Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2543 OF 2009
[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 23441 of 2007]
Seth Ramdayal Jat …Appellant
Versus
Laxmi Prasad …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
S.B. SINHA, J :
1. Leave granted.
2. What would be the period of limitation for institution of a suit for
recovery of ‘pledged ornaments’ is the question involved herein.
3. It arises in the following factual matrix:
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On or about 26.06.1998, the respondent filed a civil suit against the
appellant for recovery of certain items of jewellery allegedly pledged with
him on 2.12.1987 for the purpose of obtaining loan of a sum of Rs. 7000/-.
On the premise that the appellant had violated the provisions of the
Madhya Pradesh Money Lenders Act, 1934 in relation to the
aforementioned grant of loan, a criminal proceeding was initiated against
him, which was marked as Case No. 511 of 1997. In the said criminal case,
he admitted his guilt. A fine of Rs. 150/- was imposed on him. The charge
was read over to him, which reads as under:
“The charge on you is that before date 29.3.97
complainant Laxmi Prasad was paid borrowed
money to you but even after that you were
demanding interest at 5%. Your this act is
criminal offence under section 3, 4 of Money
Lenders Act. Therefore, show cause as to why
you should not be held guilty of the said offence.”
4. Respondent thereafter, as noticed hereinbefore, filed the
aforementioned Civil Suit before the XIVth Civil Judge, Class II, Jabalpur
being civil suit No. 4-A/1998 for recovery of the pledged jewellery. The
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said suit was decreed directing the appellant to return the said jewellery or
in the alternative a decree for a sum of Rs. 20,000/-.
5. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith the appellant preferred an
appeal thereagainst. The said appeal was allowed by the learned XVIth
Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, holding:
(i) The judgment of the criminal court rendered on the basis of the
purported admission of guilt made by the appellant was not
admissible in evidence.
(ii) An admission of the guilt on the basis of a wrong legal advice is
not binding on the appellant.
(iii) The suit was barred in terms of Article 70 of the Limitation Act.
6. The second appeal preferred by the respondent herein has been
allowed by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment.
The High Court formulated the following substantial questions of
law:
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“1. Whether the suit filed by the appellant was
barred by limitation while the suit was filed within
3 years from the date of demand and refusal by the
respondent?
2. Whether the admission of guilt in criminal
case in respect of some transaction made by
respondent is admissible in the present case to the
extent of fact that there was transaction between
the parties?”
By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court opined that the
suit had been filed within the prescribed period of limitation having been
brought within a period of three years from the date of refusal of the
demand to return the pledged ornaments. The question No. 2 was also
determined in favour of the respondent holding that admission of guilt in a
criminal case would be admissible in evidence being relevant to the fact in
issue.
7. Mr. Anurag Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant would urge:
(i) The alleged pledge of jewellery having admittedly been made in
the year 1987 and the suit filed on 26.06.1998, the same must be
held to be barred by limitation.
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(ii) No document of pledge having been produced, service of notice
by itself cannot give rise to a cause of action for filing a suit for
recovery of the pledged ornaments.
8. Mr. Rohit Arya, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, on the other hand, would contend:
(i) in view of Article 70 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the suit has
rightly been found to have been instituted within the period of
limitation.
(ii) Having regard to the provisions contained in Section 43 of the
Indian Evidence Act, the judgment of the criminal court was
admissible in evidence.
(iii) In terms of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, things admitted
need not be proved. The suit filed by the respondent has rightly
been decreed.
9. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties raised before
us, we may notice that the purported pledge of jewellery was made by the
respondent herein for taking a loan of Rs. 7,000/- on 2.12.1987. Appellant
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indisputably is a money lender. A criminal case for charging excess interest
was instituted against him on 29.03.1997. On or about 29.11.1997, he
pleaded guilty by reason whereof a fine of Rs. 150/- was imposed on him.
Respondent thereafter served a notice upon the appellant asking him
to return the pledged jewellery. As neither the said noticed was replied to
nor the jewellery was returned, he filed the suit on 26.06.1998.
10. The cause of action for filing the suit was stated in para 3 of the
plaint, which reads as under:
“3. The plaintiff through counsel sent registered
notice dated 12.5.98 and demanded the pledged
jewels. Still the defendant has not returned the
jewels of the plaintiff. Therefore, this suit is being
preferred. The aforesaid notice sent by the
counsel of the plaintiff was received by the
defendant on 14.5.98.”
