PIMPRI CHINCHWAD NEW TOWNSHIP DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. VISHNUDEV COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY

       REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7649 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.20188 of 2017] Pimpri Chinchwad New Township  Development Authority            .. Appellant(s) Versus Vishnudev Cooperative Housing Society & Ors.                         .. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal is filed against the final judgment and   order   dated   28.02.2017   passed   by   the   High Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ANITA MALHOTRA Date: 2018.08.03 13:25:40 IST Reason: Court   of   Judicature   at   Bombay   in   Writ   Petition 1 No.5783 of 2006 whereby the High Court allowed the   petition   filed   by   respondent   No.1   herein   and directed the State Government to issue notification in the official gazette for release of the acquired land from   acquisition   on   the   basis   of   the   Revenue Minister’s   order   dated   10.06.2004   passed   under Section   48   of   the   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). 3) In order to appreciate the issues involved in the appeal, it is necessary to set out the factual background   of   the   case   in   detail.   The   facts mentioned   hereinbelow   are   taken   from   the   SLP paper books and its List of Dates.  4) Survey No. (Gat. No.210 ­ measuring around 39 H 26 R and Survey No. 211 measuring around 1 H 23 R­Total land 40 H 49 R) situated at Mauje Wakad, Tehsil Mulshi, District Pune (Maharashtra) 2 was originally owned by the members of one  "Deo" family.  5) On   12.03.1970,   the   State   Government acquired this land by issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Act. It was followed by publication of   declaration   under   Section   6   of   the   Act.   The acquisition   was   for   a   public   purpose,   namely, "planned   development   and   utilization   of   lands   in Pimpri   Chinchwad   Township   Area   for   industrial, commercial   and   residential   purposes”.   The development   project   for   which   the   land   was acquired   was   to   be   executed   through   Pimpri Chinchwad  New Township   Development  Authority (for short, called "PCNTDA “) ­ appellant herein.  6) The Special Land Acquisition Officer (for short, called "SLAO“) then initiated the proceedings under Section   11   of   the   Act   for   determination   of   the 3 compensation   payable   to   the   landowners   and accordingly passed an award dated 23.09.1986. The SLAO   then   issued   notices   to   the   landowners   as required under Section 12 (2) of the Act.  Since the landowners did not accept the compensation, the entire  amount  of compensation  was  deposited  by the SLAO in Revenue Deposit Account of Treasury.  7) The members of “Deo family” (landowners) felt aggrieved by the award dated 23.09.1986 and filed writ petition being W.P. No. 3719/1987 in the High Court at Bombay. This writ petition was dismissed by the High Court by order dated 18.07.1989. The writ  petitioners  felt  aggrieved   by  the  dismissal  of their   writ   petition   filed   review   petition   (R.P.   No. 3751/1989) before the High Court, which was also dismissed as withdrawn on 08.09.1989. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition and the review 4 petition,   the   landowners   filed   SLP   (c) No.12889/1989 in this Court. It was also dismissed as withdrawn on 27.11.1989. 8) In the meantime, on 19.09.1989, the members of “Deo Family” filed an application under Section 48(1) of the Act to the Revenue Minister of the State of Maharashtra and prayed therein for release of their   acquired   land.   During   pendency   of   this application,   the   landowners   filed   writ   petition (No.36/1990) in the High Court and prayed therein for   a   direction   to   the   State   for   deciding   their application. By order dated 12.01.1990, the High Court disposed of the writ petition and directed the State   to   decide   the   landowners'   application   in accordance with law. 9) By   order   dated   07.07.1992,   the   State Government   partly   allowed   the   landowners' 5 application and while releasing the land measuring 29 H 98 R retained the remaining land measuring10 H 51 R for execution of the development project for which   the   entire   land   had   been   acquired.   The details   of   the   land   retained   and   released   are mentioned hereinbelow:

