confined solely to acts strictly within the bounds of authority but
extends to acts done ostensibly in excess of such authority, so
long as there exists a reasonable nexus between the act
complained of and the discharge of official functions.
30. A careful reading of Section 197 of the CrPC unequivocally
delineates a statutory bar on the Court’s jurisdiction to take
cognisance of offences alleged against public servants, save
without the prior sanction of the appropriate government. The
essential precondition for the applicability of this provision is
that the alleged offence must have been committed by the public
servant while acting in the discharge of, or purported discharge
of, their official duties. The protective mantle of Section 197 of
the CrPC, however, is not absolute; it does not extend to acts that
are manifestly beyond the scope of official duty or wholly
unconnected thereto. Acts bereft of any reasonable nexus to
official functions fall outside the ambit of this safeguard and do
not attract the bar imposed under Section 197 of the CrPC.
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31. Both the aforesaid provisions serve a similar protective
function. While Section 170 of the Police Act mandates prior
sanction for prosecuting a public official for "acts done under
colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority," Section 197 of
the CrPC requires prior sanction where a public official is
accused of having committed “any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty.” The underlying rationale of both
these statutory provisions is to safeguard public functionaries
from frivolous or vexatious prosecution for actions undertaken in
good faith in the discharge of, or purported discharge of, their
official duties, thereby ensuring that the fear of litigation does
not impede the efficient functioning of public administration.
32. This Court in B. Saha vs. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177
(“B. Saha”) observed that the words “any offence alleged to have
been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty” employed in Section 197 of the
CrPC, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation.
This Court observed that if these words are construed too
narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, “it is
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no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can
be”. In the wider sense, these words will take under their
umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the
course of the same transaction in which the official duty is
performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the
import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on
the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public
servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, that
is entitled to the protection of Section 197 of the CrPC, an act
constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with
his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the
said provision. As pointed out by Ramaswami, J. in Baijnath
vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (AIR 1966 SC 220), “it is the
quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope
and range of his official duties, the protection contemplated under
Section 197 CrPC will be attracted”.
33. This Court in Amod Kumar Kanth vs. Association of
Victim of Uphaar Tragedy, (2023) 16 SCC 239 held that the
State performs its obligations through its officers/public
servants and every function performed by a public servant is
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ultimately aimed at achieving public welfare. Often, their roles
involve a degree of discretion. But the exercise of such discretion
cannot be separated from the circumstances and timing in which
it is exercised or, in cases of omission, when the omission occurs.
In such circumstances, the courts must address, whether the
officer was acting in the discharge of official duties. It was
observed that even when an officer acts under the purported
exercise of official powers, they are entitled to protection under
Section 197 of the CrPC. This protection exists for a valid reason
so that the public servants can perform their duties fearlessly,
without constant apprehension of legal action, as long as they
act in good faith. While Section 197 of the CrPC does not
explicitly mention the requirement of good faith, such a condition
is implied and is expressly included in several other statutes that
offer protection to public servants from civil and criminal liability.
34. While dealing with the provisions of Section 197 of the
CrPC, read with Section 170 of the Police Act, this Court in D.
Devaraja observed that not every offence committed by a police
officer automatically gets this protection. The safeguard under
Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is
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limited. It applies only if the alleged act is reasonably connected
to the officer’s official duties. The law does not offer protection if
the official role is used as a mere excuse to commit wrongful acts.
However, it was held that the protection of prior sanction will be
available when there is a reasonable connection between the act
and their duty. While enunciating when the protection of prior
sanction will be applicable, this Court held that even if a police
officer exceeds his official powers, as long as there is a reasonable
connection between the act and his duty, they are still entitled to
the protection requiring prior sanction. Excessiveness alone does
not strip them of this safeguard. The language of both Section
197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is clear that
sanction is required not only for acts done in the discharge of
official duty as well as for the acts purported to be done in the
discharge of official duty and/or acts done “under colour of or in
excess of such duty or authority”. Sanction becomes mandatory
if there is a reasonable connection between the act and the
officer’s official duties, even if the officer acted improperly or
exceeded his authority. Therefore, if a complaint against a police
officer involves actions reasonably related to his official role, the
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Court cannot take cognisance unless sanction from the
appropriate Government has been obtained under Section 197 of
the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act. The relevant portion
from the abovementioned judgment is as follows:
“66. Sanction of the Government, to prosecute a police
officer, for any act related to the discharge of an official
duty, is imperative to protect the police officer from
facing harassive, retaliatory, revengeful and frivolous
proceedings. The requirement of sanction from the
Government, to prosecute would give an upright police
officer the confidence to discharge his official duties
efficiently, without fear of vindictive retaliation by
initiation of criminal action, from which he would be
protected under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police
Act. At the same time, if the policeman has committed a
wrong, which constitutes a criminal offence and renders
him liable for prosecution, he can be prosecuted with
sanction from the appropriate Government.
67. Every offence committed by a police officer does not
attract Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. The
protection given under Section 197 of the Criminal
Procedure Code read with Section 170 of the Karnataka
Police Act has its limitations. The protection is available
only when the alleged act done by the public servant is
reasonably connected with the discharge of his official
duty and official duty is not merely a cloak for the
objectionable act. An offence committed entirely outside
the scope of the duty of the police officer, would certainly
not require sanction. To cite an example, a policeman
assaulting a domestic help or indulging in domestic
violence would certainly not be entitled to protection.
