A. Raja vs. D. Kumar

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 06-05-2025

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Full Judgment Text

REPORTABLE
2025 INSC 629
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023
A. RAJA …APPELLANT
VERSUS
D. KUMAR …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.
1
This is an appeal preferred under Section 116-A of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Act’) against the Final Judgment and Order dated 20.03.2023
ture1 ‘116-A. Appeals to Supreme Court.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the<br>time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court on any question (whether of law or fact) from<br>every order made by a High Court under Section 98 or Section 99.
(2) Every appeal under this Chapter shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the<br>o Nort dVeerifired of the High Court under Section 98 or Section 99:
lly si<br>HA<br>2025<br>:12 I<br>on:gned by<br>MENDIRATTA<br>.05.06<br>SPTrovided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days<br>if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period.’

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 1 of 63

2
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Judgment’) passed by the
High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High
Court’), in Election Petition No.11 of 2021 (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Election Petition’), filed by the Respondent (hereinafter also
referred to as the ‘Election Petitioner’), declaring the election of the
Appellant to the Legislative Assembly of Kerala from the Devikulam
Legislative Assembly Constituency 088 in Idukki District, Kerala, which
is reserved for the Scheduled Castes, as void under Section 100(1)(a)
3
and (d)(i) of the Act.
FACTUAL PRISM:
2. General Elections to the Devikulam Assembly Constituency for
membership of the Legislative Assembly of Kerala were to be
2 2023:KER:16955 |2023 SCC OnLine Ker 1643| (2023) 2 KLT 716| (2023) 2 KLJ 1
3 ‘100. Grounds for declaring election to be void.—(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the<br>High Court is of opinion—
(a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified, to be<br>chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or this Act or the Government of Union Territories Act,<br>1963 (20 of 1963); or
(b) …
(c) …
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially<br>affected—
(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or
(ii) …
(iii) …
(iv) …
the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 2 of 63

conducted in 2021. The Appellant filed his nomination papers before
the Returning Officer on 17.03.2021 declaring therein that he belongs
to the Hindu Parayan caste as per Caste Certificate dated 09.03.2021
issued by the Tehsildar, Devikulam. The said caste has been declared
as a Scheduled Caste in relation to the State of Kerala in Part VIII of
the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘1950 Order’) issued on 10.08.1950 by
Hon’ble the President of India. Oral objections before the Returning
Officer were raised by the Respondent contending that the Appellant
was not a member of the Scheduled Castes from Kerala and instead,
he was a Christian. The Returning Officer, after examining the
nomination papers of the Appellant rejected the objections and
accepted the nomination papers. Polling in the Constituency took place
on 06.04.2021 and after counting, the result of the election was
declared on 02.05.2021. The Appellant secured 59,049 votes and was
declared elected by a margin of 7848 votes over the Respondent-
defeated candidate who had secured 51,201 votes.
3. The election of the Appellant was challenged by the
Respondent in Election Petition No.11 of 2021 before the High Court.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 3 of 63

The ground of challenge laid therein was that the Appellant’s paternal
grandparents had migrated from Tamil Nadu to Kerala in 1951. They
were of the ‘ Hindu Parayan ’ caste in the State of Tamil Nadu. ‘ Parayan
is included in the list of Scheduled Castes of both States viz . Tamil
Nadu and Kerala in the 1950 Order, as originally brought into force.
Since the Appellant’s grandparents on the paternal side were persons
who had migrated from Tamil Nadu, they and their successors were
not entitled to claim that they belonged to ‘ Hindu Parayan ’ of Kerala
State. It was averred that hence, the Appellant is not entitled to contest
from a Constituency reserved for candidates belonging to the
Scheduled Castes from Kerala. The Appellant was born on 17.10.1984
to Mr Antony and Mrs Esther. Mr Antony and Ms Esther, it was
4
asserted, were Christians baptized by the CSI’s Church in Kundala
Estate by a pastor named Ebenezer Mani in the year 1982. The
Appellant, born in 1984, also was baptized by the said Ebenezer Mani.
Thus, the Appellant was a Christian and not entitled to contest from a
Constituency reserved for the Scheduled Castes.
4
Church of South India.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 4 of 63

4. The High Court took up the Election Petition. It framed issues,
examined witnesses, admitted documents and on consideration of the
oral testimony and documentary evidence in trial proceeded to declare
the election of the Appellant void, by way of the Impugned Judgment.
5
The issues remaining before the High Court and decided through the
Impugned Judgment are as under:
(I) Whether the returned candidate is a person
belonging to Scheduled Caste among Hindus in the
State of Kerala?
(II) Whether the acceptance of nomination of returned
candidate is proper?
(III) Whether the election of returned candidate is
liable to be set aside?
(IV) Reliefs and cost.

5. This Court granted a conditional stay of the Impugned
6
Judgment by Order dated 28.04.2023 , which was continued on
5
By its Order dated 10.03.2022, the High Court had already rejected the Appellant’s contentions that (a)
the Election Petition was liable to be dismissed at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 for want of cause of action, and; (b) the Election Petition was barred by limitation.
6

Till the next date of hearing, there shall be a conditional stay of the impugned judgment and order to the
following extent:
(i) The appellant shall be entitled to participate in the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly;
(ii) The appellant shall, however, not be entitled to vote on any motion in the Legislative Assembly. He
shall also not be entitled to vote in his capacity as a Member of the Legislative Assembly on any other
matter;
(iii) The appellant shall not be entitled to receive any allowance or monetary benefits in any other form
which is admissible to a Member of the Legislative Assembly.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 5 of 63

different dates subsequently. Vide Order dated 15.05.2024, this Court
directed that the interim relief would ‘ … continue till the final disposal of
this Appeal.
APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
6. Learned senior counsel Mr. V. Giri, for the Appellant, submitted
that the paternal grandparents of the Appellant started residing in the
erstwhile State of Travancore (which subsequently became part of the
State of Kerala) much prior to 1950 and that the paternal grandmother
and grandfather of the Appellant came to Kundala Estate in Munnar
with their respective families in 1940s before their marriage and both
families started residing in Munnar. From then onwards, both families
have been residents of Munnar. Antony, the Appellant’s father, was
born in 1952 at Kundala Estate, Devikulam, Munnar. It was submitted
that the Appellant’s paternal grandmother was an employee of Kannan
Devan Hills Plantation in Munnar in the year 1949, as per Certificate
dated 17.11.2021 issued by the Deputy General Manager, Kannan
Devan Hills Plantation at Munnar.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 6 of 63

7. Further, learned senior counsel submitted that the burden to
prove that the Appellant’s family had migrated to Travancore only after
1950 is entirely upon the Election Petitioner and relied on paragraph
no.82 of M. Chandra v M. Thangamuthu , (2010) 9 SCC 712 , where
this Court held that the burden of proof is on the Election Petitioner to
prove the charges he alleges beyond reasonable doubt.
8. It was canvassed that the High Court took the view that even
though the ancestors of the Appellant started residing in Travancore
before 1950, their residence in Travancore can be only for the purpose
of employment and they cannot be treated as permanent residents.
This finding is assailed on the ground that this was neither pleaded,
nor proved by the respondent.
9. It was further canvassed that the 1950 Order was subsequently
amended in 1956 pursuant to the passing of the States Re-
organization Act, 1956. As per the direction in the States Re-
Organization Act, 1956 amendments were brought about to the 1950
Order in 1956 by the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1956
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘1956 Order’). The date on which the
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 7 of 63

residence of the Appellant’s grandparents changed to the State of
Kerala on 01.11.1956, being the date when the then State of
Travancore became part of the State of Kerala. It was the case in the
Election Petition that the grandparents of the Appellant migrated to
Kerala in 1951. If that be so, the Appellant’s grandparents would be,
without any doubt, ‘ Hindu Parayan ’ of Kerala in 1956 as the State of
Kerala, upon merger, was formed on 01.11.1956. The 1950 Order was
again amended in 1976 by the Parliament and the date on which the
residence ’ is to be reckoned shifted to 01.05.1976. Even in the
Impugned Judgment, the High Court finds that the family of the
Appellant started permanently residing in Kerala from 1970. In that
case also, it was urged, the Appellant is to be treated as a ‘ Hindu
Parayan ’ of Kerala.
10. Learned senior counsel relied on paragraph no.13 of
Puducherry SC People Welfare Assn. v UT of Pondicherry , (2014)
9 SCC 236 which states ‘ … Once Presidential Order has been issued
under Article 341(1) or Article 342(1), any amendment in the
Presidential Order can only be made by Parliament by law as provided
in Article 341(2) or Article 342(2), as the case may be, and in no other
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 8 of 63

manner. The interpretation of “resident” in the Presidential Order as “of
origin” amounts to altering the Presidential Order. ’ It was stated that
the term ‘ resident ’ therefore, assumes importance in the context. The
evidence on record would show that the ancestors of the Appellant
were residents of Kundala Estate in Munnar, a part of the erstwhile
Travancore, before 10.08.1950, the date on which the 1950 Order
came into force.