10) It appears from the record of the proceedings that after the dismissal of the review petition, the landowners (members of “Deo family”) transferred the acquired land in question to the members of one Co­operative Housing Society called, "Vishnudev Co­ 6 operative Housing Society" (for short called "VCHS")­ respondent No.1 herein on or about 25.10.1993. 11) Respondent   No.1   (VCHS)   claiming   to   be   the owner of the land in question felt aggrieved and filed writ   petition   (1116/1993)   questioning   therein   the legality of the order of the State dated 07.07.1992 to the extent it declined to release the remaining land measuring 10 H 51 R.   The High Court, by order dated 23.03.1993, dismissed the writ petition and upheld the  order of the State.   Respondent No.1 (VCHS) carried the matter in this Court by filing SLP (C)  No.10056/1993.     By  order   dated   26.11.1993, this   Court   dismissed   the   SLP.   The   Divisional Commissioner   then   passed   a   final   order   dated 20.08.1994 under Section 48 (1) of the Act directing therein for deletion of 29 H 98 R from Survey No. 210 and retaining of 10 H 33 R as acquired land for 7 completion of development project.  This is how, out of total acquired land, the land measuring 29 H 98 R was released in favour of landowners from the acquisition proceedings and the land measuring 10 H 33 R was retained to enable the State to execute the development project on the said land through the agency of the appellant. 12) Notwithstanding the termination of two rounds of litigation up to this Court, the landowners­VCHS again   started   third   round   and   filed   fresh   writ petition   (3200/1994)   in   the   High   Court   and   this time prayed therein for deletion of 10 H 55 R from Survey No. 210/1. By order dated 07.09.1994, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. Again the said order, the VCHS filed SLP (C) No.22907/1994 in this Court and the same was dismissed by order dated 10.02.1995. 8 13) On 30.05.2000, the SLAO took possession of the   land   bearing   Gat.   No.   210   (10   H   33   R)   and executed panchanama in support thereof. The name of the State Government was accordingly entered in the revenue records at Mutation Entry No. 8212(File No.   7/12)   on   21.07.2000.   The   State   Government then   handed   over   the   possession   of   the   land   in question to PCNTDA on 08.11.2005 to enable them to start the work on the land. It was followed by entry of name of PCNTDA in the revenue records on 19.11.2005.  14) Despite losing the battle in the first, second and   third   round   of   litigation,   as   detailed   above, VCHS   again   renewed   their   efforts   and   filed   an application under Section 48 (1) of the Act to the Revenue   Minister   of   the   State   of   Maharashtra  to start another round of litigation on 20.01.2004. The 9 Revenue Minister on 10.06.2004, however, noted in the file that the land in question be deleted from the acquisition proceedings.  15) It is pertinent to mention here that when the order  dated   10.06.2004   was   passed,   the  Code   of Conduct was in force in the State of Maharashtra as the assembly elections were to be held in September 2004   in   the   State   of   Maharashtra.   It   is   also pertinent to mention that the order of the Revenue Minister   ordering   deletion   of   the   land   was   never communicated to the landowners. On 04.11.2004, the State Government directed that all the matters where   the   orders   were   not   communicated   to   the parties concerned be placed for fresh consideration for passing appropriate orders. The present being a case where the order was not communicated to the landowners, the new Revenue Minister, who took 10 over the charge from the earlier Minister, directed that the matter relating to the land in question be considered afresh. The VCHS then wrote a letter to the   State   Government   on   06.06.2006   insisting therein   for   issuance   and   implementation   of   the order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue Minister but since the Government did not yield to the  VCHS insistence,  a writ petition  (5783/2006) was filed by VCHS on 21.06.2006  in the High Court praying   for   issuance   of   mandamus   directing   the State Government to give effect to the order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue Minister and issue appropriate notification in that behalf by releasing the remaining land measuring 10 H 55 R. 16) In this writ petition, the VCHS arrayed only the State Government as party respondent but did not   implead   PCNTDA   (appellant   herein).   The 11 PCNTDA then filed an application for intervention in the said writ petition which was allowed by directing the VCHS to implead PCNTDA as party respondent in the writ petition.  17) The   State   and   PCNTDA   contested   the   writ petition  inter alia  on the ground that firstly, the writ petition is not maintainable inasmuch as the entire issue in relation to the land in question has already attained   finality   thrice   in   favour   of   the   State, therefore,   nothing   now   remains   for   further adjudication;     Secondly,   since   possession   of   the land in question has already been taken over by the State long back on 30.05.2000, the provisions of Section 48 of the Act were not applicable to the case and nor Section 48 could be used for further release of   the   land   from   acquisition;   and   lastly,   the   so­ called order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then 12 Revenue   Minister   was   not   an   order   much   less   a legal   one   and   more   so   when   it   was   not communicated to the landowners, it did not create any kind of right in favour of  the landowners.  