However, if an act is connected to the discharge of official
duty of investigation of a recorded criminal case, the act
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is certainly under colour of duty, no matter how illegal
the act may be.
68. If in doing an official duty a policeman has acted in
excess of duty, but there is a reasonable connection
between the act and the performance of the official duty,
the fact that the act alleged is in excess of duty will not
be ground enough to deprive the policeman of the
protection of the government sanction for initiation of
criminal action against him.
69. The language and tenor of Section 197 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka
Police Act makes it absolutely clear that sanction is
required not only for acts done in discharge of official
duty, it is also required for an act purported to be done
in discharge of official duty and/or act done under
colour of or in excess of such duty or authority.
70. To decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is
whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty
or whether there is a reasonable connection with the
official duty. In the case of an act of a policeman or any
other public servant unconnected with the official duty
there can be no question of sanction. However, if the act
alleged against a policeman is reasonably connected
with discharge of his official duty, it does not matter if
the policeman has exceeded the scope of his powers
and/or acted beyond the four corners of the law.
35. Recently, this Court in Gurmeet Kaur vs. Devender Gupta,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761 dealt with the object and purpose of
Section 197 of the CrPC which reads as follows:
“22. … the object and purpose of the said provision is to
protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified
criminal prosecution while they discharge their duties
within the scope and ambit of their powers entrusted to
them. A reading of Section 197 of the CrPC would
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indicate that there is a bar for a Court to take cognisance
of such offences which are mentioned in the said
provision except with the previous sanction of the
appropriate government when the allegations are made
against, inter alia, a public servant. There is no doubt
that in the instant case the appellant herein was a public
servant but the question is, whether, while discharging
her duty as a public servant on the relevant date, there
was any excess in the discharge of the said duty which
did not require the first respondent herein to take a prior
sanction for prosecuting the appellant herein. In this
regard, the salient words which are relevant under
subsection (1) of Section 197 are “is accused of any
offence alleged to have been committed by him while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty, no Court shall take cognisance of such offence
except with the previous sanction”. Therefore, for the
purpose of application of Section 197, a sine qua non is
that the public servant is accused of any offence which
had been committed by him in “discharge of his official
duty”. The said expression would clearly indicate that
Section 197 of the CrPC would not apply to a case if a
public servant is accused of any offence which is de hors
or not connected to the discharge of his or her official
duty.”
36. In light of the aforesaid judgments, the guiding principle
governing the necessity of prior sanction stands well crystallised.
The pivotal inquiry is whether the impugned act is reasonably
connected to the discharge of official duty. If the act is wholly
unconnected or manifestly devoid of any nexus to the official
functions of the public servant, the requirement of sanction is
obviated. Conversely, where there exists even a reasonable link
Page 26 of 31
between the act complained of and the official duties of the public
servant, the protective umbrella of Section 197 of the CrPC and
Section 170 of the Police Act is attracted. In such cases, prior
sanction assumes the character of a sine qua non, regardless of
whether the public servant exceeded the scope of authority or
acted improperly while discharging his duty.
37. Turning to the case at hand, there is little doubt that the
allegations levelled against the accused persons are grave in
nature. Broadly classified, the accusations against the accused
persons encompass the following: (1) abuse of official authority
by the accused persons in allegedly implicating the complainant
in fabricated criminal cases, purportedly driven by malice or
vendetta; (2) physical assault and ill-treatment of the
complainant by the accused persons, constituting acts of alleged
police excess; (3) wrongful confinement of the complainant; and
(4) criminal intimidation of the complainant.
38. In the circumstances at hand, we are of the considered
opinion that the allegations levelled against the accused persons,
though grave, squarely fall within the ambit of "acts done under
colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority," and “acting or
Page 27 of 31
purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty,” as
envisaged under Section 170 of the Police Act and Section 197 of
the CrPC respectively. This Court, while adjudicating on
instances of alleged police excess, has consistently held in
Virupaxappa and D. Devaraja , that where a police officer, in
the course of performing official duties, exceeds the bounds of
such duty, the protective shield under the relevant statutory
provisions continues to apply, provided there exists a reasonable
nexus between the impugned act and the discharge of official
functions. It has been categorically held that transgression or
overstepping of authority does not, by itself, suffice to displace
the statutory safeguard of requiring prior government sanction
before prosecuting the public servant concerned.
39. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the
complainant was declared a rowdy sheeter by the Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Law and Order (West), Bengaluru City,
pursuant to a request made by the Mahalakshmi Layout Police
Station, Bengaluru, upon due consideration of the criminal cases
registered against the complainant, vide order dated 23.08.1990.
Subsequently, multiple criminal cases have been instituted
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against the complainant. It is in the course of the investigation
of these cases that the instant allegations have been levelled
against the accused persons. As noted above, any action
undertaken by a public officer, even if in excess of the authority
vested in them or overstepping the confines of their official duty,
would nonetheless attract statutory protection, provided there
exists a reasonable nexus between the act complained of and the
officer’s official functions.