11. It was also argued that the High Court went beyond the
pleadings of the parties and the evidence adduced and made out a
third case, taking a view that even though the Appellant’s ancestors
started residing in Travancore before 1950, their residence in
Travancore can be only for the purpose of employment and they
cannot be treated as permanent residents. Such case was neither
pleaded, nor proved by the respondent. Even when the Appellant was
examined as RW2, not even a single suggestion was put to him in this
regard.
12. Learned senior counsel also contended that there was no
challenge to the Caste Certificate issued in the Appellant’s favour. If
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 9 of 63

the Respondent’s case is that the Appellant’s Caste Certificate is not
properly issued, it is for him to prove that the Caste Certificate issued
is invalid and improper. Reliance in this context was placed on
paragraph no.85 of M. Chandra ( supra ), where it was observed:
There is nothing on record to show that the community certificate was
issued illegally or in contravention of the valid procedure. The election
petitioner should have examined the person in charge while the
certificate was being issued to bring to light to alleged malpractice in
issuance of the said Certificate. The validity of the issuance of the
community certificate is presumed unless shown otherwise by
7
Respondent 1, who clearly failed to do so. … ’ Hence, in the case at
hand, the Respondent, who has not objected to acceptance of the
Caste Certificate by the Returning Officer, though he makes a vague
averment that he had orally objected to the acceptance of the Caste
Certificate, which is disputed as being factually incorrect, has not
chosen to examine either the Competent Authority, which issued the
Caste Certificate, nor has he examined the Returning Officer to prove
otherwise.
7
Emphasis added by the Appellant.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 10 of 63

13. It was contended that the case of the Respondent is that in the
year 1982, Pastor Ebenezer Mani baptized the father and mother of
the Appellant in CSI Church and thus, they became Christians in 1982.
Thereafter in 1984, the Appellant was born and the Respondent
alleges that the Appellant was also baptized by the said Ebenezer
Mani. Ebenezer Mani was examined as PW8, as a witness of the
Respondent, and deposed that he was born in 1968, which means that
he was only about 14 years of age in 1982, the year when he,
according to the Respondent, had allegedly baptized the parents of the
Appellant. He further deposed that he became an Evangelist at the
age of 24 and that an Evangelist cannot perform the rite of baptism.
Even in the examination-in-chief of PW8, there was no attempt on the
side of the Respondent to prove that Ebenezer Mani was instrumental
in baptizing the Appellant’s father and mother as also the Appellant.
14. Learned senior counsel contended that a totally new case was
attempted to be developed while examining PW9, on 17.10.2022, on
the strength of some alleged tampering in a Baptism Register and
Family Register produced before the High Court by Church authorities.
The case attempted to be projected was that in 1992, the Appellant’s
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 11 of 63

father, mother and their children (including the Appellant) together
converted to Christianity. It is submitted that entries in the so-called
Baptism Register are not proved. In fact, since the said Baptism
Register from 1997 to 2008 was marked through PW9, who admittedly
joined as a pastor in the CSI Church concerned only in 2013, he is
incompetent to prove any of the entries. The person who conducted
the baptism ceremony was not identified or examined. Anybody
knowing the handwriting and signature of the person/s who made
those entries was also not examined. Above all, the dates of birth of
the persons so baptized shown in the afore-mentioned Registers do
not tally with the actual dates of birth of the Appellant’s father, mother
and their children, including the Appellant, as per official records.
8
15. It was further argued that as per Section 81 of the Act, dealing
with the pleadings in an Election Petition, the petitioner should plead
8
81. Presentation of petitions. —(1) An election petition calling in question any election may be
presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of Section 100 and Section 101 to
the High Court by any candidate at such election or any elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier
than the date of election of the returned candidate or if there are more than one returned candidate at the
election and dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates.
Explanation.—In this sub-section, “elector” means a person who was entitled to vote at the election to
which the election petition relates, whether he has voted at such election or not.
(2)  [Omitted]
(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents
mentioned in the petition and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature
to be a true copy of the petition.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 12 of 63

specifically, the ground(s) on which he claims the election is to be set
aside, relying on the following decisions of this Court in support of
above said proposition: paragraph no.33 of Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat
v Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe , (1995) 5 SCC 347 ; paragraph no.79 of
M. Chandra ( supra ), and; paragraph no.19 of Kalyan Singh Chouhan
v C. P. Joshi , (2011) 11 SCC 786 .
16. Learned senior counsel stressed that the specific case pleaded
in the Election Petition was that the ancestors of the Appellant
migrated to Kerala in 1951. Without even a whisper in the Election
Petition or in the evidence adduced by the Respondent that the
ancestors came for employment to Kerala, a completely new case was
developed after the period of limitation to file an Election Petition that
the Appellant’s ancestors came for employment to Kerala. Learned
senior counsel relied on Goka Ramalingam v Boddu Abraham ,
(1969) 1 SCC 24 and contended that after the period of limitation, a
new contention, changing the whole nature of the case, can neither be
raised nor pressed into service.
17. Learned senior counsel for the Appellant, further argued that
the instant appeal be allowed, pointing out that in the Impugned
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Judgment, the High Court held that the burden to prove that the
Appellant is a member of the Scheduled Castes within the State of
Kerala and that his family had migrated prior to 1950 was entirely cast
upon the Appellant, which is contrary to the settled proposition of law in
M. Chandra ( supra ). Emphasis was placed particularly on paragraphs
no.81 & 82 thereof.
RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS:
18. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Narender Hooda, for the
Respondent submitted that the burden of proving the authenticity of
the Caste Certificate was fully on the Appellant as per Section 10 of
the Kerala (Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of
Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Kerala Act’), which reads as under:
10. Burden of proof:-
Where an application is made to the Competent
Authority under Section 4 for the issue of a community
certificate in respect of a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe or in any enquiry conducted by the
Competent Authority, the Expert Agency, or the
Scrutiny Committee or in any trial or offence under this
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 14 of 63

Act, the burden of proving that he belongs to such
9
Caste or Tribe shall be on the claimant.
19. Learned senior counsel laid emphasis on ‘ or in any trial ’ to
support the proposition that an Election Petition would fall within the
ambit of the burden contemplated under Section 10 of the Kerala Act.
It was argued that in the present case, it was rightly understood by all
parties, based on the pleadings and the issues formulated by the High
Court and evidence adduced, that the challenge was made to the
Caste Certificate produced by the Appellant before the Returning
Officer issued by the Competent Authority under the Kerala Act. The
burden of proving the authenticity of the Caste Certificate was fully on
the Appellant which he failed to discharge. It was urged that the
Election Petitioner/Respondent had pleaded material facts and
particulars, as laid down in Virender Nath Gautam v Satpal Singh ,
(2007) 3 SCC 617 .
20. Learned senior counsel submitted that the Caste Certificate
issued to a returned candidate can be challenged in an Election
9
Emphasis added by the Respondent.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 15 of 63

Petition and he relied on Hari Shanker Jain v Sonia Gandhi , (2001) 8
SCC 233 and Punit Rai v Dinesh Chaudhary , (2003) 8 SCC 204 .

21. It was submitted that a 5-Judge Bench of this Court in Action
Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to SCs/STs v Union of
India , (1994) 5 SCC 244 has interpreted the word ‘ Resident ’ as used
in the 1950 Order to mean ‘ permanent resident ’.
22. It was further argued by learned senior counsel that the
marriage of the Appellant was also conducted according to Christian
rituals and customs. None of the Hindu rituals or customs were
followed during the marriage function of the Appellant. Thus, when
these are the special facts within the knowledge of the Appellant, the
burden shifts to the Appellant, and it becomes his duty to explain such
facts within his knowledge. It was canvassed that simple denial of
material facts is not sufficient discharge of the burden under Section
106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Evidence
Act’), nor rebuts the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence
Act.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 16 of 63

23. Learned senior counsel further contended that a person
claiming the status of a Schedule Caste in a particular State has to
demonstrate his/his ancestors’ permanent residence in that particular
State on the date of the Presidential Order. In India, a Hindu inherits
his caste from his father. In the instant case, the Appellant would
inherit his caste from his father i.e., Mr. Anthony, who, in turn, would
get his caste from his father Lachmanan. To claim the benefit of
reservation for Schedule Castes in relation to the State of Kerala, the
Appellant had to establish that his grandfather Lachmanan was a
permanent resident of Kerala much prior to the 1950 Order as per
Action Committee ( supra ). The High Court in paragraph no.17 of the
Impugned Judgment has recorded a categorical finding of fact, after
meticulous examination of the entire documentary as well as oral
evidence before it, that the Appellant’s grandfather was not a
permanent resident of the State of Kerala before the 1950 Order.
24. It was further argued that when the Appellant himself admitted
the fact of migration of his grandparents from Tamil Nadu to Kerala, it
was his responsibility to prove that his grandparents migrated before
independence to the erstwhile State of Travancore-Cochin from Tamil
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 17 of 63

Nadu and were permanent residents of Travancore - Cochin on
10.08.1950 i.e., the date the Presidential Order was issued.
25. It was submitted that since the Appellant was a minor when he
converted, the doctrine of eclipse followed him till he became a major.
The Appellant ought to have converted to Hinduism by following any
custom/ritual which was otherwise prescribed to be followed by the
community at large. The case of the Appellant that he never converted
to Christianity cannot be accepted since it was proved that the parents
converted to Christianity. The minor has no right to claim any religion
or caste so long as the parents have converted to another religion
along with the family. This being the factual position, it would be the
Appellant’s responsibility to prove that he had come out of the eclipse
by explaining the facts in his personal knowledge under Section 106 of
the Evidence Act. As long as the Respondent had discharged his initial
burden of proving the allegation against the Appellant, unless the
presumption is rebutted, under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, it
would be presumed that the circumstances and evidence are
conclusive qua the allegations made in the Election Petition.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 18 of 63