18) By   impugned   order,   the   High   Court   allowed the   landowners'   writ   petition   and   issued   a mandamus directing the State to give effect to the order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue Minister. The effect of issuance of mandamus is to release the remaining land measuring 10 H 33 R from the acquisition proceedings in favour of the landowners. It is against this order, PCNTDA filed this appeal by way of special leave in this Court.  19) The question, which arises for consideration in this appeal, is whether the High Court was justified in allowing the writ petition filed by the landowners (VCHS­respondent   No.1   herein)   and,   in 13 consequence, was justified in issuing directions to the State in relation to the land in question. 20) Heard     Mr.   Arvind   Datar,   learned   senior counsel for the appellant,   Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. Nishant   R.   Katneshwarkar,   learned   counsel   for respondent Nos. 2 & 3. 21) Mr.   Arvind   Datar,   learned   senior   counsel appearing   for   the   appellant   (PCNTDA)   while assailing   the   legality   and   correctness   of   the impugned order has mainly urged six points. 22) In the first place, learned counsel urged that the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court in allowing the landowners' writ petition is, on the face of it, legally unsustainable and being wholly perverse deserves to be set aside. 14 23) In   the   second   place,   learned   counsel   urged that an issue as to whether the land in question was   capable   of   being   released   or   not   from   the clutches   of   the   acquisition   proceedings   in   the context of Section 48 (1) of the Act had attained finality in the earlier rounds of litigation against the landowners up to this Court, the same could not have   been   again   agitated   by   filing   another application by respondent No.1(landowners) under Section 48 of the Act.  24) According to learned counsel, it was not legally permissible to empower the then Revenue Minister to entertain such application. 25) In the third place, learned counsel contended that   when   the   State   had   admittedly   taken possession   of   the   land   in   question   long   back   on 30.05.2000 strictly in accordance with law as laid 15 down by this Court in  Balwant Narayan Bhagde  vs. M.D.   Bhagwat   &   Ors.   (1976)   1   SCC   700,   the provisions   of   Section   48   of   the   Act     had   no application to the  facts  of   the   case   at  hand  and neither the then Revenue Minister nor the State had any power to invoke the provisions of Section 48 of the Act to release any part of the land on or after 30.05.2000.  26) In the fourth place, learned counsel contended that   the   then   Revenue   Minister,   who   passed   the order dated 10.06.2004 had no power to entertain any such application because admittedly during the relevant time, due to announcement of date of the State   Assembly   elections   (September   2004),   the Code of Conduct had come in force which did not permit any Minister to exercise such power.   16 27) In the fifth place, learned counsel contended that even otherwise, the so called noting made by the then Revenue Minister in the file on 10.06.2004 directing release of the land in question from the acquisition proceedings could never be construed as an “order" within the meaning of Section 48 of the Act and nor such noting had any attribute of a legal order.  28) It was his submission that firstly, such noting remained   only   a   noting   of   the   then   Revenue Minister,   which   was   never   communicated   to   the landowners   as   per   the   procedure   prescribed   and secondly, before it could take the shape of an order within   the   meaning   of   Section   48   of   the   Act   for being giving effect to, the noting was ordered to be considered afresh by the State Government by order dated 04.11.2004.  17 29) In this way, according to learned counsel, the so called noting never saw the light of the day and died its own death in the files creating no right and interest of any kind in favour of the landowners.  30) In the fifth place, learned counsel contended that the then Revenue Minister had passed similar orders alike the one in question in relation to other survey   numbers   by   directing   release   of   the   land from the clutches of the acquisition proceedings but all such orders were quashed by the High Court in the writ petition and those orders were also upheld by this Court.  Learned counsel gave the list of the cases. 