11. Respondent examined himself as a witness in the suit. He stated that
the appellant being his cousin brother, no document was executed. He also
testified that in the criminal case, appellant having admitted his crime and
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pledge of jewellery with him, a fine of Rs. 150/- was imposed and on in
default thereof, imprisonment of five days was ordered.
12. Indisputably, the judgment in the criminal case was marked as an
exhibit. Appellant also in his deposition stated as under:
“…This is correct that plaintiff filed a complaint
against me before police and case was registered.
This is also correct that I confessed upon advise
from my advocate. This is correct that fine of Rs.
150/- was imposed on me in that case. This is
correct that I do the money lending.”
He admitted that even one Chandra Kumar had borrowed money from
him.
It was furthermore admitted by him that he received the notice
(Exhibit P1) from the plaintiff but he had not replied thereto.
13. Indisputably, the law relating to the admissibility of a judgment in a
criminal proceedings vis-à-vis the civil proceedings and vice-versa is
governed by the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.
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14. Section 43 of the Indian Evidence Act reads, thus:
“43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned
in Sections 40, 41 and 42, when relevant -
Judgments, orders or decrees other then those
mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant,
unless the existence of such judgment, order or
decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant, under some
other provision of this Act.”
In terms of the aforementioned provision, the judgment in a criminal
case shall be admissible provided it is a relevant fact in issue.
Its admissibility otherwise is limited.
It was so held in Anil Behari Ghosh v. Smt. Latika Bala Dassi and
others [AIR 1955 SC 566] in the following terms:
“The learned counsel for the contesting respondent
suggested that it had not been found by the lower
appellate court as a fact upon the evidence
adduced in this case, that Girish was the nearest
agnate of the testator or that Charu had murdered
his adoptive father, though these matters had been
assumed as facts. The courts below have referred
to good and reliable evidence in support of the
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finding that Girish was the nearest reversioner to
the estate of the testator. If the will is a valid and
genuine will, there is intestacy in respect of the
interest created in favour of Charu if he was the
murderer of the testator. On this question the
courts below have assumed on the basis of the
judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the
High Court in the sessions trial that Charu was the
murderer. Though that judgment is relevant only
to show that there was such a trial resulting in the
conviction and sentence of Charu to transportation
for life, it is not evidence of the fact that Charu
was the murderer. That question has to be decided
on evidence.”
In Perumal v. Devarajan and others [AIR 1974 Madras 14], it was
held:
“2. Even at the outset, I want to state that the
view of the lower appellate court that the plaintiff
has not established satisfactorily that the first
defendant or the second defendant or both were
responsible for the theft is perverse and clearly
against the evidence and the legal position. The
lower appellate Court refused to rely on Exhibit A-
3 which is a certified copy of the judgment in C.C.
No. 1949 of 1965. It is true that the evidence
discussed in that judgment and the fact that the
first defendant had confessed his guilt in his
statement is not admissible in evidence in the suit.
But it is not correct to state that even the factum
that the first and the second defendants were
charged under Sections 454, and 380, I.P.C. and
they were convicted on those charges could not be
admitted. The order of the Criminal Court is, in
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my opinion, clearly admissible to prove the
conviction of the first defendant and the second
defendant and that is the only point which the
plaintiff had to establish in this case…”
A similar issue is dealt in some details in Lalmuni Devi and Ors. v.
Jagdish Tiwary and Ors. [AIR 2005 Patna 51] wherein it was held:
“14. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Anil Behari Ghosh v. Smt. Latika Bala
Dassi and Ors., (supra), a Division Bench of this
Court in its judgment reported in 1968 BLJR 197,
Mundrika Kuer v. President, Bihar State Board of
Religious Trusts, and 8 others, has laid down to
the same effect. Paragraph 7 of the judgment is set
out hereinbelow for the facility of quick
reference :-
"7. It is true that, if the Board acted capriciously
and arbitrarily without any material whatsoever
and attempts to administer private property, saying
that it is a public religious trust, this Court may
have to interfere in appropriate cases; but it cannot
be said here that there were no prima facie
materials to show that the trust is a public
religious trust. The acquittal of the petitioner in
the criminal case (Annexure-A) was very much
relied upon; but it is well settled that acquittal or
conviction in a criminal case has no evidentiary
value in a subsequent civil litigation except for the
limited purpose of showing that there was a trial
resulting . in acquittal or conviction, as the case
may be. The findings of the criminal Court are
inadmissible.”
