SHANKAR LAL vs. HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD.

  REPORTABLE  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION    CIVIL APPEAL NO.2858 OF 2022   (Arising out of Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 16886 of   2019) SHANKAR LAL                  .…...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS HINDUSTAN COPPER LTD. & ORS.     ……RESPONDENT(S)      J U D G M E N T ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J. The appellant is before us primarily questioning the validity   of   an   order   of   the   employer   (Hindustan   Copper Limited ­ the first respondent in this appeal) treating his date st of birth as 21  September 1945. This date has relevance for computation   of   his   benefits   accruing   from   a   Voluntary Retirement Scheme (“VRS”), for which he applied and was Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Rachna Date: 2022.04.20 17:59:37 IST Reason: st granted. The appellant’s stand is that his date of birth is 21 September   1949.   The   appellant   had   invoked   the   writ 1 jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur   (“the   High   Court”),   but   was   unsuccessful   before   a Single Judge and the Division Bench in sustaining his case. st If the latter date, i.e. 21  September, 1949 was accepted by the employer to be his date of birth, his financial benefits from the said scheme would have been higher, as he would have   had   longer   service   tenure   left.     It   appears   that   the tenure of service left was the basis on which the VRS benefit was to be computed. We would like to point out here that in the pleadings and copies of various other documents forming part of the paperbook, there are overlapping dates claimed by th the appellant to be his actual date of birth. These are 20 st September 1949 and 21   September 1949. This variation, however, is insignificant so far as adjudication of this appeal is concerned.  In this judgment, we shall ignore this variation st and proceed on the basis that 21   September 1949 is the date claimed by the appellant to be his birthdate.  The VRS was operational in the appellant’s case with 2. rd effect from 3   October 2002. Admitted position is that 21st September 1949 was recorded as his date of birth in his service book. This was opened in 1975.   He had joined the 2 organisation in the year 1971 and the  Form “B”  reflects his st date of birth as 21  September 1945.  The appellant claims that at the time of his voluntary retirement, he came to learn for the first time that his date of birth was being changed to st 21  September 1945. He invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High   Court   in   the   year   2008   as   his   representations   for st adhering to 21   September 1949 as his birthdate failed to evoke positive response from the employer. That writ petition (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5690/08) was disposed of by a Single Judge with a direction to the appellant to make a fresh representation in light of the recommendations made by a committee of the employer themselves in his favour on the subject controversy. The competent authority was directed, in th the same judgment delivered on 15  July 2008, to consider and decide on the same in accordance with law.  3. The   appellant’s   representation   was   rejected   by   the

October   2008   (“the   rejection   order”).   The   appellant’s   plea against   the   rejection   order   (S.B.   Civil   Writ   Petition   No. 13195/2008) was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the th High Court by an Order dated 24   November 2008 and his 3 appeal (D.B.Special Appeal Writ No.1501/2011) assailing the order of dismissal before a Division Bench of the same High Court also failed.   The judgment of the Division Bench was th delivered on 8  December 2016. It is this judgment which is under   appeal   before   us.     The   appellant   stakes   his   claim primarily on his service book maintained by the employer, st where his date of birth is shown as 21  September 1949.  Mr. Kaushal Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant has also relied   on   a   Life   Insurance   Corporation   (“L.I.C.”)   Policy   in which the same date of birth has been shown.  This policy, however, was subscribed to by the appellant in the month of May, 1980. The appellant’s counsel has brought to our notice sample copies of his pay slips for the months of August 1994 and August 2001. Both these pay slips carry the message, “Happy Birthday 20.09.1949”.   The appellant has also relied upon certain clauses of the Standing Orders of the employer   in   support   of   his   claim.   We   shall   refer   to   the relevant clauses thereof later in this judgment.  4. The appellant had joined the said organisation as a miner   on   completion   of   his   one­month   training   in   the temporary job.  Communication to that effect was issued on 4 th 8   September 1971.   We have already referred to different documents emanating from or maintained by the employer themselves   where   his   date   of   birth   was   shown   to   be st 21   September   1949.   In   the   computation   sheet   of   his estimated   “VR   benefit”   also   the   same   date   of   birth   was reflected. By that time, the post the appellant was holding was that of “drifter operator” (a copy of the estimate sheet forms part of the paperbook, at page 38). The appellant was rd relieved from his service on 3  October 2002.  The appellant’s case is that he came to know that his date of birth was being altered only after he was relieved from service.   From the materials available on record, we find reference to his date of st birth as 21   September 1945 for the first time in a form nd issued by the employer on 22  March 2003. The top portion of  this   form   (a   copy   of   which   appears   at   page   47   of   the paperbook) carries an endorsement made by the Assistant Manager of the first respondent: ­ “Date of birth: 21.09.1945 as per ‘B’   Form” . Immediately below this sentence there is recordal that “D.O.B: 21.09.1949 as per H.O. Application.” Rest   of   the   said   form   contains   other   particulars   of   the appellant, which also includes his date of birth, filled in as 5 th 20  September 1949. The appellant, however, had knowledge st of   his   date   of   birth   being   taken   by   the   employer   as   21 September 1945 earlier, but according to him, he had noticed this   only   after   being   relieved   from   service.   In   his   service th st certificate issued on 29  October 2002, 21  September 1945 was shown as his birthdate. 5. Stand of the respondents, represented by Ms. Nandini Sen Mukherjee, learned counsel, is that at the  entry point, he had   given   his   age   to   be   26   years,   and   that   was   the   age