31) In the sixth place, learned counsel contended that while releasing part of the land vide order dated 20.08.1994 (Annexure­P­24) it was made clear to the landowners that they would not be entitled to 18 claim any compensation for the said land. It was, therefore,   urged   that   reading   of   the   order   dated 20.08.1994 would clearly indicate that the releasing of   the   part   of   the   land   and   retaining   of   the remaining   land   was   in   the   nature   of   a   bargain between   the   State   and   the   landowners   and, therefore, there did not arise any occasion to further release of the remaining land in question which was undoubtedly   needed   for   accomplishing   the   public purpose for which it was acquired. 32) In   other   words,   the   submission   was   that release   of   part   of   the   land   vide   order   dated 20.08.1994   disentitled   the   landowners   to   claim further   release   of   the   remaining   land   from acquisition proceedings.   It is apart from the fact that  the   release   of   the   land   due  to  obtaining   its 19 possession under Section 16 was not possible under Section 48 of the Act.           33) It   is   essentially   these   submissions,   learned counsel elaborated in his arguments by referring to the   record   of   the   case   and   the   decisions   of   this Court. 34) In reply, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel   supported the impugned order including its   reasoning.   It   was   her   submission   that   the impugned order is based on proper reasoning and hence it does not call for any interference. Learned counsel elaborated her submission by referring to the documents to support the reasoning of the High Court.  35) Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we 20 find force in the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the appellant. 36) The   main   questions   which   arise   for consideration in this appeal are first,  whether the then Revenue Minister,  who was purporting to act for and on behalf of the State, had the power, in the background   facts   of   this   case,   to   invoke   the provisions of Section 48 of the Act for release of the acquired   land   in   question   from   the   acquisition proceedings; Second, whether the State had taken possession   of   the   acquired   land   in   question   on 30.05.2000 and, if so, its effect;  and lastly,  what is the true nature of the order dated 10.06.2004. 37) Sections 16 and 48, which are relevant for this case read as under:  “Section 16 16.  Power   to   take   possession­   When   the Collector has made an award under section 21 11,   he   may   take   possession   of   the   land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.  Section 48 48.  Completion   of   acquisition   not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when  not completed­(1) Except  in  the case provided for in section 36, the Government shall   be   at   liberty   to   withdraw   from   the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken.  (2)   Whenever   the   Government   withdraws from any such acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for   the   damage   suffered   by   the   owner   in consequence   of   the   notice   or   of   nay proceedings thereunder, and shall pay such amount   to   the   person   interested,   together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land.  (3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to the determination of   the   compensation   payable   under   this section .”  38) Section 48 of the Act gives liberty to the State to withdraw from the acquisition of any land " of 22 which possession has not been taken " except in the cases which fall in Section 36. In other words, once the possession of the acquired land is taken, the   State   has   no   power   to   withdraw   from   the acquisition because as a result of taking over of the possession, the acquired land vests with the State absolutely free from all encumbrances.  39) A fortiori  so long as the possession is not taken of   the   acquired   land,   the   State   is   at   liberty   to withdraw from the acquisition either partly or fully depending upon the facts of each case. 40) Section 16 of the Act empowers the Collector to take possession of the acquired land on passing of an award under Section 11 of the Act. Once the Collector takes possession, the acquired land vests absolutely   in   the   Government   free   from   all encumbrances as provided therein.  23 41) The   question   arose   before   a   Bench   of   three Judges of this Court in   Balwant Narayan Bhagde (supra) as to how and in what manner possession of the   acquired   land   is   required   to   be   taken   as provided under Section 16 of the Act. The majority view speaking through Bhagwati J. (as His Lordship then was) dealt with this issue succinctly in Para 28 thus:  “28………We think it is enough to state that when   the   Government   proceeds   to   take possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take actual   possession   of   the   land,   since   all interests   in   the   land   are   sought   to   be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking “symbolical” possession in the sense understood   by   judicial   decisions   under   the Code   of   Civil   Procedure.   