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15. A judgment in a criminal case, thus, is admissible for a limited
purpose. Relying only on or on the basis thereof, a civil proceeding cannot
be determined, but that would not mean that it is not admissible for any
purpose whatsoever.
16. Mr. Sharma also relies upon a decision of this Court in Shanti Kumar
Panda v. Shakuntala Devi [(2004) 1 SCC 438] to contend that a judgment of
a civil court shall be binding on the criminal court but the converse is not
true. Therein it was held:
“(3) A decision by a criminal court does not bind
the civil court while a decision by the civil court
binds the criminal court. An order passed by the
Executive Magistrate in proceedings under
Sections 145/146 of the Code is an order by a
criminal court and that too based on a summary
enquiry. The order is entitled to respect and wait
before the competent court at the interlocutory
stage. At the stage of final adjudication of rights,
which would be on the evidence adduced before
the court, the order of the Magistrate is only one
out of several pieces of evidence.”
12
With respect, the ratio laid down therein may not be entirely correct
being in conflict with a Three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in K.G.
Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and anr. [(2002) 8 SCC 87].
17. A civil proceeding as also a criminal proceeding may go on
simultaneously. No statute puts an embargo in relation thereto. A decision
in a criminal case is not binding on a civil court.
In M.S. Sheriff & Anr. v. State of Madras & Ors. [AIR 1954 SC 397],
a Constitution Bench of this Court was seized with a question as to whether
a civil suit or a criminal case should be stayed in the event both are pending.
It was opined that the criminal matter should be given precedence.
In regard to the possibility of conflict in decisions, it was held that the
law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making
the decision of one Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for
certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. It was held that the
only relevant consideration was the likelihood of embarrassment.
If a primacy is given to a criminal proceeding, indisputably, the civil
suit must be determined on its own keeping in view the evidence which has
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been brought on record before it and not in terms of the evidence brought in
the criminal proceeding.
The question came up for consideration in K.G. Premshanker (supra),
wherein this Court inter alia held:
“30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion
is — ( 1 ) the previous judgment which is final can
be relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43
of the Evidence Act; ( 2 ) in civil suits between the
same parties, principle of res judicata may apply;
( 3 ) in a criminal case, Section 300 CrPC makes
provision that once a person is convicted or
acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same
offence if the conditions mentioned therein are
satisfied; ( 4 ) if the criminal case and the civil
proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of
the civil court would be relevant if conditions of
any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot
be said that the same would be conclusive except
as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides
which judgment would be conclusive proof of
what is stated therein.
31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed
in a previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as
provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other
provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case,
the court has to decide to what extent it is binding
or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided
therein. Take for illustration, in a case of alleged
trespass by A on B’ s property, B filed a suit for
declaration of its title and to recover possession
from A and suit is decreed. Thereafter, in a
criminal prosecution by B against A for trespass,
judgment passed between the parties in civil
proceedings would be relevant and the court may
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hold that it conclusively establishes the title as
well as possession of B over the property. In such
case, A may be convicted for trespass. The
illustration to Section 42 which is quoted above
makes the position clear. Hence, in each and every
case, the first question which would require
consideration is — whether judgment, order or
decree is relevant, if relevant — its effect. It may
be relevant for a limited purpose, such as, motive
or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon the
facts of each case.
It is, however, significant to notice a decision of this Court in M/s
Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1970) 3
SCC 694], wherein it was categorically held that the decisions of the civil
court will be binding on the criminal courts but the converse is not true, was
overruled, stating:
“33. Hence, the observation made by this Court
in V.M. Shah case that the finding recorded by the
criminal court stands superseded by the finding
recorded by the civil court is not correct
enunciation of law. Further, the general
observations made in Karam Chand case are in
context of the facts of the case stated above. The
Court was not required to consider the earlier
decision of the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff
case as well as Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence
Act.”