26. Learned senior counsel in support of his proposition apropos
the doctrine of eclipse relied on K. P. Manu v Scrutiny Committee for
Verification of Community Certificate , ( 2015) 4 SCC 1 .
27. Learned senior counsel summed up his arguments and
contended that even though it is not mandatory under the Kerala Act to
obtain a certificate from the Scrutiny Committee, but if any challenge to
such Caste Certificate comes before any enquiry conducted by the
Competent Authority, the Expert Agency, or the Scrutiny Committee or
in any trial or offence under the Kerala Act, the burden will be on the
claimant (in this case, the Appellant herein) to prove that he belongs to
such caste or tribe. It was urged that the appeal be dismissed, and the
Impugned Judgment be upheld.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
28. Having heard learned senior counsel for the parties at length
and bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival contentions
assiduously advanced at the Bar, we are of the opinion that the
judgment impugned warrants interference.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 19 of 63

29. Article 341 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Constitution’) reads as under:
341. Scheduled Castes .—(1) The President may
with respect to any State or Union Territory, and where
it is a State, after consultation with the
Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the
castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within
castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of
this Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes
in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case
may be.
(2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from
the list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification
issued under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part
of or group within any caste, race or tribe, but save as
aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause
shall not be varied by any subsequent notification.
30. In exercise of power conferred under Article 341(1) of the
Constitution, Hon’ble the President issued the 1950 Order. The central
issue in the entire controversy is whether the Appellant belongs to the
Hindu Parayan caste in the State of Kerala and is covered by the 1950
Order insofar as it relates to the State of Kerala. The twin conditions
needing to be satisfied would be (i) being of the Hindu Parayan caste,
and; (ii) being, himself/herself or through one’s ancestors, permanent
resident of the State of Kerala as on the date of the 1950 Order. Upon
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 20 of 63

fulfilment of both these conditions, a person can claim a legal right to
derive any benefits available to Hindu Parayan caste in the State of
Kerala. In the instant case, fulfilment of the same would enable the
Appellant to become eligible to contest from the Devikulam Legislative
Assembly Constituency 088 in Idukki District, Kerala, reserved for the
Scheduled Castes.
31. There is no dispute on the factum that, originally, the
grandparents of the Appellant belonged to the Hindu Parayan caste in
the erstwhile State of Travancore-Cochin having migrated from the
State of Tamil Nadu but prior to 1950. In this regard, there is sufficient
evidence available on the record. The next relevant question which
would arise would be as to whether the Appellant had still retained the
Hindu Parayan caste, as a member of the Hindu religion, when he
contested from the Devikulam Legislative Assembly Constituency?
32. This is hotly contested between the parties. The Respondent-
Election Petitioner contends that the Appellant’s parents had converted
to Christianity and the entire family, including the Appellant, were
baptized. In this regard, certain registers of the CSI Church were
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 21 of 63

produced before the High Court. However, from the evidence, it is also
apparent that the entries in such registers were not very specific,
inasmuch as the name of the Appellant was not mentioned and other
details with regard to the age of his siblings also did not match. Even
some names of the siblings were different. Were this an ordinary civil
suit at trial, we could have possibly applied the ‘preponderance of
probabilities’ yardstick, which may have resulted in some leeway and
latitude in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant.
However, as per the dicta in J. Chandrasekhara Rao v V. Jagapathi
Rao , 1993 Supp (2) SCC 229 and M. Chandra ( supra ), Election
Petitions, including those wherein no allegations of corrupt practices
are levelled, have to be treated akin to criminal proceedings and the
Election Petitioner has to prove the charges levelled beyond
reasonable doubt. This enunciation of the law has guided our decision-
making.
33. Most importantly, Ebenezer Mani/PW8, from the Respondent’s
side, who claimed to have baptized the Appellant and his family, during
evidence, admitted that he was aged 54 years on the date of
deposition, which meant he was aged only 14 years in the year 1982,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 22 of 63

when he purportedly baptized the Appellant’s parents. This is, clearly,
unbelievable and unsustainable.
34. It is relevant to observe that mere observance/performance of a
ritual of/associated with any religion does not ipso facto and
necessarily mean that the person ‘ professes ’ that religion. That is why
the term used in the 1950 Order is ‘ professes ’, signifying that a person
although born in a particular religion can profess another religion, inter
alia , by practicing the rituals of that other religion as the basic tenets of
his beliefs and lifestyle. Adherence merely to some ritual of another
religion would not tantamount to giving-up the original religion, unless
the person concerned makes such belief explicit. In Sapna Jacob v
State of Kerala , 1992 SCC OnLine Ker 233 , a learned Single Judge
of the (Kerala) High Court (as he then was) observed:
‘6. …It may be true thatthe court cannot test or gauge
the sincerity of religious belief; or where there is no
question of the genuineness of a person's belief in a
certain religion, the court cannot measure its depth or
determine whether it is an intelligent conviction or
ignorant and superficial fancy. But a court can find the
true intention of men lying behind their acts and can
certainly find from the circumstances of a case
whether a pretended conversion was really a means to
some further end.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 23 of 63

10
(emphasis supplied)
35. The term ‘ professes ’ has been examined by five of our learned
predecessors in Punjabrao v D. P. Meshram , 1964 SCC OnLine SC
76 in like background:
13.What clause (3) of the Constitution (Scheduled
Castes) Order, 1950 contemplates is that for a person
to be treated as one belonging to a Scheduled Caste
within the meaning of that Order, he must be one who
professes either Hindu or Sikh religion.The High
Court, following its earlier decision
inKarwad iv .Shambharkar[AIR 1958 Bom 296]has
said that the meaning of the phrase “professes a
religion” in the aforementioned provision is “to enter
publicly into a religions state” and that for this purpose
a mere declaration by a person that he has ceased to
belong to a particular religion and embraced another
religion would not be sufficient. The meanings of the
word “profess” have been given thus inWebster's New
World Dictionary:“to avow publicly; to make an open
declaration of … to declare one's belief in : as, to
profess Christ. To accept into a religious order”. The
meanings given in theShorter Oxford Dictionaryare
more or less the same. It seems to us that the
meaning “to declare one's belief in: as to profess
Christ” is one which we have to bear in mind while
construing the aforesaid order because it is this which
bears upon religious belief and consequently also
upon a change in religious belief. It would thus follow
that a declaration of one's belief must necessarily
mean a declaration in such a way that it would be
known to those whom it may interest.Therefore,if a

10
The afore-extract recently found this Court’s approval in C. Selvarani v Special Secretary-cum-
District Collector , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3470 .
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 24 of 63

public declaration is made by a person that he has
ceased to belong to his old religion and has accepted
another religion he will be taken as professing the
other religion. In the face of such an open declaration
it would be idle to enquire further as to whether the
conversion to another religion was efficacious. The
word “profess” in the Presidential Order appears to
have been used in the sense of an open declaration or
practice by a person of the Hindu (or the Sikh) religion.
Where, therefore, a person says, on the contrary, that
he has ceased to be a Hindu he cannot derive any
benefit from that Order.

(emphasis supplied)
36. From the evidence available, it is not possible to hold that the
Appellant ‘ professes ’ Christianity. In the factual setting of the present
lis , the evidence adduced from the side of the Appellant would reveal
that the Caste Certificate(s) issued in his favour by the Competent
Authority till date hold the field. The Appellant’s Caste Certificate has
not been interfered with, either by the Impugned Judgment or by the
authority(ies) concerned. In Madhuri Patil v Commr., Tribal
Development , (1994) 6 SCC 241 , the Court stated, in the context of
fake certificate(s) having been obtained to secure admissions in
educational institutions:
13.  The admission wrongly gained or appointment
wrongly obtained on the basis of false social status
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 25 of 63

certificate necessarily has the effect of depriving the
genuine Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or
OBC candidates as enjoined in the Constitution of the
benefits conferred on them by the Constitution. The
genuine candidates are also denied admission to
educational institutions or appointments to office or
posts under a State for want of social status certificate.
The ineligible or spurious persons who falsely gained
entry resort to dilatory tactics and create hurdles in
completion of the inquiries by the Scrutiny Committee.
It is true that the applications for admission to
educational institutions are generally made by a
parent, since on that date many a time the student
may be a minor. It is the parent or the guardian who
may play fraud claiming false status certificate. It is,
therefore, necessary that the certificates issued are
scrutinised at the earliest and with utmost expedition
and promptitude. For that purpose, it is necessary to
streamline the procedure for the issuance of social
status certificates, their scrutiny and their approval,
which may be the following:
1. The application for grant of social status
certificate shall be made to the Revenue Sub-
Divisional Officer and Deputy Collector or Deputy
Commissioner and the certificate shall be issued
by such officer rather than at the Officer, Taluk or
Mandal level.
2. The parent, guardian or the candidate, as the
case may be, shall file an affidavit duly sworn and
attested by a competent gazetted officer or non-
gazetted officer with particulars of castes and
sub-castes, tribe, tribal community, parts or
groups of tribes or tribal communities, the place
from which he originally hails from and other
particulars as may be prescribed by the
Directorate concerned.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 26 of 63