to be maintained under The Mines Act, 1952. It has also been submitted   by   her   that   at   that   point   of   time,   the   medical practitioner during a health check­up had also assessed his age to be about 25 years, which would take his year of birth closer   to   1945.   In   the   year   1975,   his   service   book   was prepared.  In such records, the appellant’s age was entered as 26 years by mistake, repeating his age as it was at the time he joined the organisation. That is how the inconsistent recordal of the appellant’s birthdate is sought to be explained by the employer.  She has also emphasised that the appellant had raised the complaint after receiving all the VRS benefits 6

respect of other employees also in the same organisation, and a   three­member   committee   was   constituted   by   an   Order

Khetri   Copper   Complex   of   the   first   respondent.     The committee   considered   the   case   of   the   appellant   also,   and their report went in his favour.   Relevant extract from this report   has   been   annexed   at   page   54   of   the   paperbook (Annexure   P13).     In   Clauses   3,   4   and   5   of   this   report, background has been given in relation to recordal of date of birth of an employee. We quote below the said three clauses from that report:­ “3. As per the company’s certified standing orders, the  basis   for   determining   the   date   of  birth  of  an employee will be:­ a)  Birth Certificate b)  School Leaving Certificate c)  Insurance Policy d)  Horoscope e) Medical Report In   the   standing   orders   followed   in   KCC,   it   is   no where written that the ‘B’ Form will be basis for the determining the age.  4. In one of the court case (Durga Ram Vs. HCL Case No.2427/1990) for age anomaly, the Hon’ble High Court, Rajasthan has declined to accept the ‘B’ 7 Form   Register   as   the   basis   for   age/date   of   birth determination   where   the   Hon’ble   High   Court   had quoted “when ‘B’ Form entries have not been made by the petitioner in his own hand­writing and the entries have been made in ‘B’ Form in a language which   the   petitioner   could   not   have   understood, entries made in ‘B’ Form could not have been made basis for effecting the retirement of the petitioner.  5. During construction period of KCC there was no proper   system   of   recording   the   particulars   of   an employee   like   date   of   birth,   age   etc.   Most   of   the workmen were engaged as “daily rated monthly paid basis” and there was no proper system of recording the exact date of joining, date of birth etc. During this period employees so engaged were never asked for documents etc. in support of their age. Only after the Gopal Das Narayan Award in 1971, all these “daily rated monthly paid” workmen were regularized and their date of initial joining in the company were taken into account, service book was introduced and particulars of these employees were maintained.” (quoted verbatim from the paperbook) 