[See also Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam and Anr. v. State
(Delhi Admn.) and Anr. 2009 (3) SCALE 604]
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Another Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to
consider the question in Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah
& Anr. [(2005) 4 SCC 370]. Relying on M.S. Sheriff (supra) as also
various other decisions, it was categorically held:
“32. Coming to the last contention that an effort
should be made to avoid conflict of findings
between the civil and criminal courts, it is
necessary to point out that the standard of proof
required in the two proceedings are entirely
different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of
preponderance of evidence while in a criminal
case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and
proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given.”
The question yet again came up for consideration in P. Swaroopa
Rani v. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu [AIR 2008 SC 1884], wherein the
law was stated, thus :
“13. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case,
civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed
simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal
proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and
circumstances of each case.”
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18. It is now almost well-settled that, save and except for Section 43 of
the Indian Evidence Act which refers to Sections 40, 41, and 42 thereof, a
judgment of a criminal court shall not be admissible in a civil suit.
19. What, however, would be admissible is the admission made by a
party in a previous proceeding. The admission of the appellant was
recorded in writing. While he was deposing in the suit, he was confronted
with the question as to whether he had admitted his guilt and pleaded guilty
of the charges framed. He did so. Having, thus, accepted that he had made
an admission in the criminal case, the same was admissible in evidence. He
could have resiled therefrom or explained away his admission. He offered
an explanation that he was wrongly advised by the counsel to do so. The
said explanation was not accepted by the trial court. It was considered to be
an afterthought. His admission in the civil proceeding was admissible in
evidence.
20. Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act reads as under:
“58 - Facts admitted need not be proved
No fact need to be proved in any proceeding
which the parties thereto or their agents agree to
admit at the hearing, or which, before the hearing,
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they agree to admit by any writing under their
hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at
the time they are deemed to have admitted by their
pleadings:
Provided that the court may, in its discretion,
require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise
than by such admission.”
In view of the aforementioned provision, there cannot be any doubt or
dispute that a thing admitted need not be proved. [See Vice-Chairman,
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Another v. Girdharilal Yadav (2004) 6
SCC 325, L.K. Verma v. HMT Ltd. and Another (2006) 2 SCC 269, Avtar
Singh and Others v. Gurdial Singh and Others (2006) 12 SCC 552,
Gannmani Anasuya and Others v. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary and
Others (2007) 10 SCC 296]
21. We, therefore, are of the opinion that although the judgment in a
criminal case was not relevant in evidence for the purpose of proving his
civil liability, his admission in the civil suit was admissible. The question
as to whether the explanation offered by him should be accepted or not is a
matter which would fall within the realm of appreciation of evidence. The
Trial Court had accepted the same. The first appellate court refused to
consider the effect thereof in its proper perspective. The appellate court
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proceeded on the basis that as the judgment of the criminal court was not
admissible in evidence, the suit could not have been decreed on the said
basis. For the said purpose, the admission made by the appellant in his
deposition as also the effect of charge had not been taken into consideration.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court cannot be said to
have committed any error in interfering with the judgment of the first
appellate court.
22. So far as the question of the applicability of the period of limitation is
concerned, Article 70 of the Limitation Act would be applicable. It reads as
under:
“Description of suit Period of
limitation
Time from which period
begins to run
70. To recover movable
Three years The date of refusal after
property deposited or
pawned from a depository
or pawnee.
demand.”
In terms of the aforementioned provision, the period of limitation,
thus, begins to run from the date of refusal after demand.
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23. Appellant did not respond to the notice issued by the respondent
asking him to return the pledged jewellery. The date of receipt of such a
notice is 14.05.1998. The suit having been filed on 26.06.1998, thus, must
be held to have been filed within the prescribed period of limitation.
24. Having regard to the fact that the averments contained in the
paragraph 3 of the plaint were not traversed, the same would be deemed to
have been admitted by him in terms of Order VIII, Rule 5 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly [(2008) 7 SCC 85], this Court held:
“14. An admission made in a pleading is not to
be treated in the same manner as an admission in a
document. An admission made by a party to the lis
is admissible against him proprio vigore.”
[See also Ranganayakamma and Another v. K.S. Prakash (D) By LRs
and Others 2008 (9) SCALE 144]
25. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal,
which is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of
this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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………………………….J.
[S.B. Sinha]
..…………………………J.
[Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]
New Delhi;
April 15, 2009