3. Application for verification of the caste
certificate by the Scrutiny Committee shall be filed
at least six months in advance before seeking
admission into educational institution or an
appointment to a post.
4. All the State Governments shall constitute a
Committee of three officers, namely, (I) an
Additional or Joint Secretary or any officer high-er
in rank of the Director of the department
concerned, (II) the Director, Social Welfare/Tribal
Welfare/Backward Class Welfare, as the case
may be, and (III) in the case of Scheduled Castes
another officer who has intimate knowledge in the
verification and issuance of the social status
certificates. In the case of the Scheduled Tribes,
the Research Officer who has intimate knowledge
in identifying the tribes, tribal communities, parts
of or groups of tribes or tribal communities.
5. Each Directorate should constitute a vigilance
cell consisting of Senior Deputy Superintendent of
Police in over-all charge and such number of
Police Inspectors to investigate into the social
status claims. The Inspector would go to the local
place of residence and original place from which
the candidate hails and usually resides or in case
of migration to the town or city, the place from
which he originally hailed from. The vigilance
officer should personally verify and collect all the
facts of the social status claimed by the candidate
or the parent or guardian, as the case may be. He
should also examine the school records, birth
registration, if any. He should also examine the
parent, guardian or the candidate in relation to
their caste etc. or such other persons who have
knowledge of the social status of the candidate
and then submit a report to the Directorate
together with all particulars as envisaged in the
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 27 of 63

pro forma, in particular, of the Scheduled Tribes
relating to their peculiar anthropological and
ethnological traits, deity, rituals, customs, mode of
marriage, death ceremonies, method of burial of
dead bodies etc. by the castes or tribes or tribal
communities concerned etc.
6. The Director concerned, on receipt of the report
from the vigilance officer if he found the claim for
social status to be “not genuine” or ‘doubtful’ or
spurious or falsely or wrongly claimed, the
Director concerned should issue show-cause
notice supplying a copy of the report of the
vigilance officer to the candidate by a registered
post with acknowledgement due or through the
head of the educational institution concerned in
which the candidate is studying or employed. The
notice should indicate that the representation or
reply, if any, would be made within two weeks
from the date of the receipt of the notice and in no
case on request not more than 30 days from the
date of the receipt of the notice. In case, the
candidate seeks for an opportunity of hearing and
claims an inquiry to be made in that behalf, the
Director on receipt of such representation/reply
shall convene the committee and the
Joint/Additional Secretary as Chairperson who
shall give reasonable opportunity to the
candidate/parent/guardian to adduce all evidence
in support of their claim. A public notice by beat of
drum or any other convenient mode may be
published in the village or locality and if any
person or association opposes such a claim, an
opportunity to adduce evidence may be given to
him/it. After giving such opportunity either in
person or through counsel, the Committee may
make such inquiry as it deems expedient and
consider the claims vis-à-vis the objections raised
by the candidate or opponent and pass an
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 28 of 63

appropriate order with brief reasons in support
thereof.
7. In case the report is in favour of the candidate
and found to be genuine and true, no further
action need be taken except where the report or
the particulars given are procured or found to be
false or fraudulently obtained and in the latter
event the same procedure as is envisaged in para
6 be followed.
8. Notice contemplated in para 6 should be issued
to the parents/guardian also in case candidate is
minor to appear before the Committee with all
evidence in his or their support of the claim for the
social status certificates.
9. The inquiry should be completed as
expeditiously as possible preferably by day-to-day
proceedings within such period not exceeding two
months. If after inquiry, the Caste Scrutiny
Committee finds the claim to be false or spurious,
they should pass an order cancelling the
certificate issued and confiscate the same. It
should communicate within one month from the
date of the conclusion of the proceedings the
result of enquiry to the parent/guardian and the
applicant.
10. In case of any delay in finalising the
proceedings, and in the meanwhile the last date
for admission into an educational institution or
appointment to an officer post, is getting expired,
the candidate be admitted by the Principal or such
other authority competent in that behalf or
appointed on the basis of the social status
certificate already issued or an affidavit duly
sworn by the parent/guardian/candidate before
the competent officer or non-official and such
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 29 of 63

admission or appointment should be only
provisional, subject to the result of the inquiry by
the Scrutiny Committee.
11. The order passed by the Committee shall be
final and conclusive only subject to the
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.
12. No suit or other proceedings before any other
authority should lie.
13. The High Court would dispose of these cases
as expeditiously as possible within a period of
three months. In case, as per its procedure, the
writ petition/miscellaneous petition/matter is
disposed of by a Single Judge, then no further
appeal would lie against that order to the Division
Bench but subject to special leave under Article
136.
14. In case, the certificate obtained or social
status claimed is found to be false, the
parent/guardian/the candidate should be
prosecuted for making false claim. If the
prosecution ends in a conviction and sentence of
the accused, it could be regarded as an offence
involving moral turpitude, disqualification for
elective posts or offices under the State or the
Union or elections to any local body, legislature or
Parliament.
15. As soon as the finding is recorded by the
Scrutiny Committee holding that the certificate
obtained was false, on its cancellation and
confiscation simultaneously, it should be
communicated to the educational institution
concerned or the appointing authority by
registered post with acknowledgement due with a
request to cancel the admission or the
appointment. The Principal etc. of the educational
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 30 of 63

institution responsible for making the admission or
the appointing authority, should cancel the
admission/appointment without any further notice
to the candidate and debar the candidate from
further study or continue in office in a post.
xxx
15.  The question then is whether the approach adopted
by the High Court in not elaborately considering the
case is vitiated by an error of law. High Court is not a
court of appeal to appreciate the evidence. The
Committee which is empowered to evaluate the
evidence placed before it when records a finding of fact,
it ought to prevail unless found vitiated by judicial
review of any High Court subject to limitations of
interference with findings of fact. The Committee when
considers all the material facts and records a finding,
though another view, as a court of appeal may be
possible, it is not a ground to reverse the findings. The
court has to see whether the Committee considered all
the relevant material placed before it or has not applied
its mind to relevant facts which have led the Committee
ultimately record the finding. Each case must be
considered in the backdrop of its own facts.
(emphasis supplied)
37. A perusal of the decision by 2 learned Judges in Madhuri Patil
( supra ) would indicate that a Caste Certificate could be invalidated, in
the first instance, by the Caste Scrutiny Committee, whose decision
could be challenged in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 31 of 63

Constitution. A 3-Judge Bench in Dayaram v Sudhir Batham , (2012)
1 SCC 333 , ruled as under:
17.The directions issued inMadhuri Patil[(1994) 6
SCC 241: 1994 SCC (L&S) 1349: (1994) 28 ATC 259]
were towards furtherance of the constitutional rights of
the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes. As the rights
in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes are a part of legitimate and constitutionally
accepted affirmative action, the directions given by this
Court to ensure that only genuine members of the
Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes were afforded
or extended the benefits, are necessarily inherent to
the enforcement of fundamental rights. In giving such
directions, this Court neither rewrote the Constitution
nor resorted to “judicial legislation”. The judicial power
was exercised to interpret the Constitution as a “living
document” and enforce fundamental rights in an area
where the will of the elected legislatures have not
expressed themselves.

xxx
22.Therefore, we are of the view, that Directions 1 to
15 issued in exercise of power under Articles 142 and
32 of the Constitution, are valid and laudable, as they
were made to fill the vacuum in the absence of any
legislation, to ensure that only genuine Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates secured the
benefits of reservation and the bogus candidates were
kept out. By issuing such directions, this Court was not
taking over the functions of the legislature but merely
filling up the vacuum till the legislature chose to make
an appropriate law.

xxx
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 32 of 63

44.In view of the above, we hold that the second
sentence of Direction 13 ofMadhuri Patil[(1994) 6
SCC 241: 1994 SCC (L&S) 1349: (1994) 28 ATC 259]
providing that where the writ petition is disposed of by
a Single Judge, no further appeal would lie against the
order of the Division Bench (even when there is a
vested right to file such intra-court appeal) and will
only be subject to a special leave under Article 136, is
not legally proper and therefore, to that extent, is held
to be not a good law. The second sentence of
Direction 13 stands overruled. As a consequence,
wherever the writ petitions against the orders of the
Scrutiny Committee are heard by a Single Judge and
the State law or Letters Patent permits an intra-court
appeal, the same will be available.