committee was to the following effect: ­ “6. Shri   Shankar   Lal   Saini,   Code   No.36145,   Ex­ employee. Shri Shankar Lal joined the company on 21.9.1971. His age was recorded as 26 years in the ‘B’ Form Register   at   the   time   of   his   initial   joining. Accordingly, his date of birth comes to 21.9.1945. However, his date of birth was not recorded in his service book. His service book was filled up in the year 1975 where his date of birth was recorded as 21.9.1949   counting   26   years   from   the   year   1975 (year of filling up the service book). In the medical report dated 22.9.1971 also his age was assessed as 25 years, which comes nearer to 1945 and not of 1949. The date of birth recorded in the service book was not disputed for a long time. However, in the year 2002, when the anomaly was noticed the case was processed for rectification but in the meantime, Shri Shankar Lal has submitted 8 V.R.   and   subsequently   released   from   the committee’s service on 3.10.2002. His V.R. payment was   released   considering   his   date   of   birth   as 21.9.1949   and   not   as   21.9.1949   (which   was recorded   in   his   service   book)   as   the   Finance Department did not agree to accept the date of birth as 21.9.1949. After receiving the payment the ex­ employee   made   several   request   to   release   the balance amount of V.R. benefit considering his date of birth is 21.09.1949. The committee observed that the ex­employee joined this complex on 21.9.1971. Since he was only literate, a ‘B’ register was filled up at that time where his age was recorded as 26 years. In the year 1975 a service book was filled up where date of birth was recorded as 21.9.1949, counting 26 years from the year 1975. There was a medical report dated 22.9.1971 where his age was assessed as   25   years   which   makes   the   date   of   birth   as 22.9.1946   but   this   medical   report   cannot   be considered as this was a routine medical report and no   medical   board   was   set   up   specifically   for   age determination. The committee felt that the date of birth as 21.9.1949 was recorded in the service book in   the   year   1975,   which   was   never   disputed thereafter.   Moreover,   the   same   date   of   birth   was mentioned in his pay­slip ever year which was also published   by   the   committee.   His   LIC   record   also indicates the same date of birth. Only at the time of his release of payment in the year 2002 his date of birth was considered from 21.9.1949 to 21.9.1949 which   is   against   the   DEP’s   guidelines   dated 9.2.2001. The committee, therefore, recommended to maintain his date of birth as 21.9.1949.” (quoted verbatim from the paperbook) 

which resulted in the appellant filing the writ petition before the High Court. We have referred to this writ petition and

in this judgment.  9

accepted by the employer in the rejection order, relying on Clause 5 of the Standing Order.   The relevant extract from this clause has been quoted in para (iv) of the rejection order made by the competent authority.   We reproduce below the said clause, as it appears in the rejection order: ­  “iv) …..   However,   in   case   of   Mining   workmen, declaration of age by the individual workman in the ‘B’ Form Register as per the Mines Act/Rules may be relied   upon   subject   to   confirmation   by   the Company’s   Medical   Officer   whenever   considered necessary.” (quoted verbatim from the paperbook) 

guidelines   of   the   Department   of   Public   Enterprises, Government of India.  In Clauses (v), (vi) and (vii) of the said order, it is recorded:­

10

(quoted verbatim from the paperbook)

the rejection order, the High Court found the stand taken by the authorities in rejecting the appellant’s plea for treating

Single Judge of the High Court considered the fact that no documentary evidence was available on record to support his

petition was dismissed. Against the judgment of dismissal, the appellant approached the Division Bench of the same Court.   The   Division   Bench   also   primarily   relied   upon   the entry in the Form “B” register and dismissed the appeal. The Division Bench, inter alia, held:­ “(5) There shall be a presumption of correctness with regard to entries regarding date of birth made as far back   as   1971   in   the   statutory   Form   ‘B’   register 11 under   the   Mines   Act.   If   the   Appellant   seeks   to challenge entries in a statutory register duly signed by him also, the onus lies on him to prove how it was   wrongly   made.   Obviously   the   age   mentioned was not a figment of imagination by the Respondent evident from the order of appointment which states that it was based on his own statement (6) The service book of the Appellant was opened in the year 1975. There was no challenge to entry in the same also. According to the DPE guidelines any request   for   correction   in  the   date  of   birth   in   the service book was required to be made within 5 years. If there was a prescription of time limit, the question of raising  any controversy much after that period and acceptance of VRS 2002 simply does not arise.  (7)  The Appellant accepted the benefits of the VRS and then raised the dispute. The Respondents in all fairness referred his case to a Medical Board which again opined in confirmation of the entries made in the   Form   ‘B’   register   and   the   service   book.   The contention of the Appellant with regard to his date of birth being 21.09.1947 becomes a disputed question of   fact   which   cannot   be   inquired   in   the   writ jurisdiction quite apart  from  the fact  of it  having been raised very belatedly.” (quoted verbatim from the paperbook) 

book there was error in recording the age of the appellant as 26 years in 1975 and we ought not to give any credence to such recordal. The respondents had only corrected an error and such recordal in service book cannot be treated to be

