Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 5159 of 2007
PETITIONER:
Larsen & Toubro Ltd
RESPONDENT:
Fertilizer & Chemicals Travancore Ltd
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/11/2007
BENCH:
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5159 OF 2007
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4014 of 2006)
[with C.A. No 5160 of 2007 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 4015 of 2006]
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in these appeals is to the order passed by the
learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court disposing of
arbitration request filed before him.
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:-
Appellant and the respondent entered into a contract vide
purchase order no.3020/02-2701/016/1018 dated 7.1.1995.
Alleging that in breach of the terms and conditions of the
purchase order certain amounts were withheld, the appellant
invoked the arbitration agreement purportedly in terms of new
Article 26 of the Special Conditions and suggested three
names for appointment of an independent sole arbitrator and
called upon the respondent to name one out of the three
names. The respondent took the stand that it is only the
Managing Director of the respondent who can be appointed as
a named arbitrator as per Article 26 of the Standard
Conditions and refused to appoint a sole independent
arbitrator. The High Court of Kerala was moved seeking
appointment of an arbitrator by Arbitration Request 29/99.
Learned Single Judge declined the arbitration request on the
ground that terms and conditions of the purchase order
provides for arbitration by the Chairman and Managing
Director of the respondent. A writ petition was filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the
’Constitution’). During pendency of the said writ petition this
Court in CA Nos. 3777, 4168 and 4169 of 2003 held that the
order passed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short the ’Act’) is a judicial order
and writ petition challenging the said order under Article 226
of the Constitution is not maintainable. Therefore, this appeal
has been filed.
4. In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5
appellant submitted that the provision contained in Article 26
of the Standard Conditions is not the actual provision for
arbitration. The same is contained in the special terms and
conditions attached to the purchase order and the work order
respectively. The purchase order and the work order contained
special conditions, standard terms and conditions. By Article
16 of the Special terms and Conditions of the purchase, there
is amendment to the article 25 of the standard conditions.
There is similar amendment to article 26 of the standard terms
so far as it related to commissioning. The provisions contained
in the standard conditions in both the cases, it was submitted
by learned counsel for the appellant, is not actual provision for
arbitration. The general condition stated that all disputes and
differences are required to be referred to the Chairman and
Managing Director of the respondent-company for his decision
and it will be binding on the parties. It was further contended
that the provisions contained in the special conditions by
themselves do not have any provision for arbitration. It does
not have any clause that disputes and difference shall be
settled by arbitration. In both the cases, the special conditions
specifically state that it is by way of amendment of general
condition only and not in supersession of that provision. The
Chairman and the Managing Director of the respondent-
company cannot be treated as independent person to be
appointed as arbitrator. This was essentially the stand which
did not find acceptance. It is submitted by learned counsel for
the appellant that certain changes were suggested by the
respondent.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand
submitted that the High Court view is unexceptionable.
6. At this juncture it would be necessary to take note of the
few conditions :
Clause 16 of the Work Order reads as follows:-
"16. Work Order Conditions:
The order shall be governed by the above conditions
as well as by the conditions stipulated in
Attachment I, II and III of this Work Order, except
the following:
The order shall be governed by the
present special conditions of work (W.O.
Attachment III) as well as by the
conditions stipulated in Attachment I,
and II of this Work Order, except the
following:
Spec. No.3020/CS/04: Standard Terms and
Conditions of Erection & Commissioning.
Art. 4.0.0 Taxes, Duties and Levies (comment)
Taxes shall be as per Article 4.0.0. However, at
present conditions; tax on this Work Order is not
applicable.
Art. 13.0.0 Termination (comment)
FACT can terminate the Work Order without giving
any reason provided that reasonable cost for
termination and actual out-of-pocket expenses will
be reimbursed.
Art. 15.0.0 Changes (Amendment)
FACT shall issue amendment orders which provide
for changes in the scope of work required by FACT
under the Work Order, and for equitable adjustment
in the price and delivery/completion time, if any,
hereunder.
Art. 21.0.0 Tests on Completion & Taking Over (New
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5
Article Added).
Art. 21.5.0 (New Article)
The Primary Reformer Package under the scope of
this Work Order shall be deemed to be taken over
by FACT immediately after satisfactory pre-
commissioning is over within 10 days of
Contractor’s notice to Owner for commencement of
commissioning after pre-commissioning, whichever
is earlier. In case taking over is delayed due to no
fault of Contractor, after the notice given by
Contractor in this regard about the Completion, the
entire Primary Reformer Package is deemed to be
taken over by FACT.
Art. 24.0.0 Indemnification
Secondary liability such as indemnification for loss
caused by stoppage of plant of like will be excluded
from Contractor’s liabilities under the Work Order.
Art. 26.0.0 Applicable Law and Settlement of
Disputes (amendment)
The provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940
and the rules there under, any statutory,
modifications there for the time being in force will
be applied.
The venue for the arbitration shall be Cochin, and
the language of the proceedings shall be the English
language.
During the arbitration proceedings, both parties
shall continue to discharge their obligations under
the Work Order."