38. We may, in the interest of completeness take note of the
decision by another 3-Judge Bench in Food Corporation of India v
Jagdish Balaram Bahira, (2017) 8 SCC 670, which while noticing

the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified
Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and
Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification
of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000 had been enacted to provide a statutory
mechanism to answer the concerns expressed in Madhuri Patil
( supra ), re-affirmed the guidelines laid down thereunder, albeit
innocent of the modification(s) effected thereto via Dayaram ( supra ).
Pertinently, one of us (Abhay S. Oka, J.) speaking for a 3-Judge Bench
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 33 of 63

of this Court in Maharashtra Adiwasi Thakur Jamat Swarakshan
Samiti v State of Maharashtra , (2023) 16 SCC 415 has conclusively
held that once the competent Legislature passes/had passed
legislation, such legislation would govern the field and not the
Madhuri Patil ( supra ) guidelines. Ergo , the Kerala Act assumes
special relevance.
39. For proper appreciation, it is apt to re-reproduce the concerned
provision from the Kerala Act:
10. Burden of proof:-
Where an application is made to the Competent
Authority under Section 4 for the issue of a community
certificate in respect of a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe or in any enquiry conducted by the
Competent Authority, the Expert Agency, or the
Scrutiny Committee or in any trial or offence under this
Act, the burden of proving that he belongs to such
Caste or Tribe shall be on the claimant.
40. The Kerala Act, attention to which was drawn by the learned
senior counsel for the Respondent, was enacted after Madhuri Patil
( supra ). It provides, vide Section 10 thereof, that the burden of proof
would be on the claimant (which would be the Appellant herein), but in
a scenario ‘ Where an application is made to the Competent Authority
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 34 of 63

under Section 4 for the issue of a community certificate in respect of a
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or in any enquiry conducted by
the Competent Authority, the Expert Agency, or the Scrutiny Committee
11
or in any trial or offence under this Act … ’ Contextualised thus,
Section 10 of the Kerala Act does not aid the Respondent’s case. On
deeper perusal of the Kerala Act, it is obvious that an elaborate
12
scheme has been laid down covering Caste/Community Certificates ,
from issuance to verification to cancellation et al . We are unable to
accept the contention of Mr. Hooda, learned senior counsel that ‘ in any
trial ’ would encompass within its fold an Election Petition.
41. In Poppatlal Shah v State of Madras , 1953 1 SCC 492 , it was
It is a settled rule of construction thatto ascertain the legislative

intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and
each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the
general purpose and object of the Act itself.

that it is not for us to add or read words into a statute, nor should we
venture into the legislative arena, in respectful concurrence withB.

11
Emphasis supplied by us.
12
The Kerala Act uses these terms interchangeably.
13
Emphasis supplied by us.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 35 of 63

Premanand v Mohan Koikal, (2011) 4 SCC 266;Mukund
Dewanganv Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.,
, and;
DDAvVirender Lal Bahri, (2020) 15 SCC 328. In this context, the
principles ofnoscitur a sociisandejusdem generismerit closer
scrutiny. InState of Bombay v Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, 1960 SCC
OnLine SC 44, the Court commented:
‘9.It is, however, contended that, in construing the
definition, we must adopt the rule of
constructionnoscuntur a sociis.This rule, according to
Maxwell, means that, when two or more words which
are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled
together they are understood to be used in their
cognate sense. They take as it were their colour from
each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a
sense analogous to a less general.The same rule is
thus interpreted inWords and Phrases(Vol. XIV, p.
207):“Associated words take their meaning from one
another under the doctrine ofnoscuntur a sociisthe
philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful
word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning
of words associated with it; such doctrine is broader
than the maximEjusdem Generis.” In fact the latter
maxim “is only an illustration or specific application of
the broader maximnoscuntur a sociis”.The argument
is that certain essential features or attributes are
invariably associated with the words “business and
trade” as understood in the popular and conventional
sense, and it is the colour of these attributes which is
taken by the other words used in the definition though
their normal import may be much wider. We are not
impressed by this argument.It must be borne in mind
tha tnoscuntur a sociisis merely a rule of construction
and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 36 of 63

wider words have been deliberately used in order to
make the scope of the defined word correspondingly
wider. It is only where the intention of the legislature in
associating wider words with words of narrower
significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear that the
present rule of construction can be usefully applied. It
can also be applied where the meaning of the words of
wider import is doubtful; but, where the object of the
legislature in using wider words is clear and free of
ambiguity, the rule of construction in question cannot
be pressed into service.As has been observed by Earl
of Halsbury, L.C., inCorporation of
Glasgowv.Glasgow Tramway and Omnibus Co.
Ltd.[(1898) AC 631 at p. 634] in dealing with the wider
words used in Section 6 of Valuation of Lands
(Scotland) Act, 1854, “the words ‘free from all
expenses whatever in connection with the said
tramways’ appear to me to be so wide in their
application that I should have thought it impossible to
qualify or cut them down by their being associated with
other words on the principle of their beingejusdem
generiswith the previous words enumerated”. If the
object and scope of the statute are considered there
would be no difficulty in holding that the relevant words
of wide import have been deliberately used by the
legislature in defining “industry” in Section 2(j). The
object of the Act was to make provision for the
investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and
the extent and scope of its provisions would be
realised if we bear in mind the definition of “industrial
dispute” given by Section 2(k), of “wages” by Section
2(rr), “workman” by Section 2(s), and of “employer” by
Section 2(g). Besides, the definition of public utility
service prescribed by Section 2(m) is very significant.
One has merely to glance at the six categories of
public utility service mentioned by Section 2(m) to
realise that the rule of construction on which the
appellant relies is inapplicable in interpreting the
definition prescribed by Section 2(j).

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 37 of 63

(emphasis supplied)
42. 5 learned Judges in Amar Chandra Chakraborty v Collector
of Excise, Govt. of Tripura , (1972) 2 SCC 442 held:
9.Before dealing with the contention relating to Article
19 we consider it proper to dispose of the argument
founded on the ejusdem generis rule and Article 14 of
the Constitution. It was contended by Shri Sen that the
only way in which Section 43 can be saved from the
challenge of arbitrariness is to construe the expression
“any cause other than” in Section 43(1) ejusdem
generis with the causes specified in clauses (a) to (g)
of Section 42(1). We do not agree with this
submission.The ejusdem generis rule strives to
reconcile the incompatibility between specific and
general words. This doctrine applies when (i) the
statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii)
the subjects of the enumeration constitute a class or
category; (iii) that class or category is not exhausted
by the enumeration; (iv) the general term follows the
enumeration and (v) there is no indication of a different
legislative intent.In the present case it is not easy to
construe the various clauses of Section 42 as
constituting one category or class. But that apart, the
very language of the two sections and the objects
intended respectively to be achieved by them also
negative any intention of the legislature to attract the
rule of ejusdem generis.

(emphasis supplied)
43. In U.P.SEB v Hari Shankar Jain , (1978) 4 SCC 16 , it was held:
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 38 of 63

15.The High Court expressed the views that the
expression “any other rules or regulations” should be
readejusdem generiswith the expressions
“Fundamental and Supplementary Rules”, “Civil
Services, Control, Classification and Appeal Rules”
etc. So read, it was said, the provisions of Section 13-
B could only be applied to industrial establishments in
which the workmen employed could properly be
described as Government servants. We are unable to
agree that the application of theejusdem generisrule
leads to any such result.The true scope of the rule of
“ejusdem generis”is that words of a general nature
following specific and particular words should be
construed as limited to things which are of the same
nature as those specified. But the rule is one which
has to be “applied with caution and not pushed too
far”. It is a rule which must be confined to narrow
bounds so as not to unduly or unnecessarily limit
general and comprehensive words. If a broad-based
genus could consistently be discovered, there is no
warrant to cut down general words to dwarf size. If
giant it cannot be, dwarf it need not be.It is true that in
Section 13-B the species specifically mentioned
happen to be Government servants. But they also
possess this common characteristic that they are all
public servants enjoying a statutory status, and
governed by statutory rules and regulations. If the
Legislature intended to confine the applicability of
Section 13-B to industrial undertakings employing
Government servants only nothing was easier than to
say so instead of referring to various rules specifically
and following it up with a general expression like the
one before us. The words ‘rules and regulations’ have
come to acquire a special meaning when used in
statutes. They are used to describe subordinate
legislation made by authorities to whom the statute
delegates that function. The words can have no other
meaning in Section 13-B. Therefore, the expression
“workmen. . . to whom ... any other rules or regulations

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 39 of 63

that may be notified in this behalf” means, in the
context of Section 13-B, workmen enjoying a statutory
status, in respect of whose conditions of service the
relevant statute authorises the making of rules or
regulations. The expression cannot be construed so
narrowly as to mean Government servants only; nor
can it be construed so broadly as to mean workmen
employed by whomsoever including private
employers, so long as their conditions of service are
notified by the Government under Section 13-B.

(emphasis supplied)
44. In Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Limited v CCE , (1990) 3 SCC
447 , it was explained:
12.  The principle of statutory interpretation by which a
generic word receives a limited interpretation by
reason of its context is well established. In the context
with which we are concerned, we can legitimately
draw upon the “noscitur a sociis” principle. This
expression simply means that “the meaning of a word
is to be judged by the company it keeps.”