40. In the present case, it is evident that the actions attributed
to the accused persons emanate from the discharge of their
official duties, specifically in connection with the investigation of
criminal cases pending against the complainant. As previously
observed, a mere excess or overreach in the performance of
official duty does not, by itself, disentitle a public servant from
the statutory protection mandated by law. The safeguard of
obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority, as
envisaged under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the
Police Act cannot be rendered nugatory merely because the acts
alleged may have exceeded the strict bounds of official duty. In
view of the foregoing, we are of the considered opinion that the
Page 29 of 31
learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate erred in
taking cognisance of the alleged offences against the accused
persons without the requisite sanction for prosecution in the
instant case. The absence of the necessary sanction vitiates the
very initiation of criminal proceedings against the accused
persons.
41. Admittedly, the alleged incident pertains to the period of
1999-2000. Accused Nos.1, 3, and 4 have since passed away. The
proceedings now survive solely against accused Nos.2 and 5. It
is pertinent to note that both accused No.2 and accused No.5
retired from service long ago on attaining the age of
superannuation; accused No.2 superannuated in the year 2015
and is presently 71 years of age, while accused No.5 retired in
the year 2020 and is now 64 years old. In these circumstances,
we are of the considered view that no meaningful purpose would
be served by prolonging the criminal prosecution against them.
Accordingly, we are satisfied that the ends of justice would be
adequately met in the instant case by quashing the proceedings
against accused Nos.2 and 5.
Page 30 of 31
42. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered
opinion that the appeal deserves to succeed. Accordingly, the
appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 17.03.2021 passed
by the High Court in Criminal Petition No.4512 of 2020, preferred
under Section 482 of the CrPC is hereby set aside. Consequently,
Criminal Petition No.4512 of 2020 stands allowed. As a result,
the summoning order dated 07.05.2016 passed by the learned
VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru against
accused Nos.2 and 5, as well as the order dated 11.06.2020
passed by the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru City in affirming the same are hereby quashed.
The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
……………………………………….J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
……………………………………….J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 03, 2025.
Page 31 of 31
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1759 OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.6053 of 2021)
…
G.C. MANJUNATH & OTHERS APPELLANTS
VERSUS
SEETARAM ...RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court of
Karnataka dated 17.03.2021 in Criminal Petition No.4512 of
2020 in refusing to quash the order dated 11.06.2020 passed by
the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City
affirming the summoning order dated 07.05.2016 passed by the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU SACHDEVA
Date: 2025.04.03
16:26:31 IST
Reason:
learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru
Page 1 of 31
against the accused persons under Sections 326, 358, 500, 501,
502, 506 (b) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(for short “IPC”), the appellants/accused Nos.2, 3, and 5 have
preferred this appeal.
3. Briefly stated facts of the case are that the
complainant/respondent herein has been prosecuting certain
police officers for their illegal activities. Due to this, the
complainant alleged that some police officers had engaged
accused Nos.1 to 5, who were also police officers, to take revenge
against him. Accused Nos.1 to 5 were serving at the
Mahalakshmi Layout Police Station, and accused No.6 is the
daughter of the proprietor of Bruna Weekly Magazine.
4. The complainant stated that in order to seek revenge,
accused Nos.1 to 5 lodged false complaints against the
complainant and registered fabricated cases. They also
threatened him with dire consequences. On 10.04.1999, at about
10:30 p.m., accused Nos.2, 3, and 5 trespassed into his house,
dragged him out, and forcibly took him to the Mahalakshmi
Layout Police Station. There, the accused Nos.1 to 5 allegedly
Page 2 of 31
assaulted him after stripping him of his clothes and continued to
torture him throughout the night.
5. On 11.04.1999, accused Nos.2, 3, and 5 allegedly procured
a slate, forced the complainant to hold it with his name written
on it, and accused No. 6 took his photograph at that time.
Subsequently, the complainant was produced before the
Magistrate after registering false cases in Crime Nos.137 and 138
of 1999. The complainant showed his injuries to the learned
Magistrate, who referred him to a hospital. He was later released
and eventually acquitted in the above cases.
6. It was further averred that on 27.10.1999, at about 9:45
p.m., accused Nos.3 to 5 stopped the complainant while he was
riding his scooter. They slapped him, engaged an autorickshaw,
and took him to the Mahalakshmi Layout Police Station. Accused
No.1 was present at the station and abused the complainant in
filthy language, demanding that he should withdraw the case
filed by him. It was further alleged that accused No.1 then
instructed accused No.3 to take possession of the complainant’s
belongings. Accused No.3 removed his gold chain, wristwatch,
purse, spectacles, and Rs.26,000/- in cash, wrapped them in a
Page 3 of 31
handkerchief, and handed over the same to accused No.1.
Thereafter, they stripped the complainant of his clothes and
assaulted him throughout the night using a lathi and an iron rod
causing dislodgement of his tooth leading to profuse bleeding.
7. The complainant further stated that the accused persons
continued to torture the complainant and later produced him
before the Magistrate, registering a false case under Crime
No.448 of 1999 for the offences under Section 392 of the IPC. The
complainant reported the ill-treatment to the learned Magistrate,
who directed the jail authorities to provide him with medical
treatment. He was released from custody and sought treatment
at Victoria Hospital on 04.11.1999.