Nor   would possession merely on paper be enough. What the   Act   contemplates   as   a   necessary condition   of   vesting   of   the   land   in   the Government   is   the   taking   of   actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There   can   be   no   hard   and   fast   rule   laying 24 down   what   act   would   be   sufficient   to constitute taking of possession of land. We should   not,   therefore,   be   taken   as   laying down   an   absolute   and   inviolable   rule   that merely   going   on   the   spot   and   making   a declaration   by   beat   of   drum   or   otherwise would   be   sufficient   to   constitute   taking   of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of   determining   what   part   was   waste   and arable   and   should,   therefore,   be   taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where   possible,   to   give   such   notice   before possession   is   taken   by   the   authorities,   as that  would   eliminate   the  possibility  of  any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of   mere   paper   possession,   without   the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it.” 42) Keeping in view the law laid down in  Balwant (supra),   we   proceed   to   examine Narayan   Bhagde   25 the question as to whether the possession of   the remaining   acquired   land   was   taken   by   the   State and, if so, whether it was done in accordance with the test laid down by this Court. 43) Having perused the Panchanama (Annexure­P­ 4) dated 30.05.2004, Mutation Entry No. 8212 (file 7/12)   (Annexure­P­5),   possession   receipt (Annexure­P­12) and   Mutation Entry of PCNTDA (Annexure ­P­28/29) relied upon by the State,   we have no hesitation in holding that the State did take possession   of   the   acquired   land   in   question   on 30.05.2000 as per the test laid down by this Court in   Balwant  Narayan Bhagde  (supra). This we say for  the following reasons. 44) First, the State gave notice to all the co­owners of   the   land   in   question   and   informed   them   to remain present at the time of taking possession by 26 the SLAO;   Second, out of all the co­owners, two, namely,   Chandra   Kant   Gajanan   Dev   and Bhalchandra Chintaman Dev were present at the time   of   taking   possession.   It   was   sufficient compliance;   Third,   possession   was   taken   in   the presence of two witnesses by   the SLAO; Fourth, panchanama   evidencing   taking   of   the   possession was duly signed by the witnesses; Fifth, the name of the   State   Government   was   duly   entered   in   the revenue   records   after   obtaining   possession   as   an owner;     Sixth,   the   Government,   in   turn,   handed over   the   possession   of   the   land   to   the   appellant (PCNTDA);  and Seventh, the name of PCNTDA was also entered in the revenue records of the land in question. 45) Once we hold that the possession of the land in question was taken by the State in accordance 27 with law on 30.05.2004 from the landowners, we have no hesitation in holding that the provisions of Section 48 of the Act were not applicable to the case at hand. In other words, once it is held that the possession of the acquired land was with the State, the land stood vested in the State disentitling the State   to   release   the   land   from   the   acquisition proceedings by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 48 of the Act.  46) A fortiori , the then Revenue Minister had no power   to   deal   with   the   land   in   question   in   any manner   whatsoever   and   nor   had   any   power   to invoke the provisions of Section 48 of the Act for release of the land in question from the clutches of the acquisition proceedings. 47) This   takes   us   to   examine   another   question though in the light of our finding on the issue of 28 possession, it is not necessary for us to examine this question in detail.  48) The   question   is   whether   the   order   dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue Minister directing release of the acquired land in question has the attributes of an order within the meaning of Section 48 of the Act or, in other words, whether the order in question created any right in favour of the landowners   so   as   to   enable   them   to   claim mandamus for enforcement of such order against the State  49) Our answer to the question is "no". It is for the reasons that First, a mere noting in the official files of the Government while dealing with any matter pertaining to any person is essentially an internal matter of the Government and carries with it no legal sanctity;  Second, once the decision on such 29 issue   is   taken   and   approved   by   the   competent authority   empowered   by   the   Government   in   that behalf,   it  is   required   to  be   communicated   to  the person concerned by the State Government.  