This principle has been applied in a number of
contexts in judicial decisions where the court is clear in
its mind that the larger meaning of the word in
question could not have been intended in the context
in which it has been used. The cases are too
numerous to need discussion here. It should be
sufficient to refer to one of them by way of illustration.
In Rainbow Steels Ltd. v. CST [(1981) 2 SCC 141:
1981 SCC (Tax) 90] this Court had to understand the
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 40 of 63

meaning of the word ‘old’ in the context of an entry in a
taxing traffic which read thus:
“Old, discarded, unserviceable or obsolete
machinery, stores or vehicles including waste
products......”
Though the tariff item started with the use of the wide
word ‘old’, the court came to the conclusion that “in
order to fall within the expression ‘old machinery’
occurring in the entry, the machinery must be old
machinery in the sense that it has become non-
functional or non-usable”. In other words, not the mere
age of the machinery, which would be relevant in the
wider sense, but the condition of the machinery
analogous to that indicated by the words following it,
was considered relevant for the purposes of the
statute.
13.The maxim ofnoscitur a sociishas been described
by Diplock, C.J. as a “treacherous one unless one
knows thesocietasto which thesoci ibelong”
(videLetangv.Cooper[(1965) 1 QB 232: (1964) 2 All
ER 929]). Thelearned Solicitor General also warns
that one should not be carried away by labels and
Latin maxims when the words to be interpreted is clear
and has a wide meaning. We entirely agree that these
maxims and precedents are not to be mechanically
applied; they are of assistance only insofar as they
furnish guidance by compendiously summing up
principles based on rules of common sense and logic.
As explained inCCEv.Parle Exports (P) Ltd.[(1989)
1 SCC 345, 357: 1989 SCC (Tax) 84] andTata Oil
Mills Co. Ltd.v.CCE[(1989) 4 SCC 541, 545-46:
1990 SCC (Tax) 22] in interpreting the scope of any
notification, the court has first to keep in mind the
object and purpose of the notification.All parts of it
should be read harmoniously in aid of, and not in
derogation of, that purpose.In this case, the aim and

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 41 of 63

object of the notification is to grant a concession to
small scale factories which manufacture paper with
unconventional raw materials. The question naturally
arises: Could there have been any particular object
intended to be achieved by introducing the exceptions
set out in the proviso? Instead of proceeding on the
premise that it is not necessary to look for any reason
in a taxing statute, it is necessary to have a closer look
at the wording of the proviso. If the proviso had
referred only to ‘coated paper’, no special object or
purpose would have been discernible and perhaps
there would have been no justification to look beyond
it and enter into a speculation as to why the
notification should have thought of exempting only
‘coated paper’ manufactured by these factories from
the purview of the exemption. But the notification
excepts not one but a group of items. If the items
mentioned in the group were totally dissimilar and it
were impossible to see any common thread running
through them, again, it may be permissible to give the
exceptions their widest latitude. But when four of them
— undoubtedly, at least three of them — can be
brought under an intelligible classification and it is also
conceivable that the government might well have
thought that these small scale factories should not be
eligible for the concession contemplated by the
notification where they manufacture paper catering to
industrial purposes, there is a purpose in the limitation
prescribed and there is no reason why the rationally
logical restriction should not be placed on the proviso
based on this classification. In our view, the only
reasonable way of interpreting the proviso is by
understanding the words ‘coated paper’ in a narrower
sense consistent with the other expressions used
therein.

(emphasis supplied)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 42 of 63

45. Adopting and applying the afore-referred precedents, it is clear
that ‘ in any trial ’ would refer only to a trial under the Act. The terms
preceding and succeeding ‘ in any trial ’ also fortify our conclusion. Even
the start and end of Section 10 are hemmed in by reference to the
Kerala Act itself. The meaning of ‘ any trial ’ has to be ‘ judged by the
company it keeps. ’ The Kerala Act in Section 24 bars the jurisdiction of
Civil Courts, but Section 21 establishes Special Courts to try offences
thereunder. As such, arguendo , even if we brush aside the noscitur a
sociisandejusdem generisprinciples, on a harmonious reading of the

Kerala Act as a whole, we are not able to countenance that the
Legislature intended ‘any trial’ occurring in Section 10 to include an

Election Petition. In the wake of the above discussions, we have no
hesitation to hold that a Caste/Community Certificate cannot be
assailed in an Election Petition. Exception to the above proposition can
only be by way of legislative carve-out in the State concerned, which
will be determinative. Exempli gratia , if the legislation permits
challenge to Caste/Community Certificate in an Election Petition, then
the Madhuri Patil ( supra ) guidelines cannot come in the way. In the
absence of which, the Madhuri Patil ( supra ) guidelines, as modified
per Dayaram ( supra ), will prevail, under which challenge to a Caste
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 43 of 63

Certificate cannot be mounted in an Election Petition. Obviously, the
guidelines issued in Madhuri Patil ( supra ) were in exercise of power
under Article 142 of the Constitution. As elucidated by the 5-Judge
Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v Union of India , (1998) 4 SCC
409 , ‘ Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be
controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these
powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come
directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a
statute dealing expressly with the subject. ’ It was further stated ‘… the
power is used with restraint without pushing back the limits of the
Constitution so as to function within the bounds of its own jurisdiction.
To the extent this Court makes the statutory authorities and other
organs of the State perform their duties in accordance with law, its role
is unexceptionable but it is not permissible for the Court to “take over”
the role of the statutory bodies or other organs of the State and
“perform” their functions.
46. Our endeavour cannot conclude at this stage. A Coordinate
Bench’s view in Sobha Hymavathi Devi v Setti Gangadhara Swamy ,
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 44 of 63

(2005) 2 SCC 244 , the relevant paragraph wherefrom reads as below,
is to be dealt with:
11.What remains isthe argument based on the
certificates allegedly issued under the Andhra Pradesh
(Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward
Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community
Certificates Act, 1993. The High Court has not
accepted the certificates as bindingfor the reason that
the evidence showed that the certificates were issued
based on the influence exercised by the appellant as a
member of the Legislative Assembly, one after
another, immediately on an application being made
and without any due or proper inquiry.We are
impressed by the reasons given by the High Court for
not acting on these certificates. That apart, a reference
to Section 3 of the Act would indicate that a certificate
thereunder, insofar as it relates to elections, is
confined in its validity to elections to local authorities
and cooperative institutions. It does not embrace an
election to the Legislative Assembly or to Parliament.
Therefore, in any view of the matter,it cannot be said
that the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under the
Representation of the People Act in an election
petition is precluded from going into the question of
status of a candidate or proceeding to make an
independent inquiry into that question in spite of the
production of a certificate under the Act. At best, such
a certificate could be used in evidence and its
evidentiary value will have to be assessed in the light
of the other evidence let in, in an election petition.
Therefore, nothing turns on the factum of a certificate
being issued by the authority concerned under the Act
of 1993. We are also satisfied as the High Court was
satisfied, that no proper inquiry preceded the issuance
of such a certificate and such a certificate was issued
merely on the say-so of the appellant. We have,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 45 of 63

therefore, no hesitation in overruling this argument
raised on behalf of the appellant.

(emphasis supplied)
47. The Court in Sobha Hymavathi Devi ( supra ) proceeded on the
premise that a certificate under Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh
(Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes)
Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Andhra Pradesh Act’) [Section 3 of the Andhra
Pradesh Act is mostly identicalto Section 3 of the Kerala Act] ‘insofar

as it relates to elections, is confined in its validity to elections to local
authorities and cooperative institutions. It does not embrace an
election to the Legislative Assembly or to Parliament.’ While the

Caste/Community Certificates are undoubtedly issued by the State/UT
authorities, a candidate contesting elections to the Parliament or to the
State Legislative Assembly/Council is permitted to file the same with
Nomination Papers, under instructions of the Election Commission of
India. By virtue of Section 5 of the Kerala Act, a detailed procedure is
laid down for issuance of the Community Certificate by the Competent
Authority. It would not be out of place to emphasise that, as such, the
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 46 of 63

Competent Authority functions akin to a quasi-judicial authority. Section
11 of the Kerala Act enables any person to seek the cancellation of a
false Community Certificate – the Scrutiny Committee established
under Section 8 of the Kerala Act is empowered to cancel the
Community Certificate issued under Section 5 thereof. Appellate,
review, stay and revisionary provisions can also be found in Sections
12 and 13 of the Kerala Act. Section 14 of the Kerala Act confers the
powers of a Civil Court on the Competent Authority, the Expert Agency
and the Scrutiny Committee. As noted above, Section 21 of the Kerala
Act establishes Special Courts to try offences thereunder, and Section
24 ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Courts qua any order passed by any
officer/authority thereunder. What is evincible from a conjoint reading
of the Kerala Act is that it is a complete code in itself. The Kerala Act
mirrors the Andhra Pradesh Act, but Sobha Hymavathi Devi ( supra )
has not examined the statute as a whole. As such, what is observed in
paragraph 11 of Sobha Hymavathi Devi ( supra ) cannot be said to be
a binding precedent. We are, therefore, unhesitant to state that
paragraph no.11 is of no precedential value being sub-silentio , in view
of our afore-evaluation.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 47 of 63

48.InMunicipal Corpn. of Delhi v Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC
101, 3 learned Judges opined:

11.  Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the
ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not
authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge
who passed the order in Jamna Das case [Writ
Petitions Nos. 981-82 of 1984] and to the learned
Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that
this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without
argument, without reference to the relevant provisions
of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal
Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from
any public place like pavements or public streets, and
without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do
not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court
because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and
cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant
provisions. A decision should be treated as given per
incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a
statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. So far
as the order shows, no argument was addressed to
the court on the question whether or not any direction
could properly be made compelling the Municipal
Corporation to construct a stall at the pitching site of a
pavement squatter. Professor P.J. Fitzgerald, editor of
the   Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. explains the
concept of   sub silentio   at p. 153 in these words :
A decision passes   sub silentio, in the technical
sense that has come to be attached to that
phrase, when the particular point of law
involved in the decision is not perceived by the
court or present to its mind. The court may
consciously decide in favour of one party
because of point A, which it considers and
pronounces upon. It may be shown, however,
that logically the court should not have decided
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 48 of 63

in favour of the particular party unless it also
decided point B in his favour; but point B was
not argued or considered by the court. In such
circumstances, although point B was logically
involved in the facts and although the case had
a specific outcome, the decision is not an
authority on point B. Point B is said to pass sub
silentio.
12.  In Gerard v. Worth of Paris Ltd. (k). [(1936) 2 All
ER 905 (CA)], the only point argued was on the
question of priority of the claimant's debt, and, on this
argument being heard, the court granted the order. No
consideration was given to the question whether a
garnishee order could properly be made on an
account standing in the name of the liquidator. When,
therefore, this very point was argued in a subsequent
case before the Court of Appeal in Lancaster Motor
Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. [(1941) 1 KB 675],
the court held itself not bound by its previous decision.
Sir Wilfrid Greene, M.R., said that he could not help
thinking that the point now raised had been
deliberately passed sub silentio by counsel in order
that the point of substance might be decided. He went
on to say that the point had to be decided by the
earlier court before it could make the order which it
did; nevertheless, since it was decided “without
argument, without reference to the crucial words of the
rule, and without any citation of authority”, it was not
binding and would not be followed. Precedents   sub
silentio   and without argument are of no moment. This
rule has ever since been followed. One of the chief
reasons for the doctrine of precedent is that a matter
that has once been fully argued and decided should
not be allowed to be reopened. The weight accorded
to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere casual
expressions carry no weight at all. Not every passing
expression of a judge, however eminent, can be
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 49 of 63

treated as an ex cathedra statement, having the
weight of authority.
(emphasis supplied)
49. The principle in Gurnam Kaur ( supra ) found reiteration in State
of U.P. v Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. , (1991) 4 SCC 139 and A-
One Granites v State of U.P. , (2001) 3 SCC 537 . We derive no
pleasure in refusing to be bound by the dicta in Sobha Hymavathi
Devi ( supra ), but upon careful analysis, we are clear that the
observation in question therein was rendered sub-silentio .
50. Back to the facts, the records from the school where the
Appellant’s children study show them as members of the Hindu-
Parayan caste. In the present time, which is a day and age of intrusive
media, including social media, where public figures, including Judges,
politicians and bureaucrats are under constant public gaze, it is not
easy to hide one’s religion or caste. The production of some
photographs or some rituals which may have been performed by the
Appellant, nay , even assuming they were actually performed by the
Appellant, at the cost of repetition, can, in no manner, take the place of
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 50 of 63

evidence, especially when matters of the like herein are being
considered by the Courts. In this regard, the High Court seems to have
erred by shifting the burden of proof on the Appellant to prove in the
negative the allegations. Further, even the entries in the Register are
not conclusively established in the sense that they relate to the
Appellant or his family members. Apropos this, the High Court has
noticed many overwritings, edits and deletions re the purported names
of the Appellant and his parents as alleged to have appeared in the
Register. This has prompted the High Court to note that ‘ fabrication
and correction ’ were made to the entry(ies) in the Register(s). The
High Court, on the whole, accepted whatever was presented by the
Respondent and in such approach, disregarded and ignored the
material lacuna in the pleadings of the Election Petition as also the
evidence brought in by the Respondent. As far as marriage rites are
concerned, per se , assuming a practice associated with one religion
was followed/observed, the same, ceteris paribus , would not mean the
person ‘ professes ’ the said other religion.
51. The Respondent has relied on Hari Shanker Jain v Sonia
Gandhi ( supra ) [3-Judge Bench], where it was held:
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 51 of 63

‘20.Thus,looking at the scheme of the Citizenship
Act, as also the judicial opinion which has prevailed
ever since the enactment of the Citizenship Act, 1955,
we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that in spite of a
certificate of registration under Section 5(1)(c) of the
Citizenship Act, 1955 having been granted to a person
and in spite of his having been enrolled in the voters'
list, the question whether he is a citizen of India and
hence qualified for, or disqualified from, contesting an
election can be raised before and tried by the High
Court hearing an election petition, provided the
challenge is based on factual matrix given in the
petition and not merely bald or vague allegations.

xxx
34.To sum up,we are of the opinion that a plea that a
returned candidate is not a citizen of India and hence
not qualified, or is disqualified for being a candidate in
the election can be raised in an election petition before
the High Court in spite of the returned candidate
holding a certificate of citizenship by registration under
Section 5(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act.A plea as to
constitutional validity of any law can, in appropriate
cases, as dealt with hereinabove, also be raised and
heard in an election petition where it is necessary to
decide the election dispute. The view of the law, stated
by the learned designated Election Judge of the High
Court of Allahabad cannot be sustained. To say the
least, the proposition has been very widely stated in
the impugned order of the High Court. However, in
spite of answering these questions in favour of the
appellants yet the election petitions filed by them
cannot be directed to be heard and tried on merits as
the bald and vague averments made in the election
petitions do not satisfy the requirement of pleading
material facts within the meaning of Section 82(1)(a) of
RPA, 1951 read with the requirements of Order 7 Rule
11 CPC. The decision of the High Court dismissing the

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 52 of 63

two election petitions at the preliminary stage, is
sustained though for reasons somewhat different from
those assigned by the High Court. The appeals are
dismissed but without any order as to the costs.

(emphasis supplied)
52. Interestingly, the specific answer in Hari Shanker Jain v Sonia
Gandhi ( supra ) rested on what 5-Judge Benches (same coram )
speaking through the learned A K Sarkar, J. (as he then was) had held
in quick succession in State of A.P. v Abdul Khader , 1961 SCC
14
OnLine SC 149 ; Ghaurul Hasan v State of Rajasthan , 1961 SCC
15
OnLine SC 3 , and; Akbar Khan Alam Khan v Union of India , 1961
16
SCC OnLine SC 4 . These three cases pertained to the Citizenship
Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Citizenship Act’). Hari
Shanker Jain v Sonia Gandhi ( supra ) at paragraph no.11 has noted
Bhagwati Prasad Dixit v Rajeev Gandhi , (1986) 4 SCC 78 . In
Bhagwati Prasad Dixit ( supra ), it was held held:
12.In the circumstancesit is difficult to agree with the
view of the High Court that when a question whether a
person has acquired the citizenship of another country
arises before the High Court in an election petition
filed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951
it would have jurisdiction to decide the said question

14
Decided on 04.04.1961.
15
Decided on 05.04.1961.
16
Decided on 05.04.1961.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 53 of 63

notwithstanding the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on
the authority prescribed under Section 9(2) of the
Citizenship Act, 1955 to decide the question.
Whatever may be the proceeding in which the
question of loss of citizenship of a person arises for
consideration, the decision in that proceeding on the
said question should depend upon the decision of the
authority constituted for determining the said question
under Section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955.

(emphasis supplied)
53. Undoubtedly, the 3-Judge Bench in Hari Shanker Jain v Sonia
Gandhi ( supra ) was not bound by the 2-Judge Bench in Bhagwati
Prasad Dixit ( supra ). However, there is a difference between a
Certificate of Registration issued under Section 5(1)(c) of the
Citizenship Act and a Community Certificate issued under Section 5 of
the Kerala Act. The distinction being that under Section 5(1) of the
Citizenship Act, the Central Government can register persons
enumerated under clauses (a) to (g) thereof, as citizens of India.
However, for a Caste/Community Certificate issued under Section 5 of
the Kerala Act, before the issuance of such Certificate, the Competent
Authority is obligated to follow the ‘ prescribed procedure ’. This
prescribed procedure ’ can be found in the Kerala (Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 54 of 63