1949. We, however, find that the authorities proceeded in this matter in a rather mechanical manner and embarked on 12 a unilateral exercise of correcting the age entry in the service book on their perception that an error was being corrected. This exercise was conducted without giving any opportunity of hearing to the appellant and at the fag end of his service tenure.   Otherwise,   various   documents   including   the   L.I.C.

appellant’s birthdate.

been placed by the employer does not treat the entry in the Form   ‘B’   recording   date   of   birth   of   a   miner   to   be   the conclusive proof of his or her age. Any doubt on a workman’s age at the time of joining service also could be verified by a medical board.   We accept that an entry in the Form “B” possesses high probative value, but they are not conclusive proof of what is contained therein. The competent authority proceeded   on   the   basis   that   since   the   appellant   did   not question the entry in Form “B”, he ought not to be permitted to question the same at the time of his voluntary retirement.

managers of the respondent no.1 has raised doubt of the 13 correctness   of   the   medical  report  as   the   same   was   not  a report   of   a   medical   board   set   up   specifically   for   age determination.  It appears to have been a general observation in course of health check­up.  There does not appear to have had   been   any   other   medical   board   constituted   for   that purpose. The Division Bench, in the judgment under appeal, has held that the respondents had referred the appellant’s case   to   a   medical   board   which   had   again   confirmed   the entries made in the Form “B” register. We do not find from the   counter   affidavit   that   any   further   medical   board   was constituted. Moreover, the finding of the Division Bench that opinion of the medical board confirmed the entries made in the Form “B” register and service book is erroneous as in the service book prepared in the year 1975, the year of birth of the appellant has been treated to be 1949. Moreover, the rejection   order   does   not   deal   with   the   committee’s observation that the medical opinion on the appellant’s age was a routine medical report and not the opinion of a medical board   constituted   to   determine   the   age   of   an   employee. Subsequent   pay­slips,   the   sample   copies   of   which   have already been referred to in a preceding part of this judgment 14 also repeated 1949 to be the appellant’s year of birth. The L.I.C. policy subscribed to by the appellant also carries the same date of birth.

Bench was that there was no challenge to entry in the service book, which should have been done within five years as per the DPE guidelines. We are unable to accept this reasoning

date   of   birth   and   this   was   prepared   in   1975.     Thus,   no occasion arose for approaching the employer for making any correction in the service book till 2002.  

change his date of birth to his benefit at the end of his career. This is a case where the employer is altering the records at the end of the career of the workman to his detriment on taking unilateral decision that the date of birth specified in the appellant’s service book was erroneous, relying on a date disclosed in a statutory form.   Turning to Clause 5 of the Standing Order, we have already expressed our view on the evidentiary value of the entries in Form “B” as regards date of 15 birth  of   a  workman.     In  the   committee   report,  the   DPE’s

which   deals   with   alteration   of   the   date   of   birth   of   an employee. The report records: ­

(quoted verbatim from the paperbook) 

September   1945),   in   the   subsequent   documents   the   date appearing in service book had been reflected and it was the date reflected in the service book which formed the basis of the pay­slips as also the estimate statement of the appellant’s voluntary retirement benefits.   In such circumstances, the 16 appellant’s failure to seek correction in the Form “B” register could be condoned.

recorded of the appellant in the service book was an act by mistake. This is a weak explanation in our opinion. Several subsequent steps were taken by the employer in relation to the appellant’s employment on the basis of the entry in his service   book.   The   employer   are   the   custodian   of   these records.   They   acted   all   along   on   the   basis   of   the   service entries till the appellant took VRS. It has been pleaded by the appellant that at the time of his appointment, the office of the respondent company entered in all their records his date of

are not inclined to accept the version of the employer that service book recordal was a mistake. The employer, a public sector unit in this case, was expected to act with a certain element of responsibility in maintaining the service records of their   workmen   and   ensure   that   there   is   uniformity   in particulars   concerning   individual   employees.   There   is   no explanation as to how this mistake occurred and how pay slips continued to be issued carrying the mistaken date of 17 birth for such a long time.  The High Court in our view ought not to have had accepted “mistake” as the cause for different entries in different documents. 