8. Subsequently, accused No.6, with the intent to defame and
ruin the complainant’s life, published the illegally taken
photographs along with defamatory slogans in the Bruna Weekly
Magazine on 25.01.2001, 10.09.2001, and 15.09.2001. Accused
No.6 also filed a case against the complainant in Crime No.146
of 2005. The complainant alleged that accused Nos.1 to 6 have
continuously threatened him, causing him mental agony, and
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have even threatened to kill him if he does not withdraw the
complaints filed against them.
9. Therefore, the complainant approached the Court of learned
VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru by filing
a private complaint P.C.R. No.6754 of 2007 dated 21.04.2007
and prayed for taking cognisance of the offences punishable
under Sections 196, 199, 200, 201, 211, 326, 327, 345, 338,
357, 368, 395, 397, 500, 501, 502, 506(b) read with Section 120B
of the IPC against accused Nos. 1 to 6.
10. The learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate by
order dated 26.12.2009, recorded the sworn statement of the
complainant, took cognisance of the complaint dated 21.04.2007
and issued summons to accused No.1 to 6 in C.C No. 368 of
2010. Being aggrieved, accused No.6 approached the High Court
by way of filing Criminal Petition No.4364 of 2010 challenging the
order dated 26.12.2009. By order dated 30.03.2012, the High
Court set aside the order dated 26.12.2009 insofar as accused
No.6 is concerned and remanded the matter to the learned
Magistrate for a fresh consideration.
Page 5 of 31
11. Thereafter, by order dated 07.05.2016, the learned VII
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, held that there was
prima facie material to register the case against accused Nos.1 to
5 for the offences under Sections 326, 358, 500, 501, 502, 506
(b) read with Section 34 of the IPC and accordingly ordered to
register a criminal case against accused Nos.1 to 5 as well as
issued summons against accused Nos.1 to 5. However, in the
said order, the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, found that the materials on record are insufficient to
take cognisance of the offence punishable under Sections 196,
199, 200, 201, 211, 34, 338, 357, 367, 368, 395 and 397 of the
IPC. Insofar as the aspect of delay in filling the private complaint
is concerned, the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate observed that sufficient material was produced to
prove that the complainant was pursuing this case by way of
writing letters/complaints to the Higher Officials. Further, the
charges against accused No.6 were dropped.
12. Being aggrieved by the order dated 07.05.2016 passed by
the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, accused
Nos.1 to 3 and 5 approached the Court of LXI City Civil and
Page 6 of 31
Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City by way of filing Criminal
Revision Petition No.720 of 2017. By order dated 11.06.2020,
the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City
dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition No.720 of 2017 filed by
the accused Nos.1 to 3 and 5.
13. Being aggrieved, the accused Nos.1 to 3 and 5 approached
the High Court by way of filing Criminal Petition No.4512 of 2020
praying to set aside the order dated 07.05.2016 passed by the
learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru
in taking cognisance of offences punishable under Sections 326,
358, 500, 501, 502 and 506(b) read with Section 34 of the IPC
against them and in registering the case in C.C. No.368 of 2010
and issuing summons against them as well as the order dated
11.06.2020 passed by the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions
Judge, Bengaluru City predominantly on the ground that a prior
order of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”) and Section 170 of the
Karnataka Police Act, 1963 (for short “Police Act”) was not
obtained from the Government before prosecuting the accused
persons.
Page 7 of 31
14. During the pendency of the Criminal Petition No.4512 of
2020 before the High Court, accused No.1 passed away. By
impugned order dated 17.03.2021, the High Court dismissed the
Criminal Petition No.4512 of 2020 filed by accused No.2, 3 and
5. The High Court observed that sufficient material was placed
on record against the accused persons for facing criminal trial.
As regards the plea of limitation under Section 197 of the CrPC
read with Section 170 of the Police Act, the High Court further
observed that the learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bengaluru and the learned LXI City Civil and
Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City have not gone into the aspect of
obtaining a prior order of sanction. However, the High Court held
that it was evident that the complainant made sufficient efforts
to get the order of sanction. Further, the High Court noted that
the accused persons exceeded their limits and assaulted the
complainant resulting in grave injuries. Ergo, the High Court
held that the same cannot be termed as an act done in the
discharge of the official duty and protection cannot be given
under Section 197 of the CrPC. In other words, the High Court
held that an order of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC and
Page 8 of 31
Section 170 of the Police Act was not necessary in the instant
case. The High Court noted that the judgment of this Court in
D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain, (2020) 7 SCC 695 (“D.
Devaraja”) relied upon by the accused persons cannot come to
their rescue. The High Court observed that the Supreme Court
in the said judgment has categorically held that the protection
given under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police
Act has its own limitation and that the said protection would be
available only for the acts done by the public servant in discharge
of his official duty or if it is reasonably connected with the
discharge of his official duties and not in instances such as the
present case. Being aggrieved, accused Nos.2, 3, and 5 have
preferred the present appeal before this Court.
15. During the pendency of the present proceedings, the
learned senior counsel appearing for the accused persons
submitted that accused Nos.1, 3, and 4 have passed away,
resulting in abatement of the criminal proceedings against them.
Consequently, the present appeal survives only insofar as
accused Nos.2 and 5 are concerned. It was further submitted
Page 9 of 31
that accused Nos.2 and 5 have attained superannuation from
their posts in the years 2015 and 2020, respectively.
16. We have heard the learned senior counsel for the
appellants/accused No.2 and 5 and the learned counsel for the
respondent/complainant. We have perused the material on
record.
17. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants/
accused persons submitted that there has been an inordinate
and unexplained delay in filing the present complaint. In this
regard, it was contended that the complaint was lodged only on
21.04.2007, pertaining to an alleged incident that is stated to
have occurred during the period 1999-2000, while the accused
were in active police service. Learned senior counsel further
argued that several criminal cases had been registered against
the complainant, in which he was ultimately acquitted in the year
2006. It was pointed out that immediately following his acquittal,
the present complaint came to be filed in 2007. In this backdrop,
it was submitted that the present complaint is nothing but a
retaliatory measure, filed vindictively against the accused
Page 10 of 31
persons solely for having discharged their official duties as police
officials.
18. Learned senior counsel further contended that, admittedly,
the complaint was filed without obtaining the requisite prior
sanction as mandated under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section
170 of the Police Act. It was submitted that the High Court
erroneously observed that the acts alleged against the accused
persons bore no connection with their official duties. Accordingly,
it was argued that the High Court committed an error in
concluding that prior sanction was not necessary before
initiating criminal proceedings against the accused persons.
19. Learned senior counsel further submitted that the
expression “under colour or in excess of any such duty” employed
in Section 170 of the Police Act is of particular significance. It
was contended that the offences alleged against the accused
persons would squarely fall within the ambit of the phrase “under
colour or in excess of any such duty.” Therefore, it was urged that
obtaining prior sanction from the competent Government
authority is an indispensable prerequisite before entertaining
prosecution against the accused persons. In support of this
Page 11 of 31
contention, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in
Virupaxappa Veerappa Kadampur vs. State of Mysore, AIR
1963 SC 849 (“Virupaxappa”). In the said case, while
interpreting Section 161(1) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, this
Court held that the phrase “under colour of duty” encompasses
acts done by police officers ostensibly in the discharge of their
official functions, even if they exceeded the authority vested in
them under the Act.
20. Learned senior counsel further contended that the High
Court misinterpreted the ratio laid down by this Court in D.
Devaraja . In this regard, it was submitted that in the said
judgment, this Court unequivocally held that even if a police
officer acts in excess of the scope of his official duties, so long as
there exists a reasonable nexus between the act complained of
and the discharge of his official functions, the mere fact of
exceeding authority would not, by itself, disentitle the officer from
the statutory safeguard of obtaining prior government sanction
before initiation of criminal proceedings. In view of the foregoing
submissions, the learned senior counsel submitted that the
impugned order passed by the High Court is liable to be set aside.
Page 12 of 31
21. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/complainant vehemently contended that, at the time
of the complainant’s arrest in connection with certain criminal
cases, he was subjected to physical assault at the hands of the
accused persons. It was further submitted that this fact was duly
brought to the attention of the learned Magistrate, who, on each
occasion, issued directions to both the Jailor and the
Investigating Officer to ensure that the complainant was provided
with necessary medical treatment for the injuries allegedly
sustained during the said assault.
22. Learned counsel further submitted that he has placed
relevant documents on record before this Court, including the
wound certificate, which clearly reflects that the complainant
sustained grievous injuries, including broken teeth. Additionally,
it was pointed out that the X-ray report corroborates the medical
findings, indicating the presence of a healing socket and
confirming that Injury No. 2 is grievous in nature. In light of these
materials, learned counsel for the complainant argued that a
prima facie case was clearly made out against the accused
Page 13 of 31
persons. Consequently, learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bengaluru took cognisance of the offences against
them by order dated 07.05.2016, which was subsequently
affirmed by the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru City, by order dated 11.06.2020, and further upheld
by the High Court in the impugned order.
23. It was further submitted that, in the present case, learned
VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate duly considered the
materials placed on record, which demonstrate that the
complainant had made consistent efforts from the year 2002 to
2006 to obtain sanction for prosecution. The learned Magistrate
has also noted that the complainant had addressed multiple
representations to the head of the department seeking the
requisite sanction; however, no conclusive or effective response
was forthcoming from the authorities. Learned counsel for the
complainant further pointed out that the High Court, in the
impugned order, similarly recorded that all necessary steps were
taken by the complainant to secure the sanction, but despite his
earnest efforts, the competent authority failed to grant the same.
Page 14 of 31
24. Learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the
accused persons “under the colour of official duty” removed his
clothes and had abused and assaulted him. These acts neither
have any bearing on official duties nor are they connected
remotely to official duties. Instead, it was submitted that the
accused persons exceeded the limits allowed by the law. The act
of raid and seizure is part of official duties but the further acts of
the accused persons cannot fall within the scope of official duty.
It was argued that even the High Court noted that the brutal
conduct of the accused persons, which included not only
breaking the complainant’s teeth but also causing grievous
injuries, clearly demonstrates that they far exceeded the bounds
of their official duties. Accordingly, learned counsel for the
complainant submitted that the High Court was justified in
holding that criminal proceedings could have been initiated
without prior sanction.
25. It was argued that this Court in Bakhshish Singh Brar vs.
Gurmej Kaur, (1987) 4 SCC 663 (“Bakhshish Singh”) dealt
with the issue of sanction under Sections 197 and 196 of the
Page 15 of 31
CrPC. It was submitted that the said case involved a police officer
accused of causing grievous injuries and death during the course
of a raid and search. It was submitted that in the said judgment,
this Court noted that, in order to determine whether the officer,
while ostensibly acting in the discharge of his official duties, had
exceeded the limits of his official capacity, the court must first
take cognisance of the offence. Accordingly, this Court observed
that, in such circumstances, the trial need not be stayed merely
due to the absence of sanction for prosecution at the initial stage.