7. There was addition and not substitution of condition.
Without amendment there was arbitration clause and if there
was no amendment the only substitution, then that there was
no arbitration clause. In the arbitration request in the
statement of facts it has been clearly stated that article 26 of
the standard terms and conditions of purchase form part of
the work order. The same read as follows:
"Article 26: Work Order shall be subject to and
shall in all respects be governed by Indian law.
Any dispute or difference connected with or
arising out of WORK ORDER which cannot be
settled by mutual agreement of the parties
shall be referred to the Chairman & Managing
Director of FACT, and his decision will be
binding on the parties. Any legal proceeding
relating to this WORK ORDER shall be limited
to Courts of law under the jurisdiction of the
Kerala High Court at Ernakulam District,
Kerala State, India."
8. The stand of the learned counsel for the appellant that
the special conditions of the work order superseded the
standard terms and conditions, is not correct. The mere fact
that the arbitrator was named does not render the arbitration
proceedings invalid.
9. In Secretary to Government, Transport Deptt., Madras v.
Munuswamy Mudliar and Anr. (1988 Suppl. SCC 651) it was
noted as follow:
"7. Pursuant to this the Superintending
Engineer of that Circle, at the relevant time,
was previously appointed as arbitrator. There
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5
was succession to that office by another
incumbent and the succeeding Superintending
Engineer wanted to continue the arbitration
proceedings but before that an application was
made under Section 5 of the Arbitration Act,
1940 (hereinafter called ’the Act’) for removal of
the arbitrator, before the learned Judge of the
City Civil Court, Madras."
10. Again in paras 11 to 13 it was noted as follows:
"11. This is a case of removal of a named
arbitrator under Section 5 of the Act which
gives jurisdiction to the court to revoke the
authority of the arbitrator. When the parties
entered into the contract, the parties knew the
terms of the contract including arbitration
clause. The parties knew the scheme and the
fact that the Chief Engineer is superior and the
Superintending Engineer is subordinate to the
Chief Engineer of the particular Circle. In spite
of that the parties agreed and entered into
arbitration and indeed submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Superintending Engineer at
that time to begin with, who, however, could
not complete the arbitration because he was
transferred and succeeded by a successor. In
those circumstances on the facts stated no
bias can reasonably be apprehended and made
a ground for removal of a named arbitrator. In
our opinion this cannot be, at all, a good or
valid legal ground. Unless there is allegation
against the named arbitrator either against his
honesty or capacity or mala fide or interest in
the subject matter or reasonable apprehension
of the bias, a named and agreed arbitrator
cannot and shou1d not be removed in exercise
of a discretion vested in the Court under
Section 5 of the Act.
12. Reasonable apprehension of bias in the
mind of a reasonable man can be a ground for
removal of the arbitrator. A predisposition to
decide for or against one party, without proper
regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias.
There must be reasonable apprehension of
that predisposition. The reasonable
apprehension must be based on cogent
materials. See the observations of Mustill and
Boyd, Commercial Arbitration, 1982 edn., page
214. Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th edn.,
Volume 2, para 551, page 282 describe that
the test for bias is whether a reasonable
intelligent man, fully apprised of all the
circumstances, would feel a serious
apprehension of bias.
13. This Court in International Authority of
India v. K. D. Bali (1988 (2) SCC 360) held that
there must be reasonable evidence to satisfy
that there was a real likelihood of bias. Vague
suspicions of whimsical, capricious and
unreasonable people should not be made the
standard to regulate normal human conduct.
In this country in numerous contracts with the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5
government, clauses requiring the
Superintending Engineer or some official of the
Government to be the arbitrator are there. It
cannot be said that the Superintending
Engineer, as such cannot be entrusted with
the work of arbitration and that an
apprehension, simpliciter in the mind of the
contractor without any tangible ground, would
be a justification for removal. No other ground
for the alleged apprehension was indicated in
the pleadings before the learned Judge or the
decision of the learned Judge. There was, in
our opinion, no ground for removal of the
arbitrator. Mere imagination of a ground
cannot be an excuse for apprehending bias in
the mind of the chosen arbitrator."
11. The apprehension that named arbitrator may not act
fairly is without any foundation. The High Court has rightly
held that by article 16 of the special terms and conditions of
purchase there was an amendment to article 25 which reads
as follows:-
"The provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act,
1940, and the rules thereunder, any statutory
modifications thereof of the time being in force
will be applied. The venue of the arbitration
shall be Cochin, and the language of the
proceedings shall be the English Language.
During the arbitration proceedings, both
parties shall continue to discharge their
obligations under the Purchase Order."
12. Similar was the amendment to Article 26 of the
Standard terms and Conditions for erection and
commissioning in Article 16 of the Special Conditions of work
attached to the word order. The special conditions
themselves show that articles 25 and 26 contained provisions
for arbitration. The amendments incorporated by the Special
conditions only provide that the provisions of the relevant
Arbitration Act and the rules made thereunder and any
statutory modifications thereof for the time being in force will
be applicable and the venue of arbitration and language of
the proceedings.
13. The appeals are sans merit, deserve dismissal, which we
direct.