on behalf of the employer is on the aspect of delay on the appellant’s part in questioning the mistake in the Form “B”. It has been urged by the respondents’ counsel that they had extended the sum as per the VRS package computed on the

complaint on that count was raised by the appellant after receiving such benefits. It is their case that the anomaly was discovered sometime in July­August 2002 and the appellant was asked to appear before a higher authority, which he did

2002 has been annexed to the respondent’s counter­affidavit marked as “R1”. The note sheet records that the appellant had refused to put his signature thereon. Such refusal is not of much significance so far as adjudication of the subject­ dispute   is   concerned.     Fact   remains   that   this   note­sheet appears to be the first document by which the employer had 18 alerted the appellant of their decision to rely on Form “B” entry for computing his age. 

No document of earlier origin in this regard has been brought to   our   notice   in   course   of   hearing   of   this   appeal.   The

2002. Thus, the process of fixing of the appellant’s date of birth   had   continued   beyond   the   date   on   which   he   was released from his service.

dispute   was  belated  so  as  to  non­suit  him  on this   count alone.     VRS   benefit   is   an   entitlement   and   assumes   the character of property to the  employee concerned once his application for VRS is accepted. It is the right of a person under Article 300A of the Constitution of India to have the VRS benefit to be given on accurate assessment thereof, the employer here being a public sector unit.   If at the time of quantifying   the   VRS   benefit   after   accepting   an   employee’s application for voluntary retirement, the employer take any 19 step that would reduce such benefit in monetary terms, such step shall have to be taken under the authority of law.  We find the action of the employer lacking in authority of law in this case on two counts. First, it fails for not adhering to the principles of natural justice. The decision not to follow the service   book   recordal   was   taken   without   giving   an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. The opportunity of hearing of the appellant also accrued because the employer themselves had proceeded on the basis that the later date

and this was a long established position. Moreover, since in the own records of the employer two dates were shown, under normal circumstances it would have been incumbent on their part   to   undertake   an   exercise   on   application   of   mind   to determine in which of these two records the mistake had crept   in.   That   process   would   also   have   had   to   involve participation   of   the   appellant,   which   would   have   been compatible with the principles of natural justice. There are several authorities in which this Court has deprecated the practice on the part of the employees at the fag end of their career to dispute the records pertaining to their dates of birth 20 that would have the effect of extension of the length of their service.   We   are   not   referring   to   those   authorities   in   this judgment as the ratio laid down on that count by this Court is   not   relevant   for   adjudication   of   this   appeal.   The   very reasoning on which an employee is not permitted to raise age­correction plea at the fag end of his service to extend his tenure should also apply to the employer as well. It is the employer here who had proceeded on the basis of age of the appellant   reflected   in   his   service   book   during   the   latter’s service tenure and they ought not to be permitted to fall back on the Form “B” which would curtail the VRS benefit of the appellant.

against the appellant to debar him from claiming the benefit properly   computed   as   per   his   age   reflected   in   the   official documents. Occasion did not arise for the appellant to advert to the age correcting process so far as entry in the Form “B” is concerned as the employer themselves had treated his date

21

Division Bench as also the Single Judge of the High Court did not   appreciate   the   materials   available   in   their   proper perspective.   We   do   not   think   that   the   view   taken   by   the Division Bench was a possible view. Sustaining such view would   result   in   depriving   the   appellant   of   his   legitimate benefits under the applicable Voluntary Retirement Scheme. The   materials   relied   upon   by   the   appellant   were   ignored altogether. We thus set aside the judgment of the Division Bench. As a consequence, the judgment of the Single Judge

October   2008   of   the   competent   authority   shall   stand quashed.   The respondent no.1 proceeded in the case of the appellant in an erroneous manner in treating the appellant’s

the   respondents   to   extend   the   benefits   of   VRS   to   the

Such benefits shall be extended to him within a period of four months, upon deducting therefrom the sum already paid to him.   The differential amount shall carry simple interest at the rate of seven percent (7%) per annum to be computed 22

released from service, till the date of actual payment to him in terms of this judgment. 

         ….….……..................................J. (Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud)  .…………………..........................J. (Aniruddha Bose) NEW DELHI; th  20 April, 2022.  23