50) In other words, so long as the decision based on such internal deliberation is not approved and communicated by the competent authority as per the   procedure   prescribed   in   that   behalf   to   the person concerned, such noting does not create any right   in   favour   of   the   person   concerned   nor   it partake the nature of any legal order so as to enable the person concerned to claim any benefit of any such   internal   deliberation.   Such   noting(s)   or/and deliberation(s) are always capable of being changed or/and   amended   or/and   withdrawn   by   the competent authority.  30 51) Third, though Section 48 of the Act, in terms, does not provide that release of the land from any acquisition proceedings is required to be done by issuance of the notification by the State but, in our view, having regard to the scheme of the Act, which begins with the process of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of any land, the release of land from such acquisition is complete only when a notification is issued by the State in that behalf.       52) Indeed, the aforementioned issue remains no more  res integra  and was decided by this Court in several   decisions,   such   as   State   of   Punjab   vs. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh , AIR 1961 SC 493,  State of Bihar   vs.   Kripalu   Shankar ,   (1987)   3   SCC   34, , (1993) Rajasthan Housing Board vs. Shri Krishan 2 SCC 84,   Sethi Auto Service Station vs. DDA , 31 (2009) 1 SCC 180 and  Shanti Sports Club & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. , (2009) 15 SCC 705. 53) In   (supra)   a   Bench   of   two Shanti   Sports   Judges of this Court, speaking through Singhvi, J., took note of all the previous case law on the subject noted above and held as under: “37…………..Although, the plain language of Section 48(1) does not give any indication of the   manner   or   mode   in   which   the power/discretion   to   withdraw   from   the acquisition   of   any   land   is   required   to   be exercised,   having   regard   to   the   scheme   of Parts   II   and   VII   of   the   1894   Act,   which postulates   publication   of   notification   under Section 4(1), declaration under Section 6 and agreement under Section 42 in the Official Gazette as a condition for valid acquisition of the   land   for   any   public   purpose   or   for   a company, it is reasonable to take the view that withdrawal from the acquisition, which may adversely affect the public purpose for which, or the company on whose behalf the acquisition is proposed, can be done only by issuing a notification in the Official Gazette.

32

33 54) In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of   the   considered   opinion   that   the   then   Revenue Minister, who passed the order dated 10.06.2004 had no power to deal with the matter relating to release of the land in question. He simply usurped the power under Section 48 of the Act, which he never   possessed.   It   was   an   abuse   of   exercise   of power   by   him   while   dealing   with   the   State's largesse. 55) That apart, in our view, the filing of the writ petition by the landowners itself was an abuse of judicial process. It was for the simple reason that the   earlier   litigation,   which   travelled   up   to   this Court thrice having ended against the landowners, it   was   binding   on   the   parties.     It   prevented   the landowners to again raise the same issue.  34 56) Indeed,   the   release   of   part   of   the   land   in landowners’ favour and retention of the remaining land for accomplishing the project vide notification dated 20.08.1994 was in the nature of a bargain. It disentitled the landowners to seek further release of the remaining land. This is apart from the fact that consequent upon obtaining  the  possession of  the land by the State, the release of the remaining land under   Section   48   of   the   Act   was   otherwise   not legally possible.     57) In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that the High Court failed to examine the issues arising in the case in its correct perspective. We cannot, therefore, concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court   which   wrongly   upheld   the   order   dated 35 10.06.2004   passed   by   the   concerned   Revenue Minister.   58) The appeal thus succeeds and is accordingly allowed.   Impugned   order   is   set   aside.   As   a consequence, the writ petition filed by respondent No.1   stands   dismissed   with   costs   quantified   at Rs.25,000/­ to be payable by respondent No.1 to the appellant. ………………………………..J.  (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)             …..………………………………J.      (UDAY UMESH LALIT) New Delhi, August 03, 2018 36