Hence, learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the
High Court was justified in holding that a prior sanction was not
necessary in this case thereby dismissing the criminal petition
filed by the accused persons.
26. Upon hearing the learned counsel for the rival parties and
after a thorough examination of the material available on record,
the core issue that emerges for determination is, whether, the
learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate was legally
justified in taking cognisance of the offences alleged against the
accused persons in P.C.R. No.6754/2007, in the absence of the
prior sanction contemplated under Section 197 of the CrPC read
Page 16 of 31
with Section 170 of the Police Act. The real question, therefore,
is whether the acts complained of are reasonably connected to,
or performed, in the purported discharge of the official duties of
the accused persons, so as to attract the statutory protection
afforded by the said provisions.
27. Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act reads as follows:
“170. Suits or prosecutions in respect of acts done
under colour of duty as aforesaid not to be
entertained without sanction of Government. —(1) In
any case of alleged offence by the Commissioner, a
Magistrate, Police Officer or Reserve Police Officer or
other person, or of a wrong alleged to have been done by
such Commissioner, Magistrate, Police Officer or Reserve
Police Officer or other person, by any act done under
colour or in excess of any such duty or authority as
aforesaid, or wherein it shall appear to the court that the
offence or wrong if committed or done was of the
character aforesaid, the prosecution or suit shall not be
entertained except with the previous sanction of the
Government.
(2) In the case of an intended suit on account of such a
wrong as aforesaid, the person intending to sue shall be
bound to give to the alleged wrongdoer one month's
notice at least of the intended suit with sufficient
description of the wrong complained of, failing which
such suit shall be dismissed.
(3) The plaint shall set forth that a notice as aforesaid
has been served on the defendant and the date of such
service, and shall state whether any, and if so, what
tender of amends has been made by the defendant. A
copy of the said notice shall be annexed to the plaint
endorsed or accompanied with a declaration by the
plaintiff of the time and manner of service thereof.”
Page 17 of 31
28. Section 197 of the CrPC is set out hereinbelow for
convenience:
“ 197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.— (1)
When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate
or a public servant not removable from his office save by
or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any
offence alleged to have been committed by him while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty, no court shall take cognisance of such offence
except with the previous sanction—
(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
case may be, was at the time of commission of the
alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs
of the Union, of the Central Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
case may be, was at the time of commission of the
alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs
of a State, of the State Government:”
29. A plain reading of Section 170 of the Police Act reveals that
the legislature, in its wisdom, has sought to afford a statutory
safeguard to certain public functionaries, including
Commissioners, Magistrates, Police Officers, and Reserve Police
Officers. The provision is categorical in its stipulation that where
any offence is alleged to have been committed, or any wrong
alleged to have been occasioned, by such officials in the
discharge of their duties or in the exercise of their lawful
Page 18 of 31
authority, no court shall entertain any prosecution or suit
against them without the prior sanction of the Government.
Importantly, the protective umbrella of Section 170 is not
confined solely to acts strictly within the bounds of authority but
extends to acts done ostensibly in excess of such authority, so
long as there exists a reasonable nexus between the act
complained of and the discharge of official functions.
30. A careful reading of Section 197 of the CrPC unequivocally
delineates a statutory bar on the Court’s jurisdiction to take
cognisance of offences alleged against public servants, save
without the prior sanction of the appropriate government. The
essential precondition for the applicability of this provision is
that the alleged offence must have been committed by the public
servant while acting in the discharge of, or purported discharge
of, their official duties. The protective mantle of Section 197 of
the CrPC, however, is not absolute; it does not extend to acts that
are manifestly beyond the scope of official duty or wholly
unconnected thereto. Acts bereft of any reasonable nexus to
official functions fall outside the ambit of this safeguard and do
not attract the bar imposed under Section 197 of the CrPC.
Page 19 of 31
31. Both the aforesaid provisions serve a similar protective
function. While Section 170 of the Police Act mandates prior
sanction for prosecuting a public official for "acts done under
colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority," Section 197 of
the CrPC requires prior sanction where a public official is
accused of having committed “any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty.” The underlying rationale of both
these statutory provisions is to safeguard public functionaries
from frivolous or vexatious prosecution for actions undertaken in
good faith in the discharge of, or purported discharge of, their
official duties, thereby ensuring that the fear of litigation does
not impede the efficient functioning of public administration.
32. This Court in B. Saha vs. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SCC 177
(“B. Saha”) observed that the words “any offence alleged to have
been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty” employed in Section 197 of the
CrPC, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation.
This Court observed that if these words are construed too
narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, “it is
Page 20 of 31
no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can
be”. In the wider sense, these words will take under their
umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the
course of the same transaction in which the official duty is
performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the
import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on
the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public
servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, that
is entitled to the protection of Section 197 of the CrPC, an act
constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with
his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the
said provision. As pointed out by Ramaswami, J. in Baijnath
vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (AIR 1966 SC 220), “it is the
quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope
and range of his official duties, the protection contemplated under
Section 197 CrPC will be attracted”.