Rules, 2002, Rule 4 whereof mandates that the Competent Authority
conduct ‘ such enquiry, as it may deem fit ’. As can be seen from
Section 14 of the Kerala Act, the Competent Authority has powers of a
Civil Court, including to record oral evidence as also order production
of documents.
54. Therefore, the view in Hari Shanker Jain v Sonia Gandhi
( supra ) about the permissibility of going into the citizenship of a
candidate in an Election Petition will have no applicability to an
Election Petition wherein the candidate possesses a Caste/Community
Certificate issued after the observance of the due process of law,
including but not limited to an enquiry, as prescribed under the relevant
statute.
55. Insofar as Punit Rai ( supra ) is concerned, it turned on its set of
facts and does not aid the Respondent’s case. It is desirable, at this
juncture, to notice certain observations by this Court in M. Chandra
( supra ):
79.  It is a settled legal position that an election petition
must clearly and unambiguously set out all the
material facts which the petitioner is to rely upon
during the trial, and it must reveal a clear and
complete picture of the circumstances and should
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 55 of 63

disclose a definite cause of action. In the absence of
the above, an election petition can be summarily
dismissed. To see whether material facts have been
duly disclosed or whether a cause of action arises, we
need to look at the averment and pleadings taken up
by the party.
xxx
82.  An election petition challenging the election of a
returned candidate on the grounds of corrupt practices
is not a criminal proceeding; but it is no less than a
criminal proceeding with regard to the proof required
to be furnished to the court by the petitioner (see J.
Chandrasekhara Rao v. V. Jagapathi Rao [1993 Supp
(2) SCC 229]). Though, in the present case, the
charges are not those of corrupt practices, they are
not any lesser in terms of seriousness; hence the
burden of proof is on the election petitioner to prove
the charges he has made beyond reasonable doubt.
This is done so that the purity of the election process
is maintained.
83.  The testimonies of the witnesses for the election
petitioner do not qualify the test laid down in the
Evidence Act, to make the evidence admissible. It
does not inspire any confidence. The evidence is
clearly hearsay. As stated above, the opinion of the
High Court is heavily relied on the fact that the burden
of proof had been discharged and shifted to the
appellant to prove that she had indeed renounced
Christianity. We do not approve of the reasoning of the
High Court to adopt this line of thinking. The burden of
proof lay squarely on the election petitioner to show
that the appellant indeed practised and professed
Christianity. In any event, the evidence put forward by
the appellant is consistent and reliable as it has relied
on the testimony of the people who have actually
visited the house of the appellant or attended her
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 56 of 63

wedding or been in close proximity with her and her
husband's family.
xxx
85.  There is nothing on record to show that the
community certificate was issued illegally or in
contravention of the valid procedure. The election
petitioner should have examined the person in charge
while the certificate was being issued to bring to light
any alleged malpractice in the issuance of the said
certificate. The validity of the issuance of the
community certificate is presumed unless shown
otherwise by Respondent 1, who clearly failed to do
so. It is also baffling to note that the conversion
certificate from the Arya Samaj was not examined in
detail by the respondents in spite of the High Court
making a strong observation in this regard. No proof
by way of documents or oral evidence was provided to
show how the certificate was granted and what
procedure was followed. It is also pertinent to mention
that no one raised any objection to the appellant filing
her nomination for the assembly elections in 2006
from the reserved constituency. All the issues have
been raised after the appellant won the election from
Rajapalayam Constituency.
(emphasis supplied)
56. In Kalyan Singh Chouhan ( supra ), the Court stated, after
noticing various earlier pronouncements:
19.  Pleadings and particulars are required to enable
the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial.
Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in
narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 57 of 63

parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the
parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said
issue. It is settled legal proposition that “as a rule relief
not founded on the pleadings should not be granted”.
Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on
grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The
pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute
between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and
to see just where the two sides differ. (Vide Sri Mahant
Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho [(1897-98) 25 IA
195], Trojan & Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar [(1953) 1 SCC
456: AIR 1953 SC 235], Raruha Singh v. Achal
Singh [AIR 1961 SC 1097], Om Prakash
Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal [(2002) 2 SCC 256: AIR
2002 SC 665], Ishwar Dutt v. Collector (L.A.) [(2005) 7
SCC 190: AIR 2005 SC 3165] and State of
Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co.
Ltd. [(2010) 4 SCC 518: (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 207])
xxx
28.Therefore, in view of the above, it is evident that
the party to the election petition must plead the
material fact and substantiate its averment by
adducing sufficient evidence. The court cannot travel
beyond the pleadings and the issue cannot be framed
unless there are pleadings to raise the controversy on
a particular fact or law. It is, therefore, not permissible
for the court to allow the party to lead evidence which
is not in the line of the pleadings. Even if the evidence
is led that is just to be ignored as the same cannot be
taken into consideration.

(emphasis supplied)
57. From the totality of the afore-extracts, it is vivid that an Election
Petitioner is obligated to plead and prove his case beyond reasonable
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 58 of 63

doubt. In the case at hand, the Competent Authority who issued the
Caste Certificate was not examined – this should have been sought for
by the Respondent, moreso per M. Chandra ( supra ). Although even
that would not take the Respondent’s case too far, adjudged on the
anvil of the afore-scrutiny undertaken by us. Admittedly, no prayer was
made in the Election Petition to set aside the Caste Certificate(s) of the
Appellant.
58. The Respondent’s Election Petition falls short of the standards
prescribed, inter alia , in M. Chandra ( supra ) and Kalyan Singh
Chouhan ( supra ). We hold that the Appellant, therefore, retained the
Hindu Parayan caste, as a member of the Hindu religion, when he
contested from the Devikulam Legislative Assembly Constituency.
59. As a result, the appeal is allowed. The Impugned Judgment
rendered by the High Court is set aside; the Election Petition shall
stand dismissed. The Appellant is entitled to all consequential benefits
as a Member of the Legislative Assembly for the entire period from the
date of oath.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 59 of 63

60. Upon serious deliberation, we refrain from passing any order
apportioning costs. As the appeal has been finally decided, pending
I.A.s stand consigned to records.
61. Registry to forthwith act in terms of Section 116-C(2) of the Act.
62. We clarify that we have not opined on the legality or otherwise
of the Caste/Community Certificate(s) held by the Appellant. Our view
herein is not determinative of its validity or invalidity. Any challenge
thereto, if and when raised in accordance with law, shall be considered
on its own merits.
63. In Lillykutty v Scrutiny Committee, SC & ST , (2005) 8 SCC
283 [2-Judge Bench], the appellant therein, who had gotten elected to
the Thannithode Gram Panchayat as a ‘Scheduled Caste’ candidate,
was found, ultimately, to not be a member of the Scheduled Castes by
the Scrutiny Committee constituted under Section 8 of the Act. The
Division Bench of the High Court upheld the decision of the Scrutiny
Committee. Before this Court in appeal, an additional point was raised
which was left open as under:
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 60 of 63

16.  As late as on 2-9-2005, the appellant filed IA No. 2
permitting her to raise additional grounds. Apart from
relying on certain decisions of this Court, the appellant
sought leave to raise the contention that in view of
Article 243-O of the Constitution and Section 153(14)
of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, it was not open
to Respondents 1, 2 and 4 to enquire into the eligibility
or status of the appellant. It was also contended that
the only remedy available to Respondent 3 was to file
an election petition. The counsel submitted that the
order passed by the Scrutiny Committee for
verification of community certificates and confirmed by
the High Court requires to be set aside on these
additional grounds also.
17.  The learned counsel for the respondents objected
to the application submitted by the appellant at this
stage. It was stated that these grounds were neither
taken before the Scrutiny Committee nor before the
High Court. At this stage, such new plea should not be
allowed to be raised. Even otherwise, the appellant is
not right in relying on Article 243-O of the Constitution
or Section 153(14) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act as
they do not apply to the present case. According to the
respondents, the order passed by the Scrutiny
Committee was legal, lawful and in accordance with
law, which was confirmed by the High Court and this
Court is considering whether those orders are in
consonance with law.
18.  From the orders impugned, it is clear that the plea
sought to be taken by the appellant now was never
taken earlier. There is, therefore, no pleading on the
point, nor finding recorded on such plea. We are prima
facie of the view that learned counsel for the
respondents are right in submitting that the issue was
whether the appellant belonged to the Hindu Pulayan
Scheduled Caste Community. Once it is held that she
did not belong to the Scheduled Caste, the action of
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 61 of 63

cancellation of certificate could not be held illegal.
Consequential actions can be taken thereafter in
pursuance of cancellation of caste certificate.
19.  In the facts and circumstances of the case,
however, it is not necessary to deal with the contention
sought to be raised by the appellant since it was never
raised earlier. The application, accordingly, stands
disposed of without expressing final opinion on
17
applicability or otherwise of Article 243-O of the
18
Constitution or Section 153(14) of the Kerala
19
Panchayat Raj Act, 1994.
(emphasis supplied)
64. We deem it appropriate to clarify the position in the wake of the
present Judgment. A duly issued Caste/Community Certificate would
be amenable to challenge only under the provisions of the statute
concerned, and not in an Election Petition. In case no statute
governing the field in a State/Union Territory is operative, the Madhuri
Patil ( supra ) guidelines, as modified in Dayaram ( supra ), shall be
followed.
17
243-O. Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters .—Notwithstanding anything in this
Constitution,—
(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such
constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Article 243-K, shall not be called in question in any
court;
(b) no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to
such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a
State.
18
153. Election of President and Vice-President.

(14) Where a dispute arises as to the validity of an election of President or Vice-President of a Panchayat,
any member of that Panchayat may file a petition.

19
The learned Thakker, J. wrote for the Court, which was supplemented by the learned Sinha, J.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 62 of 63

65. Insofar as the constitutional bar, or any analogous provision
thereto, adverted to in Lillykutty ( supra ) is concerned, we feel no need
to dwell thereupon inasmuch as the interplay between such bar(s) and
the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or
by this Court has been dealt with in a number of precedents, referred
to in Union Territory of Ladakh v Jammu and Kashmir National
Conference , 2023 INSC 804 , specifically at paragraph no.36 thereof.
...………………..........................J.
[ABHAY S. OKA]

.....…………………....................J.
[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]
..……………………....................J.
[AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH]
NEW DELHI
MAY 06, 2025
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2758 OF 2023 63 of 63