33. This Court in Amod Kumar Kanth vs. Association of
Victim of Uphaar Tragedy, (2023) 16 SCC 239 held that the
State performs its obligations through its officers/public
servants and every function performed by a public servant is
Page 21 of 31
ultimately aimed at achieving public welfare. Often, their roles
involve a degree of discretion. But the exercise of such discretion
cannot be separated from the circumstances and timing in which
it is exercised or, in cases of omission, when the omission occurs.
In such circumstances, the courts must address, whether the
officer was acting in the discharge of official duties. It was
observed that even when an officer acts under the purported
exercise of official powers, they are entitled to protection under
Section 197 of the CrPC. This protection exists for a valid reason
so that the public servants can perform their duties fearlessly,
without constant apprehension of legal action, as long as they
act in good faith. While Section 197 of the CrPC does not
explicitly mention the requirement of good faith, such a condition
is implied and is expressly included in several other statutes that
offer protection to public servants from civil and criminal liability.
34. While dealing with the provisions of Section 197 of the
CrPC, read with Section 170 of the Police Act, this Court in D.
Devaraja observed that not every offence committed by a police
officer automatically gets this protection. The safeguard under
Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is
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limited. It applies only if the alleged act is reasonably connected
to the officer’s official duties. The law does not offer protection if
the official role is used as a mere excuse to commit wrongful acts.
However, it was held that the protection of prior sanction will be
available when there is a reasonable connection between the act
and their duty. While enunciating when the protection of prior
sanction will be applicable, this Court held that even if a police
officer exceeds his official powers, as long as there is a reasonable
connection between the act and his duty, they are still entitled to
the protection requiring prior sanction. Excessiveness alone does
not strip them of this safeguard. The language of both Section
197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act is clear that
sanction is required not only for acts done in the discharge of
official duty as well as for the acts purported to be done in the
discharge of official duty and/or acts done “under colour of or in
excess of such duty or authority”. Sanction becomes mandatory
if there is a reasonable connection between the act and the
officer’s official duties, even if the officer acted improperly or
exceeded his authority. Therefore, if a complaint against a police
officer involves actions reasonably related to his official role, the
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Court cannot take cognisance unless sanction from the
appropriate Government has been obtained under Section 197 of
the CrPC and Section 170 of the Police Act. The relevant portion
from the abovementioned judgment is as follows:
“66. Sanction of the Government, to prosecute a police
officer, for any act related to the discharge of an official
duty, is imperative to protect the police officer from
facing harassive, retaliatory, revengeful and frivolous
proceedings. The requirement of sanction from the
Government, to prosecute would give an upright police
officer the confidence to discharge his official duties
efficiently, without fear of vindictive retaliation by
initiation of criminal action, from which he would be
protected under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police
Act. At the same time, if the policeman has committed a
wrong, which constitutes a criminal offence and renders
him liable for prosecution, he can be prosecuted with
sanction from the appropriate Government.
67. Every offence committed by a police officer does not
attract Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
read with Section 170 of the Karnataka Police Act. The
protection given under Section 197 of the Criminal
Procedure Code read with Section 170 of the Karnataka
Police Act has its limitations. The protection is available
only when the alleged act done by the public servant is
reasonably connected with the discharge of his official
duty and official duty is not merely a cloak for the
objectionable act. An offence committed entirely outside
the scope of the duty of the police officer, would certainly
not require sanction. To cite an example, a policeman
assaulting a domestic help or indulging in domestic
violence would certainly not be entitled to protection.
However, if an act is connected to the discharge of official
duty of investigation of a recorded criminal case, the act
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is certainly under colour of duty, no matter how illegal
the act may be.
68. If in doing an official duty a policeman has acted in
excess of duty, but there is a reasonable connection
between the act and the performance of the official duty,
the fact that the act alleged is in excess of duty will not
be ground enough to deprive the policeman of the
protection of the government sanction for initiation of
criminal action against him.
69. The language and tenor of Section 197 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure and Section 170 of the Karnataka
Police Act makes it absolutely clear that sanction is
required not only for acts done in discharge of official
duty, it is also required for an act purported to be done
in discharge of official duty and/or act done under
colour of or in excess of such duty or authority.
70. To decide whether sanction is necessary, the test is
whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty
or whether there is a reasonable connection with the
official duty. In the case of an act of a policeman or any
other public servant unconnected with the official duty
there can be no question of sanction. However, if the act
alleged against a policeman is reasonably connected
with discharge of his official duty, it does not matter if
the policeman has exceeded the scope of his powers
and/or acted beyond the four corners of the law.
35. Recently, this Court in Gurmeet Kaur vs. Devender Gupta,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3761 dealt with the object and purpose of
Section 197 of the CrPC which reads as follows:
“22. … the object and purpose of the said provision is to
protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified
criminal prosecution while they discharge their duties
within the scope and ambit of their powers entrusted to
them. A reading of Section 197 of the CrPC would
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indicate that there is a bar for a Court to take cognisance
of such offences which are mentioned in the said
provision except with the previous sanction of the
appropriate government when the allegations are made
against, inter alia, a public servant. There is no doubt
that in the instant case the appellant herein was a public
servant but the question is, whether, while discharging
her duty as a public servant on the relevant date, there
was any excess in the discharge of the said duty which
did not require the first respondent herein to take a prior
sanction for prosecuting the appellant herein. In this
regard, the salient words which are relevant under
subsection (1) of Section 197 are “is accused of any
offence alleged to have been committed by him while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty, no Court shall take cognisance of such offence
except with the previous sanction”. Therefore, for the
purpose of application of Section 197, a sine qua non is
that the public servant is accused of any offence which
had been committed by him in “discharge of his official
duty”. The said expression would clearly indicate that
Section 197 of the CrPC would not apply to a case if a
public servant is accused of any offence which is de hors
or not connected to the discharge of his or her official
duty.”
36. In light of the aforesaid judgments, the guiding principle
governing the necessity of prior sanction stands well crystallised.
The pivotal inquiry is whether the impugned act is reasonably
connected to the discharge of official duty. If the act is wholly
unconnected or manifestly devoid of any nexus to the official
functions of the public servant, the requirement of sanction is
obviated. Conversely, where there exists even a reasonable link
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between the act complained of and the official duties of the public
servant, the protective umbrella of Section 197 of the CrPC and
Section 170 of the Police Act is attracted. In such cases, prior
sanction assumes the character of a sine qua non, regardless of
whether the public servant exceeded the scope of authority or
acted improperly while discharging his duty.
37. Turning to the case at hand, there is little doubt that the
allegations levelled against the accused persons are grave in
nature. Broadly classified, the accusations against the accused
persons encompass the following: (1) abuse of official authority
by the accused persons in allegedly implicating the complainant
in fabricated criminal cases, purportedly driven by malice or
vendetta; (2) physical assault and ill-treatment of the
complainant by the accused persons, constituting acts of alleged
police excess; (3) wrongful confinement of the complainant; and
(4) criminal intimidation of the complainant.
38. In the circumstances at hand, we are of the considered
opinion that the allegations levelled against the accused persons,
though grave, squarely fall within the ambit of "acts done under
colour of, or in excess of, such duty or authority," and “acting or
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purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty,” as
envisaged under Section 170 of the Police Act and Section 197 of
the CrPC respectively. This Court, while adjudicating on
instances of alleged police excess, has consistently held in
Virupaxappa and D. Devaraja , that where a police officer, in
the course of performing official duties, exceeds the bounds of
such duty, the protective shield under the relevant statutory
provisions continues to apply, provided there exists a reasonable
nexus between the impugned act and the discharge of official
functions. It has been categorically held that transgression or
overstepping of authority does not, by itself, suffice to displace
the statutory safeguard of requiring prior government sanction
before prosecuting the public servant concerned.
39. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the
complainant was declared a rowdy sheeter by the Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Law and Order (West), Bengaluru City,
pursuant to a request made by the Mahalakshmi Layout Police
Station, Bengaluru, upon due consideration of the criminal cases
registered against the complainant, vide order dated 23.08.1990.
Subsequently, multiple criminal cases have been instituted
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against the complainant. It is in the course of the investigation
of these cases that the instant allegations have been levelled
against the accused persons. As noted above, any action
undertaken by a public officer, even if in excess of the authority
vested in them or overstepping the confines of their official duty,
would nonetheless attract statutory protection, provided there
exists a reasonable nexus between the act complained of and the
officer’s official functions.
40. In the present case, it is evident that the actions attributed
to the accused persons emanate from the discharge of their
official duties, specifically in connection with the investigation of
criminal cases pending against the complainant. As previously
observed, a mere excess or overreach in the performance of
official duty does not, by itself, disentitle a public servant from
the statutory protection mandated by law. The safeguard of
obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority, as
envisaged under Section 197 of the CrPC and Section 170 of the
Police Act cannot be rendered nugatory merely because the acts
alleged may have exceeded the strict bounds of official duty. In
view of the foregoing, we are of the considered opinion that the
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learned VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate erred in
taking cognisance of the alleged offences against the accused
persons without the requisite sanction for prosecution in the
instant case. The absence of the necessary sanction vitiates the
very initiation of criminal proceedings against the accused
persons.
41. Admittedly, the alleged incident pertains to the period of
1999-2000. Accused Nos.1, 3, and 4 have since passed away. The
proceedings now survive solely against accused Nos.2 and 5. It
is pertinent to note that both accused No.2 and accused No.5
retired from service long ago on attaining the age of
superannuation; accused No.2 superannuated in the year 2015
and is presently 71 years of age, while accused No.5 retired in
the year 2020 and is now 64 years old. In these circumstances,
we are of the considered view that no meaningful purpose would
be served by prolonging the criminal prosecution against them.
Accordingly, we are satisfied that the ends of justice would be
adequately met in the instant case by quashing the proceedings
against accused Nos.2 and 5.
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42. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered
opinion that the appeal deserves to succeed. Accordingly, the
appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 17.03.2021 passed
by the High Court in Criminal Petition No.4512 of 2020, preferred
under Section 482 of the CrPC is hereby set aside. Consequently,
Criminal Petition No.4512 of 2020 stands allowed. As a result,
the summoning order dated 07.05.2016 passed by the learned
VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru against
accused Nos.2 and 5, as well as the order dated 11.06.2020
passed by the learned LXI City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru City in affirming the same are hereby quashed.
The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
……………………………………….J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
……………………………………….J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 03, 2025.
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